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URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-11709
URL: http://opus.uni-hohenheim.de/volltexte/2016/1170/

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SWD-Schlagwörter:		Lohnstruktur , Geschlechterforschung
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch):		Gender pay gap Public-contest recruitment , Double sample selection
Institut:		Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
DDC-Sachgruppe:		Wirtschaft
Dokumentart:		ResearchPaper
Schriftenreihe:		Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences
Bandnummer:		2015,14
Sprache:		Englisch
Erstellungsjahr:		2015
Publikationsdatum:		15.01.2016
Lizenz:		Veröffentlichungsvertrag mit der Universitätsbibliothek Hohenheim
Kurzfassung auf Englisch:		This paper analyzes the effect of public-contest recruitment on earnings by applying an extended version of the Oaxaca-Blinder model with double selection to microdata on Italy. We find that the gender pay gap vanishes among public-contest selected employees, and even reverses in favor of women (-17.4%) in the young sample. The reversal is because public contests are merit-based and gender-fair screening devices. They are merit-based because selected employees possess higher productive characteristics than unselected ones, both women and men. They are gender-fair because the coefficients component in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is never significant among public-contest recruited employees, either with or without selection. On the contrary, among employees not hired by public contest the gender pay gap is positive and significant (7.6%), and it is entirely due to coefficients, that is to discrimination in the career path.

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