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**GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES IN POST-CONFLICT AGRICULTURAL
RECOVERY PROGRAMS IN NORTHERN UGANDA:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NORTHERN UGANDA SOCIAL
ACTION FUND (NUSAF) AND THE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL
ADVISORY SERVICES (NAADS)**

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DEDICATION

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SUMMARY

Violent conflicts are a major constraint to food security and agricultural development in many regions of the developing world. Rebuilding agriculture is a primary task after a conflict comes to an end yet agricultural recovery projects are challenging to implement because governance challenges such as corruption and elite capture are wide spread in post-conflict projects. This thesis presents a detailed case study of such governance challenges taking two agricultural recovery projects in Northern Uganda as examples.

Northern Uganda has been affected by more than two decades of war resulting not only in the deaths of combatants and civilians but also in displacement and migration, destruction of livelihoods and demolition of both social and physical infrastructure. As Northern Uganda is mainly an agrarian region, programs that promote food security and agricultural development play an important role in rebuilding the livelihoods of the war affected population. The thesis focuses on two large-scale projects that have been implemented in the post-conflict situation of Northern Uganda: the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) a specific post-conflict recovery project and the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) which is an extension reform project that is implemented throughout Uganda, but plays a particularly important role for the agricultural recovery of the conflict-affected region. Since governance problems tend to be more challenging in large scale operations, these two projects offer a unique opportunity to analyze the opportunities and challenges of the different implementation and targeting mechanisms used by these projects. Accordingly, it was the goal of this thesis to analyze the two programs in a comparative perspective with the objectives to identify the governance problems affecting the two programs, to find the specific entry points for these governance problems, to assess the strategies that can be applied to overcome them and to generate policy recommendations on dealing with governance problems in post- conflict projects that contribute to food security and agricultural development.

Based on an extensive review of the literature on governance challenges in developing countries, a conceptual framework was developed that distinguishes between (1) strategies to strengthen the capacity and incentives of organizations that implement

post-conflict projects and supply services to farmers (supply-side approaches) and (2) strategies to improve the ability of farmers in post-conflict situations to demand services and hold service-providers accountable (demand-side approaches). The empirical research methods applied for this thesis included both qualitative and quantitative data collection approaches. The study covered four districts of Northern Uganda. Respondents were selected from two sub-counties that were purposely sampled in each district. For the qualitative research component, a participatory mapping method called “Process Net-Map” was applied, which allowed the researcher to identify and analyze the various steps of the project implementation process, to identify the actors involved and to specify the entry points for governance challenges. The method also makes it possible to assess the level of influence of the various actors on the final outcome of the implementation process.

The data from the Process Net-Maps were combined with the insights from focus group discussions, expert interviews and a review of relevant documents. For the quantitative research component, a household survey was conducted. Overall, 16 process Net-Map interviews were conducted and 12 focus group discussions were held. One hundred and four (104) farmers affiliated with NAADS and NUSAF were interviewed for the household survey. Moreover 62 stakeholder interviews were conducted with representatives of government organizations, NGOs, civil society organizations and other stakeholders involved in the programme.

The results showed that the main supply-side governance challenges were the following; lack of adequate skilled human resource capacity; poor targeting (for example, targeting focused on groups but left out the very vulnerable who could not join these groups); lack of adequate monitoring to control kickback payments by staff and embezzlement of funds; poor financial accountability systems and political interference in contracting for goods and services. The main demand-side governance challenges included the following: poor relationships between beneficiaries and central/local governments resulting in a lack of trust of beneficiaries vis-à-vis both the political wing and technical wing of local governments; poor relationships and lack of trust between the beneficiaries and the private sector (for example, the beneficiaries believed that the projects primarily benefit the private sector (input suppliers, contractors and contracted service providers) rather than the farmers; low literacy rates, especially among the youth due to the two decades of the war which destroyed the education infrastructure; political patronage and elite capture of goods by the well-to-do members of the communities; loss of social capital resulting in social conflicts during project implementation. The analysis showed that the two projects had different provisions

in their implementation mechanisms to deal with these governance challenges. However, these mechanisms were not sufficiently refined to avoid the problems identified in the study.

On the basis of the analysis the following policy recommendations were developed; On the farmer's level (demand-side), the following strategies can be applied: use of innovative information delivery systems that improve information sharing and transparency such as increasing access to information by marginalized groups; more emphasis by project implementers on ensuring that there is active participation by the targeted communities in the selection, implementation and maintenance of group assets; stronger focus not only on enterprises for market purposes, but also on subsistence production to ensure household food security.

On the supply-side, the following strategies were identified: The central and local governments should implement more proactive oversight mechanisms to ensure that both the public and private service providers are made accountable to smallholder farmers for their performance. There is a need to fully operationalize the Transparency and Accountability Component (TAAC) of the programs. These should not only focus on group targeting, but also ensure that the most vulnerable individuals are not left out. Program planners should put aside funds for project feasibility studies and also should invest more in internal program accountability.

Overall, the study concludes that there is no "silver bullet" in improving governance of livelihoods programs in post-conflict areas. However when both demand and supply-side strategies are implemented in a well-coordinated way, the governance challenges inherent in post-conflict recovery programs can be confronted more effectively. This will make an important contribution to rebuilding the agricultural livelihoods and ensuring food security in conflict-affected regions.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Bewaffnete Konflikte stellen in vielen Entwicklungsregionen eine wesentliche Herausforderung für die Ernährungssicherung und die landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung dar. Nach Beendigung eines Konfliktes ist daher der Wiederaufbau der Landwirtschaft eine vorrangige Aufgabe. Jedoch sind landwirtschaftliche Projekte in solchen von Krisen betroffenen Regionen besonders schwierig zu implementieren, da Governance-Probleme, wie Korruption und die Aneignung von Projektleistungen durch lokale Eliten in Post-Konfliktsituationen besonders gravierend auftreten. Die vorliegende Dissertation präsentiert eine detaillierte Fallstudie dieser Governance-Probleme, die am Beispiel von zwei landwirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbauprojekten im Norden Ugandas durchgeführt wurde.

Der Norden Ugandas wurde über mehr als zwei Jahrzehnte von Bürgerkrieg heimgesucht, was zum Tod von Kämpfern und Zivilisten sowie zu Migration und Vertreibung und zur Zerstörung der Lebensgrundlagen und der sozialen und physischen Strukturen führte. Hilfs-Programme, die Versorgung mit Grundnahrungsmitteln sichern und landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung fördern, spielen gerade im landwirtschaftlich geprägten Nord-Uganda beim Wiederaufbau eine wichtige Rolle. Die Dissertation befasst sich mit zwei großen Projekten, die den Wiederaufbau im Norden Ugandas fördern: der *Northern Uganda Social Action Fund* (NUSAF), ein spezielles Wiederaufbauprogramm, und das *National Agricultural Advisory Services Projekt* (NAADS), ein Reformprogramm des landwirtschaftlichen Beratungsdienstes, das im ganzen Land durchgeführt wird, in der Region aber für den landwirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau eine besonders wichtige Rolle spielt. Da Governance-Probleme gerade in Großprojekten verstärkt auftreten, stellen diese Projekte eine wichtige Möglichkeit dar, verschiedene Strategien zur Bewältigung dieser Probleme zu analysieren.

Entsprechend war es das Ziel der vorliegenden Studie, die beiden Projekte vergleichend zu untersuchen, um die verschiedenen Governance-Probleme und deren Ursachen zu identifizieren, sowie verschiedene Strategien zu bewerten, um diese Probleme zu bewältigen und daraus politikrelevante Erkenntnisse und Empfehlungen für landwirtschaftliche Wiederaufbauprojekte abzuleiten.

Auf der Basis einer umfangreichen Literaturübersicht zu Governance-Problemen in Entwicklungsländern wurde ein Analyse-Rahmen entwickelt, der zwischen Governance-Problemen auf der Angebotsseite (Organisationen, die Dienstleistungen bereitstellen) und Governance-Problemen auf der Nachfrageseite (Haushalte, die diese Leistungen in Anspruch nehmen) unterscheidet. Für die empirische Datenerhebung wurden sowohl qualitative als auch quantitative Daten erhoben. Die Studie wurde in vier Distrikten in Nord-Uganda durchgeführt, wobei in jedem Distrikt zwei Bezirke (*Sub-Counties*) ausgewählt wurden. In der qualitativen Forschungskomponente kam die Methode des Process "Net-Map" zum Einsatz. Dabei handelt es sich um eine partizipative Mapping-Methode, mit der die verschiedenen Schritte eines Implementierungsprozesses abgebildet werden. Dabei werden auch die relevanten Akteure und ihr Einfluss auf das Endergebnis ermittelt. Auf dieser Basis werden die Ursachen von Governance-Problemen in den verschiedenen Schritten des Implementierungsprozesses eines Projektes herausgearbeitet. Die Erkenntnisse aus dem Process Net-Map wurden mit Daten aus Fokusgruppen-Diskussionen, Tiefeninterviews, Experten-Befragungen sowie der Auswertung relevanter Dokumente kombiniert. Für die quantitative Komponente des Forschungsvorhabens wurde eine Haushaltsbefragung durchgeführt. Insgesamt wurden für die vorliegende Studie 16 Net-Maps erstellt und 12 Fokusgruppen-Interviews durchgeführt. In der Haushaltsbefragung wurden 104 kleinbäuerliche Haushalte befragt, die an den NAADS&NUSAF Projekten teilnehmen. Außerdem wurden 62 Interviews mit Repräsentanten der lokalen und zentralen Regierung, Nichtregierungsorganisationen und weiteren Beteiligten durchgeführt.

Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass auf der Angebotsseite, d.h. auf der Seite der Organisationen, die Projekte durchführen, folgende Governance-Probleme auftreten: Der Mangel an adäquat ausgebildetem Personal stellt eine besondere Herausforderung dar. Trotz bestehender Anstrengungen fällt es den Projekten schwer, besonders benachteiligte Zielgruppen zu erreichen, da diese oft schwer in den Gruppenansatz zu integrieren sind, der von den Projekten verfolgt wird. Darüber hinaus fehlen adäquate Überwachungssysteme zur Vermeidung von Schmiergeldzahlungen an Mitarbeiter und der Veruntreuung von Geldern. Außerdem ist die Verantwortlichkeit für das finanzielle Management nur unzureichend gewährleistet. Ein weiteres Governance-Problem, das aufgezeigt werden konnte, ist die politische Einflussnahme bei Vertragsverhandlungen über die Beschaffung von Waren und Dienstleistungen.

Auf der Nachfrageseite, d.h. auf der Seite der Haushalte, die an den Projekten teilnehmen, konnten folgende Governance-Probleme aufgedeckt werden: Die Beziehung zu der lokalen Verwaltung als auch zu lokalen politischen Vertretern ist durch einen Mangel an Vertrauen gekennzeichnet.

Darüber hinaus besteht auch die Auffassung, dass die Projekte den privaten Unternehmen, die Güter und Dienstleistungen für die Projekte bereit stellen, mehr Nutzen als den vom Bürgerkrieg betroffenen Haushalten. Die Fähigkeit der Leistungsempfänger, Verantwortlichkeit einzufordern, ist auch durch Schwachstellen im Bildungssystem beeinträchtigt. Gerade Jugendliche leiden unter fehlender schulischer Bildung, was durch die zwei Jahrzehnte andauernde Kriegssituation bedingt ist. Auch wurde soziales Kapital durch den Bürgerkrieg zerstört, was kollektives Handeln erschwert. Daher kam es auch zu sozialen Konflikten bei der Implementierung der Projekte. Die Analyse der Governance-Probleme zeigte, dass die Projekte durchaus sowohl auf der Angebots- als auch auf der Nachfrageseite verschiedene Vorkehrungen zur Vermeidung solcher Probleme entwickelt hatten. Diese Vorkehrungen erwiesen sich jedoch als unzureichend.

Auf der Basis der Analyse wurden folgende Strategie- Empfehlungen abgeleitet. Auf der Nachfrageseite sind folgende Ansätze aussichtsreich: Aufbau innovativer Informationssysteme, die Informationsaustausch und Transparenz erhöhen und damit den Zugang für besonders benachteiligte Gruppen verbessern. Des Weiteren sollten die Projektverantwortlichen gewährleisten, dass eine aktivere Teilnahme der Zielgruppen bei der Auswahl, Implementierung und Instandhaltung der durch das Projekt geschaffenen Infrastruktur stattfindet. Außerdem sollten die Projekte einen stärkeren Fokus auf die Ernährungssicherung legen.

Auf der Angebotsseite wurden folgende Strategien zur Überwindung der Governance- Probleme identifiziert: Die zentralen und lokalen Regierungsebenen sollten eine pro- aktivere Rolle einnehmen, um zu gewährleisten, dass sowohl die öffentlichen als auch privaten Dienstleister stärker in die Verantwortung genommen werden. Dazu sollten die bestehenden Mechanismen zur Herstellung von Transparenz und Verantwortlichkeit in diesen Projekten (*Transparency and Accountability Component-TAAC*) gestärkt werden. Darüber hinaus sollten die Implementierungsmechanismen nicht nur auf Gruppen ausgerichtet sein, sondern auch besonders benachteiligte Individuen erfassen, denen der Zugang zu Gruppen nur schwer möglich ist. Projektverantwortliche sollten außerdem Mittel für Durchführbarkeitsstudien bereit stellen und mehr in die interne Verantwortlichkeit investieren.

Zusammenfassend kommt die Studie kommt zu dem Schluss, dass es keinen Königsweg zur Überwindung der Governance Probleme in landwirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbauprojekten gibt. Jedoch können diese Probleme effektiver bewältigt werden, wenn Reform-Strategien sowohl auf der Angebots-als auch auf der Nachfrageseite inkoordinierter Weise eingesetzt werden. Damit kann ein wichtiger Beitrag zum landwirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau und zur Ernährungssicherung in Post-Konflikt-Regionen geleistet werden.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALREP	Agricultural Livelihoods Recovery Program
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CBMES	Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDAs	Community Driven Approaches
CDD	Community Driven Development
CDI	Community Development Initiatives
CDO	Community Development Officer
CPMC	Community Project Management Committee
CS0PNU	Civil Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DFID	Department for International Development
DNC	District NAADS Coordinator
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
GoU	Government of Uganda
IDA	International Development Association
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IGG	Inspector General of Government
KALIP	Karamoja Livelihoods Program
LGLP	Local Government Led Program
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAAIF	Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NARO	National Agricultural Research Organization

NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NHS	National Household Survey
NPM	New Public Management
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NULS	Northern Uganda Livelihoods Study
NUMU	NUSAF Management Unit
NUSAF	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PC	Procurement Committee
PC	Procurement Committee
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PFA	Prosperity For All
PMA	Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture
PRDP	Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda
SACCOS	Savings and Credit Cooperatives
SAO	Subcounty Administrative Officer
SFF	Subcounty Farmers' Forum
SLRC	Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
SMS	Subject Matter Specialists
SNC	Subcounty NAADS Coordinator
TI	Transparency International
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Standards
UHRC	Uganda Human Rights Commission
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VGS	Vulnerable Group Support
WB	World Bank
WDR	World Development Report
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

This thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of governance challenges which confront agricultural livelihoods recovery programs in post-conflict contexts. It provides insights into the governance challenges affecting two large agricultural recovery programs (NAADS and NUSAF) implemented in post-conflict Northern Uganda. These two programs have different implementation approaches and mechanisms, therefore they provide a good comparative case study i.e. NAADS is a Local Government Led Private Agricultural Advisory Services Delivery Program (LGLP) whereas NUSAF is a Community Driven Development (CDD) program.

