Civil War and Agrarian Contexts.

Land Accumulation, Rebel Groups' Behavior, and Collective Action Post-War in Colombia

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submitted by

Angela Patricia Navarrete Cruz

from *Bogotá, Colombia*

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Second Examiner: Prof. Dr. Eva Youkhana
Third Examiner: Prof. Dr. Andrea Knierim
Head of the committee: Prof. Dr. Uwe Ludewig

This dissertation is dedicated to my beloved son,
Felipe Giraldo Navarrete

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List of Abbreviations

AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia / United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
CNMH	Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica / National Center for Historical Memory (Colombia)
DANE	Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística / National Administrative Department of Statistics (Colombia)
DNP	Departamento Nacional de Planeación / National Planning Department (Colombia)
GMH	Grupo de Memoria Histórica / Group of Historical Memory (Colombia)
ELN	Ejército de Liberación Nacional / National Liberation Army (Colombia)
EPL	Ejército Popular de Liberación / Popular Liberation Army (Colombia)
FAO	The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FARC-EP	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército Popular / Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army
FEDECAFE	Federación Nacional de Cafeteros / National Federation of Coffee Growers (Colombia)
ha	Hectare
INCODER	Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural / Colombian Institute for Rural Development
INCORA	Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria / Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform
LD	Land Dispossession
MADR	Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural / Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (Colombia)
NSAG	Non-State Armed Groups
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
RPO	Rural Producer Organizations
RUV	Single Registry of Victims (Colombia)
UAF	Unidad Agrícola Familiar / Family Agriculture Unit

UPRA	Unidad de Planificación Rural Agropecuaria / Rural Agricultural Planning Unity (Colombia)
ZRH	Relatively Homogeneous Zones

Executive Summary

Agriculture in developing countries is especially vulnerable to social and political constraints, particularly, to armed conflict and violence. Intrastate conflict, which accounts for the majority of violent conflicts since the second half of the 20th century, occurs mainly in the rural areas of these countries. In 2018, 52 intrastate conflicts were active in 36 countries, most of them with the potentiality to spark large-scale violence. Around 79.5 million people fled from their homes, 100 civilians were killed a day, and 60% of the food-insecure people worldwide lived-in war-torn areas.

Intrastate conflicts greatly affect rural areas and have deep agrarian roots. Civil war onset, for instance, is usually anchored in unfair land distribution patterns and land tenure regimes that originate peasant grievances that give place to large-scale violence. The rural scenario in which civil wars occur also offers a suitable environment for insurgent activities (e.g., complex geography far from the radar of the state), funding sources (e.g., looting of natural resources), and a source of combatants (e.g., aggrieved peasants). However, the nexus between violent conflict and rural areas in the developing world is not straightforward. Moreover, intrastate conflicts unevenly affect local contexts and subsequently, their effects on agriculture and the livelihoods of rural inhabitants are unequal at the sub-national level. This means that the processes through which armed conflict and agriculture dovetail in developing countries emerge under certain conditions and must be grasped at various scales, including the local level.

In order to understand these processes, this cumulative dissertation aims at exploring the intersections between civil war and the agrarian settings in which they occur. The contribution of this thesis is twofold. First, different paths through which armed conflict influences agrarian societies and the livelihoods of people living in rural areas are discerned. Complementary, the theoretical implications of having rural areas as the main scenario of both civil war and peacebuilding processes are examined. A qualitative approach bearing on a case study was applied, by focusing on Colombia, where a protracted armed conflict has created around eight million victims and 260,000 casualties. Three main gaps found in the literature are tackled in each of the articles that compounds the thesis: first, how land is accumulated in wartime. Second, why the behavior of one rebel group varies across its territories of influence. Third, why collective action is possible post-war.

Regarding the first question, land accumulation dynamics during civil wars are poorly understood because the land-violent conflict nexus has been constructed around linear causations that go from aggrieved peasants to violence. In focusing on the mechanisms of land dispossession in Colombia, defined as land usurpation by taking advantage of the context of widespread violence that civil war spawns, this paper aims to shed light on how land is accumulated during an armed conflict. Based on a literature review, more than 50 different methods for dispossessing land are identified. The methods show how actors develop complex strategies for profiting from the civil war setting -often depicted as irrational-; how violent conflict benefits more certain sectors of the agrarian elites than the peasantry that initiates it; and how rural inequality is reinforced in civil war with the support of state institutions and bureaucracy.

Concerning the second question, wartime social order has shown that civil wars are not exclusively chaotic but are complex phenomena that unevenly affect local contexts. Important evidence for order in civil wars are the governance regimes established by insurgents to manage civilians' affairs. However, even if this is a desirable outcome for rebel groups, not all of them are able to build such regimes, and even armed groups that succeed are often unable to do so across their entire territory of influence. Instead, rebels also negotiate agreements with civilians and local authorities, or simply deal with disorder. Why? This paper explores the factors influencing these various outcomes by focusing on three neighboring territories in southern Tolima, Colombia, where the former communist guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army – FARC-EP was present for more than 50 years. The results lessen the assumptions of current theories on determinants of rebel governance, identifying that the behavior of rebel groups varies according to its own strategies and resources, intersected with the strategies and resources of the actors they interact with (whether civilians, other armed actors, or incumbent governments) in specific territories. The active role of both civilians and the state, often neglected by the explanations on the determinants of both rebel governance and the diversity of behaviors deployed by the same armed actor, is underscored. Situational, organizational, ideational, and strategic factors shaped the possibility for rebel groups to establish order or, on the contrary, to engage in widespread violence in specific locales.

Regarding the third question, civil wars hit rural areas intensely and Rural Producer Organizations (RPO) -as forms of long-term collective action or cooperation among small farmers- are considered essential for peacebuilding. However, the factors underpinning the formation and performance of RPO post-war are unclear. Based on a case study in the municipality of Planadas, Colombia, where the former communist guerrilla FARC-EP was formed and several associations flourished post-war, this article identifies 14 contextual factors facilitating the rise of RPO. Contrasting the findings with variables identified by collective action, commons theory, and literature on RPO, it was determined that four additional contextual variables play a critical role in RPO development post-war, namely, legacies of war, resilience strategies, institutional intermediaries, and discourses. Legacies of war refer to the vestiges left by the kind of relationship developed between the main armed actor and the civilians in wartime. Economic activity as a resilience strategy indicates civilians' strategies to stay aside from the confrontation, reducing the probability of being harmed and preventing their involvement in the war or illegal economic activities. Intermediary institutions are third-party organizations that influence RPO. In the case considered, this role was developed by certification schemes known as Voluntary Sustainability Standards. Controverting critical literature on the effects of the standards, the results suggest that they can enhance self-organizing capacities post-conflict at the local level. Finally, discourses refer to additional incentives for RPO development regarding what participants consider valuable beyond economic benefits, in this case environmental protection. Consequently, the article presents the foundations of an expanded framework to understand and foster RPO growth in post-war settings.

To qualify our understanding of civil war is imperative in a world at the edge of new forms of violence. Knowledge that illuminates public policies attempting to strengthen food systems, alleviate poverty, decrease inequalities, and build a more peaceful world, is fundamental for the future of humankind. This dissertation is intended to be a contribution in this path.

Zusammenfassung

Landwirtschaft in Entwicklungsländern ist besonders anfällig für soziale und politische Zwänge, insbesondere für bewaffnete Konflikte und Gewalt. Innerstaatliche Konflikte, die seit der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts den Großteil aller gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen ausmachen, finden hauptsächlich in ländlichen Gebieten statt. Im Jahr 2018 waren 52 innerstaatliche Konflikte in 36 Ländern aktiv. Von einer Mehrheit dieser Konflikte geht die Gefahr von großflächiger Gewalt aus. Rund 79,5 Millionen Menschen waren 2018 auf der Flucht, täglich wurden 100 Zivilisten getötet, und 60 % der weltweit von Nahrungsmittelknappheit betroffenen Menschen lebten in Kriegsgebieten.

Innerstaatliche Konflikte betreffen in hohem Maße ländliche Gebiete und haben auch tiefe agrarische Wurzeln. So ist der Ausbruch von Bürgerkriegen in der Regel in ungerechten Landverteilungsmustern und Landbesitzregimen verankert. Diese rufen bäuerliche Missstände hervor, und führen dann zu massiver Gewalt. Das ländliche Szenario, in dem sich Bürgerkriege ereignen, bietet auch ein geeignetes Umfeld für aufständische Aktivitäten (z.B. komplexe Landschaften, außerhalb der Reichweite des Staates), Finanzierungsquellen (z.B. förderbare natürliche Ressourcen) und mögliche Kämpfer (z.B. betroffene Bauern). Der Zusammenhang zwischen gewaltsamen Konflikten und ländlichen Gebieten in Entwicklungsländern ist jedoch nicht eindeutig. Darüber hinaus wirken sich innerstaatliche Konflikte ungleichmäßig auf lokale Kontexte aus, und in der Folge sind ihre Auswirkungen auf die Landwirtschaft und die Lebensgrundlagen der Landbewohner auf subnationaler Ebene unterschiedlich. Das bedeutet, dass die Prozesse, durch die bewaffnete Konflikte und Landwirtschaft in Entwicklungsländern ineinandergreifen, unter bestimmten Bedingungen entstehen und auf verschiedenen Ebenen, einschließlich der lokalen Ebene, erfasst werden müssen.

Um diese Prozesse zu verstehen, zielt diese kumulative Dissertation darauf ab, die Überschneidungen zwischen Bürgerkriegen und den agrarischen Schauplätzen, in denen sie auftreten, zu untersuchen. Der Beitrag dieser Arbeit besteht aus zwei Teilen. Erstens werden verschiedene Wege aufgezeigt, durch die bewaffnete Konflikte Agrargesellschaften und die Lebensgrundlagen der Menschen in ländlichen Gebieten beeinflussen. Ergänzend werden die theoretischen Implikationen untersucht, die sich daraus ergeben, dass ländliche Gebiete das Hauptszenario sowohl von Bürgerkriegen als auch von Friedenskonsolidierungsprozessen sind. Eine qualitative Fallstudie wurde angewandt, mit dem Schwerpunkt auf Kolumbien, wo ein langwieriger bewaffneter Konflikt etwa acht Millionen Opfer und 260.000 Tote gefordert hat. Drei Hauptlücken in der bestehenden Literatur werden in drei Artikeln adressiert: Erstens, wie Land in Kriegszeiten akkumuliert wird. Zweitens, warum das Verhalten einer Rebellengruppe über ihre Einflussgebiete hinweg variiert. Drittens, warum kollektives Handeln in der Nachkriegszeit möglich ist.

Die Dynamik der Landakkumulation während Bürgerkriegen ist kaum bekannt, da die Zusammenhänge zwischen Land und gewalttätigen Konflikten linear konstruiert wurden - von betroffenen Bauern zu Gewalt. Der erste Artikel dieser Dissertation konzentriert sich auf die Mechanismen der Landenteignung in Kolumbien, indem es den Kontext des Bürgerkriegs und der weit verbreiteten Gewalt betrachtet. Es

soll Aufschluss darüber geben, wie Land während eines bewaffneten Konflikts akkumuliert wird. Basierend auf einer Literaturrecherche werden mehr als 50 verschiedene Methoden zur Enteignung von Land identifiziert. Die Methoden zeigen, wie Akteure komplexe Strategien entwickeln, um vom oft als irrational bezeichneten Bürgerkrieg zu profitieren; wie gewaltsame Konflikte mehr bestimmten Agrareliten zugutekommen als den Bauern, die die Konflikte initiiert haben; und wie die Ungleichheit auf dem Land mit Unterstützung staatlicher Institutionen und Bürokratie verstärkt wird.

In Bezug auf die zweite Frage hat die gesellschaftliche Ordnung während des Krieges gezeigt, dass Bürgerkriege nicht ausschließlich chaotisch sind, sondern komplexe Phänomene, die die lokalen Kontexte ungleichmäßig beeinflussen. Wichtige Hinweise für Ordnung in Bürgerkriegen sind die Regierungsregime, die von Rebellengruppen eingerichtet wurden, um die Angelegenheiten der Zivilbevölkerung zu regeln. Selbst wenn dies ein wünschenswertes Ergebnis für Rebellengruppen ist, sind nicht alle Gruppen in der Lage, solche Regime aufzubauen. Selbst erfolgreiche bewaffnete Gruppen können diese häufig nicht in ihrem gesamten Einflussgebiet einrichten. Stattdessen handeln Rebellengruppen Vereinbarungen mit Zivilisten und lokalen Behörden aus oder akzeptieren gesellschaftliche Unordnung. Warum? Dieser zweite Artikel untersucht die Faktoren, die diese verschiedenen Ergebnisse verursachen. Dafür werden drei benachbarte Gebiete im Süden von Tolima, Kolumbien, in denen die ehemalige kommunistische Guerilla-Gruppe „Revolutionäre Streitkräfte Kolumbiens – Volksarmee“ (FARC-EP) mehr als 50 Jahre lang präsent war, untersucht. Die Ergebnisse schwächen die Annahmen aktueller Theorien zu Einflussfaktoren der Rebellenregierung und zeigen, dass das Verhalten von Rebellengruppen in bestimmten Gebieten variiert und sich mit den Strategien und Ressourcen anderer Akteure überschneidet (Zivilisten, andere bewaffnete Gruppen, oder amtierende Regierungen). Die aktive Rolle der Zivilbevölkerung und des Staates, die häufig durch die Erklärungen zu den Einflussfaktoren und der Vielfalt der Verhaltensweisen von Rebellengruppen vernachlässigt wird, wird unterstrichen. Situative, organisatorische, ideelle und strategische Faktoren beeinflussen die Möglichkeit für Rebellengruppen, gesellschaftliche Ordnung zu schaffen oder im Gegenteil an bestimmten Orten weit verbreitete Gewalt auszuüben.

In Bezug auf die dritte Frage haben Bürgerkriege ländliche Gebiete stark getroffen. Ländliche Erzeugerorganisationen (RPO) - als Formen langfristiger Zusammenarbeit zwischen Kleinbauern - werden als wesentlich für die Friedenskonsolidierung angesehen. Die Faktoren, die der Bildung und dem Erfolg von RPO nach dem Krieg zugrunde liegen, sind jedoch unklar. Basierend auf einer Fallstudie in der kolumbianischen Gemeinde Planadas, in der die ehemalige kommunistische Guerilla-Gruppe FARC-EP gegründet wurde und mehrere RPO nach dem Krieg florierten, werden im drittem Artikel 14 kontextbezogene Faktoren genannt, die den Aufstieg von RPO ermöglichten. Zusätzlich zu Faktoren, die von Theorien zu kollektivem Handeln und Gemeingütern, sowie in der Literatur zu RPO identifiziert wurden, wurde hier festgestellt, dass vier weitere Kontextvariablen eine entscheidende Rolle bei der RPO-Entwicklung nach dem Krieg spielten. Diese sind Kriegsvermächtnisse, Resilienzstrategien, Vermittlungsinstitutionen und Diskurse. Kriegsvermächtnisse beziehen sich auf Beziehungen zwischen bewaffneten Gruppen und Zivilisten in Kriegszeiten. Wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten als Resilienzstrategie weisen auf die Strategien der Zivilbevölkerung hin, sich von Konfrontationen fernzuhalten, die Wahrscheinlichkeit von Schäden zu verringern und ihre Beteiligung am Krieg oder an illegalen wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten zu verhindern. Vermittlungsinstitutionen sind Drittorganisationen, die die RPO beeinflussen. Im vorliegenden Fall wurde diese Rolle durch Zertifizierungssysteme für freiwillige

Nachhaltigkeitsstandards erfüllt. Die Ergebnisse widersprechen der kritischen Literatur zu den Auswirkungen der Standards und legen nahe, dass sie die Selbstorganisationskapazitäten nach Konflikten auf lokaler Ebene verbessern können. Schließlich beziehen sich die Diskurse auf zusätzliche Anreize für die RPO-Entwicklung in Bezug darauf, was die Teilnehmer über den wirtschaftlichen Nutzen hinaus als wertvoll erachten, im vorliegenden Fall der Schutz der Umwelt. Infolgedessen präsentiert der Artikel die Grundlagen eines erweiterten Rahmens zum Verständnis und zur Förderung des RPO-Wachstums in Nachkriegsumgebungen.

Unser Verständnis von Bürgerkrieg zu vertiefen, ist in einer Welt am Rande neuer Formen von Gewalt zwingend notwendig. Öffentliche Politiken versuchen, Ernährungssysteme zu stärken, Armut zu lindern, Ungleichheiten zu verringern und eine friedlichere Welt aufzubauen. Fundiertes Wissen, das diese Politiken informiert, ist grundlegend für die Zukunft der Menschheit. Diese Dissertation soll ein Beitrag dazu sein.

I. Introduction

Around 2.5 billion people in developing countries live from agriculture and 1.5 billion are smallholders (FAO, 2012). Farmers with less than two ha occupy only 12% of land but account for more than 30% of the global food supply (Rami Zurayk & Woertz, 2018; Ricciardi, Ramankutty, Mehrabi, Jarvis, & Chookolingo, 2018). Their role in food systems is crucial for guaranteeing food security (Tscharntke et al., 2012). However, agriculture in these countries is especially vulnerable to increasing risks such as climate change, environmental degradation, natural resources depletion, and loss of biodiversity, which are, to a significant extent caused by agricultural expansion (Bojić, Baas, & Wolf, 2019; Tscharntke et al., 2012). These risks intertwine with various social and political constraints. Competition over scarce resources, poor governance systems, and violent conflicts with deep agrarian roots, put at risk the livelihoods of millions of people living in rural areas, deepening the vulnerability of food systems in the developing world and posing great challenges to endeavors aiming at reducing poverty and hunger. (Birner, Cohen, & Ilukor, 2011; Bojić et al., 2019; Holleman, Jackson, Sánchez, & Vos, 2017; Poku, Birner, & Gupta, 2018).

In the report The State of Food Security and Nutrition of 2017, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) identified armed conflict and violence particularly as persistent factors explaining food crises and famines in developing countries (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, & WHO, 2017; Holleman et al., 2017). According to the United Nations (2020), 100 civilians are killed per day in violent conflicts. 79.5 million people were reported to flee from violent conflict in 2019, the highest number ever recorded. Rural areas are the primary sites for armed conflicts, exacerbating the pre-existing vulnerability of farming systems, and thus deepening marginalization, poverty, and malnutrition (Holleman et al., 2017). Indeed, around 60% of the food-insecured people live in war-affected areas. Particularly intrastate conflicts, which account for the majority of armed conflicts after the second half of the 20th century, represent a serious threat for developing countries and their rural areas. The Peace Research Institute Oslo documented fifty-two active state-based conflicts in 36 countries by 2018 (Strand, Rustad, Urdal, & Nygard, 2019). Six of them are considered wars (surpassing the threshold of

1,000 battle-related deaths) and 46 are low-intensity conflicts, most of them with the potential to spark larger-scale violence.

Nonetheless, the different hindrances agriculture experiences in developing countries do not evolve automatically into violent conflict. Moreover, intrastate conflicts unevenly affect local contexts and subsequently, their effects on agriculture and the livelihoods of rural inhabitants are unequal at the sub-national level (Kalyvas, 2006; Kalyvas, Shapiro, & Masoud, 2008). This means that the processes through which armed conflict and agriculture dovetail in developing countries emerge under certain conditions and must be grasped at various scales, including the local level. Considering armed conflict as an intervening factor between agriculture, food security, and poverty in developing countries, it is necessary to disentangle the multiple paths through which violence impacts agrarian societies and agriculture creates particular dynamics of violent conflict. For example, non-state armed groups - NSAGs find resources and adapt their strategies to the rural scenarios in which wars occur. Some of them fight because of grievances related to the agricultural setting, such as scarce access to land; or take advantage of it by engaging, for instance, in illegal crop production or taxing (Cramer & Richards, 2011; Le Billon, 2001; Peters & Richards, 2011; Weinstein, 2007). In the case of insurgents, rural areas provide greater mobility to combatants and opportunities to strengthen the support of civilians in isolated regions. Rebels usually are interested in reinforcing this isolation, making it difficult for farmers to access the necessary markets and inputs for agricultural production (Ragasa & Golan, 2014).

In the case of countries able to end their armed conflicts, the probability of the reactivation of war is as high as 50% (Paul Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2008; Gates, Hermansen, Bergstad Lansen, Jarland, & Mokleiv, 2020). The threat of relapse relates to the persistent fragility of agricultural production and food systems (Holleman et al., 2017). Illegal economies and the looting of natural resources by NSAGs, weak state institutions, and rearming of demobilized parties, exacerbate this situation of vulnerability, in which the population feels abandoned and trapped in persistent cycles of violence and poverty (Goodhand, 2008; Kreutz, 2012; Rustad & Binningsbø, 2012; Valencia & Avila, 2016).

The level of devastation, disruption, and the costs and impacts in human lives caused by violent conflict, and particularly, civil wars, make it imperative disentangle the multiple causes, actors, incentives, agendas, dynamics, and structures fueling violence. Moreover, to understand the conditions of sustainable peace and their interrelations with rural development is fundamental in avoiding relapse into war. By exploring the intersections between civil war and the agrarian settings in which they occur, the contribution of this cumulative dissertation is twofold. First, it aims at discerning different paths through

which armed conflict influences agrarian societies and the livelihoods of people living in rural areas. Complementary, the dissertation examines the theoretical implications of having rural areas as the main scenario of both civil war and peacebuilding processes.

The Introduction proceeds as follows. The next section develops the conceptual framework underlying the main arguments of the three articles compounding this cumulative dissertation. Afterward, the knowledge gaps and the research questions addressed are pointed out. The third part presents the methodology and the case. The Introduction closes with the outline of the dissertation.

1. Conceptual Framework

Against widespread perceptions of civil war from both commonsense ideas and academic literature as chaotic and irrational, the following conceptual framework strives to discern civil wars as complex social and political phenomena. Additional concepts are also elaborated to tease out the various dimensions compounding this complexity, as Figure 1 illustrates. The main proposition underlying the framework is that civil wars reinforce power structures or create new ones, and actors deal with such structures in different manners. Actors do not only act individually but also need to undertake collective action. However, one of the major problems civil wars pose to the actors (civilians, rebels, or government) is how to act collectively toward a common purpose under the war setting (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007; Kaplan, 2017; Wood, 2003). In other words, besides the devastating effects on human lives that civil wars entail, certain actors also profit from the context of violence, or adapt to it. Incumbent actors, whether non-combatants or combatants, implement resources, and develop sophisticated strategies (not only physical violence) to reach their objectives or cope with constraints (bottom right corner of Figure 1). Those resources can be used by other actors and acquire new meanings post-war in order to, on the one hand, revert the power structures reinforced or emerging in wartime and, on the other, contribute to the sustainability of peace efforts.



Figure 1 Conceptual Framework

Source: Author

1.1. Civil War

Civil war is a form of violent conflict that results in "armed combat taking place within the boundaries of a recognize sovereign entity [usually a state] between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities" (Kalyvas, 2007, p. 437). Civil wars could imply a sovereignty challenge, aiming either at reverting the power of the supreme-ruler entity or secession (Cederman & Vogt, 2017).

Intrastate conflicts are mostly fought in developing countries (Strand et al., 2019). One of the major concerns in the post-Cold-War literature has been why civil wars occur. Analyses of civil war onset include *greed* of the actors involved in the conflict, the *opportunities* civil wars pose to the incumbents, and *grievances* related to social, economic, or political inequality (Cederman & Vogt, 2017). The greed explanation presupposes that rebellion posed a collective action problem because the individual costs of becoming involve in insurgent activities -that imply necessarily putting the life at risk- are too high. The only incentive for rebellion, therefore, is the individuals' material gain (P Collier et al., 2003). Greed-based accounts have been criticized for reducing the complexity of civil war outset to motivations related to individuals' profit maximization, neglecting ideology, and other contextual factors that could explain

the emergence of large-scale violence. Opportunities highlight the political and institutional determinants of the initiation of civil war, finding a correlation between weak state-presence and a suitable environment for rebellions (Cederman & Vogt, 2017). Through this perspective, civil wars are considered the result of whether state presence and political institutions are weak enough to offer opportunities to stage insurgency. Finally, grievances highlight the socioeconomic and political structures and dynamics that marginalized certain sectors of the society, providing incentives for rebellion.

Regarding the development of civil wars, the literature has highlighted the ways in which wars spawned endogenous dynamics and structures underpinning specific trajectories of violent conflict (Cederman & Vogt, 2017; Kalyvas, 2007). The emphasis on the micro-foundations and the differentiated geographies of war, which pays special attention to the local contexts in which war occurs, made it possible to disentangle the presence of armed actors beyond their military forces, showing that social, economic, justice, or political dynamics do not cease in war zones (Kalyvas, 2006; Korf, Engeler, & Hagmann, 2010). This approach controverts macro data sets and narratives focused exclusively on the national scale that obscure the dynamics of civil war as processes in which the lives of both combatants and non-combatants are affected in their local immediate contexts in complex manners.

Via this stream, one of the most important questions has been how both armies and NSAGs gain territorial control and the practices involved once they achieve it. In this sense, the use of violence and other resources and strategies from the incumbent actors become important. The next subsections address some of these strategies and resources that underlie the understanding of the dynamics involved in civil war throughout the dissertation.

1.2. Violence and Power

Violence upholds power structures. Nevertheless, power structures cannot only rely on physical violence. Power structures that are upheld by violence eventually have to morph into a state of domination in which the power relation is internally accepted by the dominated (Weber, 1997). Violence, consequently, has a symbolic dimension aiming at facilitating the process of internal acceptance of unbalanced power relationships (Bourdieu, 2001). Yet, symbolic violence does not come to the forefront after the physical violence. On the contrary, physical and symbolic violence are interwoven and employed in different circumstances. Physical violence also upholds power structures by making the threat of coercion possible.

Galtung's (1969, 1990) violence-taxonomy is useful to illustrate this complexity by differentiating direct, structural, and cultural violence. To explain the interrelations and reinforcement among the three types of violence, Galtung uses the triangle metaphor. The different situations and contexts of violence can be analyzed from one of the three corners represented by each type of violence and how it spreads and bears on the other two forms. Direct violence is the physical or psychological aggression that occurs in specific events with easily recognizable actors. Structural violence is domination through the unequal disposition of the society based on the differentiation of the actors in it. Poverty, for instance, is a form of structural violence. Cultural violence refers to the aspects of the culture used to legitimize direct or structural violence. Temporarily, it is conceived as a long-term process that is deeply-rooted in different social formations.

Direct physical violence is an aspect inherent to civil wars (Kalyvas, 2006). Nevertheless, it has been found that warrior parties do not exclusively rely on physical violence in their relations with civilians and other combatants (A. Arjona, Kasfir, & Mampilly, 2015; Staniland, 2015). Under particular circumstances, NSAGs prefer situations in which they do not have to implement widespread direct violence. There are various reasons for this. For example, the NSAGs uphold an ideology which dictates the way they have to interact with civilians, refraining from using physical violence (Gutierrez-Sanin & Wood, 2014; Kalyvas, 2015). Another reason is that civilian armed resistance can arise when the costs of resisting become lower than the cost of conforming with a situation of indiscriminate violence where it is impossible to anticipate the behavior of the NSAG, whereas reducing the use of violence and engaging in other forms of dominance can further civilian support to the NSAG (A. Arjona, 2017).

Alternatively, ambiguous situations of violence implementation also arise in wartime. Korf & Fünfgeld (2006), for instance, analyze the case of Mavigalanthurai in Sri Lanka, where local fishers, trapped between the two main groups in confrontation, adapted to changing wartime situations to access the Batticaloa lagoon from which their livelihood depended on. In the day, the fishers closer to the military had access to the lagoon and the possibility to extract the resources. However, the situation changed completely in the nights, when the rebels of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam controlled the access, abducting and penalizing the fishers that were collaborating with the army, and welcoming their sympathizers.

1.3. Framing Cultural Constructions

Certain cultural constructions are activated in the course of conflicts with the purpose of mobilizing collective action, whether to support rebels, combat them, or profit from the civil war setting (Gutierrez-Sanin & Wood, 2014; Kalyvas, 2015; Paul, 2010). These cultural constructions can also serve the purposes of peacebuilding by e.g., transforming mindsets about the implementation of violence as a form of conflict resolution (Lederach & Appleby, 2010). This means that cultural constructions imply a strategic dimension. Actors utilized them in other to achieve certain objectives.

Some of these cultural constructions are identities, discourses, and ideologies. Discourses are specific meanings assigned to parts of the reality expressed linguistically (verbally or in written form), while identities are representations of social actors grounded on ideologies and discourses intersected with power relations, subject to historical contingencies, and reinforced by both the group to which it is referred and outsiders (Hall, 2003; Van Dijk, 2001). In other words, identities change overtime and are the product of social relations between those to whom a particular identity is assigned and the others external to that social identity. Ideology is more comprehensive in terms of the cultural scope it embraces because it is compounded by ideas and beliefs that determine a holistic and cohesive view of the world shared by specific social groups (Van Dijk, 1998, 2001). Discourses, on the other hand, are vehicles of ideology and are more diffuse in terms of the specific groups to which they can be associated. Since ideology, identity, and discourses are shared constructions but refer to specific circumstances, they are attached to contexts and cannot be understood without reference to them. Moreover, while ideology and identity shape practices, discourses not only sustain practices or express them, but are also a practice themselves (Criado, 1998).

The concept of framing helps to unveil how the activation of these cultural constructions in order to achieve desired outcomes occurs. Developed for understanding collective action in the context of social movements, frames are an "action-oriented set of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of social movements organizations" (Snow & Bedford, 2000, p. 614). They derive from different cultural constructions present in the broader society (identities, discourses, ideologies, etc), framing them as relevant for a certain set of collaborative actions needed (Tarrow, 1992). The advantage of using this conceptual category thus lies in the possibility to spot the utilization of a cultural construction in collective action settings and, in this case, in civil war, considering e.g., the engagement of certain communities in violence against NSAGs or conversely support to these groups. In other words, a specific ideology or identity does not activate collective action per se. It is under certain

conditions, strategically activated, that those constructions mobilize in order to facilitate engagement in collective action.

For instance, ethnic identity has been recognized as a major driver for engaging in violence and leading to the outset of civil war. Nevertheless, this might obscure some underlying dynamics by which ethnic identity was more an instrument than the main reason motivating violence. Considering an extreme case such as Rwanda, Verwimp (2011) found that the massacres between 1990-1992 preceding the genocide were indeed a case of ethnic cleansing but intertwined with the ideology of the Habyarimana regime, aiming at converting all pastureland into agricultural land under a romanticized image of peasants as hard workers and as the economic pillars of the nation. What Verwimp calls the socioeconomic geography of the massacres, allowed him to advance an alternative explanation of the pre-genocide killings. The massacres took place mainly in places where Tutsi pastoralists lived and, following Habyarimana ideology, their lands were needed for conversion into croplands. With this purpose, the government spread rumors to fuel anti-Tutsi feelings among the Hutus, resulting in the death of around 2,000 Tutsis. The case illustrates how ethnic identity grounded on ideological beliefs is framed for advancing objectives in civil war settings, showing the pivotal role that cultural constructions play in collective violence.

1.4. Networks and Social Capital

Perspectives on social capital range from minimalist approaches in which social capital is considered as the product of the social networks where individuals are embedded and how they profit from having these connections to achieve their goals, to approaches in which social capital is not limited to serving individuals but also enhances collective action in order to solve shared problems (Ostrom, Ahn, & Olivares, 2003). In addition to the scope these perspectives refer to (whether individual or social), the minimalist perspective emphasizes the networks as an attribute of individuals, whereas the expansionist approach unpacks the different aspects of the social structure that enhance collective action besides the networks. Networks, consequently, are conceptualized as characteristics inherently belonging to the social realm. Trust and norms of reciprocity, forms of civic participation, and formal and informal rules are the aspects of the social structure that facilitate collective action besides networks. Trust refers to the expectation that a certain person will behave collaboratively (Ostrom, 2010). General reciprocity enhances trust because it limits opportunistic behavior. Rules refer to shared understandings by participants about enforced prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited

or permitted under specific situations (Ostrom & Basurto, 2011). Therefore, rules structure interactions among actors and regularize their expectations (one knows what the others are going to do in a particular situation), contributing to trust-building.

This approach to social capital dovetails with perspectives on social networks underscoring the emotional aspects of social networks beyond their utilization by individuals in order to maximize their own profits or achieve exclusively individual goals (Mützel, 2009). This means that people act on the basis of bounded rationality and have other bases for action (e.g., norms or values) that make them reciprocate and punish defectors, developing cooperative behavior (Ostrom, 2010).

Social capital in general and collaboration, in particular, are considered pivotal for peacebuilding initiatives because they have been associated with economic development and political participation (Cox & (Ed), 2009; De Luca & Verpoorten, 2015; Vervisch, 2011). Nevertheless, social capital has a dark side and can be implemented for goals diverging from socially optimized outcomes such as civic participation, invigoration of democracy, or general economic growth (Cox & (Ed), 2009; Ostrom, 2007). Classic examples are mafias, conglomerates of criminals that are able to collaborate in order to commit crimes on the basis of broad networks, even at the international level.

Likewise, civil wars unveil this dark side by facilitating the engagement of important sectors in the violence. McDoom (2014), for instance, shows how the involvement in Rwanda's genocide as victimizers was higher in the cases of Hutus with dense and broad social bonds. In the case of Peru, the first civilian armed counterinsurgency against the rebel group the Communist Party of Perú Shining Path was staged in Iquichano in the Andean highlands of Ayacucho. Fumerton (2001) argues that the reason for this is that Iquichano communities were characterized by strong family ties and close territorially localized social networks. Over time, social capital leveraged the formation of civilian counterinsurgent groups in Ayacucho that became known as Rondas campesinas. By contrast, peasants with looser but broader social networks and relatives in the city dealt with the increasing threat to rural livelihoods from Shining Path by fleeing to urban areas.

1.5. Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding entails the non-violent transformation of the conflict from four dimensions: individual, relational, structural, and cultural (Lederach, Neufeldt, & Culbertson, 2007). The individual dimension includes attitudes and behaviors that mantain violent conflict. The relational dimension refers to the scope

in which people have face-to-face interactions, not only at the local level but also in other instances (e.g., leaders of national movements or the government). Communication patterns, the degree of cooperation between confronted parties, decision making, and conflict handling mechanisms, fall into the different patterns to examine and transform from a peacebuilding perspective. Existing structures reinforcing inequality, including the institutions endorsing it and historical patterns of marginalization of certain groups, are encompassed by the structural dimension. Finally, underlying the other three dimensions, culture refers to the believes and meanings that bear violent conflict, are deeply embedded in the society, and require long-term actions in order to transform them into cultural resources and patterns from which actors do not engage in violence when dealing with conflict.

Across the dimensions, different scales and the constellation of relevant actors in each of them should be considered (Lederach, 2005; Lederach & Appleby, 2010). Local, national, and global institutions and actors, and the manners for them to interrelate and foster specific actions for the transformation of violent conflict must be accounted for, in order to build a culture of peace and their supporting institutions at various scales. Combatants, international agencies, and national governments have a role in peacebuilding, but local communities too must undertake efforts toward peace.

While this definition is prescriptive, it also offers leveraging points to the analysis of real peacebuilding experiences. In this regard, this dissertation is an attempt to consider this complexity from the local perspective and how local conditions interact with national and global factors. The thesis is also a contribution to substantiate the current debate on peacebuilding by analyzing those interactions. This debate is focused on the liberal peace or international peace vs. the local turn in peace studies and endeavors. Liberal peace is state-centric and aims at promoting liberal values in post-war societies. This entails endeavors toward democratization, economic development, and statebuilding (Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Wallis, Kent, Forsyth, Dinnen, & Bose, 2018). State-based transitional justice as the mechanism to address victims' grievances, unveil the truth on war-related crimes, assign responsibilities, and reconstruct the social tissue, has been stressed as a key aspect of post-war rebuilding.

The local turn draws on post-colonial studies and emphasizes the category of hybridity to pinpoint the necessity to consider the local dynamics of peacebuilding as a way of resisting externally imposed liberal peace (Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Mac Ginty, 2010; Wallis et al., 2018). Hybridity, a concept with a long tradition in biology, was imported to social sciences to understand the processes whereby existing practices and structures combine with new ones. Mac Ginty (2010) recalls Canclini's definition of hybridity as 'sociocultural processes in which discrete structures or practices, previously existing in a

separate form, are combined to generate new structures, objects, and practices. In turn, it bears noting that the so-called discrete structures were a result of prior hybridization and therefore cannot be considered as pure points of origin' (p. 398). In peacebuilding terms, this implies that local actors wield a contestation power in front of top-down interventions in the hands of international agencies, a predilect form of peacebuilding initiatives, as shown by the experiences in different conflicts worldwide (e.g., Sierra Leone, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo). These agencies are considered to neglect local conditions and to design desk solutions that are imposed in dissimilar post-war settings. The concept of hybridity is considered to overcome this simplistic view, by emphasizing how local, national, and international conditions amalgamate to advance peacebuilding processes.

