Dwenger, Najda ;
Treber, Lukas
Shaming for tax enforcement : evidence from a new policy
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URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-15260
URL: http://opus.uni-hohenheim.de/volltexte/2018/1526/
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SWD-Schlagwörter: |
| Steuerschuld , Verhalten |
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch): |
| compliance , tax debt , shaming , enforcement , social image concerns , penalty |
Institut: |
| Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |
DDC-Sachgruppe: |
| Wirtschaft |
Dokumentart: |
| ResearchPaper |
Schriftenreihe: |
| Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences |
Bandnummer: |
| 2018,21 |
Sprache: |
| Englisch |
Erstellungsjahr: |
| 2018 |
Publikationsdatum: |
| 26.09.2018 |
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Lizenz: |
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Veröffentlichungsvertrag mit der Universitätsbibliothek Hohenheim
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Kurzfassung auf Englisch: |
| Can public shaming increase tax compliance through social pressure? Many tax authorities make ample use of public shaming. However, empirical evidence from outside the laboratory on how a new shaming law affects overall compliance is lacking. We provide the first evidence from the field, exploiting comprehensive administrative tax data and the introduction of a novel naming-and-shaming policy in Slovenia in 2012. The policy aims to reduce outstanding tax debt among the self-employed and corporations. Our empirical strategy exploits the variation across taxpayers in ex ante exposure to the shaming policy. We find that taxpayers reduce their tax debt by 8.5% to avoid shaming, particularly in industries where reputational concerns are likely to be important. The publication of the first naming-and-shaming list further reduces tax debt among shamed taxpayers because of social learning. This effect, however, is marginal in terms of revenue and tapers off quickly. |
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