The study focuses on Northern Uganda and more specifically the Acholi sub-region which was the worst affected by the war conflict compared to other Northern Uganda sub-regions of Teso, Lango and Karamoja. In the Acholi sub-region the LRA and Government of Uganda (GoU) war conflict created large scale insecurity, injuries and loss of lives, mass displacement and migration and loss of agricultural assets on which the population depended for their survival for over two decades until the region returned to relative stability in 2006 after the signing of the end of hostilities agreement between the LRA and GoU (Baines & Rosenoff, 2014; Birner et al., 2011).

At the time of the research in 2012 and 2014, the Acholi sub-region was in the early stages of post-conflict recovery, that is rebel activities in the region had gradually reduced to minimum levels. It should be noted that the Northern region is undeniably a safer place today compared to 10 years ago. In response to the prevailing peace, both the GoU and its development partners the aid/humanitarian organizations had transitioned from humanitarian aid to livelihoods recovery programs and considerable amounts of funds have been pumped in the Northern region of Uganda both through government and the private sector for example, NGOs, CBOs and Civil Society Organizations.

However during the implementation of these livelihoods recovery programs governance challenges emerged, for instance, challenges for local state institutions resuming their functions fully and having to respond to the overwhelming needs of an impoverished and desperate population, inadequate technical capacity and enormous issues of corruption and leakage of funds. Another related challenge is that the institutions in the post-conflict North

had to catch up with the institutional changes for instance decentralization of the delivery of public services at the local government level for which the rest of the peaceful regions of the country had gone through uninterrupted for the last two and a half decades. When relative stability returned to the North, the IDPs gradually started to leave the displacement camps which had existed for over 10 years to go back to their original villages and communities. On return the IDPs faced many challenges in the return areas but field experiences show that they were also very determined to settle down on their land and rebuild their agricultural livelihoods on which they mainly depend on for their survival. At present the former IDPs are now popularly called “returnees” encouraged by the government and development organizations to be self-reliant and to participate in post-conflict recovery programs (International Alert, 2008; ACTED, 2010; Gelsdorf et al., 2012).

During the survey by the author, many of the livelihood-related problems were visible at household level, for example, food insecurity, i.e. no visible granaries at many homesteads for food storage, which is a sign of food insecurity, lack of improved planting materials/seeds and farm tools like hoes, pangas to be able to open the virgin land plus difficulty in accessing services like education, health care, micro-credit and inadequate agricultural advisory services, especially within the livestock sector.

1.2 Problem statement

Empirical evidence from various studies, for example, by the Utstein Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (2004), UNDP (2004), Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey (2010), Goovaerts et al. (2005), Nannyonjo (2005) and OECD (2008) indicate that there is growing dissatisfaction with the quality of public services delivered to the citizens more so in fragile situations caused by war conflict. These studies report deficiencies in the coverage, access, targeting and quality of public services and infrastructures. Apart from these challenges another important issue is that developing countries have the highest incidence of war conflicts which make even the already existing problems of public service delivery worse. The effectiveness of livelihood recovery programs in post-conflict contexts for example in Northern Uganda has also been negatively impacted by a number of governance challenges, for instance high levels of corruption, embezzlement of funds, poor targeting leading to political capture and elite capture and institutional capacity problems (Robinson 2005; Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010; Birner et al., 2011 & Tusiime et al., 2013). Evidence shows that violent conflicts occur more often in developing countries and creates a big number of unemployed people in the

country and inequality in income i.e. the majority of the conflict-affected people are languishing in poverty (Abuka et al., 2007; Annan et al., 2011; Birner et al., 2011 and Baines & Rosenoff, 2014).

Goovaerts (2005), OECD (2008) and Annan et al. (2011) noted that due to war there is loss of productive livelihood options and this results into hardship and frustration in the communities and lack of productive activities leading to redundancy of productive labor, for instance making the unemployed and particularly the unemployed youth becoming easy targets for enlisting by rebel armies who use cash funds and food to lure the youth and other able bodied persons into their ranks.

In Northern Uganda the conflict that lasted for about two decades led to displacement of over 90% of the population in the Acholi sub-region. There was loss of lives and agricultural assets by the population. GoU (2005/2006) & GoU (2011) noted that Northern Uganda region being predominantly an agrarian society, agricultural livelihoods restoration is an important strategy for the economic empowerment, recovery of the communities and it also allows opportunities for the re-integration of former combatants in the agricultural sector thereby improving their livelihood opportunities hence reducing the recurrence of war conflict.

As peace has returned to the North, it has enabled the communities formerly in IDP camps to return to their home villages and begin productive activities in order to rebuild their livelihoods which were virtually destroyed during the war. In order to facilitate the resettlement process of IDPs, Government with its partners has come up with a number of big post-conflict tailor made Agricultural recovery programs e.g. NUSAF, ALREP (Agricultural Livelihoods Recovery Program) and other national programs, for example NAADS to rehabilitate livelihoods of the war affected people, however challenges like inadequate access to basic services, unemployment, lack of human capital as a result of migration and deaths due to war, corruption, inadequate technical capacity, frequent land disputes and inefficient conflict control measures present a big challenge for agricultural livelihoods recovery in the North (Hertz et al., 2007; International Alert, 2010 ; Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010). The challenge of implementing policies that support small holder farmers are not new. For example, Birner & Resnick (2010) and Feder et al. (2010) noted that such policies face problems of information asymmetries leading to high transaction costs, elite capture, market risks, climatic factors and inadequate production assets on the side of the farmers. However, field evidence shows that situations of war conflict make such situation noted by the authors

above worse and even desperate for the conflict affected communities (Goovaerts et al., 2005; Martin et al., 2009).

The NUSAF project is one of the main government programs designed to help the Northern region to catch up with the rest of the regions of the country, spur economic growth and get people out of poverty. However many stakeholders are disappointed that the objectives of NUSAF have not materialized and its impact is rather moderate. It should be noted that both NAADS and NUSAF are largely dominated by private sector participation in the delivery of services and goods, just because previous programs which were led by both the central and local governments proved a failure (Robinson, 2005 & NAADS, 2000). However, Feder et al. (2011) cautioned that the involvement of the private sector should not be taken for granted that it will solve all the earlier governance challenges of government implemented programs. The authors noted that even in private sector participation in programs challenges have been faced, for example, financial mismanagement and procurement challenges.

Despite the considerable resources mobilized by the GoU and its development partners extended to support the rehabilitation, economic recovery and livelihoods of the affected communities in the post-conflict area of Northern Uganda, for example, NAADS and NUSAF being one of the best funded government programs over the years through both domestic resources and donor funding, but impact evaluations, monitoring reports, value for money audits and various newspaper reports highlight among others inadequate/poor visibility of the program impacts on the ground. There is no doubt that NAADS and NUSAF poor performance is one of the most open indicators of what high levels of corruption and project mismanagement can do to frustrate efforts to improve the livelihoods of people affected by the war conflict.

Empirical studies on NAADS and NUSAF point to problems of rampant corruption, elite capture and lack of sustainability of the agricultural livelihoods interventions (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010 ; Mutimba, 2007; Parkinson, 2008; Parkinson, 2009; Birner et al., 2011). Similarly many voices from the stakeholders mention that the implementation of NAADS and NUSAF has fallen short of the envisioned improved livelihoods and development in Northern Uganda (Robinson , 2005; Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010; Mutimba, 2007; Parkinson, 2008; Parkinson, 2009; Birner et al., 2011 ; Bukenya , 2010).

Research shows that the Northern region recorded the biggest percentage decrease of poverty compared to other regions of Uganda due to the end of the LRA war but the challenge is that

the majority of the country's poorest people still live in the North. For example for 2009/2010 poverty level, Central region poverty level was 10.7 %, Eastern was 24.3% , Western 21.8 and 46.2% Northern (UBOS, 2010) and one of the main reasons advanced is partly due to the failure in the effective implementation of special recovery programs like NAADS and NUSAF. For example members of Parliament of Uganda on an assessment of the return and resettlement process reported that much of the money injected into the Northern region for recovery has had no tangible impact (International Alert, 2008). For example in November 2007, 20 cases of embezzlement of NUSAF funds were registered by the High Court in Kitgum District alone and there have been many other corruption and program mismanagement cases related to NUSAF and NAADS as well as its predecessors (International Alert, 2008).

Cases of corruption and financial mismanagement have been common in previous Northern Uganda government programs and this sounds a clear warning that things are not going well in as far as implementation of livelihood recovery programs is concerned. The fundamental problems in NAADS and NUSAF are mainly related to governance problems whereby for example transparency, responsiveness, availability of services and effective accountability mechanisms in livelihoods recovery services are not adequately addressed (Birner et al., 2011). There is indeed a need for significant improvement of the implementation procedures and the accountability approach that would help to ensure transparency and effectiveness of the agricultural recovery livelihoods programs in post-conflict contexts.

Unfortunately, there is limited information about the causes of the governance challenges, the entry points for the governance challenges and the strategies that can be applied in the specific post-conflict conditions to enable the internally displaced person (IDP) returnees to rebuild their agricultural livelihoods as they return to their villages. In as far as Northern Uganda is concerned currently, one of the key challenges for policy makers and program implementers is the lack of information on local perspectives regarding post-conflict agricultural livelihoods recovery. Most of the information available is in project evaluations, monitoring reports and implementation reports dumped in public offices and in addition the available reports do not paint or show a clear picture on the governance challenges affecting these programs and pinpoint out the specific entry points for these challenges. A good deal of data exists on the problems facing the Northern region of Uganda, but little information is available on what works and why in post-conflict Northern Uganda in order to build resilient households and communities.

Another challenge is the fact that even when there is information on what works is available, this information is not packaged in a relevant form for policy makers to be able to digest, interpret and use it as a reference point for policy making. In addition, although there has been a high increase in empirical studies on corruption for example Reinika & Svensson, 2004 and Reinika & Svensson, 2005 studies of corruption in the education sector and Svensson (2003) on studies of corruption and payment of bribes in Ugandan firms, Bouchard (2012) study on corruption in the health sector in Uganda, Hunt (2007) on comparative study on bribery in health care in Uganda and Peru, there are still gaps in the current state of information and knowledge on the matter in agricultural extension services and much more remains to be done. There is limited systematic empirical work about the causes and entry points of bad governance and corruption in agricultural livelihoods programs and the link between bad governance and service delivery in agriculture extension services in post-conflict areas. In this study a new innovative research tool, the Net-Map has been employed as one of the main methods for data collection and has been developed and used on a number of studies to study issues concerning governance (Schiffer & Waale, 2008). The advantage of this tool is that it has managed to identify the specific entry points for the governance challenges which could not be uncovered with only respondent interviews and field observations.

The purpose of the thesis is to begin filling this information gap by focusing on the quality of governance in agricultural recovery programs in post-conflict contexts. In doing so, this thesis will complement the existing empirical literature on governance and agricultural extension service provision. The findings from this research will contribute to bridging this knowledge gap and also guide the implementation of livelihoods recovery programs in post-conflict situations now and in the future.

1.3 Research objectives and research questions

The main goal of this study is to contribute to a more effective implementation of programs that aim at improving the agricultural livelihoods of farmers in post-conflict contexts. Additionally the main objective of this study is to discover which governance challenges the programs are facing and which elements of the programs i.e. NAADS and NUSAF work in the post-conflict conditions experienced by the target beneficiaries and under what conditions. The study will end with a forward looking conclusion that reflects on how these research findings can be applied to ongoing and future agricultural livelihoods work in post-conflict Northern Uganda and other countries which have been affected by conflict.

1.3.1 Specific objectives

The specific objectives of this thesis are:

- To draw on the lessons of experience of the programme implementation and on the evidence of what does and does not work where, why and under what conditions;
- To better understand the governance problems affecting the agricultural livelihoods programs in post-conflict situations and to gain deeper insights in the administrative procedures of NAADS and NUSAF implementation in order to identify the specific entry points for the governance problems;
- To identify strategies and approaches that can be used to solve the governance problems involved in implementations of large agricultural livelihoods recovery programs with a specific reference to NAADS and NUSAF programs;
- To analyze which factors contribute to the suitability of different implementation mechanisms to deal with the identified problems and
- To identify policy options and appropriate program designs to improve implementation of post-conflict recovery programs in the future.

1.3.2 Research questions

This thesis aims to address the following research questions:

- Which general and specific governance problems occur in the implementation of the programs that use different implementation mechanisms? These include the Local Government-Led Agricultural Advisory Services Delivery Program (NAADS) and the Community Driven Development Program NUSAF.
- Why do the above governance challenges occur?
- What are the strategies that can be used to address the governance challenges?
- What policy actions are needed to build a strong coordination of the activities of the agricultural livelihoods recovery programs in post conflict situations?

1.4 Structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of nine Chapters. Chapter 1 is the general introduction to the thesis, Chapter 2 presents the literature review of the study, Chapter 3 develops and discusses the Conceptual Framework for the study, Chapter 4 describes the study area and the NAADS and NUSAF programs, Chapter 5 describes the research design and methods, Chapter 6 presents the qualitative survey results, Chapter 7 discusses these results, Chapter 8 presents the quantitative survey results and discusses them. On the basis of the previous chapters, Chapter 9 presents the recommendations, conclusions and policy implications and suggested areas for future research.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Overview

The 2002 World Development Report indicates that in order to ensure good governance, there should be absence of corruption in public institutions this is because corruption undermines the goals of public policies and leads to undermining the public institutions that are concerned with the delivery of public services on which virtually all the poor citizens of the country depend (World Bank 2002, pp. 98-99). Here governance is defined as the set of institutions and policies that govern the way society is directed, administered or controlled (IFAD, 2013). Transparency International (TI) noted that corruption leads to poor governance and as a consequence of bad governance there is increased misallocation of the limited resources, capture of resources by the elites and embezzlement. Bad governance denies the poor access to public services on which they virtually depend.