Nevertheless, while liberal peace overlooks the specific and unique dynamics of local contexts, the local turn has been criticized for its lack of attention to the power dynamics embedded in peacebuilding. For instance, national elites may be interested in reinforcing this local approach, evading the building of democratic institutions, service and infrastructure provision, or robust justice systems and state agencies that can guarantee the respect of basic human rights (Piccolino, 2019). Moreover, international agencies can easily co-opt the 'local' discourse, reinforcing subjugation and legitimizing their own view of peacebuilding (Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Finally, while from this approach the hybridity concept has been highlighted as a pillar for the local turn to disentangle the complexity involved in peacebuilding, in theoretical terms it adds little to our understanding of peace processes (we live in a hybrid world, indeed) and bears on the dichotomy local vs international peace, unable to overcome it and neglecting the national contexts (Hameiri & Jones, 2018).

These two approaches appeared to be irreconcilable in many studies. While the discussion on whether liberal peace is the best approach to peacebuilding reminds us about the importance of overcoming the subjugation of developing countries by the global north, it seems that certain pillars of peacebuilding should be reconsidered more seriously in order to have certain guarantees for local populations, including their right to access to justice services, revert oppressive power structures (even at the local level. e.g., patron-client relations), and be able to unfold the conditions to improve their livelihoods (Piccolino, 2019; Wallis et al., 2018). On the other hand, peacebuilding is not only an endeavor in which national or international agencies are held responsible and oversee all the solutions (Brown, 2018; Mac Ginty, 2010). A major concern should be how to enhance local capacities to achieve goals related to economic development, political participation, and conflict resolution mechanisms not only state-based but also alternative mechanisms developed by locals or that they may consider more culturally appropriated. Moreover, several communities, in the face of state absence or slow implementation of the development

projects associated with the peace accords, may undertake themselves initiatives for reconstructing and improving their lives in the aftermath of war (Lederach, 2005). Analyses of local conditions, while difficult, are necessary.

The dissertation focuses on analyzing how war generates specific conditions post-war at the local level and how these conditions are connected to other scales. The local is understood as a territorial space in which people are able to develop direct relations with other people that inhabit the space (Bräuchler & Naucke, 2017). In this sense, the local is geographically situated and has a material dimension. It is the concrete place in which people develop their everyday lives and from which they experience, interpret, and try to transform the world. By emphasizing the local context, the different layers that influence peacebuilding are addressed. Indeed, the local is part of a multi-layered reality in which different cultural, social, political, and economic fluxes from the national and global scales intersect and pose constraints and opportunities to local actors (Hameiri & Jones, 2018; Kasfir, Frerks, & Terpstra, 2017; Ostrom, 2005). Instead of ignoring the macro-cleavages and the endeavors necessary in peacebuilding from the different actors situated in different scales, the dissertation attempts to unpack and tease out the various conditions and factors determining local peace across scales. State-building, the provision of security, justice, and other public services, along with infrastructure are conditions that are assumed to be necessary for local populations aiming to overcome war and build a more peaceful social environment.

2. Knowledge Gaps and Specific Research Questions

2.1. Agrarian Aspects of Civil War

The connections between civil war and the rural scenarios in which they take place have gained attention through an agrarian turn in the study of violent conflict (Cramer & Richards, 2011; Gutierrez, 2015; Van Leeuwen & Van Der Haar, 2016). As a result, different processes in civil wars have been put into an agrarian perspective. While most of the issues are addressed transversally (e.g., ideologies and discourses of the contenders (Gutierrez-Sanin & Wood, 2014; Shah, 2013; Van Leeuwen & Van Der Haar, 2016)), it is possible to identify some important focuses according to the scale. At the global level, various subjects are emphasized. Problematic insertions of national and local economies in the global trading networks of both legal and illegal commodities (Le Billon, 2001), legacies of colonialism (Cramer & Richards, 2011; Peters & Richards, 2011), and the existence of conflict despite or even because of the

imposition of development agendas from the north to the south (Ballvé, 2013; F. Thomson, 2011) are some key points.

At the national scale, the development of capitalism (Karatasli & Kumral, 2019) and governance systems limiting access to land (Boone, 2014; Peters & Richards, 2011) have received attention. The literature has also addressed the historical continuities of war (Cramer & Richards, 2011; F. Thomson, 2011; Vellema, Borras, & Lara, 2011), and agricultural reforms and policies in the transitional periods (McAllister, 2009; Rankin, Nightingale, Hamal, & Sigdel, 2018; Saad Filho, 1997).

Regarding local contexts, the spatial distribution of war and the intersection of these geographies with territorial control (both politically and economically) are crucial topics (A. Arjona, 2016a; Korf et al., 2010; Korf & Fünfgeld, 2006; Le Billon, 2001). In terms of the political aspects of territorial control, these focuses encompassed governance systems enforced by NSAGs and the relation with local authorities (A. Arjona, 2016a; A. Arjona et al., 2015; Kalyvas, 2006; Mampilly, 2011; Staniland, 2015; Weinstein, 2007). Economically, illegal crops and the circumstances under which natural resources generate the conditions for fueling violence are emphasized (Conrad, Greene, Walsh, & Whitaker, 2019; Hinkkainen Elliott & Kreutz, 2019; Rigterink, 2020; Weinstein, 2007). The agrarian background of both combatants and victims (Munive, 2011; Peters & Richards, 2011; Verwimp, 2011) and violent processes of state sovereignty construction or state absence (Ballvé, 2012; Le Billon, 2001) are also some of the subjects discussed.

The different scales from which the dynamics of civil war are considered illustrate intricate processes that respond to complex logics. This was possible because analyzes of civil war shifted the focus from the national scale and quantitative comparison between different countries in order to find correlated factors of civil war initiation and development, toward the local level and micro-dynamics of civil wars from which it is feasible to reflect on the interplay between global and more territorially localized factors.

Despite the revival of the agrarian approach in the analysis of violent conflict, the complexity of the junctions between agrarian settings and civil war require further inquiry. Under the common concern of how violent conflict affects rural areas and the practical and theoretical implications of the development of wars in these areas, each of the papers developed for this dissertation focuses on three critical aspects.

2.2. Knowledge Gaps and Research Questions

a. Changes in the land distribution and land tenure structures caused by civil wars

Land-grabbing gained attention in the context of the global crisis in 2008, when the land transferred skyrocketed to 40 million hectares worldwide, twenty times higher than the annual average since the 1970s (Wolford, Borras, Hall, Scoones, & White, 2013). Part of the research to unveil the dynamics behind land-grabbing focuses on how to minimize the negative impacts for the local communities taking into account that massive land acquisitions could have beneficial effects to increase the productivity of waste or marginal lands (Deininger & Byerlee, 2011; FAO & CFS, 2012; Wolford et al., 2013). Other researchers attempt to disentangle the motivations and power relations underlying land grabbing, whether studying the local context and how agrarian elites fuel land grabbing, or the international context considering that multinational companies benefit from land grabbing in a highly unequal Nation-State system (Akram-Lodhi, 2012; Borras, Franco, Gómez, Kay, & Spoor, 2012). Less attention has been paid to land-grabbing processes in the context of civil wars.

The literature on violent conflict, on the other hand, has addressed peasant-related grievances as an explanation for civil war onset, finding that access to land has created major motivations for rural populations neglected in fair land distribution to engage in violent conflict (Peters & Richards, 2011; H. Thomson, 2016). However, civil war usually intensifies the conditions that caused it in the first place. Civil war offers a setting for strengthening the position of powerful actors and deepening agrarian inequality by providing opportunities to accumulate assets, particularly land (Cramer & Richards, 2011; Gutierrez, 2015). Nevertheless, with the notable exception of Colombia where 6.5 million hectares changed hands in wartime (CNMH, 2016; Gutiérrez-Sanin & Vargas-Reina, 2016), the dynamics through which land is accumulated have received far less attention in the study of civil wars, usually taking land accumulation as a pre-war condition. Given this knowledge gap, the first paper addresses the following questions:

a) How is land accumulated in the course of civil wars?
b) What actors are involved in land accumulation during civil wars?
c) What is the role of the state in land accumulation?

b. Relations between Non-state Armed Groups and Civilians

A prolific field of study has emerged for analyzing the relation between NSAGs and non-combatants, particularly focused on a phenomenon that has been labeled 'Rebel Governance'. The term emphasizes the emergence of social order in war zones through the establishment of institutions for regulating civilians' behavior and public goods provision by insurgents. From this common ground, it has been found that war areas are not simply characterized by continuous violence or transformation. Korf (2007) as well as Kasfir, Frerks & Terpstra (2017) stress the coexistence of different rules despite the volatility of war. Institutions that irrupted with war and the institutions that persist in spite of violence amalgamate, creating a period of institutional fuzziness (Korf, 2007; Korf et al., 2010; Korf & Fünfgeld, 2006).

War institutions sediment overtime and while other rules are not completely suspended (e.g., state order), rebels' order thrives in dominating an important part of the local institutions. The provision of public goods (Förster, 2015; Mampilly, 2011), the rebels' aspiration to compete with the state implementing not only rules, but also displaying various symbols and practices (e.g., flags or diplomacy) (Coggins, 2015; Mampilly, 2015), and the fluctuating success of different NSAGs to establish governance systems (Mampilly, 2011), are among aspects tackled in this field.

Nevertheless, a major concern has been the factors influencing the type of regime rebels execute; in other words, how rebels rule. In his analysis of the Greek civil war, Kalyvas (2015), for instance, states that two important factors shaped the sort of governance NSAGs enforce: the political identity of the group and the geographical extension of its control. Political identity encompasses the group's ideology, political practice, and organizational resources, while the territorial control refers to the military dynamics of the conflict and the geographical extension of the governance. The Greek civil war (1942-1949) featured communist and conservative resistance against foreign occupation from 1943 and 1944, and then from 1946 to 1949 the communist insurrection against the government. In the first period, the communists' political identity 'combined Marxist-Leninist ideology, a political practice toward mass mobilization, and an organization composed by highly motivated political cadres' (p. 120), translating into a vertical bureaucratic organization of peasant masses. The National Republican League, a conservative group, relied more on the pre-existing political structure, allying with local elites and wielding a more relaxed dominion. In the fourth period of the civil war (1946-1949), the communists lost territorial control and consequently, the exercise of their political identity diminished, leading them to engage in violent coercion against civilians.

Mampilly & Stewart (2020) attempt to identify the factors determining the variation of the institutional arrangements of rebels, considering these arrangements as 'the structures and practices rebels design to interface with civilian communities' (p. 2). According to them, the institutional arrangements can change over time and are the outcome of a stepwise and dynamic process influenced by four main dimensions that account for the degree in which civilians are included in those arrangements and the transformation of previous political orders existent before the rebels ruling. Those dimensions are: 1. Power sharing with civilians (being an opposite extreme the martial law). 2. Integration (the extent to which civilians and rebels co-govern). 3. Innovation (the degree of transformation of pre-existing institutions). 4. Inclusiveness (encompassing civic participation in political institutions and representation of traditionally oppressed groups – e.g., women, specific ethnic or religious groups). Mampilly & Stewart assume that from the first one (power sharing) the rebels, if the conditions make it possible (e.g., minimum civilian resistance) advance in the other three in a stepwise process. Accordingly, six arrangements are possible: martial law, partial subjugation, status quo and less inclusive, status quo but more inclusive, transformative but less inclusive, and transformative and more inclusive.

Despite several analysis on how rebels govern, it has been found that even the same NSAG is not able to develop governance regimes across the territories it is present, resulting in the prevalence of disorder in other locales (A. Arjona, 2016b). However, the literature on the determinants of these outcomes (order or disorder) is scarce and the role of civilians and states in shaping them has been only slightly addressed. Given these omissions, the second paper aims at answering the following questions.

d) Why rebel groups behave differently among their territories of influence?
e) Under what circumstances social order or disorder emerge in wartime?
f) What is the role of civilians and the state in the emergence of these contrasting situations?

c. Collective Action in Rural Areas Post-War

Violence and especially civil wars have devastating effects, especially in economic development, infrastructure, and social capital (Bodea & Elbadawi, 2008; Cassar, Grosjean, & Whitt, 2013; P Collier et al., 2003; Paul Collier & Duponchel, 2013; Kijewski & Freitag, 2018; Rohner, Thoenig, & Zilibotti, 2013). Drawing on experiences as dissimilar as the Ugandan (Rohner et al., 2013), the Kosovar (Kijewski & Freitag, 2018), or the Tajikistani wars (Cassar et al., 2013), the disastrous consequences of war on trust and cooperation have been highlighted. Even when increases of social trust are found, they are marginal and limited to intra-group members, meaning that the generalization of collaboration that may develop

market relations or political institutions beyond the local level is difficult (Cassar et al., 2013). Most of the time, however, even intra-group trust is destroyed. Vervisch (2011), for instance, found a reversion effect on bonding social capital (within a group) generated by warfare dynamics in Burundi, which made social capital reconstruction difficult.

Furthermore, drawing on worldwide datasets, several authors have suggested that civil war inhibits long-term economic growth (Bodea & Elbadawi, 2008; P Collier et al., 2003; Hasan & Murshed, 2017). Collier et. al. (2003) found an inversely proportional relation between war and economic development, defining civil war as "development in reverse". Civil war additionally harms social capital, prompts corruption, and generates psychological traumas. To worsen the situation of countries that have coped with civil war, the "conflict trap" seems inevitable: as aforementioned, these countries have a probability of 50% of relapse in the first decade after the finalization of the violent conflict (Paul Collier et al., 2008).

Bodea & Elbadawi (2008) confirm that civil war hinders long-term economic growth, deepened by poor institutions to manage ethnic diversity in the aftermath of political violence, particularly in Sub-Sahara Africa. Hasan & Murshed (2017) claim that civil war hampers financial development, only counteracted by well-functioning institutions (impractical, however, in high-intensity violent conflicts). Collier & Duponchel (2013) also discovered the deterioration of human capital stocks post-war.

Challenging this widespread view, recent research has found increments in the probability of developing pro-cooperative behavior by victims of war (Bauer et al., 2016; Bellows & Miguel, 2009; De Luca & Verpoorten, 2015). A significant proportion of this literature signals mechanisms related to responses to trauma and behavioral transformations at the individual level as triggers of pro-cooperative behavior at the intra-group level of actors victimized by war (Bauer et al., 2016; De Luca & Verpoorten, 2015). In the case of Sierra Leone, Bellows & Miguel (2009) state that civil war has positive effects on victims' involvement in collective action, provision of public goods, political participation, and trust, even with outsiders. Recent studies analyze the effect at the individual and household levels of being exposed to wartime governance enforced by NSAGs. In the case of Angola, Justino & Stojetz (2018) found that former combatants' pro-social behavior at the local level in post-conflict correlates positively to their exposure to wartime governance developed by the group they belonged to. Arjona et. al. (2018) demonstrate that households which experienced rebel governance in Colombia developed better responses to weather shocks than households that did not.

Navigating among these mainstreams, another strand tackles both, the effects of war on economic growth or political participation and the factors facilitating them (Kang & Meernik, 2005; Stewart & Daga, 2017;

Wong, 2016). This research found both negative and positive effects of civil war, but with a predominance of negative ones. Factors such as the length of the war and degree of violence, type of end of the conflict (one side victory, a peace agreement, or a ceasefire agreement), the type of regime established for the transition (democratic or authoritarian), public policy choices, integration to the global markets, and international support are signaled as fundamental for fostering economic growth. Concerning political participation, institutional capacity to include civilians' concerns post-war is critical.

Whereas the pessimistic stream advocates for international aid as pivotal for war reconstruction, the optimistic identifies collaboration post-conflict sparked by "post-trauma growth" and exposure to rebel governance. These explanations are mainly psychological, but social and historical factors explaining the development of cooperation have remained unexplored. The third strand, on the other hand, identifies crucial factors facilitating a smoother transition to a post-conflict scenario. Nevertheless, it offers little explanation on collective action undertaken by rural communities at the local level (usually the most affected by civil war), centering on macro variables placed at the national and international levels without showing the interplay between them and local contexts.

Considering the importance of long-term collective action in rural areas post-war, particularly directed toward peacebuilding, the third article focuses on the next issues.

g) Why is collective action possible post-war?

h) To what extent do the legacies of war shape the emergence of collective action post-war?

i) What other contextual factors influence the possibility of collective action post-war?

j) How do local actors take advantage/overcome the opportunities/constraints posed by these contextual factors?

3. Methodological Approach

The dissertation implements a qualitative approach based on case studies, which allow for an intensive inquiry of single units with the purpose to identify the variables at work in specific outcomes in the units analyzed (Gerring, 2004). These outcomes are considered as the result of historical contingency, and therefore, were analyzed diachronically (Hodgson, 2001; Mahooney & Villegas, 2007). Special attention is paid to the role of agents and how they interpret and interact with situations structured by rules and historical contingency, highlighting the strategies and resources of the actors for profiting from different contextual factors and coping with constraints; or conversely, the degree to which those situations restrain the actions of the agents (Goffman, 1986; Robb, 2010).

Drawing from case studies entails the limitation of the specificity of the application of the results. Therefore, the dissertation focuses on emerging hypotheses that require further empirical evidence from other cases in order to be generalized. However, important lessons (both theoretical and practical) that are considered applicable to other cases and discussion of current theories in order to strengthen their explanatory power are provided throughout the dissertation.

3.1. The Case: The Colombian Civil War

It is estimated that the war in Colombia has created more than nine million victims since 1985, including 260,000 casualties and around eight million people forcibly displaced, particularly, rural dwellers (CNMH, 2018; Registro Único de Víctimas, 2019). Moreover, around 6.5 million hectares changed hands in the course of the armed conflict (Forjando Futuros, 2018). Figure 2 offers an overview of the different periods of the Colombian civil war and some milestones.



Figure 2 Milestones of the Colombian Civil War

Source: Author based on CNM: 2015; GMH, 2013

The violent conflict in Colombia was rooted in a partisan confrontation between conservatives and liberals in the 1940s and 1950s (GMH, 2013). The conflict evolved into class-based and insurgent violence with the creation of the most important and long-lasting rebel groups in the 1960s (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army – FARC - EP, the National Liberation Army – ELN, and the Popular Liberation Army – EPL). The formation of insurgencies was followed by the creation of legal armed civilian squads that mutated into right-wing paramilitary militias supported mainly by agrarian elites and drug lords. Burgeoning drug economies in the areas of expansion of the agrarian frontier since the 1970s lighted the flames of violence, by allowing NSAGs (both guerrillas and paramilitary militias) to fund their operations.

During the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s urban areas became the scenario of violence due to the continuous terrorist attacks of the drug lords to the state institutions and the population. Nevertheless, rural areas suffered major changes related to the transformation of the land distribution due to the civil war, including massive forced displacement, massacres, and attacks to police stations and army bases (Ávila, 2019). At the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, Colombian rural areas suffered one of the most violent cycles of the civil war, paradoxically, coinciding with the peace talks between the FARC-EP and the government. Violence against civilians became exacerbated as a result of the confrontation between the major guerrilla groups, the FARC-EP and the ELN, and illegal paramilitary militias, most of them organized under the umbrella federation United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Although the government held peace talks with the paramilitary militias from 2003 to 2007, the output of these talks was modest. The demobilization of the militias was partial and former paramilitaries rearmed and created structures similar to criminal bands (GMH, 2013).

In 2017, the FARC-EP laid down its arms. Dissidents of the FARC-EP and other NSAGs (including criminal bands and the ELN) adjusted their forces to fill the power vacuum left by the FARC-EP in many areas of the country, leading to what seems a new cycle of violence, in which community leaders in rural areas have been harshly targeted (Fundación Heinrich Böll, Indepaz, & cumbre agraria, 2018). Illegal economies and land grabbing have been identified as the motivations for these groups to continue their operations (Álvares Vanegas, Pardo Calderon, & Cajiao Vélez, 2018; Garzón-Vergara & Silva, 2019).

3.2. Selection of the Case

The Colombian civil war offers a number of advantages to analyze the nexus between the agrarian world and violent conflict. First, Colombia has suffered from violent conflict for more than 50 years. This protracted conflict offers a unique opportunity to examine the dynamics and transformation of rural areas during the civil war throughout a significant timeframe.

Second, the extreme inequality in Colombian rural areas is considered to be interwoven with the civil war. Rural poverty (44.1%) is three times that of urban poverty (DNP, 2015) and the Gini index of landowners is 0.89, the second-highest in Latin America (Oxfam, 2017). In 1954, 3% of farms occupied 55% of agricultural land, while 50% of farms had less than two hectares and occupied 3.5% of the land (Fajardo, 2014, p. 42). In 2013, 0.2% of farms owned more than one thousand hectares and used 74% of the agricultural land. By contrast, 70.5% of the farms had less than five hectares and used only 2% of the land (DANE, 2016).

Concerning the land uses, in 1954, cattle ranchers occupied 90% of the best cultivable land (Fajardo, 2014). By 2013, livestock occupied 80% of the economically usable land (DANE, 2016). Yet, the area suitable for livestock was twice the area used, while the area suitable for cropping was almost three times the area sown (DANE, 2016; UPRA, 2014). Finally, in the mid-20th century, small farmers accounted for 70% of the agrarian production, but their share plummeted to 30% by 2013 (Berry, 2017).

The influence between rural inequality and the civil war in Colombia is reciprocal. Peasant grievances provided motivations and justification to the armed insurgencies (CNMH, 2016; GMH, 2013; Lopez-Uribe & Sanchez-Torres, 2015). At the same time, civil war deepened rural inequality and generated changes in the agricultural sector (Berry, 2017; Fajardo, 2018). These connections facilitate the analysis of the ways in which specific phenomena related to agriculture unfold in the course of violent conflict and, conversely, how these phenomena are affected by civil war.

The third reason for considering Colombia is the existence of various types of armed conflict and multiple local situations. The Colombian case corresponds to a civil war, but Colombia also exhibits non-state conflict due to the existence of various groups and disputes between NSAGs in which the state is not one of the warrior parties (Rudolfsen, 2019). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that NSAGs do not behave equally among the territories under their influence (A. Arjona, 2016b; González, 2016). Sometimes they have been able to regularize the relation with non-combatants by establishing rules for civilians and reaching accords with public officers, while in other locales violence prevails. This has created complex

situations at the local level that manifest in differentiated geographies of war or patchworks across territorial space (Korf et al., 2010; Mampilly & Stewart, 2020). This multiplicity of situations yield important insights into how violent conflict unravels under different conditions, even in the same country.

Finally, Colombia has been unable to find a pacific solution to the conflict in spite of continuous peace efforts (see Figure 2). Due to the high probability of relapse into war in most of the violent conflicts worldwide, these difficulties provide a scenario to study why this relapse occurs and to identify lessons that could be crucial to other contexts beyond Colombia.

4. Outline of the Thesis

The dissertation is separated into three papers that address aspects of the civil war in Colombia and their interrelation with the agrarian settings in which it occurred, corresponding with each of the three main knowledge gaps pinpointed. The first paper tackles land dispossession in Colombia as a form of land accumulation in wartime. Considering the abundant literature on land dispossession in Colombia, the paper aims at identifying the techniques that made possible the transfer of millions of hectares mainly from smallholders to NSAGs and agrarian elites by conducting a literature review. More than 50 different techniques for dispossessing land besides physical violence were identified. Discourses and legal institutions were other instruments that facilitated land usurpation by agrarian elites and illegal armed groups, showing that actors deployed refined strategies to take advantage of the civil war setting. The paper overcomes the fragmentation in the literature by displaying a complete picture of the methods implemented for dispossessing land, connecting different scales ranging from the global to the local.

The second article accounts for factors determining the variation in the behavior of rebel groups by analyzing the case of the FARC-EP and its activities in three neighboring territories in southern Tolima. The FARC-EP changed their relations with civilians countrywide in order to craft more inclusive institutions in the territories under their control, especially after the VII conference of the group in 1982, facilitating the establishment of rebel governance regimes (Aguilera-Peña, 2013; Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2018). However, the FARC-EP could not build these institutions across all its territories of influence, even in those with a prevalence of smallholders, supposedly the FARC-EP's constituents. Rather, the FARC-EP dealt also with widespread violence or civilian resistance, limiting its behavior in this last case to tax collection and/or the regulation of civilian activities directly related to its own security. The FARC-EP, therefore, was not able to impose a governance regime in those territories. The paper aims to explain these different situations by accounting for alterations in the insurgents' behavior across both space and

time, focusing on a period of 60 years. In light of current explanations on the determinants of the variation in rebels' behavior, two main conclusions are stressed. First, how this behavior changed not only among the territories but also in each territory across time was identified. Situations of disorder evolved into rebel governance, and situations of rebel governance were threatened by armed confrontation. Second, whereas those explanations highlight state absence, civilian resistance, the internal discipline of the NSAGs, and their time horizons (either long or short-term interest in a territory) as determinants of this variation, the paper underscores the importance of the *active* role of both civilians and the state. It is concluded that the fluctuations in rebels' behavior depends on their own strategies and resources, intersected with the strategies and resources of the actors they interact with in different locales (non-combatants and the state).

The last article is devoted to understanding why collective action in the form of rural producer organizations (RPOs) was possible post-war in the municipality of Planadas, a historical stronghold of the FARC-EP. Various authors have stressed the importance of local economic development in rural areas in order to overcome war and avoid relapse. Particularly, RPOs are considered as pivotal contributors in this direction. Nonetheless, it is unclear how this might happen beyond the internal dynamics within the organizations. Following collective action and commons theory, the paper proposes a framework of contextual factors influencing the development of RPOs post-war, ranging from the local to external scales. According to the results, four additional factors that have not been considered yet by the literature, namely, legacies of war, resilience strategies, institutional intermediaries, and discourses, are identified. The legacies of war account for the historical dimension of post-war RPOs. The legacies are linked with the way in which armed actors interacted with the community. In the case considered, the FARC-EP implemented a governance regime that inhibited collective action in wartime but allowed its activation post-war, mainly by imposing a ban on illegal crop production. This enabled Planadas to avoid the conditions that explain war reactivation in other Colombian locales, related mainly to illegal economies. Intertwined with this factor, are the resilience strategies developed by civilians to stay in Planadas and sustain their livelihoods. The prohibition obliged the peasants to return to coffee growing, shielding the local peasant economy against external threats such as other NSAGs' interest in dominating the area in order to extract illegal resources. Institutional intermediaries are the set of rules emanating from external organizations that influence collective action at the local level. In this case, Voluntary Sustainability Standards played a crucial role in enhancing the organizational capacities of the peasants without interfering in the self-governance processes of the RPOs. Since the standards represent a source of additional income for the peasants, they had further incentives to contain the expansion of illegal

economies in the territory. Finally, discourses related to environmental protection provided incentives for the peasants to engage in collective action beyond material benefits. The case demonstrates that collective action is possible in post-war settings and increments of trust and social capital with peacebuilding potentialities are possible if local capacity indicators are enhanced by external conditions.

The dissertation closes with some conclusions that attempt to qualify our understanding of the complexity of civil wars and peacebuilding from the Colombian case. The fact that rural areas are the scenarios where most of the civil wars take place spawns specific trajectories and dynamics of war. The dissertation pays attention to both how land is at the core of violent conflict and the mechanisms through which agrarian structures are changed as a result of the war. The role of agrarian elites and the processes whereby they engage in violent conflict are underlined. This defies the idea that civilians are passive actors or when active pacific, in their responses to NSAGs. Civilians can be both pacific and violent and the chapters attempt to discern under which conditions violent behavior emerges.

Post-war, the importance of RPOs in peacebuilding is stressed. Relapse into war is geared to illegal economies. Since it is impossible to intervene in factors such as the legacies of war for peacebuilding, standards provide an alternative that can improve the livelihoods of rural populations. Specifically, standards may contribute to repairing the social fabric by invigorating locally based collective action and strengthening legal economies.

Besides highlighting some of the lessons from each of the chapters, the conclusions stress the contributions of the thesis to civil war theories in terms of each of the concepts addressed in this introduction. Civil wars are also examined in the light of agrarian capitalism and state-building with the purpose to discern the mutual influences between civil wars and rural areas. Additionally, the importance of developing multi-level analyses is highlighted.

The Conclusions also pinpoint some policy implications. The importance of analyzing the various sub-national levels, undermining civilian counterinsurgency, and protecting and fostering small-scale agriculture, are important tasks to cope with both civil war and peacebuilding.

Finally, the dissertation remarks on the limitations and challenges for future research in this topic for developing countries, crucial in achieving the sustainable development goals of the United Nations. Peace, justice, reduced inequalities, and zero hunger, should be considered in an agrarian perspective and the different facets of the intersections between violent conflict and rural societies requires further attention. This dissertation intends to be a contribution in this direction.

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II. Land Accumulation in Civil War. The Case of Land Dispossession in Colombia

Ángela Navarrete-Cruz, Athena Birkenberg, and Regina Birner

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Abstract

Land accumulation dynamics during civil wars are poorly understood because the land-violent conflict nexus has been constructed around linear causations that go from aggrieved peasants to violence. In focusing on the mechanisms of land dispossession in Colombia, defined as land usurpation by taking advantage of the context of widespread violence that civil war spawns, this paper aims to shed light on how land is accumulated during an armed conflict. Based on a literature review, more than 50 different methods for dispossessing land are identified. The methods show how actors develop complex strategies for profiting from the civil war setting -often depicted as irrational-; how violent conflict benefits more certain sectors of the agrarian elites than the peasantry that initiates it; and how rural inequality is reinforced in civil war with the support of state institutions and bureaucracy.

1. Introduction

An increasing concern with the rural aspects of violent conflict inspired an agrarian turn in the study of civil wars from a wide range of perspectives, stressing the necessity to advance in analyses of rural inequality to further our grasp of large-scale violence (Cramer & Richards, 2011; Gutierrez, 2015). At the core of the agrarian approache's revival is the land-violent conflict nexus (Van Leeuwen & Van Der Haar, 2016). Land related grievances were identified as being responsible for violent conflict, reinforcing the conception that land accumulation precedes civil war, fuels peasant grievances, and inspires violent responses by poor and landless peasants[1]. Although in some cases there is evidence supporting this view (H. Thomson, 2016), the land– violent conflict nexus is not straightforward: it has to emerge under certain conditions and due to certain social processes (Peters & Richards, 2011; Van Leeuwen & Van Der Haar, 2016; Verwimp, 2011). In other words, violent conflict has a socially crafted meaning and it is necessary to unfold it in order to understand what the actors consider is at stake in the conflict, why they implement

[1] We use the word "peasants" throughout the document as a translation of the word "campesino" in Spanish, which usually implies small-scale agriculture, loose relations with markets, and the development of complementary economic activities (e.g., fishing, mining, etc.).

violence, how they profit from it, and how they legitimize its use, unveiling why civil wars persist over time and reproduce themselves. Shedding light on both how land conflicts interweave with violence and how land is accumulated in the course of civil war (not taking accumulation as a pre-war condition), can deepen our understanding of at least five issues. First, the ways in which civil war changes the agrarian structures (defined as the intersections between land distribution (and the assets in it) and land tenure structures (or the rights tied to land) (Albertus, 2019)). Second, the complexity of dynamics boost by civil war beyond plain perceptions of war as turbulent and irrational. Third, the participation of other actors in violent conflict besides the peasantry. The involvement of certain agrarian sectors, political elites, bureaucracy, and other rural actors in civil war needs further analysis (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Vargas, 2017; F. Thomson, 2011). Fourth, land accumulation generates dramatic changes in agrarian societies and agriculture. It has been considered a step toward the development of agrarian capitalism (Carlson, 2018; Marx, 1887). By analyzing the mechanisms through which land is accumulated during civil war, it may be possible to comprehend how capitalism develops in violent settings and how civil war fosters agrarian change. Fifth, identifying how land is accumulated during violent conflict has important implications for building a more equal society post-war in light of two matters. First, the threat of a relapse into war (as high as 50% in the ten years after the finalization of the conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2008)). Second, the persistence of small-scale agriculture and its impact on the livelihoods of rural dwellers.

Based on the case of the armed conflict in Colombia, this paper is a contribution to further our understanding of the five aforementioned issues, by unveiling land-violence-junctions from the identification of both the methods for dispossessing land and the different paths toward land dispossession (LD) since the 1980s. The paper advances various interrelated propositions. First, LD bore in apparatuses that encompassed discourses, public policies, legal and illegal methods. We compiled those methods and found that the dispossessors used various configurations of at least 50 different techniques. This is particularly important, because one would assume that given the armed conflict setting, the use of violence to dispossess land would prevail over other methods. By contrast, LD in Colombia shows that while brutal acts of physical violence were widespread to usurp land, legitimation through discourses and public policies, on the one hand, and legalization through institutions of private property, on the other, were critical to complete LD in the context of the war. Particularly the discourses were constructed around a policy narrative of capitalism, the economic system based on markets, privatization, and accumulation (Harvey, 2004a), as the only possible way (or at least the best one) to reach progress. Against widespread ideas of civil war as chaotic and irrational, the methods implemented

for LD in Colombia demonstrate that actors use violence strategically and develop refined strategies to profit from opportunities that arise during the conflict.

Second, the civil war triggered opportunistic behavior in various actors of Colombian society leading them to seize land. Specially certain sectors of the agrarian elites were prone to use violence or take advantage of it to defend or expand their privileges during the civil war. Exposing a dark side of social capital, LD was possible due to alliances between specific sectors of the agrarian elites and right-wing paramilitary militias, public officers, and political elites, connecting local to national agendas. The disposition to use or take advantage of violence, implement their political and social connections, or manipulate law to legalize usurped land, were characteristic of the involvement of these sectors in LD, as the mechanisms implemented for doing so illustrate.

Third, land accumulation in civil war is an issue of land control, understood as "practices that fix or consolidate forms of access, claiming and exclusion" from land (Peluso & Lund, 2011, p. 668) beyond the military aspect. This means that LD was a political process grounded in power structures that dictate what actors have the right to resources and how they can profit from them. When intersected with agrarian structures, the power structures potentiate rural inequality because the control over the land and its resources in agrarian societies means the control of people and their livelihoods (Boone, 2014; Peluso & Lund, 2011). LD reinforced these dynamics of inequality by favoring the dispossessors to the detriment of vulnerable rural communities and individuals. The state underpinned these power structures because, despite being a contested arena among several social groups, it assisted the legalization and legitimation of LD by passively or actively endorsing dispossession. For instance, the state stood by different discourses that legitimized LD, or facilitated the legalization of stolen land through its bureaucracy and the institutions of property rights.

Finally, land accumulation is more a result than a precondition of the civil war, boosting the disparity of land distribution. The widespread belief that the extremely unequal land-distribution in Colombia caused peasant grievances and fuelled violence simplifies the dynamics between land and conflict. This entails a change in the narrative of the Colombian armed conflict, recognizing that civil war, in terms of land distribution, has more benefit to certain sectors of the agrarian elites than the sectors of the peasantry who initiated it.

2. Study Area

2.1. Why Colombia?

The protracted armed conflict in Colombia left a grievous imbalance. Colombia is the country with the largest internal forced displacement worldwide, with more than eight million people fleeing from their homes, 9.4 million victims since 1985, and more than 260,000 casualties since 1964 (CNMH, 2018b; Registro Único de Víctimas, 2019). At least 6.5 million hectares changed hands or were abandoned in the context of the armed conflict. This represents a quarter of all arable land (DANE, 2016). Half of the victims of this phenomenon are peasants with less than three hectares. Only 4% of the victims had plots bigger than fifty hectares. In 56% of the cases, the victimizers were right-wing paramilitary militias, and 15% of the victimizers were communist guerrilla groups. The state has restituted only 5.6% of the land to the original owners (Forjando Futuros, 2019).

At the same time, Colombia holds the ignominious title of being one of the most unequal countries worldwide. The country has the second most unequal land distribution in Latin America, with a Gini index of land distribution of 0.89 (Oxfam, 2017). According to the last Agrarian Census, Colombia has two-million farms spread over 69 million hectares, but the producers, with more than 1,000 hectares (0.2%), control almost 44 million hectares, while smallholders, with less than five hectares (71%), have only 1.88 million hectares (DANE, 2016b). With the exception of the period from 1982-1984, land concentration in Colombia has increased since the 1950s (Berry, 2017).

It has been widely considered that this land distribution structure and the armed conflict were interlinked (CNMH, 2015, 2016; FAO, 2017). Along with the long duration of the conflict, these characteristics make Colombia an excellent case to discern how land and violent conflict relate, specifically, how war alters the agrarian structure. Therefore, we decided to focus on one specific aspect, land dispossession (LD). Concisely, LD refers to land usurpation in the context of armed conflicts. The use of the term LD in Colombia led to the mobilization of academic and social sectors in order to push the state to acknowledge it as one of the most critical aspects of the civil war (Arias Vanegas & Caicedo, 2017). After the demobilization of right-wing paramilitary militias in the second half of the 2000s, the use of the concept increased, favored by the enactment of Law 1448 in 2011 (known as the “victims law”), and the beginning of the peace talks with the communist guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) in 2012. Law 1448 (Art. 74) defined LD as the action through which a person

is deprived arbitrarily of the property, tenancy or occupation of their land, by taking advantage of the context of violence produced by the armed conflict. Literature on LD expanded the definition to consider also cases in which public lands (that in Colombia have distributional purposes for landless peasants) or commons (not only the land but also natural resources on it) were privatized (Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Cárdenas, 2012; Ojeda, 2016). At the core of LD, however, is always a dispute about land control. Additionally, the loss of the land and its consequences for both material and symbolic aspects (e.g., loss of sacred places or social networks) are encompassed in the study of LD, particularly from studies conducted with a focus on feminist geography and political ecology.

