Bitte beziehen Sie sich beim Zitieren dieses Dokumentes immer auf folgende
URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-14110
URL: http://opus.uni-hohenheim.de/volltexte/2017/1411/

pdf-Format:		Dokument 1.pdf (685 KB)
Gedruckte Ausgabe:		Print-on-Demand-Kopie
Dokument in Google Scholar suchen:
Social Media:
Export:
Abrufstatistik:
SWD-Schlagwörter:		Steuergerechtigkeit
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):		Justness , Optimal Taxation , Income Redistribution , Equal Sacrifice , Inequality , Subjective Preferences
Institut:		Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
DDC-Sachgruppe:		Wirtschaft
Dokumentart:		ResearchPaper
Schriftenreihe:		Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences
Bandnummer:		2017,27
Sprache:		Englisch
Erstellungsjahr:		2017
Publikationsdatum:		28.09.2017
Lizenz:		Veröffentlichungsvertrag mit der Universitätsbibliothek Hohenheim
Kurzfassung auf Englisch:		A common assumption in the optimal taxation literature is that the social planner maximizes a welfarist social welfare function with weights decreasing with income. However, high transfer withdrawal rates in many countries imply very low weights for the working poor in practice. We reconcile this puzzle by generalizing the optimal taxation framework by Saez (2002) to allow for alternatives to welfarism. We calculate weights of a social planner’s function as implied by the German tax and transfer system based on the concepts of welfarism, minimum absolute and relative sacrifice, as well as subjective justness. For the latter we use a novel question from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that the minimum absolute sacrifice principle is in line with social weights that decline with net income. Absolute subjective justness is roughly in line with decreasing social weights, which is reflected by preferences of men, West Germans, and supporters of the grand coalition parties.

© 1996 - 2016 Universität Hohenheim. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.  10.01.24