Uslaner, (2012), Persson et al. (2010), Persson et al. (2012) and Mauro (1998) noted that international organizations for example the UN, the EU, World Bank and IMF having largely not been taking corruption as a serious impediment to development until the late 1990s, the anti-corruption item has now been brought back on the agenda of international and national development interventions and more especially in developing countries because of the frequent failure of development programs to achieve their objectives as a result of the corruption menace. For example the study by Myint (2000) and Pellegrini & Gerlagh (2007) indicated that corruption is more pervasive in developing countries' public sector service delivery.

To illustrate the pervasiveness of corruption in the public sector, a survey carried out by Gray & Kaufmann (1998) out of 150 public officials from 60 developing countries, the respondents ranked corruption occurring in the public sector as the most serious constraint affecting the countries' development processes and programs. Having noted that corruption is more pervasive in developing countries most of which are found on the African continent and having realized that corruption is having serious negative effects on the economic, political and stability of states, the African Union (AU) has come up with a strategy to combat corruption through encouraging member states to sign and implement the convention on preventing and combating corruption.

Grimes & Wangnerud (2010) argued that as corruption increases in the country, the quality of government decreases. The quality of government is the ability of the country to deliver public services effectively and efficiently to its citizens (Grimes and Wangnerud, 2010). The authors noted that a good quality of government is seen as good governance whereby there is good accountability of the government towards its citizens and it strengthens the confidence of the people have in the management and administration of public affairs. Good governance means that the government has mechanisms that function in a way that respects the rights of all of its citizens and all the wishes of the stakeholders in a spirit of democracy (IFAD, 2013). Good governance is in short a corruption free public service delivery whereby authority and its institutions are accountable, effective and efficient, participatory, transparent, responsive and equitable (IFAD , 2013).

- **Definition of corruption**

According to Myint (2000) corruption can be defined as a situation where a public official uses the position of his office for his own private gain. Examples of situations when public officials practice corrupt behavior include stealing of government assets and property for their own private use, outright embezzlement of funds, bribery, extortion and fraud (Myint, 2000).

Evans (2011) defines corruption as an act by which people in the public administration system profit at the expense of their clients i.e. the ultimate beneficiaries of the service. The author notes that corruption is when an official abuses his official position for his own personal gain. Evans (2011), argues that corruption is an act by which “insiders” profit at the expense of “outsiders”, that is conveying the ideas of abuse of position, offending against relationships and under-handedness. However Klitgaard (1998) defines corruption as the divergence in behavior from the client’s interests to those of the public official’s personal interests for his own gain. Klitgaard noted that corruption occurs when for example the civil servant betrays the interests of the client (public) in pursuit of his own interests. Heidenheimer (1989) stated that, there are two categories of the definitions of corruption, that is the public office centered definitions which explain corruption in the public service sector and the behavior centered definitions which explains the causes of corruption according to the behavior of the individual or individuals for example public interest centered, public office centered and market centered.

2.2 Theories of corruption

2.2.1 De Graaf's classification of theories

There are six different theories of corruption according to De Graaf (2007). The author argues that the choice of the theoretical model is important because it determines which strategies to be undertaken in order to control the particular type of corruption. De Graaf (2007) argues that whenever designing strategies to control corruption, it should not be one size fits all, but take into consideration the context to determine which strategies work best and under what conditions. The author continues to recommend that there is need to study corruption under different conditions in order to be able to understand the different control measures and the effective policy options to control it.

Table 2.1: De Graaf's classification of theories of corruption


Theory of Corruption	Major Characteristics	Causal Chain
Public Choice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Looks at individual level as cause of corruption Part of Institutional Economics i.e. all individuals are utility maximizing and opportunity cost of being corrupt versus being caught will determine whether corruption will take place or not. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rational decision making leading to a pre-determined outcome (s).
Bad Apple	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Looks at the individual's background. Assumes that corruption is caused by people of wrong moral character and bad values i.e. Bad Apples. Individuals generally display criminal behavior. Corruption can be caused by socialization with bad groups/individuals. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Individual bad character causing corrupt acts
Organizational Culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Looks at organizational/group and community level. Organizational culture re-enacted by its members. Individuals have to behave like other members of the organization in order to be accepted. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Culture of the individual leads to corrupt behavior
Clashing Moral Values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stronger family ties, clan or interest group than the organization. Obligation of family ties induces corrupt behavior. Can use resources of the organization to benefit family and clan. Looks at the level of the individual. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Norms and values of society that influence values of individuals
Ethos of Public Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It looks at societal and organizational levels. Public administration is taken as a business for the individual to maximize profit but not to serve the society. Public administration lacks the fundamental values to serve society. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Caused by societal pressure through organizations on officials. Pressure on officials leads them to lack of integrity making them corrupt.
Correlation Theories	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Relates corruption to variables e.g. colonialism, poverty, democracy etc. Looks at all levels i.e. individual, organization and society. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of integrity Societal pressure Bad character

Source: Author's compilation based on De Graaf (2007)

2.2.2 Theory of ethical decision-making in organizations: A person–situation interactionist model

Overview

The interactionist Model of Ethical decision making in organizations assumes that the ethical decision making in an organization is affected by the interaction of the individual and the situational components. According to Trevino (1986), three individual variables i.e. ego strength , field dependence and locus control affect the individual whether he/she will act in an ethical or unethical way. Other factors also affect the individuals' decision making for example situational variables which arise from the job context and the organizational culture , for example the organizational structure, obedience to the authorities, responsibilities of the individual to unethical consequences, enforcement of sanctions and rewards for ethical behavior (Trevino, 1986). The author argues that the moral development of an individual can also be influenced by the characteristics of the job itself and the moral content of the organizational culture.



Interactionist model of etical decision making in organizations: Adopted from Trevino (1986)

Figure 2.1: Interactionist model of ethical decision making

(Trevino, 1986 pp.603)

2.2.1 Typologies of corruption

One can distinguish different types of corruption. In the following typologies based on different criteria are presente

2.2.2 Levels of corruption

Myint (2000) noted that there are two levels of corruption, i.e. the high and low levels and these two levels go hand in hand. Myint describes high level corruption as the type which occurs at the top of the public service ladder especially by leading politicians and public servants mainly motivated by personal greed and with the high level corruption usually large amounts of funds are involved. Greed leading to corrupt behavior is due to political, economic, social and cultural factors that motivate these higher public officials to be corrupt. On the other hand,a low level corruption is the type that takes place at the lower levels of the

public service ladder with lower level civil servants and usually less money is involved e.g. underhand small payments for a service, for instance payment to get a faster service of obtaining a passport or a driver's licence (Myint, 2000).

2.2.3 Degree of organization

Mauro (1998) and Myint (2000) noted that another type of corruption is well organized and chaotic corruption. With organized corruption, officials have a clear strategy from which people they will get a bribe from and even have an idea of how much money they will be willing to pay them and the officials do whatever they promise to the bribe giver. This type of corruption usually continues sustainably in organizations or firms (Mauro, 1998; Myint, 2000). The authors note that chaotic corruption is incidental and caused by opportunistic behavior. Everybody is looking for an opportunity and nobody is sure of who is going to give him/her a bribe and how much because there is little coordination between the bribe takers and the bribe givers. The problem with chaotic corruption is that it is exploitative and unknown to the clients. If an individual cannot comply with the corrupt official's demands, then he/she will not get a service (Myint, 2000).

2.2.4 Institutional location of the actors

One can distinguish different types of corruption according to the location of the official's administrative office and institution who is engaged in corruption. For instance corrupt officials can be located in the local government, the legislature, police, health and the agricultural sector (Morris, 2011).

In a related approach, other authors such as Choo & Kukutschka (2012) and Uslaner (2012) noted that one can distinguish types of corruption depending on the relationships between the citizens and the government's bureaucratic structures. For example, political corruption results from search for favours from well connected politicians. There is also judicial corruption and corruption in the general public service. In these types of corruption, usually the sums of money involved are limited, therefore this type is called "petty" corruption (Choo & Kukutschka, 2012). Political corruption is as a result of politicians using their political powers to advance their own self-interests, for instance, they influence policies in their own favour so that they can win the next elections. This type of corruption usually involves large amounts of money because it usually takes place at the highest levels of the political and administrative structure of government (Choo & Kukutschka, 2012). Political corruption is

influenced by the political circumstances in the country and very difficult to detect because in many cases it is concealed. Choo & Kukutschka (2012) gave an example of judicial corruption whereby they stated that the entry points for corruption in the judicial system can manifold, for example, during the trial proceedings, during enforcement of decisions by the court, or in form of misuse and misallocation of funds allocated to the justice system.

2.2.5 Nature of the transactions

Morris (2011) noted that corruption can be classified according to the nature of the transactions taking place between the bribe takers and the bribe givers, for example, asking for kickbacks, extortion and political capture. The latter occurs in instances where an entire institution or agency operate that should act on behalf of societal interests becomes distorted due to political interests.

Table 2.2: Definition of terms related to corruption

Nature of transaction	Main characteristics
Bribery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment as a result of undue influence from either giver or recipient of the bribe. • Includes kickbacks sometimes called teas. • Used to make transactions move faster (to grease the wheels).
Collusion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payment made in order to avoid the official regulations or sanctions in order to get a service. • The corrupt individual usually gets a faster service.
Embezzlement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is conversion of money, property and any other assets that do not belong to the individual. • Usually termed as theft.
Fraud	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Using misleading information or trickery to steal money or property from individual or firm. • This is extractive corruption.
Extortion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is a type of fraud which uses forceful methods to get money/ assets from individuals
Abuse of Discretion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Using the person's public office to make decisions that favor self.
Favoritism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Granting benefits e.g public offices , contracts etc. to friends , family etc. , this includes kinship corruption, and nepostic corruption. • Giving opportunities to other people without merit.
Improper Political Contributions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Payments by political leaders usually in government to influence political situations/decisions.
Defensive Corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is corruption undertaken in anticipation of certain circumstances, i.e. preventing particular individuals or firms to bear losses or making others to bear losses. • Usually takes place in procurement i.e when bidding for contracts.
Transactive Corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Usually by public officials with the aim of avoiding lossess and get a profits. • Includes evasion of taxes, and other illegal transaction like illegal mining, logging etc.
Investment Corruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undertaken in order to get concessions or permits e.g. logging permits in the forestry sector.

Source: Author's compilation based on Morris (2011)

2.2.6 Systemic corruption

One can also differentiate types of corruption by the degree to which they are “systemic.” Morris (2011) developed the “Systemic Framework” to capture this aspect. He describes the Systemic Framework as the system which focuses both on the individual's corrupt character and on the context in which the corrupt act occurs. For example, corruption can occur in institutions where there are no controls to counter the corrupt activities and the motive to engage in corruption could be personal interests or could be for the benefit of the clique. The author notes that systemic corruption can be found in all institutions of society but it is the

pervasiveness of corruption that differs. Other distinctions of corruption could include centralized and decentralized corruption which depends on the level of control exercised by the political elite over the local officials (Morris, 2011).

Related to the concept of systemic corruption is the approach by Pedersen & Johannsen (2008), who argue that corruption can be active or passive depending on the decision making powers of the individuals involved. Corruption is not only private but also occurs among particular individuals in the public sphere, especially in politics and government administration. The authors noted that it is very important to know the causes and forms of corruption at the different levels of public administration in order to design effective strategies and policies to combat it.

2.2.7 Motive or purpose

As noted by Morris (2011), one can also distinguish different types of corruption according to the motives of the bribe takers, for instance, it can be corruption that purely promotes personal interests, but it can also promote a personal clique, political parties or other institutions. The author notes that types of corruption that benefit political parties are typically systematic and organized.

2.3 Dimensions and determinants of corruption

2.3.1 Dimensions of corruption

Rodriguez (2005) identified two dimensions of corruption, that is its arbitrariness and the degree to which corruption is prevalent in any given country, i.e. referred to as its pervasiveness and also noted that these two dimensions of corruption do not always co-exist. Pervasiveness can be measured in terms of how frequently an organization/ firm is asked for a bribe and the authors argue that the higher the pervasiveness of corruption the higher the costs of corruption to the organization. However arbitrariness is the degree of ambiguity which is associated with corrupt transactions, this is because corruption is characterized by uncertainty regarding target and number of corrupt transactions which are required for approval. In case of arbitrariness of corruption, officials enjoy the advantage of not being detected when they engage in corrupt behavior and the ability to plan for control of corruption thus diminishes (Rodriguez, 2005). Pillay & Dorasamy (2010) argued that a greater degree of discretion by the government officials will increase their opportunities to

act in an arbitrary way and thus increase the pervasiveness of corruption and hence less accountability and transparency to their clients.

Pillay & Dorasamy (2010) indicated that where corruption occurs under a particular structured institutional settings, in such situations corruption is more predictable and payment expectations from the bribe givers are also predictable (see above). In such cases, the pervasiveness of corruption is usually high, for example, in case of payments of bribes that are given in order to obtain tenders.

2.3.2 Determinants of corruption

Sung (2002) noted that occurrence of corruption through the illegal activities and actions requires motivation on the part of the corrupt official, motivation from the victim to pay the bribe and the absence of honesty on the part of the corrupt official. The author argues that all the three factors, (i.e. dishonest officials, willing victim to pay the bribe and motivation on behalf of the victim) increase the pervasiveness of corruption. All the three elements stated before are usually common in developing countries with weak economies, high poverty, socio-economic problems, slow growth and high income inequality (Sung, 2002). Other factors that can affect the pervasiveness of corruption include poverty, a culture of an unaccountable government and a culture of the local population that facilitates corruption (Sung, 2002). In addition the author argued that corruption is more likely to occur in governments which lack a strong judiciary, free press and noted that in countries in which there is democracy, a strong judiciary and free media appear to have effective deterrent factors against the incidence of corruption.

Other authors have highlighted that the determinants of corruption in both the private and public sector are determined by the structure of the service delivery entity and the types of services being offered. Gerring & Thacker (2004) developed a framework linking political institutions in the government and political corruption and also assessed the impact of the different constitutional arrangements on the levels of corruption in the different nations and also explained the linkages between public institutions and corrupt behavior by the public officials. The authors noted that the causes of corruption fall into three broad categories, i.e. it can be caused by societal and historical factors, for example, the level of economic development of the country, the structure of the economy, geographical location, social heterogeneity, social capital, political environment, colonial legacy and inequality.

Mocan (2008), Mocan (2005) and Shaw (2009) indicated that corruption is also determined by individual and community level characteristics and these factors are important for analyzing differences in a household's corruption experiences. The individual and community level factors that determine the household's probability to experience corruption include: gender, income, education, marital status, profession, attitude and perception towards corruption, interaction with government officials, trust network, the city size etc. (Ibid). Socio-economic characteristics of a household play a key role in the corruption experiences and the role these factors play is dependent on the context i.e. these factors are country and culture specific and therefore strategies and recommendations to control corruption should exclusively be area specific (Ibid). The authors warned that generalizations of findings about corruption and its control will not bring good results.