LD also provided part of the answer on why the forced displacement, as a process of expulsion of people from the countryside due to the civil war, has been dramatic in Colombia (CNMH, 2015, 2016; Grajales, 2015). While forced displacement did not always result in LD, usurpation of land was in most of the cases preceded by forced displacement (Gutiérrez-Sanin & Vargas-Reina, 2016).

In this scenario, LD as a field of study gained its own terrain in the analysis of the Colombian armed conflict that has tried to grasp the complexity and territorial unevenness of the phenomenon (Arias Vanegas & Caicedo, 2017; Morris, 2017; Ojeda, 2016). To discern the interaction between violence and land, we compiled and analyzed the methods used for dispossessing land by conducting a literature review, in which 68 references were mapped and integrated in order to have a complete panorama of the methods by which land was usurped in the context of the Colombian civil war.

2.2. The Civil War in Colombia

Between 1958 and 1982, violent conflict in Colombia shifted from political to subversive and class-based violence (GMH, 2013; F. Thomson, 2011). In the 1960s, arguing against the narrowness of the political system -co-opted by the conservative and liberal parties-, and social inequity, the most important communist guerrilla groups were created based on the rallying cry “land for the tiller.” Following the recommendations of the US government to counteract the guerrilla threat, the formation of citizens’ security groups became legal between 1968 and 1988 (GMH, 2013).

Since the 1970s, illegal crops (marijuana, and then, coca and opium) thrived in the rural areas (Fajardo, 2018). Drug smuggling was a source of rapid social ascension, giving birth to new agrarian elites that bought large amounts of land for money laundering (Ballvé, 2012; Reyes Posada, 2016). Along with other sectors of the agrarian elites, the narco-traffickers -transformed into landed elites- promoted self-defense groups to cope with guerrilla threats, consisting of extortions and kidnappings. Additionally,

national and multinational companies, sometimes allied with army members, supported paramilitaries as a counter-insurgency strategy (Grajales, 2011, 2013). These groups became the modern paramilitary organizations (Grajales, 2011; Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2014; Reyes Posada, 2016). The use of violence also caused the evictions of peasants from their lands by old and new agrarian elites. Counterinsurgency operations provided justification to this evictions because peasants were strategically stereotyped as guerrilla collaborators. The forced displacement occurring in this period led the Colombian Constitutional Court to acknowledge the year 1980 as the beginning of the contemporary forced displacement (CNMH, 2015).

In 1994, once again civilian security groups were legal under the *Convivir* ("Live together") label. Nonetheless, in 1996, the *Convivir* were declared illegal again and several of them strengthened the paramilitary apparatus. The illegal paramilitary countrywide umbrella organization the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) was founded in 1997 and its plan of territorial expansion began. The AUC gained control of the northern regions of the country and thereafter, moved their forces to the southern areas controlled by communist guerrilla. This maneuver was part of a plan to counteract the rebel groups but also to impose agroindustry and extractive economies, and gain control of the drug trafficking. As a result, the economic and political power of the paramilitary militias strengthened. The subsequent dispute between the illegal armed groups increased violence against civilians, especially from paramilitary forces. Massacres at the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s skyrocketed, producing massive forced displacement, particularly, of rural dwellers (CNMH, 2015; GMH, 2013).

The "success" of the paramilitary strategy after the conformation of the AUC ran in parallel with its high degree of fragmentation (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2014b, 2014a). In addition to its localism, the paramilitary militias were involved in direct confrontations among each other. The paramilitary acted more like a network than a unified organization under one command, and the lower-ranked subordinates had significant discretionary power to rule the areas under their control and to extract rents (CNMH, 2012; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Vargas, 2017).

The concurrence of the paramilitary militias with different national and local actors, ranging from local agrarian elites to the national government and army members, to multinational companies, made massive LD viable. Indeed, the term LD gained specific meaning associated with the impacts of the paramilitary proceeding in different territories of the country, strengthening the links between armed violence, forced displacement, and LD (Finzi, 2017; García-Reyes & Vargas-Reina, 2014; Gutiérrez-Sanin & Vargas-Reina, 2016; Rodríguez-González, 2014). Dispossessors particularly targeted lands granted by the state

through major land distribution processes in the beginning of the 1990s that benefited ethnic communities (black and indigenous communities), and to a lesser extent, mestizo peasants.

From 2003 to 2007, the government held peace talks with the paramilitary militias. Nevertheless, the output of these talks was modest, since the demobilization of the militias was partial, with some paramilitary groups rearming and creating structures similar to criminal bands. These bands challenged the status quo; protected illegal economies based on the taxation of drugs and mining activities; or provided an armed wing to the agrarian elites that were consolidating the power and the land gained during the paramilitary dominion. Therefore, LD continued after 2007, following the incomplete demobilization of the paramilitary militias (GMH, 2013). Criminal bands were considered as being responsible for LD, mainly for drug smuggling purposes (CNMH, 2016). The alliances between the national government and local public officers, with the economic elites (national and foreign), became more evident because the victimizers tried to massively legalize the land previously usurped (CNMH, 2016; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Vargas, 2017; Mercado-Vega, 2016; Peña Huertas, Parada Hernández, & Zuleta Ríos, 2014; Vargas & Uribe, 2017).

3. Methodology

For conducting the literature review (Torraco, 2005), we selected the references following the formal and content criteria specified in Figure 3.



Figure 3 Selection Criteria

.Source: Authors

Figure 4 illustrates the process through which identified literature were filtered to the final 68 references included in this study. Additionally, the Figure includes the sources and type of study.



Figure 4 Flow Diagram

Source: Modification of PRISMA, 2009

To extract the information, we implemented content analysis (Berg, 2001; Ryan & Bernard, n.d.) based on an iterative coding procedure, organizing the initial information on a mind-map and afterwards clustering it into main categories. The categorization of mechanisms for LD contains discourses, public policies (divided into property rights institutions and public policies for fostering specific agribusinesses), and specific methods (with six major variants: legal methods, illegal tricks, illegal methods, physical violence, and irruption into community networks). In addition, through content analysis different paths for LD were traced.

4. Results

This section is divided into two parts. The first sub-section analyzes the paths toward LD by showing the processes at work in LD and addressing specific cases. This offers an overview of how LD occurred, before tackling the specific mechanisms through which LD was possible, schematically compiled in the second part of the results.

4.1. Paths toward Land Dispossession

While the paths toward LD are not strictly distinct, analytically two main paths for usurping land during the Colombian civil war were identified, as Figure 5 shows. The first path related directly to the war. In this case, the use of physical violence as part of the armed conflict was the primary means by which LD was possible (Berman-Arévalo, 2019; Céspedes, 2011; CNMH, 2015, 2016; García-Reyes & Vargas-Reina, 2014; Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2014a; Gutiérrez-Sanin & Vargas-Reina, 2016; Vargas-Reina, 2016b). The use of violence led to the deterioration of the security conditions (without directly threatening owners) or was used directly to evict people from their lands (by threatening or killing the owners). This provoked forced displacement and, consequently, land abandonment (1A – Figure 5). Land abandonment culminated in LD by occupying the land, legalizing it, or both.



Figure 5 Paths to dispossess land in Colombia in the Context of the Civil War

Source: Authors

To consider this first path, it is important to have clarity on the involvement of paramilitary militias in LD. Not all the paramilitary militias engaged in LD and some of them were against this practice (Gutiérrez-Sanin & Vargas-Reina, 2016). However, the most violent manifestation of LD involved paramilitaries. These groups stood by strong political and economic interests. Politically, the paramilitary militias favored the establishment of the state in areas "recovered" from the guerrilla, and allied with public officers and members of the political elite to favor the election of their candidates for local elections through armed coercion (Ballvé, 2013; Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2014a). Economically, they supported specific economic interests favoring agrarian elites or members of their own militias (P. García, 2014; F. Thomson, 2011), as Vicente Castaño, a former paramilitary commander, claimed:

> The idea is to take rich people to invest in those kinds of projects [e.g. agribusiness or extractive economies] in different parts of the country. By taking the rich to these zones, the institutions of the state also arrive. Unfortunately, the institutions of the state only back those things when the rich are there. So you have to take the rich to all those regions of the country [isolated and with weak state presence] and that's a mission shared by all the [paramilitary] commanders (Ballvé, 2013, p. 68).

The case of Urabá illustrates the alliances between the paramilitary militias, the state, and the agrarian elites for LD. In this area, the paramilitary commander Freddy Rendón displayed several strategies to

cope with the "guerrilla threat" and to allow the functioning of the state in response to requests from the local elites (Ballvé, 2012; Vargas-Reina, 2016b). Implementing the counterinsurgent formula "clear, hold and build", the paramilitaries gained this region from the insurgency (cleared it) and secured it (hold it), and then started to hold trainings to gain support for its cause at the community level (building) (Ballvé, 2012). With the civilian boards *Juntas de Acción Comunal* (civilians' organizations promoted by the state in the 1950s with a widespread presence in the Colombian rural areas), the paramilitary built roads and infrastructure. However, this was not a smooth process. Indeed, in the "clear" stage, the paramilitary massacred tens of peasants accusing them of being guerrilla sympathizers, forcibly displaced thousands of people, stole land, and violently protected the agribusiness established in the area (mainly banana, and afterward, oil palm). During the "hold" and "build" stages, the paramilitaries guaranteed the election of their allied candidates for the local positions (mainly mayors) using violence and intimidation against the voters, and allowed the establishment of state agencies in the area through local offices and bureaucracy. Additionally, the decentralization process, implemented in Colombia at the end of the 1980s, helped the consolidation of both the paramilitary and state's presences. Since the decentralization includes the democratic election of governmental positions in the municipalities and departments (formerly in hands of the president of the republic), and the transfer of administrative functions and financial resources from the central government to the local, the paramilitaries guaranteed the political control of the area and additional sources of funding. This control allowed the paramilitaries and their promoters to strengthen the presence of the state, legalize the land theft, and maintain and establish agribusiness.

In other cases (1B – Figure 3), land abandonment preceded LD for several years, during which the land remained empty. Individuals or companies took advantage of this situation and appropriated the land without being directly engaged in the use of physical violence during the armed conflict (Finzi, 2017; Gómez, Sánchez-Ayala, & Vargas, 2015; Potter, 2020; Rodríguez-González, 2014; Vargas & Uribe, 2017). Nonetheless, taking into account the war context in the rural areas, these individuals or companies were considered guilty of usurping land, since they had to verify that the land they were appropriating did not belong to displaced individuals or communities. A variation of this trajectory of LD was land abandonment followed by multiple transfers between different subsequent owners. After several years, the LD completed (whether by material possession (by occupying the land) or legal dispossession (by obtaining property tiles)) (CNMH, 2016; García-Reyes & Vargas-Reina, 2014; Mercado-Vega, 2016; Ordoñez, 2012).

A case in point is the municipality of Mapiripán in the department of Meta. In 1997, the Bloc Centauros of the AUC massacred tens of peasants accusing them of collaborating with the communist guerrilla

FARC-EP. The massacre resulted in the forced displacement of around 1,300 peasants (Rodríguez-González, 2014). It was not until 2007 that the state enacted mechanisms for the protection of the lands abandoned by the displaced peasants (Finzi, 2017). The Municipal Committee of Protection of Displaced Populations of Mapiripán banned transactions on the lands of those peasants. However, the mayor of Mapiripán lifted the precautionary measures, paving the way for developing oil palm monocropping by several companies, including the multinational Poligrow, an Italian company with branches in several Latin-American countries. Poligrow was able to grab more than 7,000 hectares of land that belonged to displaced peasants and were used by the indigenous community Sikuani as communal lands and sacred places. A good will campaign supporting Poligrow was run by FEDEPALMA (the national guild of oil palm growers), the state agency Procolombia (promoting international trade and investment in Colombia), and the Poligrow Foundation (at the local level, with projects of infrastructure provision in the municipality). The company, therefore, was presented as a model of investment in conservationism through oil palm cropping, which, the rhetoric continuous, provides a solution for climate change and the need for environmentally friendly energies. The campaign ran in parallel with legal processes against the company for LD and threats to land claimants presumably made by Poligrow's agents.

The second path (2 – Diagram 3) was related indirectly to the civil war and the use of physical violence that war involves. Contrarily, strategies of pacification produced LD. In these cases, adjudication of land to private businesses favored dispossession (2A) (Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Ojeda, 2012). Land was taken away from smallholders and ethnic communities to facilitate these projects, or the project was an excuse to legalize land previously usurped, with the approval of state agencies (Ballvé, 2012, 2013; CNMH, 2018a; P. García, 2014; Grajales, 2013, 2015; Lombana-Reyes, 2012; Morris, 2017; Osorio Pérez, 2015).

In the aforementioned case of Urabá, before their demobilization but also as part of peacebuilding strategies post-demobilization, paramilitary commanders founded associations that were supposed to be community associations or promoters of community projects which included land donations to smallholders (CNMH, 2015; Morris, 2017; Reyes Posada, 2016; Vargas-Reina, 2016b, 2016a). Nevertheless, the land in question was land previously usurped. Moreover, the paramilitary groups controlled its use and their members possessed the deeds. These associations received funds from state programs to promote agribusiness (particularly oil palm), but also, small scale agriculture (cocoa and fish farming), as a pacification strategy (Ballvé, 2012, 2013; P. García, 2014; Grajales, 2013, 2015; Lombana-Reyes, 2012).

These cases could eventually be molded into business models such as contract farming (and victims of LD ended up working in their stolen lands); in other cases, business models attempted to promote specific crops and activities as pacification strategies without the involvement of demobilized members of the paramilitary forces (Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Cárdenas, 2012; Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017; Montenegro-Perini, 2017). These projects entailed specific goals that changed the land use and traditional agricultural techniques. This generated restrictions to local communities that the literature recognized as a way of dispossession, because the "beneficiaries" lost the control and the power to decide both the land use and the mode of production.

These two paths (1 and 2) could also lead to restrictions to mobility that the literature considers in its own right as LD (Arias Vanegas & Caicedo, 2017; Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Cárdenas, 2012; Hoffmann, 2010; Ojeda, 2012; Vanegas, 2017). Nevertheless, this can provoke decisions to abandon the land, with the ulterior completion of process of LD (Ojeda, Petzl, Quiroga, Rodríguez, & Rojas, 2015).

While LD could culminate in the occupation of the land, the efforts to legalize land after material dispossession were notable in the case of Colombia. In some cases, the dispossessor legalized the land even before its occupation (CNMH, 2016; Mercado-Vega, 2016; Quinche, 2016).

4.2. Mechanisms for Dispossessing Land

The mechanisms implemented for LD were both legal and illegal. We organized those mechanisms schematically into three main categories: discourses, public policies, and specific methods (which include six major variants). Discourses (or the partial meanings assigned to reality (Escobar, 1999; Sharp & Richardson, 2001)) aimed mainly at legitimizing LD, whereas the specific methods intended to directly occupy and/or legalize the land usurped. Public policies, on the other hand, fulfill both functions: legitimization and legalization. The mechanisms entailed, consequently, the use of physical and symbolic violence, the last one, aiming at facilitating the acceptance of power relations by the dominant, perpetuating power structures.

Discourses and public policies were combined with specific methods, and in several cases the dispossessors used different methods simultaneously, functioning in a similar way to an apparatus, as conceptualized by Foucault according to Ballvé (2013). "The concept of an apparatus is precisely premised on how discourses, policies, institutions, practices, and tactics around a particular problem […] become mutually interdependent" (p. 67). These apparatuses served both the legitimation and legalization of LD. The legitimation justified LD as necessary and even desirable for economic progress,

particularly, for the development of agrarian capitalism. The legalization based on private property, market forces, and accumulation, transformed the land dispossessed into a right for the dispossessors in the eyes of the state. Therefore, LD was possible due to the implementation of an apparatus that included a legal and illegal facet.

This means that LD was a systematic and complex process of opportunistic behavior in the context of the armed conflict many times upheld by legal institutions (Grajales, 2011; Gutiérrez-Sanin & Vargas-Reina, 2016; Peña Huertas et al., 2014; Vargas & Uribe, 2017). This is not to say that a particular discourse will end up justifying dispossession *per se*. A mediation is necessary: only through actors and the ways in which they utilized and customized these discourses, actions of LD can be materialized in specific methods. These methods are sometimes sustained by public policies, becoming legitimate. The same is applicable to public policies and some specific methods, demonstrating that the mediation of particular actors is required. These points become clearer by considering that, at the core of the main discourses legitimizing LD, is the development discourse.

a. Discourses and Public Policies

The Development Discourse

Development constitutes a discourse that displays progress as equivalent to material advancement, reducing the social, political, and cultural realms to the economic imperative of growth, which can only be achieved through the installation of capitalism (Escobar, 1999, 2007). By equalizing progress and capitalism, the development discourse suppresses contending views and consequently, the political debate on capitalism, because it is assumed that everybody agrees on both the necessity and desirability of progress, endured by three pillars: markets, private property regimes, and accumulation (Escobar, 2007; Harvey, 2004b). This discourse devises markets as regulatory forces that are apparently neutral and fairly accessible to all interested actors, triggering the conversion of all kind of material and even immaterial things into merchandise subject to exchange in the market. The commodification of both nature and humans is the zenith of the marketization process (Cotula, 2013; Ojeda, 2012). Profit seeking and accumulation are also a necessity, since only through them is the reinvestment that can keep the engine of progress running possible. Finally, private property regimes define who has access to property and the principles to do so, which imply allocation of resources that includes certain individuals but also excludes others from the use and distribution of the wealth generated (Boone, 2014). The development of these three pillars is only possible through a favoring legislation enacted by the state, which plays an

active role in ensuring the capitalistic system (Ballvé, 2012; Grajales, 2015; Peña-Huertas et al., 2017; Poulantzas, 2007; Vargas & Uribe, 2017).

Displaying a coherent narrative on how the Colombian countryside should look like, the development discourse is at the core of the legitimation of LD practices and dovetails with subsidiary discourses or policy narratives, which establish "causal stories that suggest a course of action and a desirable outcome" (Grajales, 2020). An agrarian capitalism path in which agroindustry, large-scale plantations, and eco-tourism dominate the rural economies, were framed from technical discourses emerging from states' technocrats and backed by landed elites and agro-businesspersons as the most suitable and rational option, depoliticizing the debate on agrarian policies and marginalizing small scale agriculture (Cardona, 2015; Ojeda, 2012; F. Thomson, 2011; Uribe Kaffure, 2014). We identified three subsidiary discourses, divided into eight additional discourses. The labels used to name them show the ways in which discourses around capitalism under the aegis of development have evolved and adapted to legitimize LD, particularly since the 1990s.

Capitalism expansion in developing countries

1. Neoliberalism. Under this discourse, it is considered that the state should minimize its intervention in the market, allowing the latter to develop its self-regulating conditions to attract investment (local and foreign) fundamental for economic growth and the well-being of the population. To do so, "deregulation, decentralization and privatization" were critical to guarantee integration into the world markets and the development of the Colombian economy (by eliminating taxation for imported products and specialization in certain commodities demanded by strategic markets such as US, Europe, or China) (Peña Huertas et al., 2014; Puyana & Costantino, 2015).
2. Agroindustry as the only manner to bring development and economic wealth to the countryside. A materialization of this discourse were "Productive alliances" (a label for contract farming), which became a public policy in 1998. This discourse portrays small farmers and particularly ethnic communities as backwards and even lazy, endangering progress and the modernization of agriculture (Haymes, 2018; Hernández Reyes, 2019; Reyes Posada, 2016). Consequently, they could contribute to development only if they ally with agroindustry. The entrepreneurship, understood as the capacity to manage the farms in a capitalistic way, is considered fundamental

to be competitive in the markets (Peña Huertas, Parada Hernández, & Zuleta Ríos, 2014). The productive alliances also allowed the development of agribusiness in communal lands of black communities which are inalienable under the Colombian law (Baquero Melo, 2014; Cárdenas, 2012; Grajales, 2013; Hoffmann, 2010).

3. Marginal/Peripheral areas or Agrarian Frontiers, "which portrays the spaces as 'vacant' and 'open' for colonization" (Grajales, 2020, p. 1). In Colombia, there were areas supposedly inhabited where the agroindustry could expand the agrarian frontier and bring economic development (Calle Alzate, 2017; CNMH, 2015; Finzi, 2017; Grajales, 2013; Hoffmann, 2010; Osorio Pérez, 2015).

4. Adaptation of capitalism

    a. Green capitalism. A "major paradigm shift in matters of resource management, conservation, and environmental responsibility" generating value from non-extractive activities and "adaptations of extractive capitalism (…) selectively turned green" (Cárdenas, 2012, p. 313). Consequently, capitalism was displayed as the only way to fight climate change and environmental destruction, mainly through conservationism and sustainable development (Finzi, 2017; Ojeda, 2012; Ojeda & Camargo, 2017; Uribe-Castro, 2014). Green capitalism expresses in different manners:

        i. The necessity to have clean-energy sources and Colombia as a leader in their production (Baquero Melo, 2014; Cárdenas, 2012).

        ii. Taking advantage of natural resources and the paradisiac places of the country, in order to promote tourism projects, thus boosting the local economy (Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Montenegro-Perini, 2017).

        iii. Green multiculturalism as the articulation of green capitalism and neoliberal multiculturalism, as a way in which neoliberalism governance carved cultural difference through multicultural policies (e.g. collective land rights for indigenous and black communities (Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Montenegro-Perini, 2017)), resulting in the formation of "green capitalists" out of those communities (Cárdenas, 2012). This discourse entails a racialized narrative in which indigenous and black communities are depicted as cohesive groups that can stand for a cultural

and social identity. This resulted in the assignation of the eco-guardian role to these communities (facilitating the control of their land as well, e.g., by imposing environmental or eco-touristic projects) (Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Cárdenas, 2012; Hoffmann, 2010; Montenegro-Perini, 2017; Ojeda, 2012; Ojeda & Camargo, 2017).

b. Grassroots development. Bottom-up alternatives to development, based on "capacity building, grassroots participation, decentralization and sound environmental practices" (Ballvé, 2013, p. 63), usually made through development projects sponsored by the local government and/or foreign and multilateral cooperation agencies and canalized by NGOs.

<u>Pacification of the territory for modernization</u> (Grajales, 2013; Hoffmann, 2010)

1. Counterinsurgency. This discourse expressed the necessity to defeat the guerrilla groups and all their manifestations including left-wing parties and organizations to guarantee the security conditions necessary to attract investors. The guerilla was the real threat to economic development (Ballvé, 2012; CNMH, 2015; Lombana-Reyes, 2012; Morris, 2017). Under this discourse, mestizo peasants were labeled as guerrilla collaborators, justifying dispossession.
2. The [myth of] post-conflict and country retaking. The peace agreement with paramilitary groups in 2007 meant a new era in Colombia, allowing foreign and national companies, and businesspersons to invest in rural economic sectors without the risks associated with the armed conflict (Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Ojeda, 2012, 2016; Ojeda et al., 2015).

The partial meanings assigned to reality through discourses aimed at legitimizing LD concurrently displayed coherent practices (e.g., by assigning funds for clean energies because they were considered the only way to fight climate change). However, discourses also obscured certain practices. Considering neoliberalism, for instance, Ojeda (2012) claims that

> neoliberalism has not translated into less state intervention. On the contrary, one can speak of a capitalist state (Jessop 2002) at the service of private capital accumulation. As Peck and Tickell (2002, 400) rightly point out, '[neoliberalism] exists in a self-contradictory way as a form of

‘‘metaregulation,’’ a rule system that paradoxically defines itself as a form of antiregulation (p. 358).

b. Public Policies and Property Rights Institutions

The discourses identified are operative through multiple public policies and laws, divided into those boosting a specific economic model oriented to capitalist expansion, and those directly related to land property institutions[2]. The first group of public policies encompassed the National Development Plan (PND, the four-year period matrix public policy document in Colombia), specific policies such as the CONPES (National Council for Economic and Social Public Policy) documents, and laws prioritizing certain economic sectors.

The most illustrative case in the literature is oil palm, which was addressed in 33 studies (Ávila-Gonzalez, 2015; Baquero Melo, 2014; Goebertus, 2008; Grajales, 2013, 2015; Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017; Vargas & Uribe, 2017). Different policies supported the development of this sector, providing incentives for LD. Law 138 of 1994, for instance, created a fund for the development of oil palm cropping. Decree 2629 of 2007 put forth the compulsory blending quota of 10% for biodiesel made of palm oil. Decree 383 of 2007 created tax-free zones for agrofuels projects. Finally, the Plan Colombia and the Alternative Development Plan promoted oil palm as an alternative to coca growing and as a counterinsurgency strategy sponsored by the US government. Oil palm was framed as a “crop for peace”. Considering the inherent features of oil palm in Colombia and its association with large-scale plantations, these policies benefited large land owners and hastened LD. While not all oil palm plantations were related to LD processes, the area sown sharply increased by more than 400,000 ha between 1990 to 2013 (CNMH, 2016; DANE, 2016; Potter, 2020).

The strategies for prompting oil palm production relied heavily on the Productive Alliance model, which includes loans from the oil palm plantation to smallholders in which the land is the collateral. Since the plantations often paid under the costs of production and do not take responsibility of incidentals (e.g., crop diseases), many peasants lost their land under this model (Ojeda et al., 2015; Reyes-Benavides, 2017). The model also facilitated the legalization of usurped land by paramilitaries and drug lords. These actors established different companies to promote productive alliances and control the land, or installed

[2] The annexes N. 1 to 3 in Pena Huertas et al. (2014) offer a complete summary of the public policies affecting the property rights of the smallholders and reinforcing the inequity between peasants and the elites.

agribusiness, even receiving public funding (P. García, 2014; Grajales, 2013). Finally, the correlation between oil palm expansion and forced displacement would prove that the oil palm industry was involved in LD (Potter, 2020). The National Center of Historic Memory identifies at least eight cases in which the oil palm expansion resulted in LD (CNMH, 2016, p. 467).

The second group of laws and public policies corresponded directly to land property institutions. Table 1 summarizes public policies that the dispossessors took advantage of in order to dispossess land and explains why the literature considered them as facilitators of LD.

Table 1 Institutional design of land property rights facilitating dispossession

Laws / Public policies	Why it facilitates land dispossession?
Processes of formalization of property rights	In private land transfers, the paperwork –including ignorance or confusion about it- and the high cost of the legalization, prevented the formalization of property rights. Therefore, peasants preferred verbal agreements and customary practices for the transactions, but they did not possess a deed. The victimizers took advantage of this situation and legalized land by acquiring property titles (Gómez Hernández, 2009; Gutiérrez Sanín & García Reyes, 2016; Pena-Huertas, Rocio; Zuleta-Rios, 2018; Peña Huertas et al., 2014).
Contradictions between norms and discretion of public officers [since 1991]	In the case of mining zones, for instance, only in the Constitution did different articles collide. The nation owned the subsoil and its products (art. 332) and the public and collective good reasons prevailed to exploit minerals. These prescriptions collided with both the right of landless peasants to access land and the protection of indigenous and black communities' collective lands (valuable due to the natural resources within them). These contradictions allowed the public officers to make discretionary decisions in certain cases facilitating LD (Velasco, 2014).
Processes of formalization of the property of land grants by the beneficiaries [since 1994] (Pena-Huertas, Rocio; Zuleta-Rios, 2018)	Grants of public lands were restricted to peasants without land and cannot surpass the Family Agriculture Unit - UAF, defined according to Relatively Homogeneous Zones – ZRH (Vargas & Uribe, 2017). Therefore, the magnitude of an UAF differed according to the region of the country. The process had three stages: occupation, adjudication, and registration to obtain the property title. The occupation, for instance, must be for 5 years at least (Decree 2664/1994). Additionally, the beneficiaries had to overcome many obstacles to complete the last stage, and most of them do not have property titles, which were a critical factor to legalize LD. a The procedures and their meaning were difficult to understand (many diverse, and disarticulated norms and regulations). b Lack of economic resources to pay the registration costs, the visit (transport and accommodation) of the public officer to verify the information provided by the potential beneficiary when applying, the transport to the nearest registration office by the beneficiary,

	and the registration of the property title in the registration office. c Discretionary adjudication by the public officer. The connections between officers and paramilitary groups, the arbitrary adjudication to individuals who cannot be beneficiaries of public lands, and the reluctance to adjudicate the plots to peasants, were used for LD (Ballvé, 2013; Grajales, 2011; Pena-Huertas, Rocio; Zuleta-Rios, 2018; Peña-Huertas et al., 2017). For the adjudication, it is also necessary that the possible beneficiary did not leave the plot longer than 30 days. The paramilitary groups threatened the beneficiary and afterward, in connivance with the public officers, the INCORA/INCODER* made the visit and the beneficiary was absent, losing the possibility of adjudication (Gutiérrez Sanín & García Reyes, 2016). d If the beneficiary abandoned the land for at least 10 years, the State could revoke the adjudication. Since many people were obliged to leave their lands due to the war, they lost it (Gutiérrez Sanín & García Reyes, 2016; Peña-Huertas et al., 2017).
Law 791/ 2002. Expiration of property rights	The time for the prescription of the property rights was reduced to five years (Pardo, 2012; Peña Huertas et al., 2014). Therefore, to degrade the security situation as much as possible was a strategy to make the farmers leave for enough time for them to lose their property rights even in lands granted as part of agrarian reform (CNRR, 2009). This gave the chance to businesspersons, companies, investors, landed elites, and paramilitary organizations to possess the land or to buy it (meeting the legal requirements in order to have full property rights). In the former case, it was very common to have the support of public officers to legalize the transaction, particularly, from the INCORA/INCODER* (Grajales, 2011). However, this was a possibility as long as the affected did not report the loss of the land (which was not always the case due to threats the victims received from the dispossessors) or the state did not acknowledge the dispossessed as a victim (J. J. R. García, 2010; Gutiérrez-Sanín, Marin Jaramillo, Perdomo Vaca, & Machuca Perez, 2018; Velasco, 2014).
Decree 1300/ 2003	The unification of four institutions (National Institution for Lands Adequacy; National Institution for Fishing and Aquaculture; Fund for the Integral Rural Development; and the Colombian Institute of the Agrarian Reform) into one: the Colombian Institute for Rural Development. This had two effects: the concentration of functions, increasing the discretionary power of the public servants, and the absence of institutional services in certain rural areas (Peña Huertas et al., 2014).
Law 1448/ 2011	The Law was an effort to protect the property rights of the victims. Nevertheless, it recognized victims of LD only after 1991, was not associated to specific goals (number of hectares to return to the real owners), and is in force for only 10 years (as of 2021). In article 99, the law established the restriction of restitution if the land was used at the time of restitution for agroindustry projects. Even if the current owner was not capable of demonstrating the innoxious purchase of the land, the agroindustry project could remain. The Unity for Land Restitution –the agency in charge of the execution of this law- opened a new office

	in 2015 (Team for Environment, Mining, Energy, and Infrastructure) that must approve every restitution sentence to avoid overlapping with mining and infrastructure projects (Gutiérrez-Sanín et al., 2018).
Act 4829/ 2011	This act reverted the burden of proof of having purchased the land in good faith, from the new occupant of the land to the victim, discouraging them from asking for the restitution of their lands.

*Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform (INCORA) that in 2003 was reformed and renamed as the Colombian Institute for Rural Development (INCODER).

Source: Authors

Discourses and public policies favored and legitimized LD as part of the rule of law intrinsic to the state functioning, and as part of the necessity and desirability of development and progress as symptoms of the expansion of capitalism. However, in most of the cases they do not explain how the material and legal dispossession of land took place, processes possible through the specific methods summarized in the next section.

c. Specific Methods for dispossessing Land

Table 2 accounts for the specific methods analyzed in the literature. Most of them complemented others. For instance, the use of violence allowed the purchase of a plot for a very low price, and then, with the help of public officers and multiple sales, the property rights were completely alienated from the original owner. The impunity of crimes related to LD was considerable, generating additional incentives to continue with these kinds of practices (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Vargas, 2017; Uribe Kaffure, 2014). The strategies are divided into those derived from legal methods, pacification strategies, illegal tricks, other illegal methods, physical violence, and irruption into community networks. The implementation of both legal and illegal methods was possible because of the concurrence of public officers supporting victimizers. In the case of physical violence, the literature shows that military units also assisted or facilitated the implementation of violence by paramilitary militias, particularly since the 1990s.

