Castagnetti, Carolina ;
Rosti, Luisa ;
Töpfer, Marina
The reversal of the gender pay gap among public-contestselected young employees
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URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:100-opus-11709
URL: http://opus.uni-hohenheim.de/volltexte/2016/1170/
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SWD-Schlagwörter: |
| Lohnstruktur , Geschlechterforschung |
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch): |
| Gender pay gap Public-contest recruitment , Double sample selection |
Institut: |
| Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |
DDC-Sachgruppe: |
| Wirtschaft |
Dokumentart: |
| ResearchPaper |
Schriftenreihe: |
| Hohenheim discussion papers in business, economics and social sciences |
Bandnummer: |
| 2015,14 |
Sprache: |
| Englisch |
Erstellungsjahr: |
| 2015 |
Publikationsdatum: |
| 15.01.2016 |
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Veröffentlichungsvertrag mit der Universitätsbibliothek Hohenheim
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Kurzfassung auf Englisch: |
| This paper analyzes the effect of public-contest recruitment on earnings by applying an extended version of the Oaxaca-Blinder model with double selection to microdata on Italy. We find that the gender pay gap vanishes among public-contest selected employees, and even reverses in favor of women (-17.4%) in the young sample. The reversal is because public contests are merit-based and gender-fair screening devices. They are merit-based because selected employees possess higher productive characteristics than unselected ones, both women and men. They are gender-fair because the coefficients component in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is never significant among public-contest recruited employees, either with or without selection. On the contrary, among employees not hired by public contest the gender pay gap is positive and significant (7.6%), and it is entirely due to coefficients, that is to discrimination in the career path. |
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