Herrera et al. (2006), Torgler & Valev (2006), Hunt (2004), Swamy et al. (2000) and Mocan (2008) indicated that the income level of an individual is also a determinant of corruption and noted that the rich people, married and educated people in the society usually have a higher demand for services and therefore they are more likely to experience corruption while the poor individuals in society will miss out from obtaining the public service because they cannot afford the bribe.

Svensson (2003) in his study on Uganda's firms elaborated the reasons why some companies (firms) pay a bribe and others do not. The author argued that the firm's probability of being exposed to bribery increases with its increasing interaction and business with the public sector. He noted that firms that have bureaucratic systems have a higher probability to pay a bribe and noted that the amount of the bribe paid by the firm depends on the ability to pay and its refusal power.

Myint (2000) and Johnston (2005) noted that the motivation by public official to do their work is also a key determinant of corruption. The authors noted that low pay of public officials has negative impacts on the attitudes and performance of public employees. For instance, it contributes to reducing incentives, low morale, increased inefficiency, absenteeism from work, loss of self respect and due to loss of work morale where some employees become even rude and nasty to their clients. Johnston (2005) also noted that the lack of trust, social capital, democracy, all these favor bureaucratic corruption. Other determinants of corruption include higher education levels, urbanization, access to mass media which are associated to higher levels of development decrease the tolerance towards

corruption (Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2007). The authors also noted that the context of war conflict raises the level of corruption.

Boris (2005) noted that with more government regulation in the public service through creation of many bureaucratic structures, keeping other factors equal, will lead to higher levels of corruption. The author noted that bureaucratic structures with a number of complicated, unclear ambiguous regulations by the government will create more entry points for bribery and rent seeking in order for a public service to be offered to the clients.

Swamy et al. (2000) studied the relationship between corruption and gender. The results from his study in Georgia have shown that women are less involved in bribery than men and usually women are not easily likely to engage in illegal or dishonest behavior, this is because a very high percentage of the women surveyed said that illegal and dishonest behavior is not justifiable. These results are consistent with Alatas et al. (2012). Results from his study showed that women have a higher propensity to punish people engaged in corrupt behavior than their male counterparts. In terms of trust as a determinant of corrupt behavior, Alatas et al. (2012) argued that people with a trust network (social capital) usually pay fewer bribes and noted that a good trust network in society can work as a substitute for bribery. The author noted that through having a trust network in society people find other substitutes for bribery like quid pro quo and other ways instead of payment of bribes.

Hunt (2004) also noted that the level of corruption in the society can also be determined by age and geographical factors. For example old people, people living in small cities and people with lower geographical mobility are less likely to be exposed to bribery. The author notes that since it is easy for such people who live in small towns to have a high trust network, they have a lower probability of experiencing bribery and also people who have age mates in the same locality tend to have more trust network and less likely to experience corruption.

2.4 Impacts of corruption on public service delivery

Peter Eigen, Founder and Chairman Transparency International illustrated the challenge of corruption to public service delivery by the statement below:

“Corruption is one of the greatest challenges of our age, a challenge that must and can be confronted. If it is allowed to continue to provoke irrational governance, driven by private greed rather than by the people’s needs, and to disrupt the

development of the private sector , corruption will deny even that most fundamental of human needs-hope “(Pope, 2000 pp. xv).

Empirical evidence indicates that countries with high levels of corruption always have poor service delivery and lack of social trust and inequality in the society e.g. inequality in income forms a vicious circle of corruption that is difficult to break. Uslander (2011) noted that corruption increases the levels of inequality in society, for example the people with high income can afford to pay a bribe in order to be able to get a faster public service, but the poor because they are not able to afford a bribe, they end up without the basic public services on which they do depend on. The author also noted that the levels of corruption are higher in those services the poor people most depend on for example health services, schools, police and agricultural extension advisory services.

Kaufmann et al. (2008) also noted that corruption can affect both the quality and quantity of public services to the beneficiaries . He gave an example of the study in Zambia where results indicated that the poor people paid 17% of their incomes in bribes in the health sector while the richer middle class paid only 3%. Because of the search for bribes, public officials discriminate against the poor when they seek for a service because the poor people usually cannot pay more than what is officially set and in the end some users may be discouraged i.e. the poor choose not to ask for the services they need because of a higher price imposed, the so called “bribery tax” (Ibid). The author argues that the quality of government and quality of public institutions play a very important role in the access to the public services provided by the government to its citizens (Kaufmann et al., 2008). Kaufmann et al. (2008) noted that corruption penalizes the poor households two times, firstly corruption increases the costs of the public services and secondly also limits the access of the public services to the poor while the rich have capacity to spend much more money and therefore have even the capability to pay more bribes in order to get a public service.

Kaufmann et al. (2008), Svensson (2003), Ware et al. (2007) and Anbarci et al. (2009) noted that corruption results from bad governance and can also lead to those actions that lead to misallocation of resources, outright stealing of resources and poor accountability of government towards its citizens and such actions will raise the official cost of public services and limit the access of users of these public services especially with the poor people in the society who are basically more dependent on the public services for their survival. Anbarci et al. (2009), Mbaku (2008), Olken (2012), Ware et al. (2007) and Birner et al. (2011) noted that another negative impact of corruption is that it negatively impacts on the efficiency of

the public procurement process through leakage of funds, poor quality goods and services and also thereby affecting the delivery of services in many cases even encouraging the supply of substandard goods and services.

Recent empirical research which basically examined the negative impacts of corruption on the provision of public goods and services, indicated that the inefficiency of public projects due to corruption arises because the costs of these projects increases and the projects become no longer cost effective. This is because corruption acts as an additional cost to the overall planned cost of the project. Because of these additional costs due to corruption, some of the planned public projects have not been completed or even in many cases abandoned all together (Olken and Pande, 2012). Corruption also leads to distortions which cannot be detected by the program managers and results in inefficiency which cannot be easily detected and rectified because these corrupt actions are usually hidden through convoluted procedures by the corrupt officials in order to extract rent.

Sutton (1996) also argued that corruption is a potential source of transaction barriers in service delivery more so in the public service. For example citizens looking for a good or service can incur a higher cost than they would have paid in a market without such barriers in addition to the higher transaction costs involved because of corruption. Similarly Sutton (1996) and Boris (2005) notes that corruption as an illegal business system creates a lot of transaction costs, for example finalizing and getting a contract, monitoring the contract, getting information and enforcing the terms of reference in the contract. All these activities take a lot of time and costs (high transaction costs) for the client and also takes a lot time from the public official which time the public official would have used to perform his/her official duties effectively.

2.5 Corruption in procurement

Acquiring the appropriate quality and quantity of goods and services at the right time through public procurement is a very important part of government activities because no government can be able to acquire goods and services without undergoing the procurement process. Evidence from for instance Ware et al. (2007) and Thai (2008) indicates that corruption through procurement of goods and services is one of the most corrupt sectors in governments and should be targeted as one of the key sectors to use as an entry point to control corruption. Other authors, for example Carter (2000) and Ackerman (1998) noted that corruption in procurement of public goods and services has become a menace and that's why it has

attracted a lot of attention from the governments, NGOs, civil society institutions and international bodies like the UN and World bank. This is because corruption in procurement most especially hurts the poor since they cannot readily access the good quality and adequate public services on which they mainly depend.

2.5.1 Entry points for corruption in procurement of goods and services

Ware et. al. (2007) suggested detailed strategies and entry points for procurement corruption that can offer opportunities for controlling corruption in procurement and tailoring the control of corruption to specific contexts.

Table 2.3: Procurement challenges

Procurement Stage	Red Flags
Project and Design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Undue influence by politicians and elites in decision making.
Advertising , Prequalification, Submission of Bids	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manipulation of bid documents (favouritism). • Collusion. • Leakage of bidding information. • Submission of very few bid documents. • Lack of widespread advertizing of bids to reduce competition.
Bid Evaluation, Post-qualification and Award of Contract	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Best bidder fails to win the tender award. • The price of delivery of goods and services is increased from the original price according to the tender terms of reference. • The quality and or quantity of the goods is decreased from the original Terms of Reference (TOR).
Contract Performance , Administration and Supervision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak accounting systems. • Ghost names of beneficiaries and project personell. • Poor monitoring systems. • Lack of random spot checks to give opportunity to the contractor to disguise illegal activities. • Poor transparency and no implementation/contract information given to the beneficiaries. • Oversight of the physical works in collaboration with beneficiary representatives is absent. • The clients of the service are dissatisfied with completed facilities. • Delays in the delivery of goods and services.

Source: Author's compilation based on Ware et. al. (2007)

2.5.2 Control of corruption in public procurement

Corruption in public procurement presents one of the most important and serious problems confronting governments' public service delivery because it weakens economies, creates lack of trust by the citizens in their governments and creates cynicism among civil society and in some cases can threaten the stability of the very governments that permit illegal procurement procedures to continue unabated.

Field experiences show that procurement corruption is even more common in times of emergency or in post-conflict environment because of the need to speed up funds to a region that is in dire immediate need of assistance and a long procurement process may not be practicable because of the high vulnerabilities and emergency situations of the targeted individuals (Ware et al., 2007). For example, a very short procurement process is not able to close all the loopholes that may lead to mismanagement and leakage of funds. In post-conflict situations a number of service providers for instance NGOs and international humanitarian organizations come into the area impacted by the war emergency or natural disaster in order to respond to the emergency.

Fighting corruption in procurement and delivery of public services requires a number of approaches and with integrated strategies. The interventions to control corruption can be classified into two broad categories:

- **Demand-side interventions**

Here the Demand-side interventions are those interventions on the side of the clients of the procurement of the goods and services designed to enable the beneficiaries demand for good quality goods and services by enabling the beneficiaries to be able to take part in monitoring of procurement contracts by looking at value for money and reporting the red flags to ensure timely and good procurement products plus the ability of the beneficiaries to hold the service providers accountable for the goods and services offered.

- **Supply-side interventions**

These are measures/strategies the public procurement agency can adopt to improve the administrative procedures within the procurement process. The Supply-side deals with issues to do with staff capacity development and welfare.

2.5.2.1 Supply-side interventions

Staff capacity development

According to the Ware et al. (2007) one of the issues that is very critical in the control of procurement corruption but usually ignored by agencies responsible for procurement both in the government and private sector is staff capacity development. Procurement corruption is usually common more especially where the staff involved in the procurement process lack the specific training and experience in procurement e.g. where staff lack skills in technical capacities like procurement law, auditing, accounting etc. Staff capacity development is important in order to be able to close the entry points of corruption and also to avoid to be duped by the contractors and also be able to have capacity to identify suspicious patterns in the procurement process (Ware et al., 2007).

With adequate training of staff and well defined Terms of Reference (TOR) for procurement, this will ensure efficiency, transparency and therefore quality services. This is because it ensures that the whole procurement cycle is transparent. As a result there are minimal entry points for corruption because the whole procurement process is well laid out by the staff who have adequate technical capacity (Ware et al., 2007).

E-procurement

Olken & Pande (2012) and Ware et al. (2007) noted that one of the entry points of corruption in public procurement is lack of transparency during the bidding process. This is because different steps involve different procurement officials and a lot of discretion by the public officials involved in the process plus the high transaction costs especially on the side of the bidders. The authors argue that, with applying technology of using internet based E-Platforms, it will have an advantage of streamlining the procurement process, for instance ensuring transparency during the bidding process because all the stakeholders can access the necessary information online. This strategy eliminates the unnecessary bureaucratic procedures and reduces the number of officials involved in the procurement process hence reducing the entry points for corruption. For example E-procurement experiences from Chile, Mexico and the Republic of Korea suggests that E-procurement can indeed lead to substantial savings (Ware et al., 2007). E-procurement can be an efficient strategy for reducing corruption but it must go hand in hand by the relevant institutional reforms to be able to manage the process, for example setting up the relevant internet based services where

they do not exist, for instance the remote areas of the country and capacity development of staff who will manage the procurement process (Ware et al., 2007).

Forensic audits , sanctions and enforcement

In order to avoid corruption in procurement, there must be procedures for on-spot checks and forensic audits to identify corruption incidences and to avoid selection of ghost companies. In addition there should be a system of investigations and punishing, blacklisting and prosecution of bidders and officials involved in corrupt practices (Ware et al., 2007).

Voluntary disclosure programs

The United Nations Convention against corruption which entered into force in December 2005 requires member states to implement voluntary disclosure programs that allow the potential contractors to report fraud in their operations. Ware et al. (2007) noted that these disclosure programs are even more important in post-conflict conditions because of the many entry points for procurement corruption due to the lack of corruption controls during the procurement process and contract implementation as a result of the emergency situations i.e. during such emergency situations all the procurement procedures are not usually followed.

2.5.2.2 Demand-side interventions

External monitoring

This involves organizing a multidisciplinary team with a purpose of scrutinizing the procurement process step by step from the beginning to the end to close all the entry points for corruption. Effective external monitoring also usually involves the effective participation of the community who are the clients /beneficiaries themselves or can also use other independent compliance monitors, for example civil society organizations who are already on the ground and familiar with the contract implementation context and have technical capacity in the procurement processes (Ware et al., 2007). In developing countries where public procurement corruption is pervasive, they have taken on strategies of using independent NGOs and or civil society monitors in order to improve transparency. Here the NGOs and civil society can be used as observers on public procurement committees (Ware et al., 2007).

Integrity pacts

The integrity pact is a tool which was introduced by Transparency International (TI) in order to curb the rampant corruption in public procurement. This is a formal agreement between agencies or committees involved in public procurement and the prospective contractors/bidders with a promise that no one will offer or accept a bribe during the bidding and contract implementation and to make sure there is compliance (Ware et al., 2007). Here a third independent party is engaged to oversee the integrity pact usually an NGO or civil society (Ware et al., 2007).

Access to information and information sharing

For efficient procurement process, there is need for access to information especially by the beneficiaries /citizens who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the procured goods and services. Information sharing between all the stakeholders is also important i.e. involvement of the private sector like NGOs who are already on the ground play a very important part in the dissemination of information to the stakeholders (Thai, 2008 , Ware et al., 2007).

Norms and conventions

International norms and conventions are important in the control of corruption. For example apart from the UN Convention Against Corruption , there is the Corruption Vulnerability Assessment tool (CVA), which is comparable to the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) tool which deals with environmental issues. The CVA is carried out before the beginning of the bidding process to detect any potential entry points for corruption before the bidding process and identifies the vulnerabilities in a specific country context that may put the aid funds at risk (Ware et al., 2007). The main importance of the CVA tool is to make sure that public funds are not put at risk of being swindled but are put to the intended use to benefit the intended beneficiaries.