Table 2 Methods of Land Dispossession in Colombia identified by the literature

LEGAL METHODS	
Licenses or concessions by the State	Licenses for resource extraction in lands owned by peasant communities using the public good and interest reasons in cases in which paramilitary militias previously forcibly displaced people (CNMH, 2015, 2016; Vélez Torres, Varela Corredor, Rátiva Gaona, & Salcedo Fidalgo, 2013). If the companies did not reach an agreement with the local communities and landowners that stayed, they had the right to evict them (Velasco, 2014).
State violence through the Army and Police	• Repression of social movements, unions, and protests. • Connivance with paramilitary militias (Ballvé, 2013; Baquero Melo, 2014; Grajales, 2013, 2015) • Participation in eviction of smallholders favoring the dispossessors (Gutiérrez Sanín & García Reyes, 2016). • Ignorance of the reports made by the victims. These strategies discouraged the local population to report crimes or threats, leaving it unprotected, and ultimately leading it to abandon the land (Gutiérrez-Sanín et al., 2018; Lombana-Reyes, 2012).
Aerial glyphosate spraying of coke crops	The state fumigated under counterinsurgency discourses despite the peasants' communities' opposition. Some of them decided to leave to avoid the negative effects on health (Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Mercado-Vega, 2016; Reyes Posada, 2016).
Sales of credits by the Caja Agraria and the INCORA/INCODER * to private organizations	The state sold the debts that some peasants had with the Caja Agraria (a public bank specialized in the rural sector) to private companies or businesspersons, using the plots as collaterals for the loans, even in the case of adjudication of land as part of programs of agrarian reform (Mercado-Vega, 2016; Uribe Kaffure, 2014)
Restitution sentences favoring victimizers	Judges of formal restitution processes recognized the property rights of figureheads or no victims (J. J. R. García, 2010)
PACIFICATION PROJECTS	
Eco-touristic projects	Projects promoting eco-tourism as a way of grassroots development, resulted in the dispossession of peasants that did not have property titles and considered areas as communal lands (Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Montenegro-Perini, 2017; Ojeda, 2012).
Projects post-demobilization of paramilitary militias (Productive Projects for Peace – PPP)	Strategy to facilitate the reincorporation of demobilized paramilitary members. Several of these projects resulted in the legalization and legitimation of LD, additionally using the two next methods (Ballvé, 2013; CNMH, 2018a; Osorio Pérez, 2015)
Associations or Foundations used as façades by the paramilitary	Supposedly community associations or promoters of community projects which included land donations to smallholders (CNMH, 2015; Morris, 2017; Reyes Posada, 2016; Vargas-Reina, 2016b, 2016a). However, paramilitary militias controlled the land and their members had the deeds (Ballvé, 2012, 2013; P. García, 2014; Grajales, 2013, 2015; Lombana-Reyes, 2012; Quinche, 2016). The

	method was used before and after the demobilization of the paramilitary militias.
Contract farming ("Productive alliances" – legal name in Colombia	• Signed in a highly unequal context favoring the interests of the landed elites and companies (Ávila-Gonzalez, 2015; Ballvé, 2012; Cárdenas, 2012; CNMH, 2016; Marin-Burgos & Clancy, 2017; Ojeda et al., 2015). • Used to keep the monocrops and plantations in lands restituted to the real owners (smallholders) by offering to pay their rent in order to keep the current land use, thereby perpetuating monocropping (Peña Huertas et al., 2014; Potter, 2020; Vargas & Uribe, 2017).
ILLEGAL TRICKS	
Transactions on public lands without meeting the legal requirements	Sale of public lands adjudicated without the permission of the INCORA/INCODER or with the implication of public officers (CNMH, 2016; Uribe Kaffure, 2014).
Regular transactions	• Predatory pricing or not paying (CNMH, 2016; García-Reyes & Vargas-Reina, 2014; Gutiérrez Sanín & García Reyes, 2016; Lombana-Reyes, 2012; Mercado-Vega, 2016; Peña-Huertas et al., 2017; Peña Huertas et al., 2014; Quinche, 2016; Reyes-Benavides, 2017; Reyes Posada, 2016; Vargas-Reina, 2016b; Vargas & Uribe, 2017). While it intends to legalize a transaction, this can cause injury (when the price paid is the half of the right price) which makes a transaction illegal under Colombian law (CNRR, 2009). • Opportunistic individuals took advantage of the violent situation or knew in advance about deposits or natural resources in the area (e.g. coal) and bought the land at unreasonable prices. Afterwards, the land was sold above the commercial real estate appraisal (Mercado-Vega, 2016; Velasco, 2014). • Changing the name of the plots and registration number to make it difficult to trace the record of transactions (CNMH, 2015) • Vitiated consent or pressures on the seller that resulted in unwanted transactions. In 1959, violence was recognized as a cause of vitiated consent of the seller (CNMH, 2015, 2018a), because the seller must accept the terms imposed and sell the land even if s/he did not want to (Peña-Huertas et al., 2017; Reyes Posada, 2016; F. Thomson, 2011). Vitiated consent, however, makes the transaction illegal (Quinche, 2016). • Purchases of land without checking whether the land was legally acquired or it was the land of victims of forced displacement, which have precautionary measures to prevent any kind of transaction without authorization of the Municipal Committee of Protection of Displaced Population (CNMH, 2016; Finzi, 2017; Hurtado & Pereira, 2011; Mercado-Vega, 2016). Usually, the buyer tried to prove that they acquired the land innoxiously. • Purchases of lands before registration of precautionary measures for land abandoned by victims of the armed conflict (CNMH, 2016).
Land aggregation	• Purchases of adjacent lands using the methods described, changing the land tenure structure in the regions (from small and medium holders to landed elites; or various plots for one person). Legally, after the purchases, the land was aggregated (Ballvé, 2013; J. J. R. García, 2010; Mercado-Vega, 2016; Quinche, 2016). • Arguing Natural accession. "Enlargement of a property due to biophysical changes in the land" (Ballvé, 2013). Peasants that had less than 50 ha, extended their properties by

	thousands of ha due to the "changing course of an adjacent river", enlarging the property. The process was done before a notary and paramilitary militias were behind the operation. Then, the paramilitaries divided the land and sold it to agribusiness companies. • Enclosure of public lands adjacent to parcels under the private property regime, exceeding the UAF in areas affected by the armed conflict (Uribe Kaffure, 2014). • Enclosure of adjacent plots of displaced people (Reyes Posada, 2016) or done simply by moving the fences (Lombana-Reyes, 2012; Reyes-Benavides, 2017).
Accumulation of public lands (a crime in Colombia)	Done in areas affected by the war, restraining access to water provisioning, timber, or fishing to rural communities. • Individuals/companies who could not be beneficiaries of public lands but received them and legalized property rights (with the support of public officers) or bought former public lands above the UAF (which was illegal after 1994 (with the enactment of Law 160) (CNMH, 2016; Finzi, 2017; Mercado-Vega, 2016)). • To avoid accumulation of public lands individuals/companies entitled the land to different people (usually individuals that could not be beneficiaries of public land adjudication) or created multiple legal societies (Uribe Kaffure, 2014; Vargas & Uribe, 2017).
Fraud in documents	• Falsification of property rights (false property certificates) (Grajales, 2013; Mercado-Vega, 2016; Uribe Kaffure, 2014; Vargas-Reina, 2016b). • Falsification of the signatures of public officers and legal owners, including communal lands (Ballvé, 2013; Grajales, 2015) • Acquiring land "by purchasing property that had been registered under individual title deeds before the collective lands entitlement, in the name of members of the black communities or of recently arrived mestizo migrants" (Grajales, 2013, p. 224). • Powers of Attorneys. Attorneys with false letters made transactions on behalf of legal tenants to favor those responsible for LD. Sometimes the owners were already dead (Ballvé, 2012, 2013; Finzi, 2017; García-Reyes & Vargas-Reina, 2014; Vargas-Reina, 2016b). These powers were also used for massive land transactions that benefited single individuals (CNMH, 2016). • Falsification in property sentences (CNMH, 2016; Uribe Kaffure, 2014). • Forcing the owner to sign blank pages to use it in the transactions (CNMH, 2015; CNRR, 2009; Quinche, 2016)
Use of figureheads	• The property was entitled to relatives or acquaintances of the group or individuals implicated in - - LD (Peña-Huertas et al., 2017; Quinche, 2016; Reyes Posada, 2016; Rodríguez-González, 2014). This resulted in the legalization of the dispossession due to the principle of opportunity, favoring third parties that have the deeds (Art. 324, Law 906 of 2004 and Art. 41, Decree 3391 of 2006) (Gómez Hernández, 2009). • Victims remained as owners in the property titles under threats of paramilitary members, to

	avoid further investigation (J. J. R. García, 2010) • Figureheads of paramilitaries were beneficiaries of land distribution programs by the INCODER (Quinche, 2016)
Payment of credits/debts	Dispossessors paid the debts of the owner (Reyes Posada, 2016) and took possession of the land or legalized property rights, supported by the receipts of the payments and/or by intimidating the owners (CNMH, 2016; García-Reyes & Vargas-Reina, 2014; Gutiérrez Sanín & García Reyes, 2016; Uribe Kaffure, 2014). A false auction for foreclosure was also used as a method to legalize the land (Mercado-Vega, 2016).
Multiple sales or transfers creating a clean record for the final owner	To clear the story of the acquisitions and to obscure the process of dispossession. In the end, an agrarian elite member, a businessperson, a company, or a paramilitary member, purchased the land (García-Reyes & Vargas-Reina, 2014; Vargas-Reina, 2016b). A variation is the transfer of property rights (Mercado-Vega, 2016; Ordoñez, 2012).
Iterative parcellations	One plot is divided, assigning to each new parcel a new registration number, making hard to identify the conditions of the original property (Ballvé, 2013; CNMH, 2016).
Projects without the acquiescence of the ethnic groups	Within lands recognized as collective property of ethnic groups, the state or companies must consult the communities whether they agree or not to the implementation of natural resource-extraction projects or changes in the land use, prior to the approval of those projects. In many cases, the state did not consult or did not assure that the concessionaire obtained the acquiescence of ethnic groups and issues licenses/concessions in areas affected by the war (Finzi, 2017).
Testimonies in the process of paramilitaries demobilization ("Justice and Peace")	• The members of paramilitary militias in most of the cases remained silent regarding their responsibility in LD (J. J. R. García, 2010). • The lands reported as paramilitary properties designated to become part of the funds to compensate victims were non-existent or occupied when the authorities went to the places to verify the validity of the report (J. J. R. García, 2010). • In 2008 several commanders of paramilitary militias were extradited to the US –under charges of drug smuggling- interrupting the justice process in Colombia and the revelation of the truth about their crimes, particularly those associated with LD (CNMH, 2015).
Opposition to the restitution processes	• Opposition by members of the agrarian elite who felt their rights were jeopardized by Law 1448/2011 (Table I). • Figureheads presented themselves as victims (Gutiérrez-Sanín et al., 2018).
OTHER ILLEGAL METHODS	
Possession of private lands and common lands	• Occupation and use of the land without any legal transaction. • Occupation of the land with sympathizers of the paramilitary groups (Quinche, 2016). • Expansion of properties in communal lands used for fishing, grazing, cropping, water provisioning, etc. (Finzi, 2017; Ojeda et al., 2015). The land was occupied with livestock, for instance (Calle Alzate, 2017). According to law 160 of 1994, the state could only grant these areas to poor peasants and fishers (art. 70) (CNMH, 2016). • Transactions on lands that belonged to black communities. These lands were inalienable

	and the law forbade transactions. However, dispossessors made possession on the land through e.g., oil palm plantations, and thereafter tried to obtain the deeds by threatening community leaders, or convincing some of them to sell (CNRR, 2009; Grajales, 2015).
Alliance with public servants and notaries	Public officers of INCORA/INCODER*, Registration offices and Notaries, mainly, but also Mayors, municipal councilors, and judges (CNMH, 2015, 2016; Gutiérrez Sanín & García Reyes, 2016; Peña Huertas et al., 2014). These servants: • Overlooked the rules regarding the registration of every observation established in the Law 160/1994 and gave property titles when transactions did not meet legal requirements. • Did not consider or illegally lifted the precautionary measures on abandoned land, and registered land for victimizers (Finzi, 2017; Mercado-Vega, 2016). • Assisted the expropriation of land previously adjudicated to landless peasants through the INCORA/INCODER*, and recognized as new tenants former paramilitaries or sympathizers (Quinche, 2016).
Fires	• Setting fires to registration offices that held property titles to impede tracing the different transactions (a strategy used by paramilitary militias) (CNRR, 2009; J. J. R. García, 2010). • Setting fires to houses and other belongings of original owners (CNRR, 2009).
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE	
Physical violence	• Massacres, assassinations, threats ("Or you leave, or I will buy the land from your widow"), exile for collaboration with the enemy) (Ballvé, 2012; Berman-Arévalo, 2019; Finzi, 2017; Gutiérrez Sanín & García Reyes, 2016; Hoffmann, 2010; Lombana-Reyes, 2012; Mercado-Vega, 2016; Morris, 2017; Ojeda et al., 2015; Ordoñez, 2012). • Invitations to meetings with paramilitary militias (for all the inhabitants of a municipality or rural district). When people returned to their farms, paramilitaries were there taking possession of the land (CNMH, 2016; CNRR, 2009). • Forced displacement. In some cases forced displacement was directly a form of LD (Grajales, 2011, 2013, 2015; Mercado-Vega, 2016; Reyes Posada, 2016), while in others forced displacement facilitated dispossession but the main objective was unrelated with LD (Finzi, 2017; Rodríguez-González, 2014; Vargas & Uribe, 2017). • Assassination of investigators and public servants who revealed the illegal methods used to dispossess land (CNRR, 2009). • After the demobilization process of the paramilitary militias, neo-paramilitaries and private security groups threatened rural communities and members to forcibly displace them and usurp their lands, or to prevent them from mobilizing in the areas grabbed for monocropping (Finzi, 2017; Ojeda, 2016; Ojeda et al., 2015). • A variation is workers from the companies or agribusiness persons, threatening the communities and their members or damaging the crops and belongings of the community members (Gómez et al., 2015).
Gender violence	Rapes, induced abortion (to prevent "the seed" of the collaborators of the enemies spread), clearing the land and easing LD (Céspedes, 2011; CNRR, 2009).

IRRUPTION INTO THE COMMUNITY NETWORKS	
Cooptation of community leaders /Division of the communities	• Dividing communities into those that wanted to access the benefits offered by the company or the government, and those that wanted either compensation or to remain in a contestant position to agribusiness or extraction projects. • Bribing community members and leaders, offering other benefits to agree with the transactions. (Baquero Melo, 2014; García-Reyes & Vargas-Reina, 2014; Grajales, 2013; Hoffmann, 2010; Osorio Pérez, 2015; Vargas-Reina, 2016a)
Threats or Assassinations of community leaders or members	• In negotiations for agribusiness projects in communal lands (Grajales, 2013) or private lands owned by rural communities (Caicedo, 2017). • Leaders of land distribution and restitution processes, and territorial defense to discourage the community to continue contesting or occupying the land (Berman-Arévalo, 2019; Lombana-Reyes, 2012; Mercado-Vega, 2016; Morris, 2017).

Source: Authors

5. Discussion

5.1. Methods for Land Dispossession: Implications for Land Accumulation and Land Grabbing in Other Contexts

LD in Colombia shows the complexity of land accumulation in civil war settings. Contrary to common wisdom, land accumulation did not exclusively profit from the use of physical violence, even when the perception of chaos attached to civil war offered a smokescreen for LD. The importance of methods used for legitimizing and legalizing dispossession demonstrates that actors justify their actions by framing them in broader discourses connected with property institutions and economic development that favored certain sectors while neglecting others. Complementary, in order to dispossess land, actors connected local and national agendas, and social linkages between public servants, armed actors, and agrarian elites were activated. These networks, as sources of social capital (understood as aspects of the social structure that enhance cooperation), shows the "dark side" of social capital (Cox & (Ed), 2009; McDoom, 2014). Without the high levels of cooperation between those actors, LD probably would have been more difficult.

Actors implicated in LD were also able to bridge and assign new meanings to different discourses, public policies, and legal institutions that did not justify nor legalize land usurpation *per se*. In this sense, the

actors created narratives that allowed them to accumulate land and reinforce rural inequality. This is not to underestimate the importance of violence in LD. Violence was used directly for usurping land, and created a vicious circle of opportunities and incentives for continuing its implementation. Nevertheless, its use was strategic and endured by other mechanisms.

The concept of narratives in public policy is useful to discern how actors strategically utilized discourses and public policy. The study of policy narratives has been devoted usually to issues that do not challenge the limits of legality. The methods for dispossessing land, however, created a fuzziness between legality and illegality that exploited the civil war setting. Policy narratives are stories (with a beginning, a middle, and an end) referring to contested portions of the reality that determine the causes of a problem and attach corresponding solutions by identifying villains (the producers of the problem), heroes (those who can solve the problem), or victims (those who are affected by the problem) (Jones & McBeth, 2010). These narratives are organized around discourses and derive scripts defining courses of action materialized in public policies. Development and the subsidiary discourses LD was built on, depicted the peasantry (the villains) as guerrilla collaborators, and consequently, as jeopardizing progress in rural areas; or agrarian capitalism as the only way of progress (undermining traditional agriculture), turned in public policies that fostered certain economic sectors (agri-businesspersons as the "heroes" of the story) and protected the institutions of individual private property.

These have implications for the study of both civil war and land grabbing in other scenarios. Civil war can transform into a social project in which violence becomes strategic, power structures reinforced, and identities of vulnerable rural sectors transformed to legitimize agrarian injustice (Cederman & Vogt, 2017; Korf, Engeler, & Hagmann, 2010; Peters & Richards, 2011; Verwimp, 2011).

Concerning land grabbing, the similarities in the methods of LD in the Colombian civil war to settings in which widespread violence is non-existent points to the underlying dynamics of this phenomenon. In this sense, Thomson (2014) has developed the concept of land-grabbing-induced displacement, in which development, disaster, and conflict-induced migration, may hide the interest for usurping land. In these cases, the threefold classification of forced migration is insufficient and misleading. This is not to say that forced displacement in civil war and in other contexts is identical, but to signal their main commonality: the land. The sophistication of methods used for dispossessing land in Colombia and the role of the state are indications that shared dynamics are at work in different processes of land grabbing including civil war and other scenarios (Borras, Franco, Gómez, Kay, & Spoor, 2012; Klem & Kelegama, 2020; Wolford, Borras, Hall, Scoones, & White, 2013).

5.2. Land Control and the State

The state is not a monolithic institution completely captured by economic elites, but rather a conflicting arena in which different narratives may coexist even in contradiction. Nevertheless, the state represents a moment of suspension of the political debate through the institutions it upholds (Arditi, 1995; Laclau & Mouffe, 1987). Because agrarian structures are social relations (Boone, 2014), they are embedded in power structures that may have detrimental effects on vulnerable social groups while benefiting others. The state becomes a major player in ensuring equity, or on the contrary, injustice around agrarian disputes.

Although the oversimplification of the role of the state in LD is misleading -several authors recognized state intervention through some laws and agencies, such as the supreme courts and the ombudsman office, in preventing LD (Berry, 2014; CNMH, 2015; Grajales, 2011; Vargas & Uribe, 2017)-, its involvement in facilitating the implementation of LD mechanisms was pivotal. The transactions that eased dispossession were possible by the existence of the state because it provided an arena of legalization and legitimation of LD. Actively, the state expedited LD by different means. For instance, by backing specific discourses favoring the capitalistic path of economic progress, enacting laws and public policies endorsing agrarian capitalism and the agendas of landed elites, legalizing usurped land with the assistance of local and national political elites, and supporting paramilitary militias with the purpose of displacing people and "clearing the land" from insurgent groups and sympathizers.

Passively, the state provided a set of institutional arrangements that facilitated LD by other actors, such as the prevalence of the private property regime and the necessity to legalize the land to ensure property rights. Those arrangements ignored other forms of property (e.g. communal lands of peasants without ethnic affiliation) and the impossibility for smallholders to legalize the land either because of ignorance of the procedure or the high cost of legalization (Berry, 2014; CNMH, 2016; Pena-Huertas, Rocio; Zuleta-Rios, 2018). The ignorance and high-costs of privatization discouraged smallholders from formalizing their property rights, making it difficult to have an updated cadaster and creating a situation of high informality in which customary laws or purchase contracts among the parties -not legalized before a notary- dominated the land transactions. Although it was not always the case, beneficiaries of LD took advantage of this situation to legalize the land as their own. Victimizers evicted smallholders that usually did not have deeds from their lands, making the process to prove their rights difficult. Grajales (2011) concludes that "armed violence becomes institutional violence when public institutions of property rights enforcement recognize grabbed land" (p. 772).

5.3. Complementing the Land-Violence Nexus and the Agrarian Explanation of the Civil War in Colombia

Colombian war has been widely recognized as a conflict with deep agrarian roots, meaning that land and violence were interlinked. The interpretation of this relationship places the cause of the conflict in land accumulation by agrarian elites, causing grievances among peasants that turned violent. This gave birth to a narrative for the civil war, such that it was painted as a war motivated by social justice that blurred overtime due to different factors (the spurring drug economies since the 1970s being the most prominent). The peasants' grievances explanation is not exclusive to the Colombian case, but has an important trajectory explaining other armed conflicts (Cederman & Vogt, 2017; Peters & Richards, 2011; Scott, 1976; H. Thomson, 2016).

Nevertheless, the focus on land concentration as the explanation for civil war outbreak obscured the dynamics of land accumulation during the civil war -which might be both a cause and a consequence- at least in three manners. First, it may imply that the agrarian elites were passive actors and that they did not take advantage of the violent setting of the civil war. On the contrary, LD in Colombia demonstrates that certain sectors of agrarian elites had the disposition to implement violence, and activate or create social connections to profit from war. The methods reported in this paper show how they did it. Second, it would indicate that peasants used violence for reallocating land and that violence spurred due to this kind of activity, thus meaning that widespread violence coincided with actions aiming at land distribution (e.g., land occupations). Although communist guerrilla groups supported some of these occupations by putting pressure on landed elites and the INCORA (Berman-Arévalo, 2019; Gutiérrez Sanín & García Reyes, 2016; Lombana-Reyes, 2012; Morris, 2017), the state bought the land and used it for redistribution among landless peasants. In the case of Turbo, Vargas-Reina (2016b) reports the use of violence against landowners and managers with the specific objective of distributing land. The magnitude and scale of this phenomenon, however, suggest that it was not systematic. Additionally, while the guerrilla-groups threatened landed elites and obliged them to leave their estates in cases in which peasant occupation was non-existent, it was unclear whether the purpose was actually to appropriate their lands for redistribution processes. The guerrilla did not steal the land, or at least not in the magnitude that the paramilitary militias did (CNMH, 2016; F. Thomson, 2011). Therefore, while the civil war in Colombia was inspired by agrarian injustice, it not only failed to revert the situation of inequality, but, on the contrary, deepened it.

This also has implications for the study of other violent conflicts. LD has been pointed out as idiosyncratic in the Colombian civil war (Gutiérrez-Sanín et al., 2018). However, violence in other countries has resulted in land concentration as a product of conflict, as well (e.g., Rwanda (Verwimp, 2011) or Guatemala (Granovsky-Larsen, 2013)). To complement explanations of civil war outbreak based on peasant grievances with inquiries on how land is accumulated in the course of civil war can deepen our understanding of the land-violence nexus. The complexity and variety of methods for LD in Colombia offer a starting point to grasp both the dynamics of land accumulation in civil war in other cases, and how the agrarian structures are affected by war. In disentangling mechanisms of LD, the involvement of agrarian elites, the state, and non-state armed actors in land usurpation becomes clearer and can facilitate land restitution processes that may contribute to preventing relapse into war.

6. Conclusion

LD exhibits four intertwined aspects that clarify the linkages between land and violent conflict. First, the role of the actors and their capacity to combine violence with highly sophisticated methods, taking advantage of discourses, public policies, and the institutions of property rights. The actors engaged in LD during the Colombian civil war strived to justify their actions and frame them as legitimate, by employing various discourses and leaning on particular public policies to demonstrate the validity of their actions, connecting local to national agendas. Second, the involvement of rural elites in a civil war with deep agrarian roots, profiting from it and deepening agrarian inequality. Third, the role of the state in LD. Since the state defines what's legal and illegal, it creates the means by which the victimizers completed LD, often legally. In other words, the state acted in such a way that certain groups of the society benefited from LD, even in collusion with institutions and particular public servants to legalize usurped land. In a broader sense, the state favored the apparatus sustaining LD as a practice for land accumulation through a policy narrative used for legitimizing dispossession. Four, the war triggered and facilitated LD. This allows us to reexamine and complement mainstream explanations that places land concentration as the cause of armed conflicts. The case of Colombia demonstrates how land accumulation can be rather an outcome of civil war.

This has important implications for both the study of civil war and land grabbing in other contexts. Against mainstream literature that depict civil war as irrational and chaotic, civil war has been progressively recognized as a complex social process, with rationalities, motivations, and agendas that strategically boost violence or indirectly profit from it (Cederman & Vogt, 2017; Cramer & Richards,

2011; Kalyvas, 2006; Korf, 2007). This study contributes to this thread by disentangling and synthesizing the complex mechanisms for accumulating land during a protracted intrastate conflict. Regarding land grabbing, the dynamics unveiled for LD in Colombia can illuminate other trajectories of land usurpation, combining legal and illegal methods, and sustained by policy narratives positing development as the only path to prosperity, while concealing power structures and economic interests of specific sectors of the society.

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III. Why a Rebel Group behaves differently among its Territories of influence? The Case of the FARC-EP in Southern Tolima

Ángela Navarrete Cruz

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Abstract

Wartime social order has shown that civil wars are not exclusively chaotic, but are complex phenomena that unevenly affect local contexts. Important evidence for order in civil wars are the governance regimes established by insurgents to manage civilians' affairs. However, even if this is a desirable outcome for rebel groups, not all of them are able to build such regimes, and even armed groups that succeed are often unable to do so across their entire territory of influence. Instead, rebels also negotiate agreements with civilians and local authorities, or simply deal with disorder. Why? This paper explores the factors influencing these various outcomes by focusing on three neighboring territories in southern Tolima, Colombia, where the former communist guerrilla FARC-EP was present for more than 50 years. The results lessen the assumptions of current theories on determinants of rebel governance, identifying that the behavior of rebel groups varies according to its own strategies and resources, intersected with the strategies and resources of the actors they interact with (whether civilians, other armed actors, or incumbent governments) in specific territories. The results underscore the active role of both civilians and the state, often neglected by the explanations on the determinants of both rebel governance and the diversity of behaviors deployed by the same armed actor.

1. Introduction

Both the existence of order in war areas imposed by Non-state Armed Groups (NSAGs) and the variety of behaviors deployed by the same-armed actor among its different territories of influence have been identified as common phenomena across different civil wars (Aguilera-Peña 2000; A. Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Mampilly 2011; Weinstein 2007). Focusing on irregular warfare, Arjona (2016b) defines wartime social order as a "particular set of institutions that underlie order in a war zone" (p. 22), where war zone is a territory with the continuous presence of at least one NSAG, and institutions are the

configurations of "rules that structure human interaction" (2014, 1361). Rules establish behaviors, both prohibited and permitted (Ostrom 2010). In regulated situations, actors can anticipate the behavior of their counterparts, facilitating interaction and even creating trust. Order is important to NSAGs both militarily and politically, because it enables NSAGs to increase their territorial control and power before their enemies. Additionally, order allows NSAGs to supervise civilians' behavior, fostering voluntary obedience and support from community members (A. Arjona 2016b; A. Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Weinstein 2007). Civilians also prefer order because they know what the NSAG expects from them, decreasing the possibility of being harmed (A. Arjona 2016b).

Arjona (2016b) identifies three variations in the behavior of NSAGs according to specific territorial challenges. Rebel groups completely dominate a territory by offering public goods and crafting institutions to regulate civilians' affairs -particularly for conflict resolution-, ally with local authorities, or implement widespread violence. She labels these variations rebelocracy (or rebel governance), alliocracy, and disorder, respectively. This typology considers rebelocracy and alliocracy as forms of wartime social order.

From this typology, this paper focuses on analyzing the differentiated presence of the former communist peasant guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army – FARC-EP in three neighboring territories of southern Tolima, Colombia. The three territories selected are the village of Planadas and surroundings (a case of rebelocracy), the Indigenous Reserve Páez of Gaitania (a case of alliocracy), and the municipality of Ataco (a case of disorder). The study aims at understanding why the FARC-EP thrived or failed in establishing social order in Planadas, the Reserve, and Ataco. In the case of the Reserve and Ataco, civilian counterinsurgency impeded the FARC-EP's establishment of a rebelocracy. Considering that a revolutionary agrarian program under the acclamation "land for the tiller" inspired the formation of the FARC-EP and that in southern Tolima the majority of rural inhabitants are smallholders, the resistance from peasantry to this NSAG is particularly puzzling. By contrast, in the case of Planadas, peasant basis furthered the governance of the FARC-EP. Why did these different outcomes occur?

Arjona (2016b) claims that three factors explain the varying presence of an NSAG: its time horizon, its internal discipline, and civilian resistance. Short-time horizons produce disorder, whereas long-time horizons along with internal discipline of the group and no civilian resistance explain the emergence of rebelocracies. However, even with long-time horizons and internal discipline, if the NSAG encounters civilian resistance in a territory, the outcome will be an alliocracy.

The findings in this paper lessen some assumptions of Arjona's theory by offering a more nuanced picture of wartime social order and the variations in the behavior of an NSAG among its territories of influence by addressing three aspects. First, a qualitative account of areas of disorder compared to areas of order (an important omission in the literature on rebel governance) is offered. Second, the fluctuations on the behavior of the FARC-EP, not only across space but also across time, are emphasized. The length of irregular warfare makes examining the history and specific events that carved the way in which the war developed important, and may explain why the behavior of NSAGs varies. Third, the role of both civilians and state in influencing the behavior of NSAGs is considered.

Significant events related to the presence of the guerrilla in each territory were traced back to the 1950s, finding that the contrast among Planadas, the Reserve, and Ataco, responded to more variables than those identified by Arjona. Key factors that shaped the relationship between civilians and the FARC-EP were: armed civilian resistance, kinship and social networks, the FARC-EP's ideology, the presence of agrarian elites, shifts in the military and political strategy of the FARC-EP, and the evolution of the state's strategies to counteract the guerilla. According to these results, this paper hypothesizes that the behavior of rebel groups varies according to their own strategies and resources, *and* the strategies and resources of the actors they interact with (whether civilians, other NSAGs, or incumbents). Importantly, the actors, their strategies and their resources, vary across time and space.

By analyzing the FARC-EP's varying presence, the contributions of the paper are twofold. Theoretically, the results show the necessity to account for the constellation of actors and their interactions in wartime to comprehend how they shape the development of violent conflict. Despite the progress in our understanding of civil war from the local settings, the spotlight has been put almost exclusively on the NSAGs. Consequently, civilians and state agencies are depicted as passive actors. By detailing the variations in the behavior of NSAGs within their territories of influence, the results qualify our knowledge on how other actors participate actively in civil war. Additionally, my research illustrates the interplay between local and national conditions often overlooked in different accounts of the micro-dynamics of civil wars.

Practically, and considering that most of the armed conflicts worldwide are intrastate conflicts with deep local roots, the results aim to facilitate public policies that are more sensitive to the different situations emerging from war at the subnational level. By analyzing the different ways in which NSAGs relate to civilians fundamental knowledge on how to manage warfare beyond military strategies can be revealed, according to the conditions in different locales. Additionally, it enables further understanding of the

legacies of war at the local level and the kind of peacebuilding strategies required both to cope with the complexity of the social dynamics created by violent conflict and to inhibit the reactivation of war. This is particularly important since the threat of relapse into war is as high as 50% in the ten years right after the finalization of the conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2008).

2. Literature Review

The establishment of rebel governance means that rebel order is able to dominate relevant institutions for the daily life of non-combatants (A. Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015). But why are NSAGs able to engage in institution building for civilians? And why does the behavior of one NSAG vary across its territory of influence?

Although the literature on rebel governance is limited regarding the determinants of rebel governance and variation of NSAG behavior, it is possible to identify two kinds of answers. The first highlights state weakness, absence or failure as a determinant of rebel governance (even when intersected with other factors). This explanation presumes, explicitly or implicitly, that the vacuum left by the state gives space for rebel groups to rule an area (Aguilera-Peña 2000; Grynkewich 2008; Khalaf 2015; Rubin 2020; Urdaneta 2018; Wickham-Crowley 2015).

Nonetheless, rebel rule over a war zone does not mean necessarily state absence or weakness (Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra 2017; Korf 2007; Korf and Fünfgeld 2006). The state may still provide basic services such as health and education, while an NSAG oversees security and conflict resolution services for civilians. Moreover, different kinds of arrangements between NSAGs and states can emerge as forms of political order to prevent violence and coexist amid civil war (Staniland 2015). By enforcing agreements with NSAGs, for instance, the state guarantees a certain level of control over a territory, meaning that civil war as a form of violence can also transform into a means of state formation (Ballvé 2012; Grajales 2011; Staniland 2015). In these cases, clear collusion deals can exist, in which, for example, the NSAG prepares the arrival of the state by educating civilians, imposing forms of community-based organizations, displacing the population considered as supporters of other NSAGs, and providing security for the state bureaucracy to work in a locality (Ballvé 2012).

Therefore, the state weakness explanation also does not account for all the cases (which compromises its explanatory power), or specific variations in wartime social order. Oppositely, state absence or weakness in a war zone can also trigger social disorder and violence. Thus, the relationship between state weakness and rebel governance is not deterministic and can even conceal dynamics of state formation.

The other set of explanations emphasizes internal dynamics of rebel groups and the broader context of NSAG operation, with special attention to the role of civilians. Concerning the internal dynamics, Hart (2016) observed in Libya that cash payments and the expectation of future rewards to top commanders of a rebel group increased the probability of the group to provide security services to civilians. However, the FARC-EP did not pay commanders or subordinates which demonstrates the difficulty in applying this assertion to other cases (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2018).

Weinstein (2007) claims that an NSAG is quicker to engage in a shared democratic governance regime when it counts on internal discipline, which arises with long-time horizons. Long horizons prevail if the maintenance of the group depends on social endowments, meaning, civilian labor and contributions such as food or illegal crops, rather than economic endowments such as natural resource exploitation. When the NSAG requires civilian cooperation to a greater extent, the construction of a governance regime is more likely. Otherwise, an NSAG may act violently toward civilians. Complementary research has found that not only natural resource extraction but also international support only boosts civilian targeting because rebel groups do not have incentives to restrain their behavior (Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood 2014; Wood 2014).

A shared assumption of this literature is that an NSAG relies exclusively on one kind of endowment. NSAGs, however, may have multiple funding sources simultaneously (Mampilly 2011). Even using large data sets from different war-torn areas, evidence on the correlation type of endowment- civilian targeting is not conclusive (Walsh et al. 2018). Contradictory findings blur the relation between the type of endowments and rebel governance, demonstrating that even relying on economic endowments or international support, some NSAGs refrain from using violence against non-combatants (Stanton 2020).

This explanation is also path-dependent, as if the decision of the type of resources for rebellion was taken once and for all (Mampilly 2011). Nevertheless, the NSAG's behavior changes overtime, as the political context it is embedded in does: NSAGs must adapt. Civilians are also perceived as passive actors, whose only role is to comply with the NSAG's will. In the best of cases, civilians provide the rebels with resources.

Against this background, alternative research recognizes the contestation capacity of civilians, which contributes to shaping the development of war (Kalyvas 2006; Mampilly 2011). Mampilly (2011), for instance, advances in acknowledging the constraints and opportunities that other actors pose to rebel rulers. He draws attention particularly to civilian needs, transnational actors, and the degree of state penetration pre-war. For rebel groups to succeed in implementing governance regimes, the pre-war

presence of the state in a locale should be neither too strong, nor too weak. In the first case, rebels can easily face defeat. In the second, civilians are not used to dealing with vertical institutions supplying services for them. Consequently, civilians will oppose rebel governance. The presence of transnational actors, such as NGOs, on the other hand, offers opportunities to rebels for claiming they are providing some of the NGOs' services, strengthening their local presence. The major problem with Mampilly's hypotheses is that their generalization is difficult and, again, the problem of the state presence arises. Moreover, he does not explain the variation in the behavior of a single NSAG.

We consider the most comprehensive explanation Arjona's (2014, 2016b, 2016a), which encompasses both internal and external factors to understand the variations in the behavior among rebel groups and within them. Drawing on the case of Colombia, Arjona established that three variables affect the outcome of the relationship between civilians and NSAGs in wartime, namely, the time horizon of the group, its degree of internal discipline, and the quality of pre-existing local institutions for conflict resolution (whether civilian or governmental). Accordingly, Arjona's theory anticipates three variations in the behavior of rebel groups: disorder, alliocracy, and rebelocracy. If the armed group has a short time horizon because, for example, it encounters confrontation with another armed group in a given territory, it will prioritize present rewards. The result will be disorder.

However, NSAGs prefer situations where the expectations of civilians and its combatants are clearly stated. NSAGs usually aim to establish order when they have both long-time horizons and internal discipline to control their own combatants. Under these conditions, an alliocracy emerges when the civilians consider the conflict-resolution institutions prior to the arrival of the armed group as legitimate and effective. In this case, civilian defiance to the presence of the armed group is likely to arise because the community has available channels to resist collectively, gaining bargaining power in front of the NSAG. The NSAG is forced to settle for a social contract in which the armed group is limited to tax collection and activities directly related to its own security, while civilians, the state, or both maintain the control of the rest of social affairs.

If the quality of those institutions were poor, the NSAG would be able to establish a rebelocracy; that means, a regime to adjudicate disputes, enforce contracts, and provide public goods, based on a social contract with precise rules for both sides, combatants and civilians, including public officers. Since, for civilians, conflict resolution is extremely important for daily life, they would prefer to have effective justice mechanisms, even if offered by a NSAG, rather than an ineffective or non-existent justice institution.

This theory has significant advantages. Arjona identifies the determinants of rebel governance even in situations in which the state is present. The theory also overcomes the dead-end explanations based on funding sources of an NSAG. Additionally, the role of civilians in intrastate conflicts is highlighted.

Nonetheless, important challenges remain. Studies qualitatively comparing the three variations in the behavior of NSAG are, to the best of our knowledge, non-existent. Additionally, the role of the state requires further inquiry, especially considering that the state develops public policies to counteract NSAGs. For these reasons, I return to the question on why an NSAG behaves differently among three neighboring localities, as in southern Tolima.

3. Study Area

Colombia is an interesting case for inquiry on the diversity of behaviors deployed by a single NSAG. First, the protracted armed conflict offers a wide timeframe for analyzing those variations across time. Second, the war generated different subnational situations that made it impossible for a single armed actor to gain total territorial control of the country. Therefore, NSAGs dealt with disparate situations at the local level, leading to order or disorder. Third, Colombia reported several NSAGs as active, allowing the analysis of situations in which different armed actors are present. This is important because, in most cases, intrastate conflicts are aggravated due to the simultaneous activity of various NSAGs (Rudolfsen 2019). Fourth, civilian resistance challenged the presence of NSAGs. Finally, the state implemented both collusion agreements and confrontation against NSAGs in different locales. These last two traits of the Colombian civil war offer the opportunity to analyze the active role of other actors -besides NSAGs- in shaping different outcomes in wartime (order or disorder).

3.1. The Colombian Civil War

The FARC-EP was a rebel communist guerrilla group directly descended from the communist peasants' self-defense groups created during the period known as The Violence (1946-1956) in which pro-government conservative sympathizers confronted both liberals and communists (GMH 2013). In 1956, liberals and conservatives signed a peace agreement known as "The National Front". Other ideologies were excluded and the army persecuted the settlements of communist peasants that fled from their homes during The Violence. In 1964, a settlement in Marquetalia, in the rural area of Planadas, was attacked. According to the FARC-EP, this attack was the leitmotiv to the creation of the insurgent group (CNMH 2014).

From 1968 to 1988, the government approved the creation of civilians' self-defense groups to fight the guerrilla (GMH 2013). Under this legal pretext, narco-traffickers and landlords formed armed groups in the 1980s, which evolved into paramilitary militias with a significant presence countrywide (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2014). The government allowed them again in 1994, this time as "security cooperatives". Under a counter-insurgency discourse, and supported by the army, these militias persisted illegaly after their prohibition in 1996. In 1997, the countrywide umbrella organization known as the Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) was created to overcome the fragmentation of those militias. The paramilitaries demobilized partially in 2007.

Peace talks with the FARC-EP date back to the 1980s, when demobilized members of the guerrilla and other leftist sympathizers founded the political party Patriotic Union, which was systematically exterminated by right-wing forces. Simultaneously, the FARC-EP radicalized its struggle and strengthened its military structure, expanding from ten to 31 Fronts (Aguilera-Peña 2013). Indeed, during the VII national conference of the group in 1982, the military strategy of the FARC-EP shifted. From tactical movements (based exclusively on the guerrilla warfare), the guerrilla would evolve toward an organization similar to an army, with strategic movements in order to hold the initiative of attacking and mobilizing their armed forces from the countryside to the cities. While in the 1980s this plan proved difficult to accomplish, in the 1990s the FARC-EP made progress in that direction (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2018; Aguilera-Peña 2013).

Consequently, the FARC-EP transformed into a high vertical command structure (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2008). The main organs were the central high command (the commander in chief plus 30 commanders) and the secretariat (consisting of seven top commanders). The FARC-EP had seven blocs spread countrywide and each bloc had fronts, columns, companies, guerrillas, squads, and tactical combat units (CNMH 2014). The Clandestine Communist Party-PC3 and the Bolivarian Movement were the political arms of the FARC-EP, providing political instruction to gain sympathizers for the revolution (both civilians and privates).

From 1998 to 2002, the government demilitarized four municipalities to hold peace talks with the FARC-EP (GMH 2013). In 2002, President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) decided to prioritize a military solution to the conflict. Uribe significantly injured the guerrilla but could not defeat them. In 2012, the president Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2016) started peace negotiations that resulted in the demobilization of the FARC-EP in 2017.

3.2. The Case: Southern Tolima

The main criterion for selecting southern Tolima was the importance of this territory to the FARC-EP and the continuous presence of this group. Additionally, cases complying with Arjona's typology of rebelocracy, alliocracy, and disorder, where verified as present in this locale by conducting exploratory interviews and a literature review.

Figure 6 shows the location of Ataco, Planadas, and the Indigenous Reserve Páez of Gaitania, which is part of the rural area of Planadas. The villages of Bilbao, Gaitania, and Planadas and their corresponding rural districts (*veredas*) also form the municipality of Planadas. This research focused only on the village of Planadas and its 49 veredas, besides the Reserve.



Figure 6 Map of Study Area

Source: Modification of mapasinteractivos.didactalia.net

In the three localities, most of the population resides in rural areas and agricultural activities prevail, particularly, coffee growing. Despite these similarities, the figures on the affectations caused by the conflict vary remarkably. Although the civil war harshly affected the three areas, Ataco had a higher

number of victims recognized by the state: 7,320 (Unidad de Víctimas 2020a). In Planadas, 4,579 victims were reported and 29 in the Reserve (Unidad de Víctimas 2020b).

4. Methodology

4.1. Data collection

Due to the sensitive topic this research addresses, qualitative techniques were implemented to collect relevant information, mainly observations, in-depth interviews (23), and group interviews (4), conducted in both urban areas and on farm-sites at the municipalities of Planadas and Ataco. The data was collected in two visits to southern Tolima in October 2018 and January 2019. A collaboration with a local NGO allowed us to contact persons with the disposition to participate in the study. Thirty-nine farmers, six community leaders, four public officers, and two former FARC-EP members were interviewed. Secondary sources, such as court sentences in the process of demobilizing paramilitary militias in Tolima, sentences for land restitution in Ataco[3], reports of the National Center of Historical Memory, and press reports, were also included. The period of study begins from 1950, when the communist guerrillas were created during The Violence, to 2017, when the FARC-EP demobilized its military forces.

4.2. Data analysis

Process tracing, a method that "attempts to identify the intervening causal process -the causal change and causal mechanism- and independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennet 2005, 141), was implemented to analyze each case. Process-tracing relies on historical and analytic narratives; the identification of possible variables explaining an outcome; and the elaboration of hypotheses. Relevant events were organized in timelines as part of the process tracing.

Complementary, content analysis was applied to extract the information collected (Berg 2001; Ryan and Bernard, n.d.). An iterative coding was conducted, generating an initial matrix for the organization of the information and mind maps by identifying only common topics as codes emerging from the data in an inductive process. Then, these initial codes were organized deductively in clusters applying the

[3] The process of land restitution in Planadas and the Reserve had not started at the time of data collection.

classification based on Arjona's typology of rebelocracies, alliocracies, and disorder. From the variables emerging, a second phase of comparative analysis was performed.

5. Results

5.1. Disorder: Ataco

As Figure 2 shows, five periods marked the presence of the FARC-EP in Ataco and the emergence of armed resistance against the guerrilla. The history of disorder in Ataco cannot be understood without reference to the neighboring municipalities of Rioblanco, Chaparral, Coyaima, and Planadas (Figure 7). In some periods, Ataco was not the protagonist but transformed into a battlefield due to the events in those municipalities. Additionally, the presence of the armed groups was not confined to the borders of the municipalities, but it created, in many cases, a fuzziness among the rural districts and villages in which the front lines of the war constantly changed. Therefore, the historical recount I make does not necessarily center in Ataco but shows how both internal and external influences configured the situation of disorder in the municipality.



Figure 7 Timeline of Disorder in Ataco

Source: Author. Based on interviews and (CNMH 2014; Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2016, 2017; CNMH 2017)

In the 1950s, southern Tolima became a haven for both liberal and communist peasants persecuted by the conservative government. Liberals and communists established a camp in the farm El Davis in the rural area of Rioblanco, but ideological confrontation arose when the peasants were deciding the coexistence rules in the camp. The communists defended the collectivization of land and considered that a revolution was necessary for replacing the state. By contrast, the liberals defended the private property and wanted to be included in the sociopolitical project of the central nation-state through political participation, public services, and infrastructure provision (Peña-Valenzuela 2017; CNMH 2014). Those differences prevailed and the communist peasants moved out of the camp further to the south.

The liberal guerrillas demobilized between 1953 and 1954, but some of them transformed into counterinsurgent groups supported by the army, the government, and local landed elites (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2014; CNMH 2014, 2017). Jesús María Oviedo, the leader of the liberal guerrillas, and Jacobo Prías Alape, leader of the communist guerrilla, agreed to divide the territory in southern Tolima. The communist would remain in Planadas. The liberals would stay in Ataco and Rioblanco.

However, personal revenge and conflicts sparked confrontation between the liberals and the communists. Violence escalated with assassinations of the leaders of each band and the resentment created among family members and supporters. The conflict was aggravated when the communist peasants formed the FARC-EP and the national government legalized self-defense groups to cope locally with the increasing presence of guerrilla groups (CNMH 2017).

b. Civilians' self-defense groups: 1968-1983

Members of the families that inherited the legacy of the counterinsurgent confrontation of the liberal guerrillas were the leaders of the different self-defense groups, formed according to local patronage (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2017; CNMH 2017). Each chief controlled specific parts of territories and the military bases were their own farms. Although the counterinsurgency was dispersed, they coexisted pacifically and even collaborated with each other. The groups became stronger because they relied on local networks and social hierarchies.

> The chiefs of the farms offered incentives to the peasants to get involved in the counterinsurgent war, combining friendship and *compadrazgo* with material benefits (…) The self-defense groups operated under feudal arrangements, where the binds of allegiance created between the armed watchmen and the patrons of the farms were founded on food and lodging (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2017, 15).

This organization was enforced by the army, which created Boards of Peasant Self-defense, forcing the local peasant population to participate in the self-defense groups according to the number of sons in each family., This was upheld by local military leaders, cattle ranchers, and local elites (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2016; CNMH 2017).

c. The Rojo Atá: 1983-1995

In 1983, the Rojo Atá, the main self-defense group of the region, was formed, instating their presence in rural areas of Bilbao, Rioblanco, and Ataco (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2014). The Rojo Atá was a mobile column of 60 combatants, but the counterinsurgency had ca. 600 hundred members in this period (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2014). These groups, and particularly the Rojo Atá, had a clear anticommunist character, expressed in the acclamation "Better to be dead than in the hands of insurgents or communism" (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2017). The group attacked and killed sympathizers of the left-wing Patriotic Union party in southern Tolima. In 1989, the collaboration of the army became clandestine because the Supreme Court banned the self-defense groups. Poppy growing for opium expanded in Rioblanco and Chaparral, providing an income source to the Rojo Atá and other counterinsurgent groups in order to buy food and weaponry (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2017).

d. Live Together groups: 1995-1999

The self-defense groups of the region took advantage of the national regulations that allowed the legal formation of security cooperatives in 1994 known as "Live Together". The application of the law transformed into the massive legalization of former paramilitary groups that shared a counterinsurgency purpose, including four cooperatives in southern Tolima that had around 300 members (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2014). The traditional leaders of the counterinsurgency -that belonged to families of the old war or directly participated in it- also coopted the Community Action Boards, civilian groups very important in Colombian rural areas, recognized by the state but without public funds. The support of the army –legal from 1994 to 1996- strengthened these groups which became the authority in the municipalities of Rioblanco and Ataco, patrolling the areas, asking for contributions from the civilians, protecting opium poppy sowing, and intimidating peasants that did not want to collaborate with them (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2016, 176).

Nevertheless, the army refrained from collaborating openly with the counterinsurgent groups in 1996 with a subsequent ban on these groups. Additionally, the peace talks from 1998 to 2002, paradoxically,

increased the military power of the FARC-EP, which initiated plans for the territorial expansion from Planadas to the northern territories formerly controlled by the counterinsurgency.

e. The Bloc Tolima: 1999-2005

The self-defense groups were not strong enough to counteract the growing power of the guerrilla and, due to aerial application of glyphosate to the opium crops, the primary source of funding was removed. Therefore, in 1999, remnants of the counterinsurgency asked the illegal paramilitary organization, the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) for help(Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2014). Military brigades in the area, traders, and local elites welcomed the renewed counterinsurgency. This was the origin of the Bloc Tolima of the AUC. In this Bloc, the bulk of privates were from the region and usually had strong social networks in the group prior to their incorporation as combatants (CNMH 2017). Until its demobilization, the Bloc relied on recruitment based on kinship, and victims of the FARC-EP. Indeed, 36% of former members that demobilized in 2005 declared that they joined the group for the possibility of revenge against the guerrilla (CNMH 2017).

In the first period of the Bloc Tolima (1999-2001), the main funding sources were voluntary contributions from the rural elites (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2017). The Bloc also maintained the rural character of the self-defense groups (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2017, 2014). These militias controlled both the adjacent municipalities, Coyaima and Natagaima, the village of Santiago Pérez in Ataco, and more loosely “The Plan”, the name given to the flat valley area of Ataco. The paramilitary combatants were suspicious of the peasants for collaborating with their foes and constantly attacked civilians. Ataco was a buffer zone between the paramilitaries and the guerrilla because none of them had complete dominion of the area and avoided direct confrontations among the troops after the FARC-EP reassured its dominion at the beginning of 2000.

That year, the FARC-EP attacked the village of Puerto Saldaña in Rioblanco and Santiago Pérez, historical strongholds of the counterinsurgency. In 2001, the village of Ataco was assaulted, weakening the presence of the Bloc Tolima in the area (Tribunal Superior de Bogotá 2017). The FARC-EP gained control of what is known as the high part of Ataco, from Santiago Pérez to Planadas, and the seven eastern rural districts of Ataco. With their plan of territorial expansion, the guerrilla tried to impose a rebelocracy. The FARC-EP registered the population in these areas in order to issue ID cards and demanded contributions from the farmers. This was not well received by the population. In rural districts such as El Paujil (formerly controlled by the counterinsurgency) the peasants, for instance, decided outright not to

pay the contribution of $50.000 COP (around 14 euros) the guerrilla claimed. In addition, in the seven eastern rural districts, farmers and indigenous residents restricted their movements to avoid problems with the guerrilla. The FARC-EP also punished the local population for collaborating with the paramilitaries (and their predecessors, the Live Together groups and the Rojo Atá). Forced displacement was the main mechanism of the guerrilla to penalize peasants (23% of the peasants who abandoned their land in Ataco argued that they did so due to threats of the FARC-EP (Forjando Futuros 2020)). However, the guerrilla also assassinated farmers, community leaders, and members of local authorities. In 2000, Nevio Fernando Serna, the mayor of Ataco, was killed presumably by the FARC-EP. In the case of the indigenous community Pijao in Ataco, the guerrilla killed four of their leaders in 2003, including the governor, who was the highest authority in the community. The peasants and indigenous peoples were displaced en masse from the seven rural districts to the main urban area of Ataco.

Under the presidency of Uribe (2002-2010), the army tried to recover control of the area and attacked the guerrilla directly in their areas of dominion in Ataco, transforming them into a battlefield. This is argued by the peasants as the main motive for abandoning their farms (66%) (Forjando Futuros 2020). The situation in Ataco changed with the demobilization of the paramilitary militias in 2005, and especially with the ceasefire agreed between the national government and the FARC-EP in 2016.

5.2. Alliocracy: The Indigenous Reserve of the Páez Community of Gaitania

Three periods of interaction between the FARC-EP and the Páez Community of Gaitania were identified. First, coexistence and collaboration from 1950 to 1960. Second, confrontation between 1960 and 1996. Finally, from 1996 to 2017, the peace accord which started the alliocracy between the Páez community and the FARC-EP. Figure 8 summarizes major events in the relation between the FARC-EP and the Páez community.



Figure 8 Timeline relation between the FARC-EP and the Páez Community of Gaitania

Source: Author

a. Coexistence and collaboration during The Violence

The Páez indigenous people arrived in Planadas from the adjacent department of Cauca, expelled by the "Thousand-day war", a civil war resulting from the confrontation between the conservative and liberal political parties from 1899 to 1902.

In the mid 20th century, The Violence forced communist peasants to settle in the rural areas of Planadas, neighboring the Reserve. Jacobo Prías Alape, under the alias "Charro Negro" and Pedro Antonio Marín, under the alias "Manuel Marulanda Vélez" or "Tirofijo", leaders of the communist peasants' self-defense groups, established agrarian colonies based on communist principles of distribution of land and food, while respecting the territories of the Páez community (CNMH 2014, 2017). The Páez not only coexisted pacifically but also collaborated with the armed resistance of the communist peasants. The communist self-defense group demobilized in 1957 but the settler peasants remained in the rural area of Planadas.

b. The confrontation between the Páez and the FARC-EP

Tirofijo, one of the founders of the FARC-EP and its chief commander until his death in 2008, rearmed due to the assassination of Charro Negro by liberal counterinsurgents in 1960. Tirofijo relegated the Páez to the western margin of the Atá river because the Páez community was reluctant to join the insurgency

and some of its members were already collaborating with the army. The Páez lost their lands in the eastern margin, fuelling the discontent toward the guerrilla, especially because the majority of the improved farms were on the east side. Various indigenous leaders even guided the army during the attack on Marquetalia in 1964 (CNMH 2017).

> [Tirofijo] said 'the indigenous became whistleblowers' and the persecution against us started. Then he said 'if you take the side of the government, let us divide what we have. You [the Páez] lose everything you have on the left side of the Atá river and leave this side because that land is going to be for us'. The indigenous started to think 'what are we going to do?' Because the improved farms, more farms were [there] in San Miguel (…) the government, the militaries, took advantage of the situation, they used the indigenous to become the counterinsurgency of the zone (Indigenous leader, 2018).

The state intervention intensified when the FARC-EP tried to recover Marquetalia in 1973. The army and local politicians warned the indigenous about the illegality of Tirofijo's rebellion and made promises on social investment and even the provision of weapons to the Paéz community. In this context, the indigenous formed a counterinsurgent group. The Páez is a closed ethnic community, so only community members live in the Reserve. The members of the counterinsurgent group, consequently, were exclusively community members with strong family ties.

Instead of containing the military occupation of southern Tolima by the rebels, the counterinsurgent strategy only fuelled violence from the FARC-EP against the Páez community. According to Ramírez & Gómez-Alarcón (2018), at the peak of violence, more than 60 indigenous were killed. Additionally, the FARC-EP punished the indigenous that were found committing crimes outside the reserve. According to the indigenous' law, these individuals, regardless of the place where they have committed a crime, ought to be judged by the indigenous' authorities.

The military power of the self-defense group of the Páez prevailed within the community. The most important person in the community became the captain of the group. However, by the mid-1980s, the Páez adopted the legal political organization typical of the indigenous communities in Colombia (Arango-Prada 2016; Barrios-Navarro and Padilla-Quintero 2017). This included a *cabildo* a democratically elected body in charge of preserving the indigenous law and order in the community, in which the most prominent figure was the governor.

c. The Peace Accord

At the beginning of the 1990s, the state formalized the Reserve. The Constitution of 1991 guaranteed jurisdiction to the indigenous people, meaning that they were autonomous to enact and enforce their own regulations in the Reserve. Recognition as an administrative entity opened the possibility for the Páez community of Gaitania to negotiate a legal peace accord with the guerrilla. In the beginning, the indigenous community was divided. Not all of them were enthusiastic about establishing conversations with the 30-year-war enemy, and those promoting the talks within the community, including the governor of the *cabildo*, had hard work convincing the reluctant sector. Because of the reduction of the support from the army and the negotiations with the FARC-EP, the Páez counterinsurgency finally decided to disarm.

On the side of the FARC-EP, in 1992, "Jerónimo Galeano" was commissioned as the commander of Front 66. Jerónimo had a deep appreciation for the autonomous forms of the political organization of the indigenous people and understood that a peace accord was urgent. Jerónimo asked for permission from the Secretariat and Tirofijo, and the talks were approved.

It is not clear who took the first step, and the testimonies, press reports, and literature are contradictory at this point. However, in 1994, conversations started. The result was the signing of a peace accord with ten main points on the 26th of July 1996. The guerrilla committed to respecting the territorial control of the Páez community in the reserve, while the indigenous agreed on forbidding external forces, including the army, from being present in their territory. Figure 9 reports the main points of the agreement.



Figure 9 Main points of the Peace Accord between the Páez Community of Gaitania and the FARC-EP

Source: Author based on the text of the Peace Accord

5.3. Rebelocracy: Planadas

In Planadas, the FARC-EP presence went through three phases as shown in Figure 10. Marginality marked the first period, whereas the second represented the consolidation of the FARC-EP governance across the village and its rural districts. A closer relationship with the peasants marked by FARC-EP's ideology, kinship, and confrontation with the army, prevailed in this stage. Finally, with the beginning of the peace talks in 2012, the guerrilla dominion relaxed.



Figure 10 Timeline FARC-EP presence in Planadas

Source: Author

a. Marginality of the FARC-EP

Except for the period 1967-1973, in which the FARC-EP retreated to the departments of Caquetá and Huila, Planadas experienced the continuous presence of the guerrilla. Planadas was strategic for the FARC-EP due to its location (a corridor between the departments of Caquetá, Huila, Tolima, and Cauca on the Colombian Pacific coast), the ability to hide guerrilla chief commanders (not only due to its mountainous geography and forest coverage, but also due to the support of the local population), and its symbolic value. Indeed, the foundational myth of the FARC-EP was the aforementioned army attack to the peasant settlement in Marquetalia, in the rural area of Planadas.

While this presence was permanent, it was not until the 1990s that the NSAG implemented a rebelocracy. In the previous decades, the guerrilla were hidden in the mountains. "We knew that the guerrilla were here, and I remember seeing them as a child. But it was rare. Then, I think in the late 1980s, they started to prove that they were ferocious warriors" (Peasant, 2019). This coincided with the military plan of the guerrilla to change from tactical (defensiver) to strategic positions, making it necessary to strengthen its relations with civilians (Aguilera-Peña 2013). This might be the reason why attempts by the counter-insurgent group Rojo Atá to dispute the territorial control of the FARC-EP resulted, contrarily, in the consolidation of the FARC-EP dominion in Planadas.

In the mid-1980s, the Rojo Atá reached the urban area of Planadas, taking strong actions against the local population. The counterinsurgents threatened and killed several communist leaders, especially members of the Patriotic Union party. The guerrilla intensified the military operations, expelling the paramilitaries and strengthening their presence. To restore order in southern Tolima, the FARC-EP commissioned "Adán Izquierdo" to reform Front 21 and "Jerónimo" to command Front 66.

b. FARC-EP governance

In 1998, the national government and the FARC-EP initiated a peace process, which diminished the power of the state agencies and the police in Planadas, and concomitantly, favored the guerrilla both militarily and politically. Coexistence agreements between the FARC-EP and the police prevailed to avoid armed confrontations. A former guerrilla member (2018) remembers that

> There was a time when the police were here [urban area of Planadas] and the guerrilla in the surroundings. We sat together to drink coffee or soda, and even to play soccer or basketball with the police officers (…) the police received the guidelines of the guerrilla and it was the guerrilla

who controlled the village. (...) there was a huge feeling of respect between the police and the guerrilla.

The FARC-EP controlled important aspects of the daily-life in Planadas, from domestic violence to the local politics, but the state provided public services, health, and education. In spite of agreements with the guerrilla and sometimes with explicit threats against public officers (see Figure 11), state agencies were functioning. Figure 6 reports the most relevant rules enforced by the guerrilla. The civilians recognized that the bulk of rules were beneficial to the community.



Figure 11 FARC-EP Governance in Planadas

Source: Author

The role of the commanders, the intervention of the guerrilla political squads, and the direct relations among guerrilla and community members were important to the operation of the FARC-EP's rebelocracy -particularly for conflicts such as civilian collaboration with the army. The FARC-EP also relied on the rural Community Action Boards to enforce the rules and solve the conflicts in which the mediation of

partisans was not necessary. Through the boards, the guerrillas were able to communicate with the civilians and organize community work. The FARC-EP promoted the board as the first step for conflict resolution, stewardship of natural resources, and community work.

c. The War and the Decline of the Guerrilla

The peace talks ended in 2002. President Uribe (2002-2010) was elected under the promise of a military defeat of the guerrilla. The forced displacement of the population increased due to the clashes between the army and the guerrilla under the new policy enforced by the national government and the intensification of the FARC-EP's efforts to recruit young people, including minors. The guerrilla also executed or forced not-sympathizers, soldiers' family members, and paramilitary collaborators to leave. The peasants named this period "The War".

In this period, the guerrilla were forced to retreat to the rural areas of Planadas. Yet the FARC-EP continued monitoring the activities of the locals with spies. In the rural areas, although the access of the civilians to the commanders was not as easy as before, their sociopolitical power was barely diminished. Some civilians were even supporting the guerrilla to overcome this difficult period for two main reasons, besides armed coercion. First, many locals were part of the FARC-EP, and their families, consequently, had incentives to provide food, shelter, and medicines to the guerrilla. Second, part of the civilians believed that the behavior of the army against the local population was extremely violent and unfair.

> We all had to do with the guerrilla, at least we all had one family member there (…) when armed confrontations occurred everybody was like 'Oh my god, we beg you that nothing happens to the guys'. And if the people had the opportunity to help them, they helped them, and if they had the opportunity to bring them medicines, they brought them (Community leader, 2019)

> Uribe came here to attack the local population. Then, what happened? The guerrilla strengthened locally (…) [The army] put everybody into the same bag, everybody was guerrilla for them. Then the guerrilla strengthened because the people started to be on their side. Then they said, 'They [the army] are controlling the food' and the population decided 'well, I put this, and this' [food for the guerrilla], the people started to support the guerrilla (Community leader, 2019).

d. Relaxation of the FARC-EP dominion

The initiation of the peace talks between the national government and the FARC-EP in 2012 relaxed the guerrilla dominion in Planadas until the demobilization of the rebels in 2017. The end of the war relieved

the locals and allowed them to establish contact with the external world. A vibrant economy around coffee growing and trade flourished after the relaxation of the guerrilla dominion and the peace accord. Nevertheless, for a population used to the FARC-EP presence, it was difficult to deal with insecurity and increasing social conflicts. Some of them declared that they "missed" the protection the guerrilla offered to them.

6. Analysis and Discussion

6.1. Revisiting Arjona's Theory of Order in Civil War

The FARC-EP's behavior varied according to the circumstances encountered in specific territories and changed across time. In Ataco, the situation of disorder was characterized by the transformation of self-defense groups. Where they originally had a broad peasant basis, they transformed into a criminal organization that responded to the changing dynamic of the war and the formation of modern paramilitary militias associated with the AUC. In between, however, the FARC-EP neither strived to implement a rebelocracy nor consistently deployed its military forces to control Ataco, an important territory considering its position neighboring Planadas, a FARC-EP sanctuary. The situation would change in the late 1990s, responding to the shifting strategy of the FARC-EP to expand their political and social bases while having the military initiative. The impressive growth capacity of the guerrilla made the execution of this plan a real possibility (it was inconceivable in previous decades). The guerrilla took control of the high part of Ataco and tried to impose a rebelocracy.

This has important theoretical implications. According to Arjona, a situation of disorder arises because an NSAG has short time horizons in a territory, magnifying present rewards. The case of Ataco lessens this assumption because despite armed confrontation (a short-time horizon situation), the FARC-EP did try to establish a governance regime in the areas it took from the civilian counterinsurgent groups and where they were fighting the army later on. An NSAG might have a long-term interest in a territory – demonstrated by their endeavors to establish a rebelocracy-, even when the dynamic nature of civil war obliged it to change the strategy in order to fight an armed enemy, prioritizing present rewards as a result. Therefore, a situation typical of short time horizons might not be an impediment for establishing a rebelocracy. This challenges the lineal causation that goes from the prevalence of short time horizons to disorder.

In the case of the Reserve, the army intervened to form self-defense groups, with a diluted anticommunist tone. For the indigenous, the promises and support of the army were important to form an armed resistance against the presence of the guerrilla. Nevertheless, the fact that the FARC-EP took the territories of the community was the crucial motivation, fuelled in the course of the confrontation by assassinations of community members and the attempts of the FARC-EP to impose territorial control, assuming the responsibility of punishing indigenous that were found committing crimes. This supports Arjona's claim that civilians who appreciate their own institutions for conflict resolution will defend them. However, against Arjona's anticipation, the indigenous resistance was far from peaceful and disorder prevailed as a result. The 36-year confrontation also lessens the assumption of the capacity of rebel groups to know in advance how the situation is in each locality or to figure it out rapidly to adapt its strategy. Yet, the Páez engaged in a peace accord with the FARC-EP once they disarmed, an accord expedited by their strong community institutions, as anticipated by Arjona's theory.

In Planadas, the FARC-EP was a fundamental part of the history of the town. However, the FARC-EP's presence, while constant, was marginal. In the first decades, the guerrilla did not direct efforts toward crafting a rebelocracy with conflict resolution institutions at its core. The FARC-EP had some restrictions on the local population, but its intervention in civilians' affairs and conflict resolution was gradual. As we noted, the shift of strategy in the mid-1980s to strengthen the relationship with the civilians would change the situation. This also attenuates the assumption that long time horizons, which the guerrilla definitely had in Planadas, will automatically transform in rebelocracies (as long as strong civilian conflict resolution institutions are not available). In the final periods of the FARC-EP presence, continuous confrontations with the army, which would change the time horizons of the guerrilla to prioritize present rewards, did not mean that the guerrilla refrained from enforcing its governance either.

This demonstrates the necessity to reconsider some of the core aspects of Arjona's theory in order to strengthen its explanatory power. One major problem of this theory is the difficulty in capturing some nuances in the behavior of the NSAGs, because, the categories of rebelocracy, alliocracy, and disorder, are presented as separate fixed containers instead of contingent outcomes in a continuum between wartime social order and disorder. In the following section, we identify some factors that were crucial in explaining the contrasting presence of the FARC-EP in southern Tolima. Arjona's theory recognizes some of these factors in considering how social order in civil war is built. Inquiring into the strategies to craft order, the theory further analyzes the role of civilians and the mechanisms through which rebels approach them (e.g., by co-opting community leaders in the case of alliocracies, or by co-opting some factions of the community like in the case of rebelocracies (Arjona, 2016b. Chapters 6 & 7)). Nevertheless, the

results show that the interplay of these factors are conditions that dictate the possibility of wartime social order, and the role of the state is also underscored. Furthermore, we show why these factors may cause disorder (a situation partially considered by Arjona), contributing to qualifying our understanding of disorder as a situation that has complex underlying dynamics besides armed confrontation.

These factors need further consideration to assess their potential for generalization but illustrate how the situations of order and disorder in civil war configure as complex contingent historical processes. Moreover, they show that the behavior of a rebel group varies according to its own strategies and resources, and the strategies and resources of the actors they interact with (whether civilian or incumbent governments) in specific territories.

6.2. Why the FARC-EP behaved differently in Three Neighboring Territories in Southern Tolima?

According to the process tracing conducted, seven determinants explained the variation of the FARC-EP's behavior in southern Tolima, in addition to some of the variables identified by Arjona (2016b). Those determinants are: milestones as key events in the development of war that marked the relation of the FARC-EP with the community, creation of self-defense groups, kinship, presence of agrarian elites, ideology and identity, the military and political strategy of the FARC-EP, and the change in public policy to cope with the guerrilla. Table 3 presents a summary of the findings according to these variables, which intertwined permanently and created the complex situation of disorder and order during the war in southern Tolima. Nevertheless, these factors changed over time. One set of variables became more important according to specific periods. Because of the reasons discussed already, we partially considered the determinants identified by Arjona's theory (gray color).

Table 3 Determinants of the Variation in the Behavior of the FARC-EP in Southern Tolima

Determinants	ATACO Disorder	INDIGENOUS RESERVE Alliocracy	PLANADAS Rebelocracy
According to Arjona's Theory	Short time horizons • Armed confrontation	*Before the Peace Accord* Short time horizons • Armed confrontation *After the Peace Accord* Long time horizons • Strategic territory for the FARC-EP Internal discipline of the FARC-EP High quality conflict resolution institutions • Civilian resistance (but armed, not pacific as anticipated in the theory)	Long time horizons • Strategic territory for the FARC-EP • Internal discipline of the FARC-EP Poor quality conflict resolution institutions • No means for collective action • No civilian resistance
Milestones in the relation FARC-EP - community	Division in El Davis between liberals and communists due to ideological differences.	Manuel Marulanda Vélez relegated the Páez to the western margin of the Atá River. The indigenous community lost their farms in the eastern margin.	The FARC-EP was created as a response to the military attack to Marquetalia, rural area of Planadas
Presence of Agrarian Elites	The self-defense groups had a strong peasant basis interwoven with agrarian elites that supported and even funded the Bloc Tolima.	Prevalence of small-holders	Prevalence of small-holders
Creation of self-defense groups as a counterinsurgency strategy	The army intervened by creating and supporting civilian counterinsurgent groups. Armed civilian resistance created disorder.	The army intervened by creating and supporting civilian counterinsurgent groups. Armed civilian resistance created disorder before the signing of the Peace Accord.	Self-defense groups were non-existent
Kinship and Social Networks	Counterinsurgent groups based on family ties and social networks prompted resistance against the FARC-EP	Dense family and social networks within the members of the reserve made collective resistance possible, but also upholding the peace accord when signed	Family members in the FARC-EP allowed faster collaboration with the insurgents
Ideology	Identification with liberal and anti-communist ideology	The FARC-EP ideology did not mobilize support from	The FARC-EP recognized as its constituents landless

		the Páez community.	peasants and smallholders, the latter forming the large part of the peasantry in Planadas
Military and political strategy of the FARC-EP	In the VII conference of the FARC-EP, the group decided to become an army and strengthen the relation with civilians. Expansion to Ataco became a possibility. Amidst disorder, the FARC-EP tried to impose a rebelocracy in the areas they controlled.	The growing capacity of the FARC-EP influenced the decision of the Páez to sign a Peace Accord.	The FARC-EP directed efforts to build a rebelocracy in Planadas.
Changes in the public policy to counteract the guerrilla	In the beginning of the 2000s, the Colombian government changed the policy for combating the guerrillas. Instead of defending from attacks of the insurgency and leaving the areas, the army was permanently installed in the localities with rebel presence and held the initiative to attack the NSAG.	Due to indigenous jurisdiction and the peace accord with the FARC-EP, the army did not attack the guerrilla in the reserve.	The army was seen as a factor of disorder and was also accused of attacking the local population, furthering civilian support to the FARC-EP.

Source: Author

Other research has highlighted factors that refer to self-defense groups, kinship, social networks, and identity, but from the perspective of support to terrorists, rebel groups, or counterinsurgency (Fumerton 2001; Paul 2010). In the case of southern Tolima, these variables intersected with the possibility or impossibility of the FARC-EP's ability to establish social order during the war and the degree to which the rebels succeeded. However, in the same spirit as the aforementioned research, the subsequent set of variables highlights the importance of examining particular contexts. These variables correspond to situational, organizational, ideational, and strategic factors.

a. Situational factors

Milestones in the relation FARC-EP - community

Milestones are key events that mark the development of a war. To identify them is vital to understand why an NSAG's behavior varies in specific territories and particularly, why certain sectors of a rebel group's constituents may turn against the group. In Ataco and the Reserve, initial collaboration existed with the communist guerrilla. However, major events carved the way in which this collaboration evolved

towards eventual confrontation. The conflict between the FARC-EP and the Páez had agrarian roots that generated grievances from the indigenous community. In Ataco, the main axis of confrontation was diverging political ideologies, fuelled by agrarian elites that recognized a threat in the communist ideology. The rupture materialized in El Davis and evolved into widespread counterinsurgent groups in Ataco, Rioblanco, and Chaparral. Finally, in Planadas, the FARC-EP was inextricably associated with the town's history. The colonization by communist peasants in the 1950s and the attack to Marquetalia in 1964, converted Planadas into a symbol of the revolution and a bastion of the FARC-EP.

Presence of agrarian elites

Agrarian elites can mobilize their resources against the presence of rebels, as a form of defending their privileges and the social relations in which the production of those privileges is possible, especially if the insurgents aim at replacing the status quo. In this case, agrarian elites co-opt peasants through incentives or coercion, making it difficult for the rebel group to create a governance regime as happened in Ataco until the 2000s.

In the Páez community, an elite engaging their connections and economic resources in order to continue the resistance against the guerrilla was non-existent. Without these kinds of resources and connections, the lengthy and persistent armed confrontation with the FARC-EP would have meant defeat to the indigenous counterinsurgency. In Planadas, agrarian elites were not present.. This means that the presence of agrarian elites may bolster the resistance, or conversely, the support to certain NSAGs, according to their interests.

b. Organizational factors

Creation of self-defense groups as a counterinsurgency strategy

Due to their knowledge of the territory and topography, low-cost, and access to local social networks, the creation of civilian self-defense groups has been recognized as an effective strategy to fight rebels in irregular wars (Peic 2014; Stanton 2015). To be sure, counterinsurgent groups meet some criteria: they are armed, their rank-and-file are mainly local civilians, and they develop mainly static and tactical functions -rather than strategic (such as attacks) (Peic 2014). It is not surprising, therefore, that the existence of an armed civilian resistance poses challenges to the establishment of rebelocracies or alliocracies, as occurred in Ataco and the Reserve.

Kinship and social networks

The literature on the social basis of recruitment and participation in violence has shown the importance of social networks and kinship in mobilizing support, either to incumbents or rebels (McDoom 2014; Paul 2010; Larson and Lewis 2018). Considering the high-costs of upholding arms and becoming involved in a violent confrontation, these networks are crucial to motivate new recruitments and prevent the defection of both combatants and civilians. How does this affect the behavior of NSAGs?

Rubin (2020) highlights the importance of social networks in leveraging rebel governance. He claims that state absence intersected with collective action capacity - CAC determined the existence of rebel governance regimes. If a rebel group counts on civilian CAC in specific territories -or the capacity to mobilize collectively toward a common purpose through local social networks- the cost of establishing and enforcing a governance regime decreases. CAC facilitates the cooperation with the NSAG, the obedience of the whole community, and the mobilization of resources, as long as the state is weak in a territory.

However, the CAC can be an important source of civilian resistance as the cases of Ataco and the Reserve suggest. Thus, CAC does not determine the existence of rebelocracies but it can be taken as a variable that potentiates either support or resistance, mediated by specific events. These events can produce hostility and revenge sentiments between communities and NSAGs, or oppositely, a history of collaboration and even identification with these groups.

c. Ideational factors

Ideology

In Ataco, the confrontation with the FARC-EP was related to diverging ideologies. In the context of political violence, ideology is a set of ideas and beliefs that appoint specific challenges, strategies, objectives, and institutions for an NSAG (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2014). Internally, ideologies foster the commitment of combatants to the NSAG, restrain their behavior, and encourage new recruits to join the group. Externally, ideology favors crucial civilian support for the survival of NSAGs by defining a constituency and potential allies. While it is desirable for the social basis of a group to be as wide as possible, NSAGs choose ideologies that would resonate more with certain social groups and local structures than with others, in order to ensure strong and permanent collaboration, especially considering the tough circumstances that civil war spawns (Suykens 2015; Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2014).

The FARC-EP was a communist guerrilla, contradicting the ideology of the liberal party. Therefore, due to its communist ideology, the guerrilla was perceived in Ataco as a threat to the status quo, private property, and the state. This ideology consolidated in an anti-communist feeling that encouraged participation in counterinsurgency efforts. In Planadas, by contrast, the FARC-EP's ideology echoed more with the peasantry. While the degree of legitimacy of the FARC-EP in Planadas might be a contested issue, the perception that the FARC-EP was on the side of the people due to their peasant condition was evident in most of the interviews.

d. Strategic Factors

The Military and political strategy of the FARC-EP

There is evidence that the guerrilla enforced governance regimes from the 1960s (CNMH 2014). However, in Planadas the regime was strengthened in the 1990s by including community institutions such as the Community Boards. This was the result of the modification of the FARC-EP's military and political strategy by the mid-1980s and the dominion reached during the peace talks from 1998 to 2002 (Aguilera-Peña 2013; Gutiérrez-Sanín 2018). In Ataco, the territorial expansion of the guerrilla meant directing efforts toward imposing a rebelocracy. The signing of the peace accord with the Páez and the expansion to the northern municipality of Ataco -which included a military but also a political aspect (specifically the imposition of the governance regime)- occurred after the imperatives of forming a military structure similar to an army and invigorating the relationship with civilians. This suggests that the military and political strategy of the NSAG can determine whether social order emerges or not, lessening the presupposition that NSAGs will automatically devote resources to governance regimes in territories where they hold long-time horizons and internal discipline of their rank-and-file.

Changes in Public Policy to counteract the Guerrilla

With the modernization of the army at the beginning of the 2000s the possibility -or at least, the perception- of a real defeat of the FARC-EP became real. Along with the transformation of the civilian self-defense militias into paramilitary groups with a strong presence countrywide in the 1990s, shifts in public policy to fight the insurgency altered the course of the civil war in Colombia. Through a process of modernization sponsored by the US government, the army increased its operational capacity and invigorated its air force (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2018). As Aguilera-Peña (2013) points out, the democratic security policy meant that, instead of counterattacking the guerrilla and leaving the territories, the army would hold the military initiative and establish bases in recognized guerrilla strongholds, leading to a

weakening of the military capacity of the FARC-EP. These changes posed challenges to the relationship between the FARC-EP and civilians, affecting the governance systems of the guerrilla in different territories. This suggests that the armies strategy also accounts for the possibility of NSAGs to craft institutions for civilians' affairs and the extent to which they can enforce them.