Citizens Driven Approaches (CDAs)

Basheka (2012), Malena & Forster (2004), Philips, Caldwell and Callender, (2007), Myint (2000), Singh and Vutukuru(2010) , Björkman & Svensson (2010) and Ware et al. (2007) noted that the CDAs are now a popular tool in the fight against procurement corruption because of the ineffectiveness of the existing institutions especially in developing countries to offer quality goods and services to their citizens. The authors argued that by involving the

citizens who are beneficiaries themselves in all the procurement processes, it can make it possible for them to demand accountability from the service providers and their elected leaders. This is also the case with the limited success of community procurement under NAADS and NUSAF programs in Uganda (Robinson, 2005, Parkinson, 2009). With CDAs, the beneficiaries are involved in the monitoring of public projects to ensure that contractors offer quality goods and services (Basheka et al., 2010). Examples of citizens initiatives include citizen report cards, social audits public expenditure tracking and citizen oversight committees etc. (Basheka et al., 2010). Mbaku (2008) noted that the local citizens who are the ultimate beneficiaries from the procurement process are on the ground have more time, have more information about the community conditions and are more familiar with their tastes and preferences than the bureaucrats at the center.

2.6 Interventions to curb corruption in public service delivery

2.6.1 Supply-side strategies

Effective strategies to control corruption both at the national and international levels have been enhanced because empirical evidence indicates that control of corruption leads to improved social well being of the citizens especially the poor who basically depend on the public services for their survival (Anbarci et al., 2009).

Access to information and monitoring

Emperical studies on the levels and incidence of corruption is also recommended by Choo & Kukutschka (2012) and Boris (2005) , here the authors argue that without baseline information to give deeper understanding of the problem of corruption in a particular country, institution and context, it is very difficult to devise effective measures to control corruption. For example if the citizens in the particular country agree that the surveyed levels of corruption in a particular institution are high, this information will prompt for the immediate action on the part of government to act on the situation.

Ware et al. (2007), Olken & Pande (2012) recommend for transparency i.e. sharing of information as an effective tool in the control of corruption in governments' public service delivery system. International organizations for example Transparency International (TI) in collaboration with civil society organizations have also played a key role in the fight against corruption, for example through TI's Global Corruption report, which plays an important role

in the creation of awareness about corruption and its negative impacts and in the process forcing some of the countries to act more especially on the corruption red flags raised by the global corruption report. According to Pope (2000), Choo & Kukutschka (2012) and Reinikka & Svensson (2005), they recommend governments to ensure free access to information and working closely with a free press and an active and independent civil society in the dissemination of information.

The Uganda survey carried out by Reinikka and Svensson (2005) on access to information as a tool to improve service delivery and avoid corruption in Ugandan schools, survey results showed that schools with access to information e.g. News Papers received an 8.68 % greater share of their entitlements than schools that did not have access to News Papers. These results show that information is a powerful deterrent tool to the diversion of public funds at the local level and also results confirm that the improvement in the amount of money received by schools was due to access to information by the beneficiaries.

However Olken and Pande (2012) noted that increasing monitoring by public officials alone in many cases may not reduce corrupt behavior because the same officials that are given the task of monitoring may be corrupt themselves and it may be difficult to enforce punishments. The authors noted that this type of monitoring can even simply increase transfers from low level officials to the auditors. Monitoring in order to be effective has to be complimented by other corruption control strategies because corrupt officials most of the times hide corrupt behavior and even if audits are carried out it does not mean that auditors will find enough evidence to enforce sanctions and punishments (Olken, 2011; Olken, 2007). The study by Olken (2007) on roads construction in Indonesia demonstrates that the traditional economic approach of fighting corruption by increasing the expected cost of corruption, by increasing the probability of being caught can play an important role in reducing corruption even in a highly corrupt environment where those doing the monitoring are themselves potentially corruptible.

Collaboration with civil society and NGOs

Transparency International (TI) notes that the role of civil society is crucial in the fight against corruption. TI's Global Corruption Report (GCR) has played an important role internationally in raising awareness about corruption and its negative social impacts, raising a red flag and in some cases forcing countries to act. Governments alone cannot contain corruption, therefore they need and must win the support and participation of an active but

independent civil society (Pope, 2000). Themudo (2009) and Themudo (2012) argue that the introduction of competition in public service provision and hence reduction in the monopoly of government and its officials in the provision of public services, will reduce the ability of government officials to extort the so called “special fees” to offer services, which fees are a form of corruption. The author suggests that examples of how government monopoly can be reduced is through engagement of the non-profit sector to fight corruption through competition with other private agencies to offer public services.

Similarly Schleifer and Vishny (1993) also argue for increasing competition to decrease corruption. The authors argue that the government officials can extract a higher amount of bribe when some goods or services are only available with the government. Allowing competition through giving permission to some private companies to produce those goods or services may reduce government officials’ bribe extraction. Only implementing strong rules and regulations may not help in closed market situations where households do not have any exit option and officials have a monopoly over some services (Schleifer & Vishny, 1993). Here competition will be more effective in curbing corruption because an individual /household or company has the freedom to exit when asked for a bribe. Therefore before designing policy interventions, the probable effects of corruption should be studied and it is important to know causes and forms of corruption at all levels in order to design effective policies or strategies to combat corruption (Schleifer & Vishny, 1993).

Themudo (2009) noted that donors have found the strategy of engaging NGOs especially on aid delivery as a more efficient system because engagement of the non-profit sector has managed to by pass the corrupt governments. Another role of NGOs is that they can act as a watch dog to government activities in order to ensure that public funds are used for their planned activities and the watch dog role of NGOs ensures that the government officials are accountable for their proper use of public funds and they do not use their government offices to carry out corrupt activities (Themudo, 2009).

Themudo (2009) gives an example of the NGO-Debt Action Network in Uganda, a volunteer non-profit group that regularly monitors the uses of foreign aid and debt relief at the grassroots. By increasing transparency and making public both corrupt acts and actors, the non-profit sector increases the likelihood of sanctions against corrupt behavior. In addition NGOs may educate citizens and public officials about the negative impacts of corruption on public service delivery creating a political will by the governments to change for the better.

Staff welfare

Improvement in remuneration and work motivation by staff has been indicated to reduce the levels of corruption. A number of studies carried out in different countries have indicated that in countries where public wages are higher there is relatively lower levels of corruption (Olken & Pande, 2012 ; Boris, 2005). However, other studies for example Rijckeghem & Weder (2001) which was carried out in poor countries indicated a minimal change in corruption levels after an increase in wages i.e. results showed that doubling of wages was associated with only 0.5 % point reduction in the ICRG corruption index measured on a scale from 0-6.

In another study Niehaus and Sukhtanker (2012) examined the idea that the rents from keeping one's job can deter corruption today in order to preserve tomorrow's opportunities. The authors from their research noted that when opportunities for theft from daily wage projects increase, theft on piece rate projects goes down. Duflo et al. (2012) noted that in situations where the mechanisms to monitor performance are tamper free, performance pay can reduce absenteeism e.g. in case of school teachers it has been proved to improve test scores. Olken and Pande (2012) noted that caution must be taken to design incentives well and to prevent them from being undermined.

Olken and Pande (2012) suggests that tying incentives more closely to performance either through direct financial awards or through promotions, assignments etc. can be one of the methods to reduce corruption. Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991) argue that in designing such incentive schemes it is critical to deal with the so called "multitasking" problems and ensure the true goals of government are achieved but not just the ones that are incentivized.

Government institutional reforms

This includes: political will, reduction in red tape, using technological innovations declaration of assets, sanctions and grievance redressal mechanisms. Strategies to control corruption in government are usually effective when there is a strong political will by the government to support the anti-corruption strategies i.e. the willingness of the government to fight corruption should always be followed by action through policy and institutional reforms followed by the relevant official lines of detection and control and control followed by sanctions through criminal prosecution of all the individuals implicated in the corrupt practices (Choo et al., 2012). Another way to control corruption is by using simple

administrative procedures in government institutions to be able to cut on the redtape to reduce on the various levels where corrupt practices can take place (Choo et al., 2012).

Choo et al. (2012) argues that ordinary citizens (local people) have a lot of first hand experience with corruption and therefore are a good source of information and their help is important in order to launch a successful anti-corruption campaign. There is need to provide the communities with information through publicity to create awareness on corruption. For example to initiate public community programs to enable the citizens express their views on corruption brings immediate outpouring of information, ideas and suggestions that will be very helpful (Mbaku, 2008 ; Choo et al., 2012).

Declaration of assets by politicians and public officials prior to their appointment may work to curb corruption (World Bank, 2007). However sometimes this may not work because of overstatement of their assets and claims of family inheritance so that later enhancements can be discounted and concealed (Ware et al., 2007).

Mbaku (2008) argues that one effective way of fighting corruption is the devolution of power in favor of local, regional, and or provincial political jurisdictions. The author argues that in order to fight corruption power should not be concentrated in the center (Mbaku, 2008).

Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Olken (2007) noted that in order for the strategies to control corruption to be effective, the expected costs from corrupt behavior if the corrupt agent is detected should be greater than the expected gains and therefore because of this the corrupt agent will decide not to be corrupt. The author notes that for governments designing strategies to control corruption, they should ensure that the strategies should be able to reduce the expected gains from corruption while increasing the probability of the corrupt agents caught and increasing the size of the punishment (sanction) if caught. Gary & Stigler (1974) suggested the right combination of monitoring and punishments in order to control corruption.

Boris (2005), Myint (2000) and Choo et al. (2012) argue that the strict rule of law, reducing the complexity of laws and improving the performance of the judicial system is one of the elements of an effective strategy to fight corruption. The authors also recommend for a reduction in bureaucracy by cutting back on red tape to reduce the discretion of public officials. Myint also recommends for the creation oversight bodies e.g. independent

commissions against corruption for instance the creation of the Inspector General of Government (IGG's) office in Uganda.

Another supply-side innovation to control corruption is through technological innovations by creating tools that make it very difficult for government officials to tamper with and to enhance communication through technological innovations which can provide reliable information to enable efficient monitoring (Olken and Pande, 2012). Olken and Pande (2012) argue that in the online procurement system high quality contractors are more likely to win contracts and therefore can offer better quality services compared to other procurement methods whereby bribery is rampant ending up hiring poor quality contractors who offer poor quality services. Similarly Choo et al. (2012) suggests that one solution to reduce corruption is to reduce contacts with public officials so as to minimize the opportunity for public officials to ask for a bribe, for example investing in E-government platforms can then serve as a good strategy since it reduces contact of public officials with the citizens and reduces the ability for public officials to exhibit rent seeking behaviors and to commit illegal acts such as bribery, extortion or any other type of malfeasance punishable by the law. Examples include digitalization of transactions, online payment tracking and audits. However the author cautions that this strategy will only be feasible and successful given that the country has adequate resources to implement it, able to carry out the required institutional reforms and the majority of the population are of a required level of competency and have access to the internet.

Targeting

It is economically efficient to allow the production and distribution of public goods to be undertaken at the local level where demand and supply conditions as well as changes in them can be determined with greater levels of accuracy. Local provision of services can enhance the ability of stakeholders to hold civil servants more accountable and hence minimize bureaucratic corruption (Mbaku, 2008).

Grimes & Wangnerud (2010) noted that to control corruption in public service delivery is the use of conditional cash transfers to the local governments and the beneficiary government entities. Grimes & Wangnerud (2010) argue that, the CCTs are designed in a way that funds pass through fewer hands and this eliminates bureaucracy in the implementation chain and also aims at increasing transparency in the process of selecting beneficiaries through

providing information about entitlements by the recipients i.e. the beneficiaries are aware of what they are entitled to.

Mungiu-pippidi (2013a) and Persson et al. (2010) have criticized the control of corruption by thinking that when the boss is not corrupt but a lower cadre is the one who is corrupt this will force the lower cadre to change. The authors argue that good governance programs by international agencies to control corruption are usually misdirected i.e. towards ministries, control agencies and anti-corruption bodies which are also corrupt but wrongly assumed that they are morally above corruption. This finding is also similar to Persson et al. (2010) who argued that the principle agent approach to control corruption cannot work because they argue that those officials at the top end of the public administration ladder have the most discretionary power and also the most opportunities to ask for bribes. The authors noted that officials e.g. legislators are in a better position to influence policies and legislation in favor of specific interest groups involved in corruption. There is need for collective action to control corruption through creation of effective checks on corrupt officials through enlightened citizens rather than simply dependent clients and dis-empowered individuals (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008 ; Persson et al., 2010). Here ordinary citizens who are the beneficiaries of the service should be able to play the role of principals and hence corruption can be controlled through collective means (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008).

2.6.2 Demand-side strategies to control corruption

There has been a growing emphasis on the importance of enhancing accountability in public services by the government through social audits. Social audit is a process through which government expenditure details at the local level (usually at village level) are obtained and discussed in a public hearing attended by both the service providers and the people who have benefited from that particular government program (Singh and Vutukuru, 2010).

Persson et al. (2010), Persson, Rothstein & Teorell (2010) and Mungiu- Pippidi (2013b), these authors argue for collective action to control corruption. Here they argue that in order to create effective checks on corrupt officials in order to create real accountability there must exist at the grassroots level an active and enlightened citizenry rather than simply dependent clients and dis-empowered individuals. They argue that ordinary citizens themselves should be able to play the role of principals and corruption can be controlled through collective means. Civil society associations, political participation and the media all serve to empower collective action on behalf of society, thus rendering it better equipped to solve common

problems for example corruption and in this case associations of every kind lower the cost of collective action for the average citizen (Mungui-Pippidi, 2013b).

Olken and Pande (2012) present another approach to providing effective monitoring that does not involve a central auditor. This is grassroots monitoring where regular citizens are empowered to monitor their officials to prevent corruption. Olken's previous study in Indonesia examined grassroots monitoring by randomly allocating villages to receive more intensive community monitoring. This was through two interventions with different purposes. The first intervention involved inviting hundreds of villagers to attend local accountability meetings to reduce elite control of which community members were involved in monitoring. The second intervention he used involved distributing hundreds of anonymous comment forms throughout the village in order to allow community members to voice concerns or complaints without fear of retaliation.

Results from the study indicate that invitation intervention reduced theft of materials, but only for theft of wages, for example convincing the villagers to work for free but billing the project for their work. The benefits from detecting theft of materials would accrue to the village as a whole in the form of a better road, so the free rider problem may be more severe. Olken and Pande (2012) conclude that for community participation to work successfully, it is important to get the details right in terms of protecting people from retaliation, limiting the free rider problem and preventing elite capture. The authors argue that increasing community participation can influence governance through a number of channels, that is ; improvements in monitoring, improved information flow and exchange whereby leaders may learn more about villagers' preferences and villagers in turn may learn more about outcomes especially when outcomes relate to service delivery but not necessarily corruption.

An example of the above approach is a recent study in Uganda's health service sector whereby Björkman and Svensson (2010) examined community monitoring intervention in Uganda in which local NGOs encouraged the communities to be more involved in the state of the health service provision. The interventions included meetings to discuss baseline information on the status of health service delivery relative to other providers and the government standard and encouraged the community members to develop a plan identifying key problems and steps the providers should take to improve health service provision. Results show that the intervention increased the quality and quantity of primary health care

service provision, however the design of the intervention suggests that the mechanisms could have included either or both better information flows and monitoring.

Social audits provide an opportunity to the citizens, especially the poor to directly engage with service providers and provide continuous feedback on the implementation of large government programmes. Social audits are important because they also serve a purpose of exposing corruption in the implementation of government programmes (Myint, 2000).

3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

Earlier approaches to public administration assumed that the public service production and delivery was basically the sole responsibility of the government i.e. the Supply-side and ignored the role of the clients (Demand-side) of the service in the efficient delivery of public services. Many of the public sector reforms concentrated on improvement of the Supply-side through capacity development, bureaucratic reforms and staff welfare through financial incentives (ECA, 2003 ; Standing, 2004). Here the private sector and clients were basically ignored and government departments were considered the only available agencies in the provision of public services (ECA , 2003 ; World Bank , 2004).


At service provider level, in extension for example, Supply–driven production packages were promoted in the past decade and at the Demand-side often rather shallow needs assessments were carried out to make the system appear “ participatory” and “responsive”, while the overall effectiveness and efficiency remained poor (Hagmann et al., 2002). Standing (2004) noted that all this focus mainly on the Supply-side of public service delivery was as a result of ill informed policies by governments which were formulated through a top-down approach without involvement of the beneficiaries who would support implementation by giving feedback to the implementing government agencies.

ECA (2003) and Hagmann et al. (2002) noted that such traditional approaches to delivery of public services have not proved effective because many countries more especially the developing countries have limited institutional capacity to offer the public services alone. Similarly ECA (2003) and Standing (2004) noted that the challenges of the traditional approach are the institutional and governance failures e.g. resource deficiencies, poor management, corruption, accountability issues, general hostility of the Demand-side to government etc. especially in the developing countries resulting in failure of programs to achieve their objectives.

Approaches that ensure that the poor people have access to service delivery of recent have been given a high priority by governments and international agencies alike. The World Bank(2004) on improving service delivery to poor people particularly captures the emerging demand language of empowerment, voice and accountability (World Bank, 2004).The World Development Report (WDR) published by the World Bank in 2004 captures the emerging Demand side language of empowerment, voice and accountability through its model of the

three central service provision relationships of user-provider –planner. In this model (see figure 3.1), empowered citizens/consumers use voice to hold providers/policy makers to account for fulfilling their contract to deliver competent responsive services.

The accountability triangle indicated in figure 3.1 which is adopted from the World Bank (2003a) indicates that the users of the service have two potential routes of accountability for securing essential public services; a long route via the policy makers and a short route directly to the producers as shown in figure 3.1. Where a short route to accountability is effective, clients can help tailor the package of services to their own needs and monitor the producers leading to effective and efficient services (World Bank, 2003a). However for the short route to accountability (social audits) to be effective, producers must be responsive to information on local preferences and have sufficient discretion to respond to local needs and this can also serve as a good feedback effect on demand. By monitoring government performance, demanding and enhancing transparency and exposing government failures and misdeeds social accountability mechanisms are also powerful tools against corruption and it addresses also the Demand-side aspects of public service delivery, monitoring and accountability (Malena et al., 2004).



Source: World bank, 2003

Figure 3.1: The accountability triangle

The new paradigm shift through the New Public Management (NPM) approach believed that apart from the public sector, the private sector if well organized can also play a role in the delivery of public services (World Bank, 2003a ; Standing, 2004 ; ECA, 2003 ; WDR ,2004

& Birner, 2007). Here the private sector service providers can be formal/informal and civil society organizations.

Through the NPM approach, the private sector has been given an active role in public service delivery and also has emphasized that citizens have an active role to play in the delivery of services rather than being just on the receiving end of whatever public goods /services are offered to them i.e. NPM addresses the beneficiaries of the public services much like customers and shareholders but not just as obedient subjects (Birner, 2007, Pollitt, 2003).

According to Matheson & Kwon (2003), Birner (2007) and Birner et al. (2009) the characteristics of NPM include decentralization of the delivery of public services to lower levels, contracting out of some of the public services to the private sector, competition within government, client involvement and management by objectives.

Hagmann et al. (2002) noted that matching the Supply-side with the Demand-side should also be matched by improved capacity and governance of the organization i.e. good policies, adequate financial capacity, mandate etc. and any forgotten aspect of the service delivery system will hinder the success of the overall intervention. Similarly Birner (2007) argued that only improving the Supply-side of public service delivery will not guarantee efficient service delivery.

3.2 Description of the conceptual framework

3.2.1 Overview

The Conceptual Framework underlying this study is the service delivery framework modified from Hagmann et al. (2002), framework for analyzing pluralistic advisory services worldwide by Birner et al. (2006) and framework for improving governance, Demand and Supply side approaches by Birner (2007). This Conceptual Framework describes the concepts guiding the study, how they relate to each other and how they affect project performance.

This framework describes the various Demand-side and Supply-side factors that affect program performance. Here performance is defined as the ability of an organization to meet its goals and achieve its overall mission (Birner et al., 2006). For effective program performance, there is need for the Demand-side itself (the rural populations/the beneficiaries) to be supported in organizing themselves and have a formalized voice in the service (Hagmann et al., 2002). Hagmann et al. (2002) concludes that any forgotten aspect in the

service system can turn to be a blockage hindering the success of the other and of the overall program intervention and hence poor program/project performance.

According to Birner et al. (2006) and Birner et al. (2011), the ability of the agricultural service organization to achieve its objectives is influenced by its capacity both technical and financial, its internal environment and the context in which it operates. Birner et al. (2006) and Birner et al. (2011) identified four indicators of program performance i.e. relevance of the agricultural advisory service, technical and financial capacity, efficiency and effectiveness. Additionally, Blum (2008) noted that other indicators of program performance includes the characteristics of the agricultural extension system plus the system actors, coordination of advisory services with other partners, beneficiary involvement, financial capabilities and human resource capacity of the organization.

Birner et al. (2006) describes two types of variables that influence program performance i.e. the choice variables and frame conditions. The choice variables are described as those variables that policy makers and advisory program managers can influence directly, for instance the characteristics of the agricultural extension services, management and advisory methods, governance structures of the extension services and the capacity of the organization offering the advisory services. The choice variables are displayed in boxes I, J,K,L and M in figure 3.2. Birner et al. (2006) defined the frame conditions as those factors that the policy makers and agricultural service managers can influence only in an indirect way because they are beyond their control and influence. These are displayed in boxes A, B,C, D, E, F, G and H in figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2: Conceptual framework

Source: Author's compilation based on Hagmann et al. (2002), Birner et al. (2006), Birner et al. (2011) and World Bank (2003a).

3.2.2 The Supply-side of public service delivery

(See Boxes I, J, K, L and M in figure 3.2)

In this Conceptual Framework, the Supply-side refers to the production and delivery of public services through the involvement of multiple governance actors (Standing, 2004, Hagmann et al., 2002). Looking at rural extension services the Supply-side consists of the service providers and in addition to the organizations of the service providers and their institutional arrangements (Hagmann et al., 2002). Supply-side of public service delivery refers to the production and delivery of public services through the involvement of multiple governance actors that include public agencies, private enterprises, CSOs, NGOs, CBOs, and the communities (Hagmann et al., 2002).

The Supply-side of service delivery is influenced by the organization capacity i.e. the resources, knowledge and processes employed by the organization. It includes; staffing, infrastructure, technology and financial resources, strategic leadership, program and process management, networks and linkages with other organizations and groups (Horton et al., 2003). Service providers need to have the capacity to interpret the demand and to identify the type of services which is appropriate to support the different clients (Hagmann et al., 2002).

The internal environment refers to the internal factors that influence the direction of the organization and the energy displayed in its activities. It includes; incentive and rewards systems, the organization climate or culture, leadership and management style, the history and traditions of the organization, clarity and acceptance of the organization's mission, extent and shared norms and values promoting teamwork and pursuit of organization goals and organizational structure (Hagmann et al., 2002; Birner et al. 2006).

Financial management

(See Box J in figure 3.2)

This involves fiscal and administrative decentralization of public agencies and creating an enabling environment for the involvement of non-state actors that include NGOs, CBOs and the private sector in the provision of public services. This strategy is aimed at improving the capacities of autonomous service delivery of public agencies and local governments. However Birner (2007) argued that this approach can only be successful if there is a willingness and commitment by the central/state governments to ensure effective administrative and fiscal decentralization.

In terms of financial management for effective project performance adequate funds should be allocated and finance services need to be enabling for service providers to perform well and this calls for effective financial governance (budgeting and accounting mechanisms). It should be noted that allocating adequate financial resources is not a guarantee for effective service delivery, therefore for efficient project performance strong accounting and monitoring systems should be in place to ensure that resources are allocated equitably so that the diverse needs of the targeted beneficiaries are fulfilled. End of year financial statements and budget execution reports should be available to the public so that the monitoring mechanisms can achieve the desired outputs. Financial management should go hand in hand with accountability, which is an institutional relationship with three features i.e. delegation, financial performance and enforceability. It should be noted that accountability is at the heart of effective and efficient public service delivery coupled with improved external as well as internal communication channels which enhance transparency and accountability (Hagmann et al., 2002).

Capacity and management of the organization

(See Boxes I and K in figure 3.2)

Efforts to provide better services and improve project performance depend on whether the service providers have the capacity to respond to the demand and deliver better services to the communities. Here capacity refers to the number of service providers, their training levels, attitudes, motivation, aspirations of the staff members' of the advisory service, their incentives, mission orientation, professional ethics and organizational culture (Birner et al., 2006 , Birner et al., 2010). If any of these factors are in short supply it will affect project performance negatively (Birner et al., 2010). Competence development is a central aspect to reach organizational capacity and this is not perceived as a conventional training but integrally incorporated learning with the organizational development process (Hagmann et al., 2002). Manning and Parison (2004) have noted that staff recruitment should be on merit in order to ensure that qualified staff are carrying out the job effectively.

Design features of the program

(See Box L in figure 3.2)

Agricultural livelihood programs will have limited impact on the beneficiaries if the advisory methods applied are inappropriate (considering the context), the training level of the advisory services agents was too low and if the system was not managed well. Examples of strategies

to improve capacity and performance include training to improve technical and practical skills, on the job promotions, work delegation, merit based recruitment, and work motivation e.g. through creating incentives, and the adjustment of payment structures (Birner et al., 2006).

According to Batley (2006) the second approach of improving Supply-side of public service delivery aims at creating an enabling environment for non-state providers (NGOs, CBOs, CSOs, user organizations etc.) to engage in activities that increase and improve service provision to the poor people. There are a number of institutional arrangements through which non-state actors take part in the production and delivery of public services and the most common ones for example include: privatization, contracting out for example the NAADS in Uganda where the provision of agricultural advisory services is contracted to individual consultants, private sector enterprises and NGOs on a competitive basis, service cooperatives and devolving management authority to user groups e.g. water user committees (Birner, 2007; Birner et al., 2006 ; Batley, 2006; Awortwi, 2012).

3.2.3 The Demand-side of public service delivery

(See Boxes F, G and H in figure 3.2)

In this Conceptual Framework, the Demand-side refers to the community members and their organizational capacities to aggregate and articulate demand towards service providers with the objective of influencing the availability, access, quality and timeliness of services provided as well as to claim accountability of providers to their clients (Standing, 2004, Hagmann et al., 2002). Looking at rural extension services, the Demand-side are the rural communities and their organizations (i.e. the beneficiaries of the services) (Hagmann et al., 2002).

The Demand-side capacity of public service delivery refers to the community members and their organizational capacities to aggregate and articulate demand towards service providers with the objective of influencing the quality, quantity and timeliness of services provided as well as to claim accountability of providers to the clients (Hagmann et al., 2002). Similarly the Demand-side of public service delivery therefore focuses on the voice, regulation, transparency and accountability and financial management dimensions of governance (Birner, 2007; Rouse, 2007). Citizens need to have voice and the government should be able to provide avenues so that they can express it effectively. There is need to provide open and responsive avenues for the consumers to exercise their voice through well laid out procedures

and complaint mechanisms (Birner, 2007; Rouse, 2007). Standing (2004) gives examples of factors on the Demand-side to include: cultural, intra-household resource allocation, labor, income level, skills in monitoring, education levels (formal or informal), planning, designing, management and monitoring of service delivery and gender issues.

Birner (2007), Birner et al. (2006) and Hagmann et al. (2002) argued that aggregation of demand is critical in public service delivery because demands for better service can only be responded to in an effective manner if a critical mass of people shares the same problem/need and be able to organize their demands. The authors note that the degree of assertiveness of citizen's demand is influenced by the level and type of information they have about their entitlements, rights, regulations, financial resources and resource allocation procedures and mechanisms. In order to strengthen the Demand-side, there is need to strengthen the capacity of citizens in general and more especially the poor people and vulnerable groups to demand for better services and creating institutional arrangements and complaints mechanisms that can help them channel their demands to public agencies and hold them accountable.

One of the Demand-side factors considers the community characteristics as important factors that affect project performance. The community factors include: educational level, human capital, household income, social capital, pre-conflict agriculture expertise, local organization's capacity and culture, gender issues, availability of markets, farming style and practices (Birner et al., 2006).

For example the education level of the communities matters for the project to achieve its objectives. Education impacts on how the demand needs are managed and the articulation of the demand towards service providers and the ability of the clients to claim accountability from the service providers (Hagmann et al., 2002). Schultz (2002) noted that every additional year of schooling increases a person's productivity and increases earnings. Communities with higher education are able to articulate high quality demand which is created by ability of the farmers to have deep analysis of causes of problems or issues based on a thorough exposure and assessment of options to address their problems and the understanding of what the service providers can contribute at solving their problems (Hagmann et al., 2002).

Low educated or illiterate communities usually have shallow so called "wish lists" of needs or wants which cannot enable the programs to effectively solve their very important needs in the communities (Hagmann et al., 2006). Evidence from rural India also suggests that higher levels of education and literacy correlate with lower corruption, more accountability, better targeting and less political capture (Plummer & Cross, 2007). If the society is not sufficiently

educated and informed about their rights and access to government information and cultural and social dynamics keep away people from demanding information to hold public officials and institutions accountable (Byrne et al., 2010). Education level can impact on the farm households/clients to exercise voice and formulate demand. Birner et al. (2006) and empirical research shows that educated households are less prone to experience corruption (Shaw, 2009).