7. Conclusions

This paper maps the variables determining the differentiated presence of the FARC-EP in southern Tolima across both time and space. The interplay of these variables illustrates the historical contingency of civil wars, capturing their dynamic nature. This dynamism has important implications for current theories on rebel governance, especially Arjona's, which we consider the most comprehensive to date. First, it lessens assumptions about the relevance of the length of time horizons in explaining wartime social order. Second, strong community institutions may also boost violent civilian resistance.

Because of the historical and territorial contingency in civil wars, any analyses must be context-based. We hypothesize that the behavior of NSAGs varies both across space and time according to their own strategies and resources, intersected with the strategies and resources of the actors they interact with (whether civilian or incumbent governments). In other words, the three situations of disorder, alliocracy, and rebelocracy, do not only depend on the rebel group. Although Arjona underscores the importance of civilian resistance in alliocracies, the results highlight that civilians and incumbent governments are active actors in all three situations.

Due to the limitations inherent to a case study, we cannot provide a complete theoretical typology of how specific interactions among these variables result in one outcome or the other. We conclude that future research aiming at developing this typology must disentangle the constellation of actors, their strategies, and their resources in specific times and localities, in order to understand why a rebel group behaves differently in its territory of influence. This is also applicable to public policy. The growing research on rebelocracy has shown that NSAGs do not only have a military component. NSAGs for better or for worse interact with both civilians and local state agencies beyond their military forces. The threat of disorder or reactivation of war (e.g., in cases in which other NSAGs are present) relate then with the power vacuum left by a defeated or demobilized NSAG. However, this vacuum depends on the situations that arose during the war (either order or disorder) and consequently, affects specific territories differently. The results of this paper demonstrate that to understand the contrasting situations of war (disorder, alliocracies, and rebelocracies with their nuances) is of major relevance to address

peacebuilding strategies that must be customized to specific local contexts, because not all of them dealt with the same war, and the same behaviors from those involved (whether rebles, governments, or civilians).

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IV. Factors Influencing the Development of Rural Producer Organizations in Post-War Settings. The Case of Coffee Growers Associations in Southern Tolima, Colombia

Ángela Navarrete-Cruz, Athena Birkenberg, and Regina Birner

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Abstract

Since civil wars hit rural areas intensely, Rural Producer Organizations (RPO) -as forms of long-term collective action or cooperation among small farmers- are considered essential for peacebuilding. However, the factors underpinning the formation and performance of RPO post-war are unclear. Based on a case study in the municipality of Planadas, Colombia, where the former communist guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army – FARC-EP was formed and several associations flourished post-war, this article identifies 14 contextual factors facilitating the rise of RPO. Contrasting the findings with variables identified by collective action, commons theory, and literature on RPO, it was determined that four additional contextual variables play a critical role in RPO development post-war, namely, legacies of war, resilience strategies, institutional intermediaries, and discourses. Legacies of war refer to the vestiges left by the kind of relationship developed between the main armed actor and the civilians in wartime. Economic activity as a resilience strategy indicates civilians' strategies to stay aside from the confrontation, reducing the probability of being harmed and preventing their involvement in the war or illegal economic activities. Intermediary institutions are third-party organizations that influence RPO. In the case considered, this role was developed by certification schemes known as Voluntary Sustainability Standards. Controverting critical literature on the effects of the standards, the results suggest that they can enhance self-organizing capacities post-conflict at the local level. Finally, discourses refer to additional incentives for RPO development regarding what participants consider valuable beyond economic benefits. Consequently, the article presents the foundations of an expanded framework to understand and foster RPO growth in post-war settings.

1. Introduction

Most civil wars occur in the rural areas of developing countries, affecting agriculture and putting at risk the livelihoods of millions of smallholders living directly from agriculture (Holleman, Jackson, Sánchez, & Vos, 2017; Rami Zurayk & Woertz, 2018). In the cases in which an end to armed conflict was possible, the probability of relapse into war were as high as 50% (Collier et al., 2003). The threat of relapse related to the persistent fragility of agricultural production, whether preceding the conflict or resulting from the violence (Holleman et al., 2017). A significant challenge for peacebuilding, therefore, is to foster economic development in rural areas. Consequently, peacebuilding processes involving rural communities undertaking collective action -as cooperation efforts to tackle problems impossible to solve individually- are crucial (Cox, 2009; Ostrom, 2010; Vervisch, 2011). The role of Rural Producer Organizations – RPO is particularly stressed because these organizations constitute forms of long-term collective action and community-based development efforts that influence better horizontal market access and improve the livelihoods of rural communities post-war. (Cooperatives Europe & CEDP, 2019; Ettang & Okem, 2016; Majee & Hoyt, 2011). Therefore, peacebuilding endeavors would be facilitated by grasping the dynamics of RPO post-war.

However, the literature does not provide definitive answers on the determinants explaining the development of RPO post-war. Literature on RPO and collective action highlights different variables addressing how they prompt or hamper collaboration at both the internal and external levels of the RPO, neglecting post-war settings. Internally, formal rules, democratic mechanisms, accountability, the professionalization of the RPO managers, number of participants, and managerial capacities are identified as critical aspects to strengthen trust and promote collaboration (Agarwal, 2010; Brandão & Breitenbach, 2019; Ostrom, 2010).

Externally, variables such as social, economic, or cultural homogeneity of the RPO participants providing a source of shared identity, market relations, and the different actors interacting with the organizations (including the state) affect the performance of RPO. (Agarwal, 2010; Attwood & Baviskar, 1987; Brandão & Breitenbach, 2019; Ostrom, Ahn, & Olivares, 2003; Ragasa & Golan, 2014; Ruben & Heras, 2012; Snider, Afonso Gallegos, Gutiérrez, & Sibelet, 2017). The literature defines those relations as bridging capital (cooperation with outsiders that affects trust and collaboration at the intragroup level) and nested enterprises (membership to umbrella organizations). State interference is found to have negative effects on RPO because the farmers felt alienated from the organization, and the development of democratic and participatory mechanisms is difficult in this top-down environment (Agarwal, 2010;

Ostrom et al., 2003). Besides, relying on external funding may prompt free riding, whereas self-funding increases the farmers' commitment to the organization.

Studies on post-war contribute little to this issue as well, focusing on the effects of war and even reaching contradictory conclusions, especially regarding economic growth, trust, and cooperation (Kang & Meernik, 2005). The "war ruin" school portrays war as chaotic and warzones as devastated during and after a conflict (Bodea & Elbadawi, 2008; Cassar, Grosjean, & Whitt, 2013; Collier et al., 2003; Kijewski & Freitag, 2018; Rohner, Thoenig, & Zilibotti, 2013; Vervisch, 2011). By contrast, the "war renewal" school has found cooperation post-conflict, pointing out mechanisms related to responses to trauma and behavioral transformations of individual victims and ex-combatants as triggers of pro-cooperative behavior (Bauer et al., 2016; Bellows & Miguel, 2009; De Luca & Verpoorten, 2015). Nonetheless, these explanations highlight psychological determinants as a base for collective action post-war, neglecting contextual factors.

Given this gap and due to the importance of RPO in peacebuilding processes, the main objective of this article is to contribute to answering the question of what the factors influencing RPO development in post-war settings are. With this purpose, we conducted a case study in the municipality of Planadas in Colombia, where the former communist guerrilla Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army - FARC-EP was formed. After peace talks from 2012 to 2016, the FARC-EP demobilized its military forces in 2017. Various coffee growers associations flourished post-war in Planadas, allowing us to identify the determinants of the development of RPO. The factors observed are discussed in reference to literature on RPO and Ostrom's collective action and commons theory. While different internal factors and governance mechanisms were important for the success of the associations, they corresponded to aspects tackled already in the literature. We found three dominant factors: self-governance (the associations were able to craft their own rules), monitoring mechanisms (the associations implemented monitoring mechanisms to verify the compliance with the rules), and rules regarding market relations (especially with commercial partners).

Therefore, we focus in this article on contextual aspects found at the local, national, and global levels, identifying four additional external factors not yet captured by the literature, namely, legacies of war, economic activity as a resilience strategy, institutional intermediaries, and discourses.

The *legacies of war* refer to the remnants of the presence of armed actors in a warzone, specifically, how these actors relate to civilians. These legacies may affect positively or negatively RPO formation. In the

case study, the development of a governance system by the guerrilla forces, which stated clear rules for the peasants, eased the subsequent formation of the coffee growers' associations post-war.

Economic activity as a resilience strategy provided the means for the civilians to stay aside from the confrontation, reducing the probability of being harmed and preventing involvement in the war or illegal economic activities. Despite the difficulties of coffee growing, such as low and volatile prices on the international markets and increasing input costs, the peasants in Planadas persisted in coffee growing and ultimately were able to form associations.

Intermediary institutions are third-party organizations that influence RPO. Certifications constructed by third-party organizations, national governments, or multinational companies for ensuring the social, environmental, or economic sustainability of agricultural products in exchange for premiums paid by consumers in developed countries, known as Voluntary Sustainability Standards (from now on, standards), sparked cooperation in Planadas. Standards provided incentives for the formation of the associations and a set of rules that diminished the costs of learning "how-to-do", favored the adoption of environmentally sustainable practices, and made possible the access to premiums that are improving the livelihoods of the farmers. Against critical literature on the effects of the standards (Bray & Neilson, 2017; DeFries, Fanzo, Mondal, Remans, & Wood, 2017; Levy, Reinecke, & Manning, 2016), the case of Planadas shows their potential for fostering collaboration in post-war areas and contributing to peacebuilding by enhancing the self-organizing practices of the producers.

Finally, *discourses,* understood as the specific meanings assigned to parts of the reality, provided a common ground to collaborate beyond market-oriented benefits. Environmental discourses made meaningful cooperation in new ways, facilitating farmer adoption of the practices promoted by both the standards and the associations.

The paper proposes an expanded framework for understanding the formation and development of RPO post-war that includes these four factors and differentiates between the local, national, and global levels. The emphasis on these four factors draws attention to various omissions in collective action and commons theory and shows how this theory can be strengthened. The legacies of war and resilience strategies relates the analysis to the ways in which the past-history of a community affects collective action. This is important in view of some critics to commons theory concerning its lack of attention to the specific historical circumstances in which collective action takes place (Husain & Bhattacharya, 2004; Quintana & Campbell, 2019). Institutional intermediaries account for the institutional environment

in which collective action develops beyond governmental rule and provide standards that instead of negatively affecting the self-governance processes of the communities can actually invigorate them. Discourses unveil factors that can illuminate why people engage in and sustain long-term collective action efforts such as RPO (Snow & Bedford, 2000; Tarrow, 1992).

By analyzing RPO, the paper also sheds light on the intersections between commons based on natural resources and commons as resources created by human action (Hagedorn, 2013). Agriculture is highly nature-dependent and the depletion of resources by human intervention can be regulated by acting collectively through self-governance mechanisms, such as RPO that establish clear rules of production and environmental care. Additionally, the necessity of trading leads to the generation of common-pool resources from which the farmers contribute to and benefit from on a market-oriented basis (Berkes & Davidson-Hunt, 2009; Berkes & Davidson–Hunt, 2007; Orozco-Quintero & Davidson-Hunt, 2009). In this sense, community-based enterprises, such as RPO, are gaining attention as forms of new commons that connect local and global concerns through markets while maintaining social purposes, managing hybrid resources (partially natural, partially human made), and sharing agricultural knowledge and practices (Hagedorn, 2013). The case of Planadas also highlights how they can improve rural livelihoods post-war.

Additionally, by showing the interplay of various external and local factors, the framework furthers the understanding of peacebuilding not as an imposition of external actors in charge of solutions, but as an intricate process of local and external conditions in which local actors wield a significant capacity in shaping the outcomes of peace endeavors (Lederach, 2005; Mac Ginty, 2010). Peacebuilding is a complex process that implies a non-violent transformation of conflict, including the individual, relational, structural, and cultural levels (Lederach, Neufeldt, & Culbertson, 2007). Not only direct violence among individuals must be overcome. The structures that enforce inequality, reproduce injustice, and limit the rights of individuals and groups, on the one hand, and the beliefs and mindsets that endure the use of violence as legitimate, on the other, require to be modified. For these reasons, peacebuilding demands the endeavors of governments, armed groups, and the different social groups and organizations in the incumbent society (Lederach, 2005; Lederach & Appleby, 2010). Thus, a peace accord and public policies, while necessary, are insufficient in the peacebuilding process. Our research highlights the significant role of local actors by showing how they deal with the various factors identified, whether by taking advantage of them or by overcoming the different constraints that some factors pose to collective action. In this sense, the extended version of collective action and commons theory we propose becomes an important tool for fostering community-based and self-governance approaches in post-war settings.

Finally, despite the focus of the paper on post-war scenarios, it intends to discern why collective action is possible in general, contributing to both post-conflict literature and commons theory. Concerning the literature on civil wars and post-war, the paper explains why cooperation emerges post-war beyond psychological variables. Regarding commons theory, the mechanisms through which people managed shared resources or failed to do it have been extensively identified (Colin-Castillo & Woodward, 2015; Ostrom, 2000, 2010, 2011; Partelow, Senff, Buhari, & Schlüter, 2018; Tschopp, Bieri, & Rist, 2018). Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand why these endeavors emerged beyond explanations of cooperation as the result of the continuous interactions among the stakeholders and expedited principally by rules crafted as an outcome of those interactions. Contextual factors have been reduced to biophysical conditions, the governance environment (emphasizing mainly the role of state institutions as rule producer and as a connector between the local and the national scales), and the individual attributes of the actors. (Delgado-Serrano & Ramos, 2015; Epstein, Vogt, Mincey, Cox, & Fischer, 2013; Partelow et al., 2018; Rahman et al., 2017; Ratner, Meinzen-Dick, May, & Haglund, 2013). However, disentangling other external variables influencing the possibility of the emergence of collective action remains a challenge. Our research is a contribution in that direction by both unpacking additional contextual factors that influence collective action and understanding how actors take advantage of these external factors to spark cooperation.

2. Study Area

Rural areas in Colombia suffered from the atrocities of war for decades. The war resulted in almost nine million victims, including 7.5 million people forcibly displaced and more than 260,000 casualties (CNMH, 2018; Registro Único de Víctimas, 2019). In 2016, a peace accord between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government intended to end the 52-year conflict. The accord recognized the necessity of RPO as a peacebuilding strategy in rural areas (Mesa de Negociaciones, 2017). In the section 'Rural Productivity Development', the agreement established support for RPO through funding, access to credit, technical assistance, and market access. Nevertheless, by May 2018, the monitoring report on the implementation of the accord stated that 64% of the activities planned in this section had achieved no progress and 36% had minimal progress, meaning that none of the planned activities had been completed (Iniciativa Barómetro, 2018, p. 22). Despite this meager progress, several press reports have detailed RPO establishment in former warzones producing cacao, coffee, shrimps, and milk, among other products (Barrios, 2019; Universidad del Cauca, 2019; VerdadAbierta, n.d.; Zuluaga & Vera, 2019). In

most of the cases, it was reported that the national government has not supported RPO. What contextual factors explain the emergence of these RPO if the role of the national government was marginal?

To answer this question, the municipality of Planadas was selected. Planadas is located in the southern part of the Department of Tolima, as shown in Figure 12, and has around 25,000 inhabitants. Only 25% live in the three main villages (Planadas, Gaitania, and Bilbao), whereas the majority lives on farm sites (Alcaldía Municipal Planadas, 2016). Therefore, agriculture is the primary income source. Around 75% of the farms have less than 10 ha, 13% have between 10 and 20 ha, and 12% have more than 20 ha (UPRA, 2013).



Figure 12 Map of Planadas, Tolima

Source: Modification of Google maps

For selecting the case, we followed three main criteria. First, the area should be highly affected by the armed conflict and the presence of the FARC-EP. Second, post-war, as a transitional stage that implies a

significant reduction in both violence and the presence of non-state armed groups, prevails. Third, long-term collective action efforts materialized through functioning RPO exist.

Regarding the first criterion, civil war affected Planadas significantly. Communist peasants formed the FARC-EP in 1964 after the army attacked a peasant settlement in Marquetalia, a rural area of Planadas (CNMH, 2014). Since then, the presence of this group was permanent in the municipality, due to both symbolic and military importance. Planadas is also a corridor connecting eastern Colombia to the Pacific Coast, and was used for hiding guerrilla chief commanders and drug smuggling (FIP, USAID, & OIM, 2013). More than 230 armed conflict-related events affected Planadas from 1990 to 2013 (IGAC, 2016). Since 1985, the war has created 4,579 victims (Registro Único de Víctimas, 2019).

In 2016, the peace agreement brought hope to rural areas. Nevertheless, several locales faced war relapse provoked by dissidents, disputes among non-state armed actors to occupy areas formerly controlled by the FARC-EP, and the skyrocketing assassinations of community leaders. Seminal research unveiled associations with land-grabbing, drug trafficking, natural resource extraction, smuggling corridors, and in general, difficulties in the implementation of the peace accord (Álvares Vanegas, Pardo Calderon, & Cajiao Vélez, 2018; Defensoría del Pueblo, 2018; Garzón-Vergara & Silva, 2019; González-Posso, González-Perafan, & Espitia-Cuenca, 2018).

Yet this relapse is occurring unevenly. While misdemeanors increased in Planadas, the degree of violence compared to other former FARC-EP territories is low. Non-state armed actors are inactive, no community leaders have been killed, and the levels of violence have decreased (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2018; DIJIN, 2018). Therefore, Planadas met the second criterion.

Concerning the third criterion, coffee growers associations do constitute collective action in Planadas. The coffee sector is quite important for Colombian agriculture. In 2018, Colombia was the third largest coffee producer worldwide and the largest producer of Arabica coffee (ICO, 2019). Coffee-growing involves more than 560,000 families (Café de Colombia, 2010). The National Coffee Growers Federation – FEDECAFE, a private-public organization, oversees coffee growing, commercialization, and exports (FEDECAFE, 2016). FEDECAFE settles the price for Arabica coffee on the national market and guarantees the purchase of all of the production (even low-quality coffee) through different cooperatives and warehouses. However, independent coffee growers' associations are becoming more important. It is unofficially estimated that more than 600 associations are active countrywide. Organic coffee production is rising, as well. At least 47 associations are certified organic (BIOTRÓPICO, 2018; MAYACERT, 2019).

Six-thousand peasants grow coffee in Planadas, the largest coffee producer in Tolima and the ninth largest producer countrywide in 2018 (MADR, 2019b). FEDECAFE's local cooperative is the Cooperative of Coffee Growers from Southern Tolima – CAFISUR. Still, seventeen coffee producers' associations, centered in the village of Planadas, have prospered (MADR, 2019a). Therefore, Planadas met the third criterion.

3. Data Collection and Analysis

For the case study, we conducted a focus group with ten coffee growers, 17 individual semi-structured interviews, and five group interviews in two visits in October 2018 and January 2019. Considering that Planadas is an area that remained isolated by the presence of the FARC-EP in wartime, collaboration with a local NGO with strong community ties enabled us to collect sensitive information about both the conflict and post-war periods. The local NGO contacted associations' managers and respondents with the disposition to cooperate with the study. Nineteen members and seven managers of six associations, and one group of coffee growers in the process of forming an association participated. These associations were located in the village of Planadas. Consequently, the data collection excluded the associations in the villages of Gaitania and Bilbao. For confidentiality reasons, we refer to the associations with numbers. One public officer, six community leaders, and two former FARC-EP members were also interviewed in order to deepen our understanding of the war and post-war contexts in Planadas. The information was collected until reaching saturation point.

For the analysis, we followed essential principles of grounded theory, consisting of an inductive process in which the data collected is clustered and coded according to constructed categories (Rennie, 2007). To understand the factors facilitating collective action in Planadas, multi-level and multi-causal analyses were conducted to develop what is known in grounded theory as axial coding which 'focuses on the relationships between categories and sub-categories, including conditions, cause-and-effect relationships, and interactions' (Bitsch, 2005, p. 79). The multi-level analysis allowed us to identify three critical contextual levels (global, national, and local). Using multi-causal analysis, we associated different actions and processes influencing the development of RPO to each of the three scales (Clark, 2014; Ostrom, 2007).

To discuss the findings in relation to already developed collective action theory and literature on RPO (not tailored to post-war settings), we conducted what Kelle (2005) calls abduction, integrating 'previous knowledge and new ideas.' We assessed whether the variables influencing collective action in general

can also account for it in a post-war settings, or whether through axial coding, it was possible to find new emergent categories. With this purpose, we compared the factors identified in Planadas with Ostrom's collective action theory and literature on RPO, by running a second coding to group the factors under general categories. Finally, the information was triangulated with secondary sources, such as press reports, official records, and gray literature.

4. Results

The associations in Planadas managed their own funds, paid premiums to their associates granted by buyers in the United States, Europe, and Asia, and leased or owned -in most of the cases- warehouses and laboratories. Moreover, the associations broke the monopoly held by CAFISUR and local buyers in what the peasants called the Trade Street, a street in the village of Planadas where independent traders had warehouses and bought washed coffee under the price settled by FEDECAFE. Indeed, the sales through the cooperative dropped 40% from 2017 to 2018, whereas the production increased by 702 tons in the same period (CAFISUR, 2018; MADR, 2019b). The associations spread collaboration in Planadas and guaranteed the sustainability of coffee growing in the municipality. Additionally, they provided labor opportunities for the associates' children, spurred coffee growing practices, and offered training programs to compel the young population to stay in rural areas. The associations also disseminated practices of environmental protection among their associates, forbidding the pollution of natural resources and taking care of wildlife. How was it possible?

Fourteen events and processes influenced the development of coffee growers' associations in Planadas, ranging from local to global levels, as shown in Figure 13: Seven factors at the local level, four at the national, and three at the global. At the local level, the first aspect tackled is the FARC-EP presence, which played an essential role in the formation of the associations post-war. Afterward, we present the factors influencing the development of the associations from the national to the global levels. The information was collected prioritizing the period 1990-2018.



Figure 13 Factors influencing the Formation of the Associations according to the Level

Source: Authors

4.1. The FARC-EP Governance System

In wartime, the de facto rulers in Planadas were the FARC-EP. Although public officers and agencies, such as police and the mayoralty, made presence in Planadas, the guerrilla held the monopoly of violence. Furthermore, the FARC-EP provided justice and security services, competing efficiently with an insufficient state offer for those services. The guerrilla created a regime of governance based on different rules to manage civilians' affairs, enforce contracts, provide public goods, and solve conflicts, a phenomenon named by other authors *Rebelocracy* or *Rebel Governance* (A. Arjona, 2016; A. Arjona, Kasfir, & Mampilly, 2015). The FARC-EP regulated coexistence (e.g., public scandals, gossips, debts, domestic violence, curfews), petty crimes, and work (which was mandatory) at least from 1990 to 2017 (FARC-EP, 2016). Strategic violence against the civilians to punish those that did not observe the regulations upheld the system. The punishments included community work (e.g., cleaning the village's central park), threats to leave the municipality, and assassinations. Different aspects of daily life in Planadas were consequently regulated despite being a warzone.

The peace talks in El Caguán (1998-2002) between the national government and the FARC-EP did not alter the situation (CNMH, 2014). Instead, the FARC-EP strengthened their rebelocracy in Planadas,

because the insurgents took the opportunity to invigorate their military forces and political dominion in their historical strongholds during the ceasefire. The only period that jeopardized FARC-EP dominion was 2003-2008 when the state aimed at recovering the control of Planadas militarily after the failed peace talks. The peasants named this period as "The War" due to the continuous armed confrontations between the FARC-EP and the army and the increasing accusations among civilians of being whistleblowers or guerrilla collaborators. Therefore, violence from armed actors against civilians was exacerbated. The beginning of the peace talks in 2012 led the guerrilla to relax its governance system, which ended after the demobilization of the rebels in 2017. Figure 14 presents the temporal allocation of relevant events during the FARC-EP presence.



Figure 14 Timeline - FARC-EP presence in Planadas 1990-2017

Source: Authors based on the focus group conducted in October, 2018

The guerrilla relied on rural Community Action Boards to implement and legitimize their governance system (FARC-EP, 2016). The boards are voluntary civilians' organizations to manage different kinds of affairs at the local level (in both urban and rural areas). The government created and regulated the boards in the 1950s, but they do not receive public funds for their functioning.

While the FARC-EP enforced numerous rules, a specific set of rules affected the ulterior post-war setting and the formation of coffee associations. The first group of rules isolated the municipality in wartime, inhibiting the development of necessary market relations and partnerships for the associations to thrive. The guerrilla issued identity cards for the local population and controlled the mobility of all the outsiders coming to Planadas, including seasonal workers. If a local wanted to invite a foreigner, he/she had to inform the boards in advance. Additionally, when a foreigner arrived in Planadas, the guerrilla inquired into the acquaintance/relation, and the purpose and duration of the visit. The guerrilla also urged the local population to inform the board about strangers. In addition to the war setting, foreigners avoided going

to Planadas because one of the funding sources of the FARC-EP was extortion and kidnapping (CNMH, 2014).

While the boards have been a strong community actor, other forms of cooperation among civilians were stagnated. The FARC-EP did not interfere with collective action efforts, but the war setting and perhaps its effects on trust among civilians (some of them reporting the guerrilla about the activities of other civilians) could have been the causes that discouraged collective action.

However, the second set of rules deactivated conflicts after the peace agreement. When the FARC-EP enforced them, it was impossible to anticipate the consequences, but these rules influenced the post-war situation greatly. First, the guerrilla regulated the land market in the area by approving or rejecting transactions considering both the buyer and the property. The guerrilla commanded the peasants to inform and ask permission to the boards for selling a real estate property, enabling the preservation of a land tenure structure based on smallholders. Additionally, the isolation of Planadas due to the war might have discouraged land acquisition by outsiders or at least in amounts significant enough to change the land distribution patterns.

Second, the guerrilla banned opium growing. Opium was introduced in Planadas in the late 1980s (El Tiempo, 1991). Nevertheless, the opium bonanza in Planadas occurred between 1998 and 2003. The FARC-EP rebelocracy was destabilized because poppy-growing for opium attracted foreigners that ignored the rules, and the cash flow during the bonanza fostered alcohol consumption and conflicts among the peasants. Additionally, the government began to use aerial spraying of glyphosate to eradicate the opium since 2003 (El Tiempo, 2004), jeopardizing the security of the guerrilla members. The FARC-EP could afford neither the social disorder generated by poppy-growing nor the threats posed by the aerial spraying in this stronghold territory. Therefore, the guerrilla prohibited it after 2003, even when they were taxing the production.

The prohibition had twofold effects. In wartime, it obliged the peasants to return to coffee growing as their primary income source, also considering that work was mandatory. In the post-war, the banning deactivated one of the major problems that areas formerly occupied by the FARC-EP encountered: illegal economic activities (mainly, illegal mining and crops) that attracted various non-state armed actors interested in controlling the production and smuggling corridors (Garzón-Vergara & Silva, 2019; González-Posso et al., 2018).

4.2. Evolution of Coffee Production and Trade

Besides the guerrilla ruling, the other central aspect fostering the formation of the associations corresponds to the evolution of coffee production and trade. As shown in Figure 15, the respondents identified three periods. The first period is the FEDECAFE system from 1992 to the beginning of the 2000s. The growers relied on FEDECAFE's extension services and sold the coffee principally to the Trade Street and CAFISUR, which established a warehouse in the village of Planadas in 1992 (CAFISUR, 2016). The peasants called the second period "the pioneer associations" when the first associations were established. The associations, however, were still weak regarding coffee production and commercialization. The third period is "the revolution" or "the boom" of the associations when the associations broke the monopoly of FEDECAFE. Within these periods, different factors underlined the formation of the associations from the local to the global levels.



Figure 15 Timeline – Evolution of coffee trade in Planadas 1990-2018

Source: Authors based on the Timeline conducted in October 2018

Figure 16 illustrates the production and marketing processes that occur in the associations' system. Due to the necessity to verify compliance with the standards, the associations directly hired technical assistants in charge of routine monitoring visits to the farms. The growers dried the coffee at the farm. Consequently, at the delivery point in the warehouse post-harvest processing that influences key characteristics of the coffee was determined. Therefore, for the associations was important to be able to track the coffee to each farm. To do so, besides the monitoring visits, the associations owned laboratories

and hired trained personnel to analyze the coffee. The associations in Planadas distributed the profits to each grower according to both the quantity and the quality of the coffee sold. Since compliance with the standards was associated with additional premiums, the farmers were highly motivated to produce both high quality coffee and follow the standards. The associations required each farmer to market a minimum percentage of their coffee through the RPO and expelled the growers that were not selling coffee (with the exception of Association-6 who had a "black list" of these farmers). The associations regulated the number of members (on average 65 farmers) to be able to implement the harvest and postharvest monitoring system.



Figure 16 Production and Marketing under the associations' model

Source: Authors

a. Local factors. Agro-climatic conditions, Resilience, and Pioneer Associations

The first factor at the local level facilitating the formation of coffee growers associations besides the FARC-EP presence are the agro-climatic conditions in Planadas (altitude, temperature, and rainfall), which are propitious for high-quality coffee growing.

The peasants stated as a second factor their perseverance in coffee-growing despite the war. Living in a warzone obliged them to seek solutions that enabled them to stay without participating in the war economy or as informants. Coffee growing provided the opportunity to stay aside. A coffee grower said. 'As long as the guerrilla knows that you were working, they would not bother you. If they knew that you were not a *sapo* [literally: toad, equivalent to whistleblower], they would not bother you'. Another peasant stated, 'The peace shielded behind the coffee trees,' stressing the pivotal role that coffee played as a resilience strategy in both wartime and post-war.

As Figure 4 shows, the firsts associations established around 2000. Association-1 and Association-2 were founded not for coffee but other products, such as *panela* (raw sugar) and poultry. FEDECAFE promoted the only pioneer association created for coffee growing, Association-3. The peasants formed the first associations that evolved into coffee associations to access funding opportunities, in the context of the impulse given by the national government on the model of solidarity economy, particularly since 2002 (DNP, 2003). Some peasants recognized this moment as "associations of beggars" because the associations lacked an agenda, and the primary funding sources were the government or development projects.

FEDECAFE played another role in the formation of associations. The peasants felt discontent with the monopoly held by the Federation because it allowed FEDECAFE to establish arbitrary conditions without considering the farmers' opinion. Furthermore, while the cooperative representing FEDECAFE at the local level, CAFISUR, was Fairtrade certified since 2004 (CAFISUR, 2016), it did not forward the premium to the producers. Frustration and distrust in CAFISUR spread when the peasants discovered the situation after several years. Strengthening or forming associations was the alternative to access the premiums not granted by the cooperative.

Nevertheless, the associations became widespread and relevant for the local economy since 2014, when an entrepreneur formed Association-4, considered by the farmers as the leading association. Association-4 created a successful model that other peasants wanted to imitate, in terms of the visibility that it gave to the coffee from Planadas and the networking with commercial partners and other public and private organizations. Several farmers and managers of other associations were initially members of Association-4 (e.g., Association-5 and 6), but a confrontation with Association-4's managers led them to establish other organizations. Therefore, Association-4 boosted the conformation of coffee associations, whether by imitation or by conflict.

b. National factors. Coffee Crises, the Cup of Excellence, and the Peace Process

In 2001, FEDECAFE changed the policy of price stabilization, making the national market vulnerable to the price volatility characteristic of the international coffee market since the end of the International Coffee Agreement in 1989 (World Bank, 2002). The same year, the prices plummeted due to coffee oversupply affecting principally smallholders. For the coffee growers in Planadas, this vulnerability was a warning. In 2012-2013, the price slumps and the increasing cost of fertilizers prompted the formation of countrywide peasants' movements and strikes (Cruz-Rodríguez, 2013; Restrepo, 2013). While many farmers were involved in demonstrations, others sought alternatives to compensate for the losses, motivating them to form associations.

Additionally, the coffee growers from Planadas were regularly reaching the finals of the Cup of Excellence, a contest organized by the Alliance for Coffee Excellence since 2005 (Alliance for Coffee Excellence, 2019). The contest assesses only high-quality coffee based on the cup profile, a scoring system assigning points on a scale in which the maximum is 100. To participate, the growers sell micro-lots with a cup profile of a minimum of 85 points quality score. The final stage of the contest includes an auction in which buyers from around the world can make offers for the finalist coffees. Thirty producers countrywide and six producers from Planadas reached the final round on average each year[4]. The outstanding performance of the producers from Planadas convinced the peasants of the quality of their coffee and motivated them to strengthen or form associations.

Finally, the beginning of the peace talks in 2012 favored the associations to develop relations with potential partners, especially exporters and buyers. Even in 2014, some partners were reluctant to visit Planadas for security reasons, a situation that gradually changed. Initially, the associations were meeting their partners outside the municipality until the representatives of the companies trusted the security conditions. Therefore, for the associations' managers, the initiation of the peace talks in 2012 was pivotal for the creation of commercial relations that facilitated market access. The manager of Association-5 said

> 'There was a time when we had to go to visit the export companies. After one, two years, they decided to come. But at the beginning of the system it was me who was going, I sought them

[4] The information about the winners of each year in Colombia is available on https://allianceforcoffeeexcellence.org/.

> because they were afraid to come, and two big companies came for a very short visit but the bosses didn't come, they sent their employees. But now even people from other countries have come, we have been able to bring them (…) because now it is possible for them to come to taste and buy our specialty coffee'

For a member of Association-2, the situation was more critical

> 'The exporters never came here. We did not have businesses with the export companies. The truth is that [before the peace process] we were selling coffee to CAFISUR, but only green coffee. But that was individually, not the association (…) because who would come to Planadas 10 years ago? A foreigner couldn't come'

c. Global factors. Standards and Discourses on Environmental Protection

Fairtrade, Organic standards, and Rainforest Alliance are the main standards for the associations in Planadas. Fairtrade guarantees a floor price and promotes the formation of democratic producers' associations to strengthen their position in the market (Fairtrade International, 2019). Therefore, Fairtrade certifies only whole associations of smallholders.

Organic agriculture is a production system aiming at protecting both the environment and human health, by enhancing soil fertility, reducing pollution, and banning the use of agrochemicals (Reed, M; Holt, 2006). The Rainforest Alliance's hallmarks are the protection of wildlife, tropical forests, and the improvement of management practices within the farms. Contrary to Fairtrade, both organic and Rainforest certify the producers individually and do not have a surcharge settled in advance. However, associations reduce the investment in consultancy and monitoring systems and increase the bargaining power of small farmers, since the growers must negotiate the bonus directly with the buyers.

Association-1 obtained both Fairtrade and organic certifications in 2006 but did not renew them due to the lack of trustworthy commercial partners. Only after 2012, when state agencies granted funds, the pioneer associations adopted standards, while the coffee crisis hastened their adoption by other associations.

The standards provided incentives to form associations, especially Fairtrade, considered by the farmers as the necessary certification for the associations. Nevertheless, according to the growers, the market for Fairtrade certified conventional coffee is small. Therefore, as a marketing strategy, all the associations participating in the study were organic certified, and four sold micro-lot coffee additionally (up to 100

bags of coffee from one farm with a quality score above 85 points). Since the associations had laboratories, the farmers did not have incentives to shirk and sell the coffee independently because without the association the farmers would not have had the possibility to analyze the coffee and obtain better prices. The associations also sold conventional coffee because farmers that were in transition to organic production were also affiliated.

Despite initial slumps in the yields, the peasants considered organic production better than conventional production due to both the high international demand for organic products and increasing concern about the environmental degradation generated by conventional growing. The manager of Association-4 claimed that

> 'If I am obsessing applying poisons, applying agrochemicals, is what's happening in other regions growing coffee going to happen here? You go to Huila [the first coffee producer in Colombia], to Caldas, to Quindío [departments in the Colombian coffee belt], and the land is done, those are lands that if you do not apply huge amounts of fertilizer you will not grow anything, and you have to apply high-quality fertilizer. 10 years and those lands are going to be a desert. Therefore, if I want to provide a better future for my children, I have to become organic. Otherwise here will be the same as what is happening in Antioquia [the second coffee producer], of course, they have the boom of conventional coffee but they are ruining the environment'

A member of Association-2 said also that

> 'Organic is better than conventional growing, because with the organic fertilizer what one does is improve the soil quality, and with the chemical fertilizers you deteriorate the soil. Then you will need more fertilizer, while with the organic fertilizer there is a huge contribution to the soil quality and with that we contribute to counteracting global warming. We [the association] have a campaign here in Planadas to make the people aware about the problems that we are having because of climate change and with the destruction of wildlife. Where I live we have different species that are in danger of extinction, like the spectacled bear and native birds (…) Those species are in danger because humans are deforesting, burning, then we have a sensitizing campaign on this [with other farmers not affiliated].'

Only Association-3 and Association-5 were Rainforest certified. Both associations recognized that this standard was the hardest regarding the requirements. For Association-5, Rainforest was necessary due to both environmental management and as a marketing strategy, whereas the members of Association-3

decided to hold on this certification because they considered the Rainforest's contribution to environmental protection as higher than Organic's. The manager of Association-3 pointed that

> 'With Rainforest we observe the same agricultural practices like in other standards, but Rainforest helps us to preserve better the environment, the animals, many things, we are not only selling and selling coffee, we are rescuing the environment as a whole, the soil minerals, the water, the animals, everything.'