For instance, complex community based programs which are transaction and document intensive e.g. NUSAF and NAADS are difficult to implement if the average education levels of the community are low. Education inequity may also contribute to elite capture by the more educated members of the community (Birner et al., 2011). It has also been observed that educated people can easily adapt to new technologies. The level of agricultural expertise from the pre-conflict time may also determine how well the beneficiaries are able to utilize the agricultural expertise provided by the program (Birner et al., 2011). Social capital is the most important factor in determining the nature and effectiveness of protective strategies. Mungiu-pippidi (2013a), Mungiu-pippidi (2013b) and Putnam (1993) refers to social capital as a widespread habit of engaging in formal or informal collective action around shared interests, purposes and values and notes that collective action is a public good. Group approaches to advisory services can be effective when communities have high levels of social cohesion.

If the program is being implemented in post-conflict situations where the social capital has been eroded, implementation should begin with programs that aim at strengthening the social capital within the communities. Hagmann et al. (2002) argues that a well-organized community (stronger social capital) can lead to a stronger Demand-side. A stronger Demand-side can be able to hold service providers accountable and mass publics can make extension services more cost effective (Birner et al., 2006 ; Hagmann et al., 2002). For political reasons, for example insecurity caused by war, participation in local groups may be discouraged this is because the knowledge and social networks of farmers can be highly fragmented leading to absence of common set of values.

A study by Narayan & Pritchett (1997) has shown that social networks are important in overcoming coordination problems and reducing transaction costs. Miguel & Gugerty (2004) argues that ethnically diverse communities (limited social networks) are less able to ensure enough social pressure for sustaining school contributions, a case of rural western Kenya. The author concludes that higher ethnic diversity is associated with lower community participation in school meetings. Reinikka & Svensson (2004) conclude that investment in

social capital through nation building policies can be an important explanation for the observed difference in local capture as it determines communities' ability to produce local public goods, raise funds and cooperate on policies to improve on the communities' welfare.

Once cooperation and a habit of association exist in a society, it becomes easier to use the social capital i.e. cooperation and association for any collective action (Mungiu-pippidi, 2013a/b). The author argues that, a society capable of collective action is capable of controlling its most violent or selfish tendencies for example extreme individualism, divisiveness where there is very little trust and each person acts on his own behalf and against anyone who stands in his way. The capacity for collective action is a public good that derives from extensive interaction. Evidence shows that households with more limited social network have greater difficulty accessing resources such as land and employment opportunities. It should be noted that social cohesion is the foundation of collective identity and customary laws and as such is a factor for mitigating tensions and conflict in society (McCormac & Benjamin, 2008).

Labor availability (Human capital) is a variable also affecting farmers' decision about the adoption of new agricultural practices or inputs. Some technologies are relatively labor saving and others are labor using. Ox-Cultivation is labor saving and its adoption may be encouraged by labor shortage (Birner et al., 2006). Technologies that increase demand for labor in peak seasons, adoption is less attractive for those with limited family labor. If the technology is not easy to adopt due to limited human capital, then this will negatively impact on program performance.

Land availability and tenure security determine whether the farmers can utilize the technologies provided by the program. Technologies which require large tracts of land may not well be utilized by small land owners or the landless e.g. women and this will impact on the adoption of these technologies. If the project is promoting technologies which require big chunks of land where land is scarce, land issues will have a negative impact on the project performance. Where there is no secure land tenure, technologies which take a long time like tree planting will not be easily adopted by the targeted communities.

Socially determined gender roles in the community influence the strategies that advisory services systems need to apply in order to reach women farmers (Birner et al., 2006). Byrne et al. (2010) has argued that cultural and social dynamics in the society keep people away from demanding information to hold public institutions accountable. In relatively more patriarchal societies where women do not play as active role in the public domain, women's

views on social issues may be influenced to a greater extent by men's views and hence in such societies one would expect to see less of a gender difference in behavior towards corruption in comparison to societies where women feel more comfortable in voicing their own opinions (Alatas et al., 2008).

The level of agricultural expertise before the beginning of the war conflict may also determine how well the targeted beneficiaries are able to internalize and utilize the agricultural technologies provided by the program. If the beneficiaries had prior knowledge on the technologies being promoted before the war, it is likely easier for the extension workers to deliver the message effectively than when the farmers had no prior knowledge. With prior knowledge of the technologies before the war conflict there is improved program performance because it will take more little time and resources to let the beneficiaries adopt the new technologies.

Contextual factors

The contextual factors are represented by Boxes A, B, C, D and E in figure 3.2. These factors include location, indicators accounting for season, occurrence of conflict, perceptions of safety in the neighborhood, level of poverty, security situation and policy environment, general corruption level and level of reconciliation.

In addition Hagmann et al. (2002) and Birner et al. (2006) argued that strategies to improve the Supply-side of public service delivery will be more effective when they consider the context in which the public service delivery is taking place i.e. not to consider a one size fits all but to tailor the strategies to the specific problems that the clients and the public agencies face. For example, post conflict settings are characterized by the breakdown of social structures, the exertion of political power and control over other communities, ethnic differences and socio-economic discrimination. Such characteristics are among the major threats to men's and women's livelihoods and have a negative impact on project performance. For instance the conflict in Northern Uganda has deeply traumatized the populations and shattered traditions and social cohesion, destabilizing the old and new generations, shifting social values and profoundly affecting the psycho-social wellbeing of Northern Ugandans (McCormac & Benjamin, 2008). Engagement with the community decreased as a survivalist mentality increased and these are often replaced with a tendency for people to adopt an "each person for themselves" attitude (McCormac & Benjamin, 2008).

4 STUDY AREA AND PROGRAMS

4.1 Background on Uganda

Uganda is a landlocked country located in Eastern Africa which borders South Sudan, Kenya, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Tanzania. The country has a population of about 33,796,000 and the country has more than 40 different ethnic groups (UBOS, 2010). UBOS statistics of 2010 show that the population of Uganda is growing at a very fast rate and currently it is growing at 3.2 % per annum, which is making Uganda one of the countries with the highest population growth rates in the World. The implications of high population growth rates is that it reduces the real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (UNOCHA(b), 2011).

Uganda has been widely recognized as one of the most successful countries in Africa in terms of sustained economic growth and reduced poverty levels (Kjaer and Joughin, 2010). The authors note that, in spite of this sustained growth recent analyses point to the fact that there has been no real structural transformation of the economy in terms of a genuine change from predominantly subsistence to an economy with a commercial agricultural sector and increasing manufacture. For the last 2 decades, the economic growth in Uganda generally has been robust averaging 7% per annum over the period (World Bank, 2010). According to MoFPED (2010) report, the share of people living in households below the poverty line dropped from 56% in 1992/93 to 31% in 2005/2006, income inequality as measured by the Gini Coefficient increased from 0.365 in 1992/93 to 0.428 in 2005/2006.

Though Uganda has gained sustained growth over the years, Joughin and Kjaer (2010) noted that this growth has not shown real impacts in as far as changing the mainly subsistence agricultural economy to commercial agriculture. Though there has been some growth, there are still structural constraints that government development policies so far have not been adequately addressed and these constraints include unequal access to land, long marketing chains and high transaction costs due to among other things, poor rural infrastructure (Joughin and Kjaer, 2010). The other challenge facing Uganda is that it has a highly dependent population i.e. more than half the population is under the age of 15 whereas the life expectancy of working individuals is 50.4 years. While Uganda has substantial natural resources, 35% of the population lives below the poverty line and the country is dependent on foreign aid, with net official direct assistance (ODA) of \$ 54.6 per capita (IMF, 2010). However when you consider the regional levels, the indicators for Northern Uganda are even considerably worse i.e. 35% poverty levels at national levels and 41.7% for Northern

Uganda. Empirical research shows that this poor performance of the Northern region compared to other regions is due to the negative impacts of the LRA war conflict (UNDP, 2005).

Land is the most important asset in Uganda where the majority of the population is deriving a large part of their income directly from working the land (ZevenBergen et al., 2012). This holds even more for Northern Uganda which after prolonged conflict of over 20 years is just now currently returning to normality. It should be noted that land related conflicts and perception of tenure security determine whether investments in improving production and productivity take place (Zevenbergen et al., 2012). It is important to note that agriculture has for a longtime been the core sector of the Uganda's economy providing the basis for growth in other sectors and significantly contributing to GDP for ensuring food security.

Agriculture contributes up to nearly 20% of GDP, accounts for 48% of exports and provides a large proportion of the raw materials for industry. According to the MAAIF (2013) report, food processing alone accounts for 40% of the total manufacturing. MAAIF (2013) indicated that the country's efforts to reduce poverty depend on agriculture because it employs 73% of the population and it is dominated by the subsistence smallholder farmers who depend on agriculture for food security and income. However evidence indicates that the food security situation in Uganda is not that good. According to the World Food Programme report of 2006 , about 45% of the population in Uganda is potentially food insecure throughout the year, 26% highly vulnerable and 15% moderately vulnerable with variations both geographically and amongst livelihood groups. For example real growth rate in agricultural output declined from 7.9 % in 2000/01 to 1.3 percent in 2012/13 financial years ((MAAIF, 2010a ; MFPED, 2014a). Regions in Uganda that are affected with food insecurity, it is mainly as a result of disruption of farming by war conflict in Northern Uganda and bad climatic conditions for instance inadequate rainfall like in the Karamoja sub-region. The Northern Region of Uganda has good rainfall and fertile soils but the food security situation is not good because of the negative impacts of the war (Birner et al., 2011).




Figure 4.1: Map of Uganda showing the Northern sub-regions

Recent research indicates that some successes have been achieved, but food insecurity gaps still exist especially in conflict affected areas with implications for more concerted investments in a multiplicity of community assets to achieve better results (Sseguya, 2009; Sseguya et al., 2013). In terms of advisory services, demand for extension services in Uganda is still low, despite 71% and 43.2% of farmers demanding for extension services in crop and animal husbandry respectively, only 17% of crop and 21% were served by the extension services (ZevenBergen et al., 2012). It should however be noted that economic growth and

poverty reduction have also been uneven throughout the country especially in areas affected by protracted conflict and insecurity notably the Northern region of Uganda (Levine, 2009 ; UBOS, 2010 & Jones, 2009). This situation is true particularly for those people living in the Northern parts of Uganda where poverty levels remain double those experienced elsewhere in the country (Nandy, 2008). Even with peace returning to the Northern parts of Uganda over the past few years, living conditions in the North compare unfavorably with those in most other parts of the country and this is well recognized by independent researchers and the government alike (Nandy, 2008).

4.1.1 Agricultural extension reform in Uganda over the years

The agricultural extension system in Uganda has undergone a lot of changes since the beginning of the century, for example between 1920-1956 most of the extension services were provided by chiefs, for example it was the chiefs who had responsibility to visit the homesteads to offer extension advise. Between the years of 1956 to 1963 agricultural advisory services were provided by progressive farmers. Progressive farmers were those farmers who had been trained in the area of crop and animal production and were willing to share this knowledge with other farmers. From 1964 to 1972, extension work was carried out by trained personnel who were deployed at sub-counties. However between 1972 and 1980 extension services collapsed because of the political turmoil in the country.

In addition, significant agricultural extension reforms took place in the 1990s (Lukwago, 2010). In 1990, a program funded by the World Bank to improve extension services in the country was set up. After the study, it recommended the merging of agriculture related sections into MAAIF (Lukwago, 2010). Here the major challenge was however that the extension services were still centralized. It should be noted that when decentralization came into force in 1995, extension services were decentralized alongside other services. This strategy emphasized farmer to farmer extension than before and here the challenges faced were that the districts were poorly staffed and poorly funded to effectively handle this huge program.

At the beginning of year 2000 the NAADS program was launched as a result of the failure of the existing top down agricultural extension system which was accused of not being able to effectively offer extension services to the farmers at the grassroot levels. Under the NAADS program the government increased funding to the agriculture sector to around 6% of GDP in 2002 to kick start NAADS activities (Bukonya, 2010). A case in point is that at least half of

the 4.5% of the annual budget for agriculture goes to NAADS and extension services. One of the major objectives of the NAADS program was bringing extension services nearer to the farmers. Here the NAADS programme adopted a farmer centered extension approach with model farmers selected from among the community. NAADS was aimed at overcoming institutional constraints that were perceived to be undermining farmers' access to quality knowledge and productivity enhancing technologies. The main aim was transformation of public delivery system of agricultural extension services into largely private sector led delivery system under a client or farmer controlled arrangement (Bukonya, 2010). The first phase of NAADS financial year 2001/2002 to 2007/2008 cost US dollars 108 million with 80% of this from donors and the 20% from government and the farmers. The second phase from 2010/11 financial year was to cost 120 billion Uganda shillings with 77% of this figure from the government and 23% from donors.

4.1.2 The Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA)

In order to address the problems of poverty and food insecurity in Uganda, the GoU laid out a Master Plan through the PEAP whose main objective was the transformation of Ugandan agriculture from the mainly subsistence production to commercial farming (MAAIF & MFPED, 2000). The PMA was started in the year 2000 and it is also one of the main pillars of the PEAP with the aim of increasing the ability of the poor to improve their incomes and to promote rapid and sustainable development. The vision of the PMA is to increase the incomes of the poor and at the same reduce poverty through promotion of profitable and sustainable production and the promotion/growth of the agro-industrial sector in the country (Kidd, 2001 , Bahiigwa et al., 2005). The mission of the PMA is to transform the subsistence agriculture to commercial agriculture. The PMA is implemented through the local government decentralized structures in both the technical and political framework of Uganda i.e. it is the responsibility of the districts and the sub-counties at the lower levels to implement the PMA (Kidd, 2001 , Bahiigwa et al., 2005). In the PMA agricultural advisory services have been prioritized and advisory services are mainly implemented through the highly funded NAADS program (MAAIF & MFPED, 2000).

According to MAAIF and MFPED (2000) the PMA notes that transforming the country's subsistence agriculture requires addressing two types of constraints, namely production related and governance related constraints. The productivity related constraints range from lack of sufficient food, lack of land, soil infertility, insecure land tenure rights, lack of agricultural skills and knowledge, limited access to technical advice, low use of improved

inputs, lack of capital and access to credit, poor roads, poor transport networks and poor marketing infrastructure. It is recognized by the government and various stakeholders that due to conflict, insecurity and under development, the poverty targets for the rest of the country are not at the moment realistic for Northern Uganda and that's why in addition to the PEAP and PMA, Northern Uganda also has adopted the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP). However it should be noted that the PRDP is not a separate project but it is a coordination framework for all programs and projects in the North setting out certain objectives and targets for Northern Uganda (OPM, 2011).