Standards influenced the practices of the farmers greatly. Indeed, the critical process inside the associations was trust-building, or as a community leader called it 'beating the fear' of involving in an association and collaborating. Previous networks permitted the founders to gather an initial group of associates and convince other farmers to participate. Nevertheless, the process of running the associations tested the trustworthiness of this initial group and made it possible to identify defectors. Consequently, a major concern was how to guarantee the collaboration of all the members, including the managers. The associations adapted, adopted, and modified different rules to compel the peasants to collaborate, clearly stating what the rights and duties as a member of the associations are. Since the standards entail mandatory regulations, the farmers had available a set of rules influencing their practices. In this sense, they adapted the standards to their particular setting. For instance, according to Fairtrade, the associations must be managed democratically and are free to state the rules they considered convenient. Additionally, to adhere to the rules of the standards and foster environmental protection, the associations forbade burnings, deforestation, pollution of water sources, application of agrochemicals (or poisons, as several associations' members call them), and promoted recycling, for instance, of honey water. Finally, the standards eased market integration through traders interested in certified products.

5. Discussion

The case of Planadas stresses the importance of RPO as a peacebuilding strategy, at least in four manners. First, RPO has the potential to improve the livelihoods of vulnerable rural communities through better market access. Second, the RPO can implement production systems coupled with the necessities and values of their associates, e.g., organic production. Third, the RPO are opportunities for developing self-governance practices that strengthen the ability of small farmers to deal with social challenges such as enhance trust and cooperation in the aftermath of war or can make rural areas appealing for the next generation. Fourth, RPO can shield legal economies, preventing the production of illegal crops, which in Colombia are responsible for war relapse in several territories. Nevertheless, factors influencing long-

term collective action in the form of RPO in post-war settings are unclear. This study contributes to filling this gap.

Our results support the "war renewal" school optimism. However, this school bears psychological explanations, and it is difficult to understand the contextual determinants of cooperation. According to our results, 14 external factors influenced the RPO rise in Planadas. We ran a second coding to assess whether general categories encompass the determinants identified in the case of Planadas to sketch a framework for the analysis of RPO in post-war settings. In this process, we compared the factors with variables, relations, and processes that influence collective action, according to Ostrom (2010). First, actors must consider the problem at stake as an important one and have enough incentives to embark on collective action efforts (Ostrom, 2004). Second, the biophysical conditions or referring characteristics of the resource system (sector (e.g., water, forest), size, productivity, location, among others) and the resource units (e.g., economic value, size (Ostrom, 2007)), must enable the solution to the problem (Ostrom, 2011). Third, it is necessary to consider social capital as aspects of the social structure that can enhance cooperation, particularly the macro-institutional environment surrounding collective action (Ostrom et al., 2003). An effective law system, a democratic environment, and a well-functioning government facilitate collective action for three reasons. First, because collective action is permitted; second, the participants can develop their own rules to shape collective action and promote collaboration; third, the participants have available additional sanction systems to punish non-cooperators (e.g., to enforce legal contracts).

In the case study, the problem, the incentives, the biophysical conditions, and the macro-institutional environment relate to factors at the global, national, and local scales. Table I presents the second coding. Some determinants of the performance of RPO identified by specific literature are also included.

Table 4 Correspondence of factors influencing the formation of associations in Planadas and the variables identified by Ostrom and the Literature

FACTOR INFLUENCING THE FORMATION OF ASSOCIATIONS IN PLANADAS	RESULT OF THE STUDY	VARIABLES INFLUENCING COLLECTIVE ACTION	DETERMINANTS FROM RPO LITERATURE
Coffee crisis 2013 Price volatility on the international markets Changes in FEDECAFE's price policy Monopoly held by CAFISUR and the Trade Street CAFISUR not forwarding the Fairtrade premium Trade Street paying natural coffee below the price settled by FEDECAFE	Problem	Problem (Ostrom, 2004)	
Cup of Excellence Premiums provided by Standards Organizations granting the funds for certifications	Incentives	Incentives (Ostrom, 2010)	
Pioneer associations Association-4	Entrepreneurs- imitation	Leaders Generalization of collaboration (Ostrom, 2010)	
Agroclimatic conditions	Agroclimatic conditions	Biophysical conditions (Ostrom, 2011; Ostrom et al., 2003)	Regional agrarian structure (Attwood & Baviskar, 1987)
Land tenure structure based on smallholders, providing a sense of equality among the members of the associations	Source of homogeneity	Heterogeneity of participants (Ostrom, 2010)	(Attwood & Baviskar, 1987) Socioeconomic homogeneity or marked social affinities among their members (Agarwal, 2010)
Initiation of the Peace Talks between the FARC-EP and the national government	A real possibility of the end of the war	Macro-institutional or political environment (Ostrom, 2011)	
FARC-EP governance system	Legacies of war		
Coffee growing as a resilience strategy during war	Economic activity as resilience strategy		
Voluntary Sustainability Standards	Institutional intermediaries		
Discourses on environmental protection	Discourses underlying CA		

Source: Authors

Most of the determinants found in Planadas correspond with factors established by collective action theory or RPO literature. Nevertheless, we found that RPO literature neglects the role of entrepreneurship and imitation. Since the support provided by the state was minimal, we cannot conclude that state interference might have detrimental effects on RPO development. However, the RPO formation was possible in Planadas without direct state interference, besides the signing of the peace accord and funds for first-time certifications for the pioneer associations.

5.1. Additional Factors found influencing the Development of Rural Producers Organizations Post-war

According to our results, it is necessary still to expand the understanding of one variable already addressed by the theory and to include in the analysis four further variables.

a. Macro-Political Environment

A real possibility for the end of the war. The macro-environment in post-war includes the real possibility of the end of the war, e.g., expressed in peace talks and the ulterior commitment of the parties involved to meet the agreement. To consider this factor might seem obvious, but if the parties are evading an accord and the end of the confrontation is infeasible, the result could be the strengthening of rebel governance, as in Planadas during the peace talks in El Caguán (1998-2002). Therefore, a real possibility for the end of the war can trigger RPO development in warzones, even during negotiations.

b. Additional Contextual Variables

Legacies of war determined by the relationship between the main armed actor and the civilians in wartime. The FARC-EP developed a rebelocracy system in Planadas, stating clear rules of coexistence. In wartime, the rebelocracy impeded market integration and the creation of bridging capital because it isolated Planadas. Furthermore, warfare affected trust among civilians. In contrast, in post-war, some legacies of rebelocracy facilitated collective action, while in other regions, the FARC-EP prompted illegal economies that nowadays truncate collective action endeavors undertaken by the communities (González, 2016).

Therefore, the type of relationship that an armed group develops with civilians affects RPO formation, either positively or negatively. Arjona (2016) identified three variations of this relationship in irregular warfare, namely, disorder, alliocracies, and rebelocracies. Disorder prevails when the armed group has short time horizons, prioritizing present rewards. A common case of disorder is when the armed group deals with confrontation with armed foes. Defeating the enemy becomes the preeminent task (A. Arjona, 2016). Alliocracies and rebelocracies are, by contrast, situations of order. Non-state armed actors prefer order because the expectations of their combatants and civilians are clearly stated. Civilians also prefer order because it decreases the possibility of being harmed (they know what to do and what not to do). Besides territorial control and increased power in front of the enemy, order in war zones helps a non-state armed actor to supervise civilians' behavior, foster voluntary obedience, and even to obtain support

from community members. Consequently, armed actors usually aim to establish rebelocracies when they have both internal discipline to control their combatants and long-time horizons in a territory. However, this is not always the outcome. The armed actor prefers to settle for an alliocracy if the community and/or the public institutions for conflict resolution are legitimate and effective before the arrival of the group, because civilian resistance to the group is likely to emerge for two reasons. First, since conflict resolution is extremely important in the daily life of non-combatants, they will try to protect their own institutions instead of letting the armed group to impose their rebelocracy (in which the offer of conflict resolution services to the civilians is essential). Second, those institutions provide the community with channels for organizing and acting collectively against the group. Consequently, in this case the armed actor refrains from collecting taxes (civilians' "contributions" for its operation) and regulating conduct directly related to its security, whereas the community, the state or both, keep the control of other aspects of life.

In Colombia, the FARC-EP developed rebelocracies, alliocracies, and disorder, according to the conditions of specific territories (Aguilera-Peña, 2000; A. Arjona, 2016; Urdaneta, 2017). In order to analyze post-war collective action, therefore, it is necessary to account for the type of relationship between the main armed actor and the civilians. In the case of rebelocracies, the content of the rules, arrangements, and practices in specific contexts must be understood.

Economic activity as a resilience strategy. Coffee growing allowed the peasants to stay aside from the confrontation and to meet FARC-EP's rules concerning work as mandatory. The peasants counted on FEDECAFE and the Trade Street that provided marketing channels during wartime when collective action was difficult. Therefore, the peasants were able to deduct an income from coffee growing. Some distinctive traits of coffee also impeded the capture of the production by the FARC-EP. Coffee is not a staple crop. Direct consumption by the combatants was impossible. Additionally, coffee depends on international markets characterized by high-price volatility. Family labor absorbs the losses when the price drops beyond the break-even point. Therefore, a tax on the production by the FARC-EP (as they did with opium) would have meant taking away the means of subsistence from the peasants, and would have created an unfavorable environment against the insurgents interested in keeping their rebelocracy. Consequently, coffee growing became a resilience strategy during the war. Resilience is the capacity of the people to deal with adverse situations, which depends on different contextual factors (Lewis, 2013; Southwick, Bonanno, Masten, Panter-Brick, & Yehuda, 2014). In wartime, resilience refers to the efforts to contain the violence from the armed groups, protecting and setting aside civilians from the confrontation (Jose & Medie, 2016; Lederach, 2005). Coffee was paramount to allow the peasants to stay in Planadas, despite the severe conditions spawned by the war because it granted a means of subsistence

and impeded the farmers' involvement in the war economy (whether by joining the guerrilla, or supporting it as whistleblowers, or participating in illegal economic activities).

Intermediary institutions. The literature considers outsiders influencing RPO as organizations, analyzing them from the bridging capital or nested enterprise perspectives. The case of Planadas allowed us to identify institutional intermediaries, not considered as organizational entities but as a set of rules (which may emanate from organizations). Therefore, we understand intermediary institutions as third-party rulers that influence collective action. The FARC-EP, FEDECAFE, and CAFISUR affected cooperation greatly in Planadas in wartime, especially before the peace talks. However, the peasants felt disconnected from the collective action effort because it was imposed, external, and, in the case of the pioneer associations, dependent on other organizations that granted the only funds they could access. The standards, on the other hand, provided a set of working rules without interference in the process of creating the association, which was initiated by the peasants. In this sense, our findings suggest that the kind of rules available (complementary or imposed), how the intermediary institutions and the participants of collective action are linked (horizontally or vertically), and the funding source (external or self-generated) are indicators of whether the intermediary institutions can foster or stagnate collaboration.

The results also reveal the necessity of considering the standards beyond both the environmental impact perspective and economic lenses, analyzing them instead as intermediary institutions. The case of Planadas controverts the literature finding negative or neutral effects of the standards in the livelihoods of small farmers (Bray & Neilson, 2017; DeFries et al., 2017). Standards in Planadas provided incentives for cooperation and a set of working rules for the associations, had significant social effects (e.g., strengthening trust among both the associates and with external actors and invigorating self-organizing practices), and facilitated the appropriation of discourses related to environmental protection.

Discourses underlying collective action. Discourses defined as a set of ideas that assign specific meanings to particular situations (how they are or should be) (Runhaar, van Laerhoven, Driessen, & Arts, 2013; Sharp & Richardson, 2001), underlies collective action by condensing what the actors consider valuable besides economic rewards and creating a sense of responsibility among the participants. In the case analyzed, while the initial goal of the RPO was coffee trading, environmental discourses noted in the section on Global Factors provided a common ground to commit to and maintain cooperation, providing further incentives. Discourses reduce free-riding problems, people's tendency to calculate based on their own private benefits, and enforcement costs, because discourses deepen the legitimacy of

collective action institutions (Ambrosino & Fiori, 2018; Snow & Bedford, 2000; Tarrow, 1992). In short, discourses make cooperation valid and worthy to the individuals, making behaviors (in this case, holding environmentally friendly practices), not an external constriction, but a voluntary process aligned with the individuals' beliefs (even though shared). Considering the post-war situation in Planadas, a further advantage of environmental discourses is their neutrality regarding contending discourses and ideologies, such as the communist ideology held by the guerrilla, deactivating sources of conflicts, or motives to push away collaborators that wanted to recede from the guerrilla.

Since power relations underpin discourses, they are also an analytical tool to answer questions linking collective action with broader societal structures. While it is not the focus of this research, questions such as to whom (besides the stakeholders) and to what general purposes collective action serves can be elucidated by paying attention to discourses grounding it.

While the legacies of war are specific to post-war scenarios, we consider resilience strategies, institutional intermediaries, and discourses underlying cooperation have the potential to analyze further collective action situations, especially for disentangling the incentives and motivations of the actors to collaborate.

5.2. Framework to understand Rural Producers' Organizations Development Post-war and Implications for Public Policy design

The results suggest that RPO as forms of collective action in post-war settings are possible due to the interplay of different factors. First, external factors placed at various scales (global, national, and local) can prompt or stagnate collaboration. Second, the capacity of the actors to deal with those factors, take advantage of the opportunities, and overcome difficulties (some of them inherent to collective action as distrust) is crucial. Figure 17 presents the factors identified in Planadas as a framework to investigate and understand RPO in post-war settings. The factors are sorted by scale (external factors, local capacity indicators, and internal factors of the RPO) and classified according to their type of influence on collective action (prerequisites, facilitating conditions, and triggers). Prerequisites are conditions of possibility and precede collective action but are difficult to alter (e.g., biophyisical conditions). Facilitating conditions can be intervened or fostered for expediting collective action (e.g., social entrepreneurs). Triggers provoke collective action but are unpredictable because they depend on situations out of the direct control of the local stakeholders (e.g., a real possibility of the end of the war).



Figure 17 Framework to understand RPO development in post-war settings

Source: Authors

According to this framework, we can expect collective action in post-war zones if the following factors are present, taking for granted the possibility of the end of the war. RPO literature identified an essential group of elements influencing collective action in post-war settings:

1. The stakeholders encounter a problem only possible to solve through cooperation.
2. Awareness of the importance of solving the problem and the necessity of collaboration exist.
3. Incentives to solve the problem and undertake collective action efforts are enough.
4. Biophysical conditions allow the solution of the problem (or the solution is adapted to the biophysical conditions).
5. A source of homogeneity that invigorates a shared identity is available.
6. Stakeholders craft rules fostering self-governance practices, establishing monitoring practices, and stating precise practices to relate to the markets.

We found additionally that legacies of war that abolished illegal economic activities and affected other aspects (e.g., a source of homogeneity) influence the possibility of collective action. Moreover, if the civilians during the war were able to develop an economic activity that allowed them to stay aside from

the war dynamics, collaboration is more likely to occur. This does not mean that if there is not a specific set of legacies of war or economic activities as a resilience strategy in a certain area, collective action would be impossible. It means that the analysis must be context-based to understand why or why not collaboration occurs in a specific post-war setting considering these two factors, and how to advance suitable strategies according to local capacity indicators (Figure 6). This study provides alternatives and strategies to prompt RPO development in situations different from Planadas, e.g., in which the emergence of resilience strategies was impossible, the confrontation between different armed actors prevailed, or illegal economic activities succeeded. In this sense, to direct endeavors to facilitating conditions is required.

For example, social entrepreneurs can show to others that cooperation is possible and that to tackle the problem together could be rewarding. Social entrepreneurs, as agents implementing practices to solve social problems through market approaches (Douglas & Grant, 2014), spurred collaboration and proved that local communities are able to solve their problems collectively without the necessity of direct state interference. These entrepreneurs were able to connect local concerns (e.g., problems with the commercialization of coffee, the main agricultural product of the municipality) with global approaches (e.g., standards), tailoring solutions to these specific settings (Berkes & Davidson-Hunt, 2009; Berkes & Davidson–Hunt, 2007; Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman, 2009). Therefore, assisting individuals and groups that can foster cooperation directly or by imitation may expand the formation of RPO.

We also found that institutional intermediaries are decisive. While institutions and laws enacted by the government are recognized as important to promote collective action and RPO, it is assumed that these efforts fall into an institutional vacuum concerning third-party institutions and regulations. To understand how collective action interacts with other institutions, particularly those affecting the collective action endeavor directly, is imperative, especially in post-war settings, where they can play a critical role in sparking cooperation and encouraging self-organizing processes. It is also the case of discourses, also neglected by the literature on RPO, because discourses make collective action relevant to the individuals besides economic rewards, and fosters the practices required for maintaining cooperation (e.g., environmentally friendly practices). Pur results suggest that trainings and funds for acquiring the standards can hasten the formation of RPO in post-warzones.

Nonetheless, academic and public policy analyses must be context-based. The lack of data impeded us from developing a complete typology of all the possible variations of the factors found. Comparison with contexts where the RPO formation has been particularly difficult in post-war scenarios (especially in

those where the war ended with the peace agreement) is necessary. Additionally, we are considering a case framed by irregular warfare. Therefore, the validity of the results might change in the context of extreme violence or high intensity conflict.

6. Conclusions

Our results provide evidence on the importance of RPO as strategies of community-based economic development for peacebuilding in former warzones. RPO prompted trust and cooperation, improved the livelihoods of rural communities, and contributed to inhibiting the re-initiation of war in Planadas. Nevertheless, despite the importance of RPO for peacebuilding and economic development in rural areas, the factors underlining the formation of RPO are unclear. This paper contributes to addressing this gap, by analyzing contextual factors and their interplay to better grasp why RPO develop post-war. Four additional factors were found: legacies of war, resilience strategies in wartime, institutional intermediaries, and discourses. An expanded framework for understanding the formation and development of RPO post-war that includes these four factors is proposed.

Major implications for both public policy and theory are derived from the expanded framework on collective action we outlined. Concerning public policy, top-down interventions may have detrimental effects on local collective action post-war because peacebuilding is a complex process in which the local agents are not merely recipients of national policies or international interventions. Since actors respond in different manners to opportunities and constraints, we suggest that assessing local capacity indicators is necessary. In this sense, devoting efforts to facilitating conditions of collective action may be more effective than to intervene directly, e.g., by working with social entrepreneurs. Different actors can also adapt or boost the opportunities posed by triggers, which are outside the scope of the direct control of local actors. For instance, institutional intermediaries reveal how outsiders can contribute to collective action without compromising the self-governance practices of the stakeholders; complementary, they show how local actors profit from the possibility of having available these institutions with the purpose of promoting cooperation.

Regarding theoretical implications, the attention to history and context also allows us to broaden the psychological explanations distinctive of the war renewal literature and to challenge the “war-ruin” school generalizations, which portray warzones as chaotic and devastated. While violence does have devastating effects, generalizations oversimplify complex situations as war and post-war that affect local

contexts differently, even in the same country. We found indications of social order in wartime and successful cooperation during post-war in Planadas.

Additionally, from this historical and context-based approach, the article addresses some gaps in commons theory, specifically, its lack of attention to history, the difficulty to understand how stakeholders interact with other institutions beyond the state, and motivations underpinning engagement in long-term collective action (besides the mere necessity to solve a problem). The article also enriches the growing literature on new commons by stressing the role of community-based enterprises as efforts in which actors connect global and local concerns, find market-oriented solutions to social problems, share knowledge and practices, and manage hybrid resources.

The theory is particularly invigorated by inquiring why collective action is possible even in extreme situations such as post-war. Whereas commons theory has made major contributions to understand how people are able to manage shared resources and the mechanisms through which they do so, contextual variables explaining the possibility of collective action have received less attention. Our analysis points out to the necessity of considering additional factors such as the legacies of war in the case of long-term collective action post-war; and resilience strategies, institutional intermediaries, and discourses, which have the potential to broaden our understanding of why collective action emerges in various kind of situations. Complementary, the results emphasize the importance of local actors and the ways in which they enhance collective action by profiting from opportunities and coping with constraints.

However, important challenges remain, both theoretical and practical. As indicated, the analyses must be context-based. It is important to test, and if necessary, broaden or modify the proposed framework accordingly. Moreover, while we highlight the role of local actors in peacebuilding, the commitment of both the incumbent government and demobilized non-state armed groups is indispensable to preserve and defend peace accords. This is a crucial condition for all local communities to enjoy the benefits of post-war instead of uneven situations, in which relapse into war is a constant threat in several territories, as is currently happening in Colombia.

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V. Discussion and Conclusions

Violent conflicts are one of the major hindrances developing countries experience. Civil wars, particularly, take place mainly in the rural areas of these countries, jeopardizing the livelihoods of millions of people engaged in agriculture. Although civil wars have been fought across the 20th century, it was only until the post-cold war period that they garnered attention from academia. The literature has made significant contributions to our understanding of the dynamics explaining civil war onset, development, and finalization. Nevertheless, the implications of having agrarian contexts as the main setting in which civil wars occur are only slightly addressed in the literature. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) recognizes that more research is needed in order to better grasp the linkages between violent conflict, agriculture, and food systems in general (Holleman, Jackson, Sánchez, & Vos, 2017). This dissertation is a step toward elucidating how civil wars are affected by the agrarian setting in which they take place, and conversely, how the agrarian world is transformed by the dynamics of violent conflict.

With this purpose, three main gaps found in the literature were tackled. First, my dissertation discusses how land is accumulated in civil wars, identifying the actors involved in land accumulation and stressing the role of the state. Second, the factors underpinning the differentiated behavior of NSAGs among their territories of influence are considered. This thesis identifies how the strategies and resources of NSAGs, civilians, and the state explain the emergence of situations of disorder (as the implementation of widespread violence) or order (as arrangements among the different actors based on clear rules of interaction that diminishes the use of violence by armed groups). Third, the conditions under which collective action with peacebuilding potentialities is possible post-war are identified. Rural Producer Organizations (RPO), as forms of long-term collective action in agrarian societies aiming to boost economic development at the local level, are taken as an example.

By addressing these gaps, the contributions of the dissertation are twofold. First, civil war theories are enhanced by unfolding the factors, incentives, and strategies that explain the behavior and involvement of certain sectors of the agrarian societies in civil war. Additionally, underpinnings and impacts of NSAGs behavior are discerned. The findings and their analysis stand for a complex understanding of

civil war. Warfare's territorial unevenness, the active participation of non-combatants in determining the outcomes of civil war at the local level, the dynamics of the emergence of wartime order, the multilayered character of civil war, and the necessity to consider various scales in the inquiry of violent conflict and peacebuilding are emphasized through out the thesis. Second, the multiple fluxes and influences between the social, economic, and political realms are stressed. The economy, and particularly the development of agriculture in war-torn areas, is largely dictated by the dynamics of civil war. War also alters local community dynamics, social networks, and in many cases deepens inequality between elites and peasants, resulting in profound transformations of agrarian societies. These economic and social transformations are bolstered by both civil war political orders, as the different arrangements of power emerging in wartime ("who rules, where, and through what understandings" (Staniland, 2012, p. 247)), and wartime social order, as the regulation of the relations between civilians and NSAGs (Arjona, 2016). This is so, because these orders entail alliances between actors engaged in civil war, rule-crafting and imposition, and are directed toward the development of strategic objectives of the actors based on the different interpretations they made of the civil war situations. At the same time, economy and the development of agriculture influence those situations by offering opportunities and constraints to the actors in wartime and post-war (or at least, influence what the actors can perceive as favorable and unfavorable circumstances).

Since each of the three main chapters presents its own conclusions, in the following sections some of the arguments or aspects that were insufficiently or implicitly tackled are elaborated on progressed further. The Discussion and Conclusions begin by synthesizing the main findings of each of the three papers and remarking on some lessons from the Colombian case. Concerning the first paper, it is further explained why land is placed at the core of violent conflict in Colombia (subsection 1.1). For the second paper, the possibility of violent civilian opposition to NSAGs is highlighted (1.2). The role of certifications in boosting cooperation with peacebuilding potentialities is stressed regarding the third article (1.3.).

This is followed by the presentation of some implications for the conceptual framework outlined in the Introduction. The first part of this section (2.1.) discusses the insights gained in each of the concepts presented in the Introduction. In the second part (2.2), the intersections between civil wars and the agrarian settings in which they occur are reconsidered in light of the development of agrarian capitalism, state-building processes in rural areas, and multilevel analysis. In analyzing these intersections, the contributions to both civil war theories and our understanding of the agrarian world are made explicit. The third section of the Discussion and Conclusions pinpoints some public policy implications. Finally, gaps and future research challenges are acknowledged.

1. Main Findings, Discussion, and Lessons from the Colombian Case

1.1. Land Accumulation in Wartime: Agrarian Structures at the Core of Violent Conflict

Land is a fundamental asset in agricultural production and it is pivotal for understanding inequality and power relations in rural societies. The first article strives at discerning the strategies facilitated by the civil war context to boost transformations of patterns of land distribution and tenure. Indeed, the dispute about land control has fueled violent conflict in Colombia and has provided incentives to different actors to persist in violence. This is so because land has been a source of power and prestige. Consequently, Colombian conflict is anchored in agrarian structures and the attempts to transform it. Agrarian structure, as indicated in the first paper, refers to the intersections between land distribution (and the assets in it) and land tenure structures (or the rights tied to land) (Albertus, 2019a). These intersections create constellations in which different social relations marked by power (even resulting in subjugation), and modes of production in agriculture emerge and evolve (Machado, 2017).

Land is a synonym of social and political status in these constellations, motivating its acquisition and consolidating social relations of dominance around it (CNMH, 2014; Geisler, 2015; McSweeney, Richani, Pearson, Devine, & Wrathall, 2017). Consequently, highly unequal land distribution patterns and land tenure structures invigorate agrarian elites. Laborers, landless peasants, and peasants with different farm sizes and modes of production are trapped into the resulting power structures that favor elites (Joshi & Mason, 2008; Scott, 1976). Land coupled with political connections and other economic resources that can be mobilized when needed reinforce agrarian elite's status (Yamokoski & Dubrow, 2008). Clear indications of the importance of land in these power configurations in Colombia are the mobilization of agrarian elites against land reform and the activation of their connections to benefit from public land grants (Albertus, 2019b; Albertus & Kaplan, 2013).

In these power configurations, elites channeled the demands of the peasantry, connected them with the regional and national centers of power, even precariously, and reinforced social inequality (González, 2016). In many cases, these elites formed themselves the counterinsurgent groups that gave rise to the paramilitary phenomenon in Colombia, by co-opting peasants and workers and even commanding the militias (Gutiérrez-Sanín, 2014; Gutiérrez-Sanín & Vargas, 2017). Some of these paramilitary militias

transformed the land distribution patterns favoring new and old agrarian elites by forcibly displacing smallholders (Ballvé, 2013; García-Reyes & Vargas-Reina, 2014; Grajales, 2013; Rodríguez-González, 2014).

This resulted in the phenomenon of land dispossession (LD), which has shown why and how certain sectors of civilians and public officers were involved in violent conflict. LD in Colombia illustrates also how physical violence amalgamates with symbolic violence, and how incumbents use very refined strategies to reach their objectives. Indeed, three kinds of mechanisms were identified: Discourses, public policies, and specific methods. These specific methods consist of legal methods, pacification strategies, illegal tricks, other illegal methods, physical violence, and irruption into community networks. Specific processes of LD, however, were the result of the implementation of a configuration of these various mechanisms and methods, and not of one single method. This means that despite the easiness to use violence in a civil war setting, actors were able to craft complex strategies to accumulate land. Importantly, the use of discourses underpinned LD, showing that actors were interested not only in legalizing land in the eyes of the state, but also aimed to legitimize their actions (justifying them as valid, necessary, and desirable).

The implementation of those mechanisms included a dark side of social capital whereby actors attempting to endure agrarian injustice by accumulating land and displacing rural dwellers were connected. The state proved to be a pivotal actor in this process, passively and actively, supplying legal means but also a bureaucracy that served the purpose of accumulating land.

By addressing the case of LD in Colombia, the thesis shows how accumulation processes occur in the course of violent conflict, controverting explanations based on the lineal causation that signals land accumulation as a pre-war condition. This is not to say that unfair agrarian structures do not generate violent conflict, but it points out to the necessity to complement these accounts by considering the great transformations that civil wars entail for agrarian structures.

1.2. Rebel Groups' Behavior and the Importance of Armed Civilian Resistance to Non-State Armed Groups

Despite the progress made by the literature in grasping the differentiated geographies of war (Kalyvas, 2006; Korf, Engeler, & Hagmann, 2010; Mampilly & Stewart, 2020), explanations on the determinants of rebelocracies, alliocracies, and disorder in civil war are scant and the accounts on the role of the various actors involved has been challenging. The second article identifies the trajectories for the emergence of either order or disorder, and their nuances are analyzed and explained. From this account, the thesis is a

contribution toward highlighting the importance of discerning the variety of actors, their strategies, and resources influencing civil war outcomes in regard to order and disorder, particularly, in reference to the role of civilians, public officers, and the army. This multiplicity of actors and their strategies pose constraints and opportunities for NSAGs, deriving in various situations according to specific locales. This is why civil war features order (either rebelocracies or alliocracies) or disorder, and the implementation of violence may vary largely not only across civil wars but also within them.

The FARC-EP has gained attention as a prototype of an insurgent group crafting governance systems (Arjona, 2016; Espinosa, 2016; Urdaneta, 2018). Nevertheless, even if the FARC-EP attempted to do so, it was impossible for it to establish governance regimes across its territories of influence. Instead, the FARC-EP had to adapt to fluctuating circumstances, changing its behavior accordingly. In some locales, the FARC-EP implemented widespread violence. Therefore, the FARC-EP was an appropriate case to consider the differentiated behavior of a NSAG. The protracted conflict in Southern Tolima shows that this behavior varies in both space and time. Simultaneously, it points out how certain equilibrium can be reached and how different situations related to order and disorder may persist for many years. The constellation of actors engaged in the civil war in Southern Tolima also allowed the examination of the different strategies deployed by the state (at both the local and the national levels) and civilians in dealing with armed conflict. The resolute role of peasant and indigenous communities was crucial in determining the course of the civil war.

This contradicts literature tackling the role of non-combatants. Civilians are depicted as actors or, when active, pacific, especially when considering the Colombian case. For instance, Masullo (2020) found that ideational factors shape the kind of response civilians deploy toward armed actors. The cases considered by him, however, are all cases of pacific resistance. Likewise, Kaplan (2017) argues that social cohesion within specific communities enables civilians to participate in collective action for protection against NSAGs, curbing the violent behavior of armed groups. Arjona (2016) also assumes that civilian resistance will be pacific when alliocracies emerge. This literature provides amazing examples of how non-violent opposition can yield incredible outcomes for local communities. NSAGs in these cases have refrained from using violence, with few exceptions (though these exceptions include extreme tragic events such as massacres).

Nonetheless, civilian opposition is not always pacific. The Rondas Campesinas in Perú (Fumerton, 2001; Weinstein, 2007) (a civilian counterinsurgency staged in the area of Ayacucho against Shining Path in the 1980s), the self-defense groups in Ataco, and the counterinsurgency in the Indigenous Reserve demonstrate that civilians can react violently against NSAGs. The results from the second article clarify

under which conditions civilian opposition to NSAGs turns violent. Although Masullo (2020), in accounting for the kind of responses a community develops to deal with NSAGs, dismisses organizational, situational, and strategic factors to favor an explanation based on ideational ones, the findings presented in the second article support a different perspective. It is concluded that the interaction and different configurations of those four factors (organizational, situational, strategic, and ideational) shape the kind of responses non-combatants implement in facing the threats NSAGs pose to local communities and their livelihoods. Among those factors are: milestones in the relationship between the FARC-EP and communities, creation of self-defense groups as a counterinsurgency strategy, kinship and social networks, ideology, presence of agrarian elites, the military and political strategy of the FARC-EP, and changes in the public policy to counteract the guerrilla. Contrary to depictions of non-combatants as nonviolent static actors, bent to the will of armed actors, these factors show that civilians can develop violence as a crucial strategy to deal with NSAGs.

1.3. The Possibility of Post-war Recovery by promoting Collective Action in the Form of Rural Producer Organizations

The case of Planadas stands for the possibility of post-war recovery. RPOs are important indications for the possibility of healing the social fabric in the aftermath of war. Economic recovery, an important challenge post-war, can also be achieved at the local level by expanding community-based organizations that shield legal economies against persistent threats such as re-emerging and non-demobilized NSAGs funded with illegal resources. Socially and environmentally sustainable organizations in Planadas proved that market-based approaches can have beneficial effects for post-war recovery.

Particularly, Voluntary Sustainability Standards leveraged these processes by offering incentives to rural producers to act collectively and connecting them with markets. This opened opportunities for peacebuilding, showing socially optimized outcomes of social capital strengthening. The evidence provided in the third article controverts critical literature on the effects of the standards. This literature, for instance, has found that standards may legitimate both water and land grabbing, by depicting certain agricultural practices as socially and environmentally sound, while being to the detriment of vulnerable rural communities. Cases in point are Bonsucro in Valle del Cauca, a Colombian department in which sugar cane production has been monopolized by large sugar mills that privatized the water needed for subsistence crops, and oil palm companies across the country that were certified but were simultaneously

involved in land grabbing (DeFries, Fanzo, Mondal, Remans, & Wood, 2017; Marin-Burgos, Clancy, & Lovett, 2015; Selfa, Bain, & Moreno, 2014).

Other literature assesses whether the beneficial effects of the standards are consequences of the cooperation triggered by the RPO, or are actually caused by the certifications and their market-based approach (Beuchelt & Zeller, 2013; Jena, Chichaibelu, Stellmacher, & Grote, 2012; Sellare, Meemken, Kouamé, & Qaim, 2020). These studies support that those consequences are mainly trigger by the RPOs. This is known as the "cooperative effect". The case of Planadas, by contrast, stands for the importance of the standards to spark cooperation at the community level, providing incentives to invigorate legal economies and facilitating post-war recovery. The third paper is an effort to identify when the standards have socially, environmentally, and economically optimized outcomes.

The evidence on collaboration in the aftermath of war provided in this dissertation also controverts pessimistic mainstream literature that forecasts wrecked scenarios, inevitable deterioration of human and social capital stocks, and difficult economic development post-war. This has important implications for how peacebuilding is addressed, because of the necessity to assess local capacity indicators to foster post-war reconstruction rather than assume that peacebuilding is a process that starts from scratch. Moreover, by paying attention to context and history, this evidence facilitates the explanation as to why collective action is possible even in extreme settings, such as post-war. According to the results, the persistent problems that farmers perceived were the continuous coffee crises resulting from the price volatility of coffee in international markets and the monopoly held by two kinds of organizations at the local level, meaning that they were facing a problem requiring collective action. Different types of factors placed at various scales explain the emergence of RPO post-war. Biophysical conditions, a source of homogeneity, economic activities as a resilience strategy, the legacies of war, and social entrepreneurs indicate local capacities toward forming RPOs. A real possibility for the end of the war, institutional intermediaries, discourses, incentives (mainly standards), and organizations facilitating the acquisition of the standards also influenced the formation of RPOs post-war at the external levels (including the national and the global scales).

2. Intersections between Civil War and the Agrarian World

With the end of the Cold War and the rising intrastate conflicts, the attention in the study of civil wars diverged from the agrarian roots of the conflicts to aspects such as the correlation between resources accessibility, ethnic conflicts, or religious conflicts, on the one hand, and violence, on the other (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Rebels were depicted as greedy warriors whose only objective was material gain (Collier et al., 2003). In recent years, the agrarian aspects in the study of civil wars have regained attention (Cramer & Richards, 2011; Gutierrez, 2015; Peters & Richards, 2011). This has been important for discerning the role ideology, injustice, and inequality play in civil war outset. The agrarian context in which rebels act became clearer as these different aspects were disentangled.

The specificity of civil war complexity and endurance is deeply intertwined with the agrarian setting in which most of the civil wars occur. This setting supplies opportunities and constraints. Fundamental assets in the agrarian world also provides incentives to continue fighting (in the case addressed in this dissertation, land), and funding sources. Combatants not only rely on natural resources or illegal economies, but also on cash and in-kind contributions (voluntary or imposed) from the peasants (Le Billon, 2001; Walsh, Conrad, Whitaker, & Hudak, 2018; Weinstein, 2007). Nevertheless, the cases presented here also illustrate how the civil war context may be a way of developing and protecting legal activities, as disparate as large-scale plantations (in the case of land dispossession) or subsistence farming (in the case of the rebellocracy of the FARC-EP in Planadas).

These processes have implications for the concepts outlined in the Introduction. The conceptual framework aims at elucidating civil wars as complex phenomena from which power structures are reinforced or created. By power structures, I mean the relations and institutions accounting for power exercise. Therefore, both wartime social order (regulation of the relation between NSAGs and civilians (Arjona, 2016)) and wartime political orders (arrangements between armed actors, including state forces and authorities (Staniland, 2012, 2017))) are encompassed under the label of power structures. This means that civil wars are considered mainly as political phenomena that alter and are shaped by dynamics of the agrarian societies in which they developed. Land accumulation (first paper) is deemed as a process in which power structures are reinforced by allowing the maintenance and renewal of agrarian elites. Warfare entails the creation of different power structures according to the various situations of order or disorder (second paper). RPOs (third paper) allow the subversion and overcoming of wartime social and political orders, by strengthening peasant communities via the economy. The findings of the thesis

concerning land accumulation, wartime orders, and collective action post-war unveil processes whereby power structures are consolidated or modified in wartime and post-war by stressing the connections with the agrarian setting in which civil wars occur. The following subsection discusses each of the concepts developed in the Introduction (violence and power; cultural frames; networks and social capital; and peacebuilding) in the light of each of the three processes addressed in the articles and their linkages to the agrarian world. Additionally, war leverages processes of state building (even from non-state actors) and insertion of particular forms of agrarian capitalism. These aspects will be assessed in the second part of this section, which closes with some analytical implications.

2.1. Violence, Cultural Constructions, Networks, Social Capital, and Peacebuilding

a. Violence and Power

Order and violence are seen as disconnected processes and even as antithetic terms (Kalyvas, Shapiro, & Masoud, 2008). War, as a maximal manifestation of violence, is considered accordingly as the opposite of order. Our own images of war evoke chaos and turbulence, and the logical expected result of armed conflict is devastation. Specialized literature broadly supports this perception by signaling the negative effects of civil war on economic development, infrastructure, and social capital (Bodea & Elbadawi, 2008; Cassar, Grosjean, & Whitt, 2013; Collier & Duponchel, 2013; Collier et al., 2003; Kijewski & Freitag, 2018; Rohner, Thoenig, & Zilibotti, 2013).

This perspective holds true in many situations because war does create disorder and negatively impacts the lives of millions of people. A standard civil war situation is confrontation among warrior parties and civilian victimization. However, the use of direct violence varies largely within and across conflicts. The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) (Strand, Rustad, Urdal, & Nygard, 2019), for instance, developed a category of low-level conflicts (under the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths but above 25) to capture this diversity. When, where, and why is the degree of violence altered in civil wars?

To be sure, NSAGs do implement violence, for instance, when they deal with confrontation with other armed groups, internal indiscipline, or civilian resistance in strategic territories. Also, disorder and widespread violence are important strategies to achieve territorial control when the purpose is to leave the territory vacant in order to enable asset accumulation, as in the case of LD in Colombia. Conversely, the installation of governance systems by insurgents aiming at consolidating broad civilian support explains decrements in the degree of violence. The development of governance systems allows rebels to

stage insurgency in the long-run, eliciting civilian collaboration (or at least, obedience). Violence, while upholding the system, is not the main means by which rebels rule civilians affairs. As theories on domination have pointed out, any power can be sustained in the long-term bearing only on physical violence (Bourdieu, 2001; Weber, 1997). This is also true for civil wars, despite the apparent ease of using direct violence. This explains why, from the political standpoint, order is necessary for NSAGs. The implementation of widespread violence can be counterproductive if the NSAG plans to gain civilian support. Civilians may massively flee or stage a counterinsurgency. However, when a certain degree of order is reached, civilians either adapt or suffer the consequences of disobedience.

The evidence provided in this thesis demonstrates that civil wars are not exclusively featured by direct violence. First, the degree of use of violence changes according to different wartime situations. In areas of disorder, it is expected that violence, not only between combatants but also toward civilians, increases, while in areas of order the NSAGs have incentives to refrain from using direct violence (including pacts with local authorities). Second, indirect and symbolic violence play a crucial role in the kind of power structures emerging in wartime and post-war. For this reason, the concept of framing, and specifically, how ideology and discourses were used to inspire collective action and mobilize support, underlie the generation of power structures in wartime and post-war.

b. Framing Cultural Constructions

Discourses and ideologies indicate what is deemed as valuable by the actors, but they do not result in collective action alone. A process of connecting discourses and ideologies to collective action and expressions of support (not only rhetorically but factually) is necessary (Snow & Bedford, 2000; Tarrow, 1992). This process in known as framing, and entails the displaying of discourses and ideologies deemed valuable and nonnegotiable. A set of actions, therefore, are presented not only as desirable but required in order to defend these ideologies and discourses.

Concerning the agrarian environment of civil wars, ideology plays an important role because some ideologies resonate more with certain agrarian sectors than with others (Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood, 2014). For this reason, the ideology of the NSAG is pivotal in determining wartime situations. By recognizing specific types of constituents, ideology fosters civilian support from certain social segments to their cause, and simultaneously, rejection from others. The paramilitary militias, with an ideology bearing on the importance of agrarian elites for economic development, were crucial in the process of changing agrarian structures by supporting land accumulation as a strategy to “bringing the rich” to what they considered isolated rural areas of the country and at the same time contributing to specific forms of state

building. These were also justified by discourses related to specific trajectories of capitalism as the only feasible and desirable paths of development.

The guerrillas, on the contrary, defended an agrarian reform based on smallholder farming with a clear communist tone. This boosted rejection from certain sectors of agrarian elites that welcomed or staged counterinsurgent militias on their own. In the case of Southern Tolima, peasants holding a liberal ideology repudiated the communist FARC-EP ideology, and organized a counterinsurgent group with broad peasant basis. Post-war, a discourse built around environmental protection, facilitated mobilization for collective action in Planadas, showing that discourses that seem unrelated to peace, may have peacebuilding potentialities.

Nonetheless, the agrarian character of civil war and the ideologies of some NSAGs may disconnect urban sectors from key issues at stake in the conflict, as it happened in Colombia. While some groups tried to engage poor urban sectors to gain support to their cause, as in the case of the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the FARC-EP in the late 1990s, the perception of two different countries (the urban and the rural) was widespread in the social representations of the nation and the war (Ávila, 2019; GMH, 2013). Furthermore, political elites succeeded in portraying the guerrilla as the public enemy number one.

c. Networks and Social Capital

The type of actors involved in violent conflict are determined by the agrarian contexts in which civil wars occur. Agrarian elites and peasants became the main protagonist of civil war in various manners. It was a sector of the peasantry who formed the FARC-EP and other Colombian guerrillas. Agrarian elites may also mobilize their resources against the presence of rebels, as a form of defending their privileges and the social relations in which the production of those privileges are possible, bearing in mind that insurgencies aim at replacing the status quo. The case of paramilitary militias commanded by agrarian elite members in Colombia is illustrative.

Violent conflict shaped alliances between those different sectors of the rural society, modifying social networks as the result of consolidating supports and siding with armed actors. For example, the relaxation of state presence in rural areas and intricate processes of state building, determine the type of alliances that public officers, armed forces, and NSAGs made, from direct confrontation to very complex collusion agreements. Additionally, dense social networks in rural areas prompt collaboration from civilians or, on the contrary, opposition. Family ties and the amplification of social networks they provide played a crucial role in the armed groups' composition and the support a community offered to a NSAG. While it has been found that civilians can pacifically oppose an armed group based on dense community networks

that prompt collective action (Kaplan, 2017), the results of this dissertation details how social capital in wartime develops a dark side enabling the reproduction of violence. Moreover, the involvement of the army in fostering counterinsurgent groups can find a fertile ground with the existence of agrarian elites or resentment against rebel groups.

The thesis also emphasizes the opposite situation: the bright side of social capital post-war. The processes whereby new forms of cooperation are constructed for the communities to improve their livelihoods and trigger economic development are identified. The activation of social networks allowed the peasants in Planadas to form associations around coffee growing, positioning them into new markets and invigorating the local economy.

d. Peacebuilding

Enhancing the debate between liberal peace vs. local peace (Ginty & Richmond, 2013), it is possible to advance three theoretical and practical propositions from the evidence presented in this dissertation. First, peacebuilding is a process shaped by wartime situations. The meaning of peacebuilding and the actions required to do it change accordingly. These situations correspond to the type of the war fought and the prevalence of order or disorder. Second, peacebuilding is a multilayered process defined by an interplay of factors at various scales. Third, the rural scenarios in which civil wars take place position agriculture in an important role for peacebuilding.

To be sure, the results are grounded in the study of an irregular warfare resulting from a class-based dispute. In irregular warfare, the crafting of institutions (as different types of rule configurations) is a crucial strategy to back the sovereignty challenge a NSAG poses to incumbent governments. As the results show, situations of extreme violence are possible in irregular warfare, but the degree of violence varies across different wartime situations. Therefore, peacebuilding is a process shaped by what is labeled in the third article as the legacies of war. In other words, the meaning of peacebuilding in locales dealing with disorder is different from locales in which situations of order prevail, because these diverging situations affect local capacity indicators disparately. In both rebelocracies and alliocracies, for instance, social capital may be enhanced by engaging the communities in respecting the accords with NSAGs. Conversely, in areas of disorder, social capital may be highly deteriorated and consequently, the kinds of collective actions required post-war for peacebuilding may become more difficult. Importantly, these legacies also depends on the kinds of rules impose by the armed actor. For example, if the NSAG in a specific territory develops illegal activities and engages civilians in those activities (as the FARC-EP did in other locales (Gutiérrez D & Thomson, 2020)), post-war recovery may be more difficult. Non-

demobilized NSAGs and civilians may have incentives to persist in those economies jeopardizing peace endeavors (Salazar, Wolff, & Camelo, 2019).

To claim that peacebuilding is a multilayered phenomenon implies that peace is a complex process that requires effort from different sectors of the society. Macro, meso, and micro approaches are needed in order to foster peace endeavors aiming at overcoming violence as the way to solve social and political conflict. The importance of social entrepreneurs in mobilizing collective action, for instance, underscores the relevance of local actors in fostering peacebuilding initiatives. The necessity to evaluate the legacies of war as a result of different wartime situations accounts for the importance of the local level in defining the meaning and actions required for peacebuilding. Additionally, the results of the third article demonstrate that macro-conditions, such as a real possibility for the end of the war, represent an unavoidable scale of intervention. This scale also encompasses the analysis of public policies that endure social inequality, such as those related with private property institutions and the support of specific economic sectors, as the first paper shows. The evidence of the first paper also suggests that the deactivation of discourses legitimizing inequality and criminalizing rural communities is also an important process toward peacebuilding.

Finally, besides territorial unevenness, the rural setting of civil wars implies that agriculture plays a crucial role for peacebuilding. By enhancing RPOs, for instance, economic recovery post-war attenuates threats of war reactivation by boosting legal economies that can improve the livelihoods of farmers, contrary to profitable illegal economies fostered by NSAGs.

2.2. Rethinking the Junctions between Civil Wars and the Agrarian World

The intersections between civil wars and agrarian environments are indicative of two processes deeply interwoven: one mainly economic and the other mainly political. First, the development of agrarian capitalism is stimulated by the civil war setting. Second, civil war underpins state building in rural areas. While this is tangentially scrutinized in this dissertation, evidence on these two processes is provided.

a. Agrarian Capitalism and Civil Wars

Land accumulation and the marketization of land are unavoidable processes in the development of agrarian capitalism (Pierce, 2012). Different trajectories of installation of agrarian capitalism are possible and their analysis, therefore, must be context-based (Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 2010). Nonetheless, at least three main trajectories have been recognized, ranging in the degree of violence they entail (Bernstein,

2002): 1. The Junker path, which indicates the transformation of feudalist lords into capitalist farmers, implying the reaction of the lords to protect their privileges before the changes brought by capitalist development. 2. The American path, that is, when family farmers are able to convert into capitalist farmers. 3. The British path, an extremely violent primitive accumulation based on LD through which the landlords transformed into capitalist farmers or tenants and businesspersons transformed into capitalist tenants (Marx, 1887). The literature shows that these transitions are social processes expressing class-based disputes intersected with other social categories, such as ethnicity and gender (Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 2010; Bernstein, 2002; Levien, Watts, & Yan, 2018). The role of the state is also underscored as essential in determining these different outcomes. Moreover, instead of being peaceful processes, agrarian transitions can be extremely violent (Cramer & Richards, 2011; Marx, 1887; Thomson, 2011).

In other words, accumulation and dispossession are important parts of certain trajectories of capitalism development. According to Luxemburg ((1968) cited in Harvey (2004)) the dispossession processes described by Marx that precipitated capitalism are not only primitive, but a continuous movement of capital to deal with the cyclical crises of the system. Harvey (2004, 2007) focuses on how these processes work both at global and national scales, renaming them as accumulation by dispossession. At the national level, Harvey (2004) describes these processes as waves of accumulation by dispossession, "the necessary cost of making a successful breakthrough into capitalist development with the strong backing of state powers" (p.154). At the global level, he portrays accumulation by dispossession as a new imperialism characterized by temporal and spatial (re)accommodation of the surpluses generated in the developed countries toward peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, in a move for avoiding crises and continuing the accumulation processes. While dispossession is a feature of the continuous development of capitalism, it escalated after the exacerbation of globalization under the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. LD consists, accordingly, of a process of land privatization in the global south, by displacing peasant agriculture and rural communities that are not absorbed as a workforce into the capitalistic circuits (McMichael, 2005).

It is not surprising therefore that civil wars offer an appropriate context for the development of agrarian capitalism through processes of land accumulation, as the first article demonstrates. LD entailed the incorporation of vast portions of land under the private property regime and the possibility to incorporate them into the market dynamics. An important part of these lands have been devoted to cattle ranching just to have proof that the land is occupied (but it is far from a capitalistic mode of production) (CNMH, 2016; Duarte-Rojas & Cotte-Poveda, 2014; Quinche, 2016). Thus, it is unsure whether the complete insertion of these assets has resulted in the full development of agrarian capitalism. This would imply

that the property rights are subject to market dynamics because the mode of production is capitalist and the maintenance of those rights complies with market conditions (e.g., access to credit and generation of surpluses to pay it) (Carlson, 2018). Nevertheless, the state recognized property rights in dispossessed lands that were under customary regimes and it has been found that one of the main purposes of this unproductive land is rent speculation. Consequently, it is possible to claim that the civil war fostered the introduction of agrarian capitalism and the logic of accumulation, private property, profit generation, and markets characteristic of capitalism in the Colombian countryside.

While the first chapter is devoted to provide evidence on this violent trajectory of agrarian capitalism development, the third chapter portrays a completely different path in which market approaches can even have peacebuilding potentialities. It is important to recognized the broader scenario of capitalistic development in which those market approaches are embedded, fair to say, not exempt from a robust criticism. Friedmann (2005) claims that capitalist development in the agri-food sector is reaching a phase in which adaptation of the system toward more socially and environmentally sustainable practices has become imperative. This has led to the emergence of a green capitalism, which selectively addresses demands, pushed by social movements toward sounder modes of production, e.g. organic production. The selection of the demands, based on profit and market opportunities, depicts capitalism as the only way to achieve sustainability, and at the same time, deepens the gap between wealthy consumers (those who can access sustainable agri-products) and poor consumers. Therefore, this phase is marked by duality: conventional production (massive and industrial production for the poorest) vs. alternative (environmentally and socially responsible for the wealthiest). Green capitalism has also provided a discursive device to legitimize LD though unintended (Bocarejo & Ojeda, 2016; Cárdenas, 2012). Importantly, standards have played a pivotal role in the development of green capitalism.

Nevertheless, market-based approaches cannot be stigmatized for various reasons:

1. Since economy defines the forms of material reproduction of human beings (Marx, 1997) and agriculture accounts for this process in rural societies, farmers look for solutions to improve their livelihoods and increase their incomes. While subsistence agriculture forms an important part of the nutritional intake in rural areas, the necessity to connect producers with markets to generate additional income required for other expenditures of rural households has been largely recognized (Barrett, 2008; Corsi, Marchisio, & Orsi, 2017; Markelova & Mwangi, 2010). Therefore, to envisage solutions providing market access is important.

2. Directly related to the first point, economic development is imperative for peacebuilding processes before the danger of relapse into war and the constant threats non-demobilized NSAGs

pose to rural communities (consisting of engaging them in illegal economies (Salazar et al., 2019; Valencia & Avila, 2016)).

3. The capitalistic mode of production can hold responsible for loss of biodiversity, climate change, and alterations in ecosystem services (Bauhardt, 2014; McMichael, 2006). Challenges to capitalism are evolving, for instance, by positioning agro-ecology and food sovereignty as alternatives to the prevailing mode of production to counteract the negative effects of capitalism into the earth system. The findings of the third chapter are at the interstices of green capitalism and alternatives to capitalism, by emphasizing the role of community-based enterprises (Berkes & Davidson-Hunt, 2009; Berkes & Davidson–Hunt, 2007; Cháves Ávila, 2018). These enterprises have both social and economic objectives, while implementing practices aiming at environmental, social, and economic sustainability. The standards echoed these concerns, while facilitating market access and better incomes for farmers.

4. While a different mode of production and even economic system is desirable, history has demonstrated that transformations to the systems have been the result of violent revolution, in which most of the affected were the poorest (Hobsbawm, 1971; Marx, 1887). We have to think about imaginative ways to change and create new orders with socially, environmentally, and economically optimized outcomes that imply pacific transitions in which the vulnerable sectors of society do not pay the costs. In the boundaries of capitalism, market-based approaches that have beneficial effects for peacebuilding and promote environmentally friendly practices, such as those examined in the third chapter, represent a successful path that rural communities are showing us.

Therefore, the research also stands for a comprehensive discussion to two strands of capitalism development. Community-based enterprises as endeavors aiming at social, environmental, and economic sustainability within capitalism are alternatives to violent accumulation patterns that deepen inequality. These enterprises may also open the possibilities of pacific transitions toward new economic systems that revert or at least curb the damages produced by human activity to the earth system.

b. Wars Driving State Formation in Rural Areas

The results suggest that state-building in rural areas is a process enhanced by civil wars. Civil wars are instances of state formation because they imply a sovereignty challenge resulting in competitive state-building (Cederman & Vogt, 2017; Staniland, 2012). There are at least two reasons for this. On the one hand, confronting parties aim to hold political power which mirrors state practices (authority bearing on

violence, some degree of legitimacy, and effective rule) (Duyvesteyn, 2017; Grynkewich, 2008; Mampilly, 2011). On the other, rather than maximizers aiming at holding the monopoly of authority, states and NSAGs are optimizers (Staniland, 2012). Under the fluctuating circumstances of civil war, this seems especially relevant because these wars are clear examples of the impossibility of holding the monopoly of violence and power by one single actor. In other words, at some point armed actors have to cede power, paradoxically, in order to wield some of it. This challenges the prescriptive definition of the state based on the monopoly of violence and an omnipresent bureaucracy (Weber, 1997). This is so because "States are not engaged in an all-consuming quest for territorial authority, but instead are intertwined with other social and political forces that shape authority across time and space" (Staniland, 2012, p. 244). As a result, various situations in civil war are unleashed. Concerning the relation state-NSAGs, three outcomes are possible: alliance, limited cooperation, and military hostilities (Staniland, 2017).

This dissertation provides evidence of these various results. In the case of land accumulation through discourses, public policies, and alliances with agrarian elites and paramilitary militias, the state consolidated in areas taken from the guerrilla. Moreover, sectors of the local bureaucracy were benefited by the alliances formed between public officers and paramilitary militias, allowing the functioning of the state apparatus. From the opposite venue a similar result is possible. In the case of the guerrilla, tolerance between warrior parties in specific locales as in Planadas, allowed state agencies to provide some services and to control the degree of violence (especially considering the accords with the local police). Simultaneously, this facilitated the consolidation of the rebel governance regimes enforced by the guerrilla. In other locales, clear confrontation existed, as in Ataco.

This means that civil war existence and persistence cannot be comprehended based exclusively on explanations of state absence or failure. Contrarily, civil wars can provide a scenario for the state to consolidate its power in rural areas. Of course, there is a flip-side of the coin: NSAGs try to imitate state power, and some of them are very efficient in doing so, as successful cases of rebel governance exhibit. In between, alliances, limited cooperation, and hostilities, are present. This creates instances of sovereignty fragmentation (spaces of contested sovereignty where the state and NSAGs overlap), and instances of sovereignty segmentation (where one of the confronting parties enjoys territorial control) (Staniland, 2012), resulting in different forms of state formation in civil war.

c. Analysis connecting the Micro, Meso, and Macro Dynamics of Civil War

The agrarian turn in the study of civil wars was accompanied by an increasing interest in local dynamics, which impact and alter rural settings dramatically (Gutierrez, 2015; Kalyvas, 2006; Vervisch, 2011). Irregular warfare affects differently the sub-national level, and particularly, agrarian settings, by establishing new political and social orders, affecting agriculture, and in some cases deepening inequality. Nonetheless, this is profoundly intertwined with national and global circumstances. Therefore, analytically, the thesis is an effort to discern how the interplay of different scales explains civil war dynamics and peacebuilding processes. A multilevel approach connecting the micro, meso, and macro levels was applied to analyze the strategies deployed by various actors to cope with constraints and take advantage of the opportunities posed in situations determined by processes at various scales. Balcells & Justino (2014) define

> "the macro level as the processes of conflict and violence that take place at the level of the sovereign state (e.g., establishment of elections, restructuring of property rights, justice and security reforms, demobilization and reconstruction programs, peace agreements, conflict negotiations, and outcomes). The micro level (…) encompasses conflict processes that involve individuals or households (e.g., participation in violence or recruitment, social and economic coping strategies, and decision to support factions). Finally, we conceive the meso level as processes that take place at the community level or at the level of local social groups and organizations (e.g., local forms of collective action and governance, local institutions, and local and group leadership). The meso level connects individuals and households with larger communities and broader processes" (p.3).

I expand the macro level to consider also dynamics at the global scale that influences both wartime and peacebuilding processes. Each of the three articles of this dissertation show the interplay of these different levels.

The first paper aims at connecting discourses and public policies (including private property institutions) to particular configurations of specific methods to dispossess land. Discourses of development positioned at the global level were utilized for the legitimization of LD practices. Public policies at the national level provided the legal means whereby actors were able to privatize stolen land. By standing for specific trajectories of economic development, these policies not only facilitated the legalization of LD, but also its justification. Specific methods applied at the local level constituted the materialization of LD.

The cases considered in the second article illustrate how changes at the macro-level interrelate with micro and meso dynamics, determining the course of the war in different locales and the complex outcomes of order and disorder. While the most elaborated theory in regard to rebel group behavior considered changes at the macro-level, it only includes the signing of peace accords as a variable that could foster disorder (Arjona, 2016). This is so, because NSAGs may plan to gain a better position in the negotiations by pressing the government via civilian victimization. In other cases, NSAGs refrain from using violence to foster civilian support in an eventual process of political participation of demobilized members of the NSAGs. The case of Southern Tolima depicts how public policy for confronting war defined at the national sphere has profound impacts on the way in which war develops locally and how NSAGs, civilians, and local authorities adapt to war. It also shows that the programs and strategies of the NSAGs establish a course of action with direct effects in the behavior of the group, meaning that NSAGs may strive to craft governance regimes at the local level in spite of confrontation with other armed groups, or may delay the imposition of those regimes even when they have long-term interest and presence in one particular locale.

Finally, the framework for understanding RPO development post-war is anchored in a multi-level analysis that illustrates how individual, local, national, and global factors interact to create conditions for the rising of collective action. Economic activity as a resilience strategy, for instance, shows the ways in which civilians deal with the presence of armed groups by preventing their involvement in illegal activities. Social entrepreneurs post-war demonstrate how individuals can spark cooperation at the local level. At the macro level, it was found that a real possibility for the end of the war creates a favorable environment for the RPO by facilitating market access. The diversity of institutional intermediaries (the guerrilla, the National Federation of Coffee Growers – FEDECAFE, and the standards) show also how certain factors are placed across scales.

The dissertation, therefore, stands for a multi-level approach for studying both civil wars and peacebuilding. In analyzing different instances for understanding wartime and peacebuilding outcomes at the local level, it is possible to account for the situation at the sub-national level while understanding how it is shaped by macro cleavages and processes, not only nationally but globally. This is important in view of some difficulties for both macro and micro approaches in civil war research to reconcile their own perspectives. Concerning peacebuilding, the debate between liberal peace vs. hybrid peace is enhanced by recognizing the necessity to analyze both local and global conditions, while integrating the national scale.

3. Policy Implications

Along with climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic, man-made conflict is recognized as a major hindrance to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Civil wars in particular jeopardize particularly food systems, by threatening smallholders responsible for an important portion of the food supply in the developing world. Civil wars in rural areas also create vicious circles of poverty. Migrations caused by violence and the deterioration of the livelihoods of the people that were able to stay at home in wartime negatively affect lifelong learning, nutrition, health, and social and cultural assets of the communities that are able to survive war (Collier et al., 2003; English & Mayo, 2019; Figueroa, Linhart, Beckley, & Pardosi, 2018; Martin-Shields & Stojetz, 2018). Even in cases of rebelocracies, civil war creates challenges for the livelihoods of rural communities, by imperiling collective action in wartime and complicating market access to the farmers, as the results of the dissertation demonstrate.

The policy challenges that civil wars pose are twofold. On the one hand, it is necessary to design strategies to cope with war. On the other, actions toward avoiding war reactivation and push forward peacebuilding are required once the finalization of the war is possible. As this dissertation remarks, these strategies and actions must respond to different levels. Specific policies at the local and national level are required. Accordingly, the implications for public policy stemming from this research imply actions across time (wartime and post-war) and across scales. Three main implications are discussed: the analysis of the sub-national level, undermining civilian counterinsurgency, and protecting and fostering small-scale agriculture.

3.1. Analyzing the Sub-national Level considering Wartime Situations and the Legacies of War

Territorial unevenness characterizes civil wars underlined by the construction of diverging social and political orders at the local level in wartime. This directly affects the capacity of local communities and the state institutions to cope with warfare. As a consequence, it is necessary to design differentiated strategies according to the behavior of armed groups and their capacity (or not) to build wartime social and political orders. In other words, strategies for dealing with disorder should be different from those aiming at dealing with rebelocracies, or alliocracies. For example, in Ataco the people welcomed the army. But the same army criminalized the population in Planadas and the Indigenous Reserve. These peoples were not used to having a strong relation with state institutions, and consequently, state agencies and particularly the army cannot arrive in a territory to strengthen violence toward civilians. This is

relevant considering that civilians may further their support to the rebels. Therefore, both military and state-building strategies must be customized to the different wartime situations, shaped by the resources and the strategies civilians, NSAGs, and local authorities develop.

These different wartime situations also carve the legacies of war in specific locales, which should be taken into account for peacebuilding. These legacies affect local capacity indicators post-war. In areas of disorder, the pessimistic mainstream literature pointing out the difficulties faced by actors to cooperate post-war due to negative affectations of the social tissue, could make more sense. Nevertheless, this does not mean that peacebuilding efforts would be impossible, but that a different approach is required. Oppositely, collective action may be enhanced by the legacies of war in zones of order. As the case addressed shows, NSAGs dictate the local economy and can protect (even unintendedly) legal economies. However, this statement should be taken cautiously. In other warzones, NSAGs developing rebelocracies may also impose and regulate illegal economies, that, post-war, attract other armed groups in order to control the production and have funding sources (Salazar et al., 2019). Therefore, the analyses may account for the type of legacies of war in different locales.

3.2. Undermining Civilian Counterinsurgency

Different research has shown the advantages for governments of staging a civilian counterinsurgency (Paul, 2010; Peic, 2014; Stanton, 2015). They are low-cost, have a good knowledge of the terrain and the communities at the local level, and can support the army in strategic actions to attack the enemy. It is considered that certain wars would have had a completely different result without them, as the case of the Rondas Campesinas in Peru to fight Shining Path demonstrates.

Against this literature, the findings of this dissertation show tragic outcomes. Civilian targeting increases (both from rebels and from the self-defense groups), social conflict within the communities arises between those supporting armed solutions and those supporting pacific methods to deal with NSAGs (as in the Páez Reserve), and counterinsurgencies can mutate into criminal bands out of the control of the military and the state (as many paramilitary militias in Colombia did). Additionally, those bands can reactivate war, as is happening in many Colombian locales. Therefore, the support to civilian counterinsurgency most be avoided even when locals have the disposition to develop counterinsurgent activities.

3.3. Protecting and Fostering Small-scale Agriculture

The Colombian case shows that small scale agriculture can be largely neglected by public policies in wartime, putting at risk the livelihoods of millions of farmers and furthering agrarian inequality. Indeed, grounded in discourses and public policies that enforced inequality between agrarian elites and rural dwellers, LD affected mainly smallholders. The effects of neglecting small scale agriculture in civil war contexts are twofold: on the one hand, grievances that might evolve into renewed cycles of violence are produced. On the other, incentives for accumulating land violently are created, targeting the land of smallholders.

Therefore, small-scale agriculture should be fiercely protected in wartime and fostered post-war. Multiple land tenure regimes in which common lands (not only based on ethnic affiliation) are recognized, low-cost formalization of customary agreements for land transactions, simplified legislation, and up-to-date cadasters, are pivotal for the protection of smallholders. Additionally, the deactivation of discourses deepening inequality and justifying land dispossession is required. While discourses of green capitalism, for instance, may acquire new meanings, as the third chapter shows, the deactivation of discursive devices supporting the criminalization of the peasantry as guerrilla collaborators is imperative to protect local communities that may be targeted by counterinsurgent groups and the military. As the cases have shown, this can lead to massive LD.

Post-war, it is necessary to provide incentives to collective action by identifying social entrepreneurs, opportunities to improve incomes, and market access. Training in standards, especially in the requirements and the implications of applying them, can motivate collective action among rural producers aiming at improving their livelihoods and developing legal economic activities, putting off non-demobilized NSAGs.

4. Limitations and Future Research Challenges

Case studies entail the limitation of the external validity. This dissertation aims, consequently, to outline hypotheses that need further inquiry and larger samples. Additionally, the case selected has some traits that confine the results to specific types of conflict. First, Colombia is not a conflict of extreme violence, unconventional warfare, or where the main objective is the annihilation of the enemy. Some of the propositions made may be not applicable to contexts of high-intensity violence. For instance, in cases of civil wars resulting in genocide, such as the Rwandan, the incumbents usually are not interested in developing territorial control by regulating civilians' affairs, but the objective is the complete

extermination of what are perceived as the enemy. The insights gained into rebel governance, therefore, are inapplicable, affecting also the implementation of the framework for understanding the development of RPO post-war.

Second, Colombian civil war is a class-based dispute. In cases of ethnic or religious violence the agrarian aspects of civil war may have a different tone. Although it has been found that conflicts apparently bearing on different macro cleavages have an agrarian dimension (Cramer & Richards, 2011; Verwimp, 2011), it is important to discern to what extent and how those cleavages are determined by the agrarian contexts in which civil wars are mainly fought.

Third, the intervention of foreign actors in Colombia has been more partial (Borda, 2012) than in other contexts. This partial internationalization was materialized in the provision of technical support and funding to the armed actors by other governments or terrorist groups (Murphy, 2005; Stokes, 2001); or by framing the dispute within broader cleavages such as communism vs. capitalism (in the cold war period), or as war on terrorism (after 2001) (Borda, 2012). In other contexts, foreign participation has been much more critical. In Iraq, for instance, international armed forces invaded (Hinnebusch, 2007), and in Syria, besides the participation of other countries in funding and providing support to the armed actors, an important number of fighters from different countries enlisted as soldiers (Mishali-Ram, 2018). Therefore, the results presented cannot account for intense international intervention either.

These represent constraints but also opportunities for future research, especially in view of persistent difficulties in the civil war literature to conciliate qualitative and quantitative approaches. Comparison among different types of war requires grounding in qualitative research that accounts for different aspects and manifestations of macro-cleavages at the sub-national level. This can allow one to capture nuances that are important in explaining civil war onset, dynamic, and finalization (e.g., typologies explaining the interlinks between kinds of macro-cleavage, ideology of NSAGs, and different political and social orders at the local level). Moreover, by implementing quantitative methodologies, these data can have greater explanatory power.

Future research venues relate also to the specific ways agriculture is affected by violent conflict. This dissertation contributes to understand why and how the rural world is affected by violent conflict, and conversely, how the agrarian settings in which civil wars develop determine the course of war. For instance, the literature review conducted details the methods whereby land accumulation in the context of civil war was possible. However, wars and their implications for agrarian transitions, as the way in which capitalism permeates the agrarian sector, need further research and the Colombian case can also be an advantageous context to investigate the nexus between civil war and agrarian capitalism. This

would have important consequences not only for civil war theories, but also for our understanding of agrarian capitalism. Capitalism was supposed to mean economic growth, poverty reduction, and peace (Filip, 2013; Friedman, 1982). These assumptions were also true for the agrarian version of capitalism featured by high-input agriculture, extractivism, installation of cash crops, mono-cropping, agronomic practices based on the application of western science and technology (e.g., green revolution), high inputs, and wage labor (Cárdenas, 2012; Shiva, 1993). The indication of the successful development of agrarian capitalism is the generation of both, economic growth and social development (Bair, Harris, & Hough, 2019). The Colombian case, however, challenges these assumptions. While the economic growth (including agriculture) is decent, the rural areas sink into poverty and it has been challenging to stop the violence (Thomson, 2011). Furthermore, while capitalism defenders claim that it is the best system for enhancing the productivity of the means of production, it often justifies accumulation of land for unproductive uses, such as rent seeking and speculation. These contradictions show that capitalism development, and specifically agrarian transitions, have multiple paths and that they can occurr not only in spite of civil war, but also because of it. This led us to consider land accumulation in the context of civil war featured by land dispossession, resulting in a violent development of agrarian capitalism. Nevertheless, the advancement of agrarian capitalism entails also the differentiation of the peasantry and changes in the modes of production. The first article of the dissertation is a step forward to grasping better the interactions between civil war and agrarian transitions. However, to unfold the specific processes implied, for instance, by analyzing how specific agrarian sectors change in the course of civil war, would yield fundamental insights on how the introduction of capitalism in the developing world in the context of violent conflict takes place.

Regarding rebel governance, an explosion of studies to understand how rebels relate to civilians has created fundamental knowledge on order in civil war, territorial control, justice systems, and the lives of combatants and non-combatants in wartime. Nevertheless, even when a fundamental aspect of order in civil wars are institutions (as conglomerates of rules), studies on the purposes of these institutions, how they organize local life, and how they respond to strategic choices and the ideology of NSAGs, are scarce. In other words, whereas rebel governance has been recognized as a widespread phenomenon across civil wars, the comprehension of the rules enforced by insurgents and other NSAGs is minimal. Are all NSAGs enforcing the same type of rules? If not, what factors explain the variation of rules? How do NSAGs craft them? Under which circumstances do they change them?

The intersections between rebel governance and other phenomena have received little attention, as well. Commonsense ideas and evidence from some countries (e.g., Yemen(FAO, 2017)) have shown that

agriculture is negatively and severely affected by war. In other cases, it has been found that in spite of war, agriculture may respond efficiently in order to continue the food supply and avoid famines, even in severely war-torn areas such as Syria (Holleman et al., 2017). These governance systems may explain under which circumstances agriculture and food systems are resilient (or not) in wartime.

There is also evidence that the responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in rural areas, at least in Colombia, have been shaped by NSAGs' governance regimes (El Espectador, 2020). These measures included curfews and travel bans between neighboring municipalities and villages. Future research will have to evaluate the intersections between rebel governance and the strategies to cope with the pandemic in the rural areas of war-affected countries.

The third paper identifies the conditions of successful collective action post-war. Nevertheless, to investigate the opposite case in which collective action has been challenging, despite peace accords and the commitment of the parties to respect them, is required to identify further factors that can enhance collective initiatives with peacebuilding potentialities. Collective action in contexts featured by high-intensity violence might also be more defiant than scenarios of irregular warfare.

More research is also needed in terms of understanding how collective action can reach the national scale, allowing the invigoration of three critical aspects. First, political institutions that can guarantee access to all the social sectors to processes of decision-making. Second, justice systems that can both facilitate the knowledge of crimes committed in wartime and address grievances. Third, economic development that can reach rural areas and can alleviate poverty in urban areas that hosted displaced populations during war. Important, it is to elicit mechanisms to overcome national cleavages and potentiate the role of national leaders in bringing together supporters to devote efforts toward national reconciliation. In Colombia, for example, the peace agreement referendum reflected high polarization. 50.2% of the voters rejected the agreement while 49.8% supported it. The political party that promoted the rejection of the accords won the presidential elections in 2018, jeopardizing the implementation of the peace process with the FARC-EP. Indeed, this is intertwined with new forms of violence in different Colombian departments that are dealing with constants threats to community leaders, massacres, and illegal economies spurred by non-demobilized NSAGs. This is a clear case illustrating the necessity to take actions at the national level involving high levels of cooperation among political parties and leaders to overcome major schisms that may lead to the renewal of violence.

Last but not least, to pay attention to the interactions between violence and climate change is important in order to discern how violent conflict affects agriculture, and oppositely, how climate change, via agriculture, may lead to violent conflict. The social, political, and economic conditions under which

climate change induces violence require further inquiry precisely because the nexus between climate change and violence is not deterministic (Salehyan, 2008; Theisen, 2012; Verhoeven, 2011). This is a crucial task if the dynamics of violent conflict in the contemporary world are going to be elucidated.

To qualify our understanding of civil war is imperative in a world at the edge of new forms of violence stemming not only from agrarian inequality, ethnicity, or religion, but also from environmental and climate change-related conflicts that may jeopardize our survival as a species. To develop knowledge that illuminates public policies attempting to strengthen food systems, alleviate poverty, decrease inequalities, and build a more peaceful world, is fundamental for the future of humankind. This dissertation was intended to be a contribution in this path.

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