4.1.3 The Northern region of Uganda

The people of Northern Uganda and their economic activities

Northern Uganda refers to the sub-regions of Acholi, Lango, and Teso and to some degree West Nile. However the Acholi sub-region of Northern Uganda was the worst affected by the over two decades of the LRA insurgency. The Acholi and other ethnic groups of Northern Uganda are organized in Chiefdoms and clans and oriented towards patrilineal descent. A chief called Rwot heads each Chiefdom.

who have responsibility to allocate land. Men control the land but women also have some user rights. A woman has rights to use the parent's land prior to marriage and her husband's land after marriage. Cross border trade between Northern Uganda and South Sudan is increasing and as trade has increased so too has the number of banks and businesses expanding in Northern Uganda in addition private sector investment is also increasing in the entire North (Carrington, 2009 ; International Alert, 2008).

The Northern Uganda region's socio-economic indicators

The Northern region of Uganda is home of about 20% of the total population of the country with an average household size of 5.2 persons. The population in the region comprises of high proportion of inactive working age population (UBOS, 2006a). The 2002 Census indicates that the population of Northern Uganda is youthful and becoming even younger overtime. Children less than 18 years constituted 49% while the elderly, more than 60 + years of age are made up 4%. The majority of the population in Northern Uganda is now young with little memory of living outside of the IDP camps and many live in households headed by females (SLC, 2014).

The Northern region of Uganda records the worst figures across all dimensions of poverty compared to other regions in the country. Conflict affected Northern Uganda has benefitted little from Uganda's development initiatives and the region has benefitted little from Uganda's impressive rates of both economic growth and poverty reduction over the past 2 decades. Research findings by Robinson (2005) show that there are also significant variations in poverty levels, social indicators and economic conditions in the Northern region with those districts bordering Southern Sudan and Congo with more insecurity worse off i.e. with poor infrastructure and with more governance challenges at local government levels such as, limited capacity, very low revenue base and restricted levels of service provision. However government recognizes that the human security situation has been a key factor here. The conflict between the LRA and the Uganda army for the last 2 decades has been a major factor in determining the level and character of deprivation in Northern Uganda. Annan et al. (2007) estimated that in the heavily affected sub-region of Acholi, the LRA abducted 1/3 of male adolescents and 1/6 of female adolescents.

Even with the onset of peace in Northern Uganda over the past few years, living conditions in this war ravaged Northern region compare unfavorably with those in most other parts of the country as evidenced by a number of studies (Nandy, 2008 ; UBOS, 2010). Seven and half million Ugandans still live in absolute poverty and poverty rates in the North (at over 50%) of

the population are double those in the rest of Uganda (Smith, 2012). The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) which seeks to measure acute poverty and complements income based poverty measures by measuring indicators for health, education and living standards to investigate the multiple deprivations people face at the same time, the Northern Uganda MPI is at a staggering 87% is higher (i.e. greater prevalence of acute poverty) than any other region in the country (Smith, 2012).

For example at 66% Poverty levels in Northern Uganda remain double those experienced elsewhere in the country (UBOS, 2005/2006). The National Household Survey (NHS) of the year 2005/2006 reveals that despite a small reduction in poverty, the Northern Uganda region has the largest portion of people living in poverty estimated at 66 percent almost twice the national poverty level of 31 percent. Examining regional poverty rates, Eastern and Northern Uganda have the highest reduction in poverty rates of 21.7 and 16.8 percentage points respectively compared to an 11.1 % decline in Western Uganda (UBOS, 2010). According to UBOS (2010), overall more people in Northern Uganda live below the poverty line (64.8 %) followed by Eastern region at 38.4 %, Central Uganda has 19.6% while Western has 19.3 % poor people. In addition Northern Uganda had the lowest score of any region on the Human Development Index with a rating of 0.418 for the year 2003 and 0.499 for the year 2006 compared to the Central region with 0.547 and 0.637 for Western region respectively (UNDP, 2007). And again, the North had the highest Human Poverty Index (HPI) of 30.7% as compared with the Central, Western and Eastern regions' percentages of 20.19, 20.56 and 27.11 respectively (UNDP, 2007). Furthermore, while the annual income per capita is estimated at 570,000 Uganda Shillings the figure for the Northern region stands at a paltry 153,000 Shillings which is about 27% of the national average (UNDP, 2007).

The abductions by the LRA rebels during the war and the conditions in the IDP camps made it difficult for the children and the youth to attend school and get life skills. For instance the literacy rate in Northern Uganda is about 54% which is lower than the national average of 68% (UBOS, 2006a). Current primary education graduation rates in Northern Uganda are at 47% and access to secondary school in Northern Uganda remains extremely low only 15% of villages in the North (SLRC, 2014). Annan et al. (2011) describes the tremendous cost of lost education and other livelihood opportunities owing to conflict and displacement as perhaps the single largest impact of the war in the North. Households with a household head that only had some primary schooling (53.5 % of sample) whether female or male headed, were significantly more likely to have less food security and those households with a household head with O-level or above had greater wealth, the higher the level of education, the better

off the household (SLRC, 2014). Livelihoods analyses indicate that the vast majority of households do not have the education level or primary livelihood occupation that will pull them out of the lowest levels of society, improve their wealth and assets and improve their food security (SLRC, 2014).

The infant mortality rate is 20% higher than the national average (UBOS, 2006b). While Uganda's national infant mortality rate stands at 76 per 1000 live births, the average rate for the North is a hefty 106 per 1000 live births (UBOS, 2003). The residents of IDP camps suffered from malnutrition, high mortality rates, low life expectancies, high primary school dropout rates, and early pregnancies and marriages (SLRC, 2014). According to the WHO 2005 report on IDPs in Northern Uganda, mortality rates in Northern Uganda were the highest of any emergency situation in the World at that time standing at 1.54 per 10,000 people per day and 3.18 per 10,000 children under the age of five. ACTED (2010) noted that the agricultural sector in Northern Uganda is currently underdeveloped compared to other regions of Uganda, with an annual growth rate of only 1.9 % compared to 6-10% annual growth rates in other regions of the country (e.g. Western, Southern and Central) resulting into challenges of household food insecurity and poverty.

In terms of technical capacity in the local governments, conditions are also not good, for instance the local administration staffing gap in the Acholi sub-region is at 63.2 % with a wage bill gap of 54.4% and the creation of a number of new districts in 2006 only added to the severe challenges faced (International Alert, 2008).

Impacts of the LRA war conflict on the people of Northern Uganda

World Bank (2011) noted that the violent conflicts have been a pervasive feature of the recent global landscape especially in countries and regions that are poor and have weak institutions and low levels of human development. Evidence shows that once wars begin, they lead to further increases in poverty (World Bank, 2011 ; Buvinic et al., 2012). Wars destroy physical and human capital, disrupt service delivery, divert public expenditures to the military, disrupt the efficient functioning of markets and lead to lack of savings, capital flight and the departure of skilled workers from the conflict affected areas, reduction of both social and human capital and reduction in household income and consumption (OECD, 2008 ; Collier, 2007 ; Buvinic et al., 2012; World Bank, 2011; Blattman, 2009 ; DANIDA, 2005; OHCHR, 2007; OHCHR & UHRC, 2011)).

The above picture is not different from the war affected Northern Uganda. It is evident from numerous empirical studies that the long running conflict in Northern Uganda has led to major violations of rights against civilians, destruction of the physical and social infrastructure and has severely paralyzed economic activity in the region. Poverty, subsistence agriculture, loss of social capital, political/elite capture, corruption, land disputes, hostility against government by the populace and market failure have been reported in various empirical studies as serious challenges affecting people in the post-conflict Northern Uganda (Robinson, 2005; Claussen et al., 2008 ; International Alert, 2010 ; Martin, 2010; Hickey, 2003). In Northern Uganda mass displacement destroyed the social fabric of the family and community and war led also to displacement from family and social networks (Baines & Gauvin, 2014). For instance, before the war, the Acholi Clan system for managing land and other natural resources was inclusive and its traditional institutions, customs and social conventions ensured access to and use of land for the whole clan including women and girls. But after the war these institutions were weakened and are currently not working effectively (Baines & Gauvin, 2014).

The loss of income and productive assets by over 80% of the households during the war also complicated efforts to restore livelihoods (Pham et al., 2007; Bozzoli & Muhumuza, 2011). This situation has also been highlighted by other studies for example the Northern Uganda Livelihoods study (NLS) and UNDP (2007), Northern Uganda Internally Displaced Persons' Profiling Study (NUIPS) (2005) and the Lira District Early Recovery Needs Assessment (LDERNA) (2006). These studies found that the internally displaced population in Northern Uganda has very few resources and livelihood options. While the proportion of the population living in poverty in the South and West is now roughly 27%, the percentage in the North is 63% while in the East it is 46% and other indicators of wellbeing show a similar disparity (OPM, 2007).

The conflict in Northern Uganda has severely affected the region's economic productivity. In some of the affected districts, more than 90% of the population were displaced and have not been able to engage in meaningful economic and agricultural activities for several years (UNDP, 2007). Because of the war conflict, a population that previously provided the rest of Uganda with basic foodstuffs and which was it self-reliant became dependent on food aid (Birner et al. 2011 ; Tusiime et al., 2013).

Birner et al. (2011) and Tusiime et al. (2013)observed a number of limitations to increased agriculture production and household income made worse by the war and these included lack

of capital, skills and degradation of the environment especially charcoal burning. In addition, in Northern Uganda alternative livelihood options to agricultural production are still limited i.e. people have limited access to capital, knowledge, technologies, other farm inputs and linkages to the private sector are insufficient compared to other regions of Uganda that have not been affected by the war conflict.

Death and destruction due to conflict altered the structure and dynamics of households including their demographic profiles and traditional gender roles. For instance in Northern Uganda the conflict created households mainly headed by widows who can especially be vulnerable to intergenerational poverty (Buvinic et al. 2012 ; NULS, 2007; Bozzoli et al., 2011; Hertz et al., 2007). The Northern Uganda Livelihoods Study-NULS (2007) revealed that 23% of the households heads are female headed and moreover that 18% of women between the ages of 30-49 are widows which is double the rate in the rest of Uganda.

The abductions of civilians by the LRA rebels during the war made it difficult for the children and the youth to attend school to get life skills and this led to loss of chances for them to get productive employment and hence loss of productive labor in the region. Evidence indicates that the majority of the current youth population in Acholi sub-region were born in IDP camps and had no access to quality healthcare, education, skills and social development. In the IDP camps, the communities depended on handouts and this strengthened the dependency syndrome and therefore they do not want to engage in labor intensive activities like agricultural production. With the destruction of schools, looting of supplies and shortage of teachers, education in Northern Uganda has been severely affected by conflict hence limited access to quality education denied their basic human right and restricted their future involvement in mainstream economic and social life and also compromised the overall development prospects of the region and country at large (Nannyonjo, 2005).

In conclusion, it should be noted that in Northern Uganda as anywhere else, the conditions of life do not affect every one equally. There may be a shared vulnerability among the population in Northern Uganda, but some are more vulnerable than others and policy makers need to be aware of these hierarchies of vulnerabilities i.e. the women, youths, widows etc. are more vulnerable (Zevenbergen et al., 2012).

4.1.4 Agricultural livelihoods reconstruction in Northern Uganda

High levels of displacement and restrictions on mobility caused by war and insecurity have caused major disruption to peoples' agricultural livelihoods in northern Uganda and in turn this has affected farming systems and reduced agricultural production in the area which is the main source of food security and income (UNDP, 2007). In Northern Uganda, which is agriculture and agrarian skills based economy production is closely tied to productive agriculture assets and the ability of individuals to use them well. Physical capital such as farming tools and storage facilities in addition to availability of land are very important for an agriculture based society (UNDP, 2007). The withdrawal of the LRA in Northern Uganda has improved security significantly and enabled the return of over a million people to their homes and helped spur the rebuilding of lives and livelihoods (SLRC, 2014). Supporting livelihoods is key when building resilience to the threat of renewed violent conflict.

As peace continues to return to Northern Uganda and as people return to their villages, so availability of food to the returnees will be a critical factor for the regional and national stability. Before the war conflict Northern Uganda was a blossoming region with high levels of agriculture production, booming education sector, thriving tourism and was destined to be a very important market hinterland for the neighboring Sudan, DR Congo, however due to the negative impacts of the war the once thriving economy of Northern Uganda came to a near halt and stand still as agricultural production was curtailed (Birner et al., 2011 ; SLRC, 2014).

Early recovery seeks to support the economic and social reintegration of IDPs to restart productive lives, rebuild their livelihoods so that they can also become stakeholders in peace. Livelihoods therefore take a central place in development and peace making. At the time of the field survey and writing this thesis, the conditions in Northern Uganda are far better than they have been for the many years. Since the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement on the 26th August 2006, peace has prevailed in Northern Uganda and this has clearly improved the humanitarian situation. There are a number of initiatives/interventions to improve livelihoods in the Northern region and these include;

Examples 1: NGO/CBO led interventions

One of the largest interventions to support post-conflict development in Northern Uganda was the UNDP –Transition to recovery program (TRP) which was aimed at strengthening crisis prevention and recovery through training and support for income generating projects,

building government capacity to handle internal displacement at the central and local government level and re-integration of ex-combatants in their communities (SLRC, 2014).

Other initiatives underway in Northern Uganda includes: increasing seed availability through seed fairs and seed multiplication programs, provision of in-kind grants for seeds, inputs and farm implements, vouchers for work programs where people are given opportunities to work on community projects and paid with vouchers which they exchange for agricultural inputs and implements, in-kind grants for oxen to support agricultural land use (opening of land) and farmer trainings. In Northern Uganda also efforts to re-stock livestock which was lost during the insurgency are being undertaken through grants of animals, vouchers for work programs, animal fairs, animal traction and training of community animal health workers. During the survey it was observed that some agencies are also promoting small scale businesses by supporting informal financial mechanisms such as Voluntary Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs), promoting micro-credit, training in income generating activities as well as cash grants for extremely vulnerable groups and compensation of the livestock lost and stole during the conflict which is being spearheaded by the Ministry of justice. Some SACCOS (cooperative financial schemes) are also being spearheaded by the microfinance support center. Examples of the key stakeholders involved in this recovery include, DANIDA, World Vision, FAO, WFP, CARE, Ox-farm etc.

Example 2: Government led livelihoods recovery interventions

Government recognizes the unique challenges facing the post conflict Northern region of Uganda and a number of several efforts have been undertaken to tackle problems of poverty, food insecurity and conflict. The current National Development Plan (NDP) 2010/11-2010/45 explicitly recognizes the need to integrate Northern Uganda into mainstream development of the country. A series of big agricultural recovery programs are being run e.g. NAADS, NUSAF and ALREP.

It should be noted that both NUSAF and ALREP are tailor made programs for conflict affected regions, whereas NAADS covers the whole country. The Agricultural Livelihoods Rehabilitation Program (ALREP) is the continuation of the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Program (NUREP) which was supporting livelihoods in the LRA affected regions under the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) with support of the European Union (EU). ALREP for example includes provision of improved tools and equipment for opening land to increase yields, promote efficiency in farming and training and transfer of agricultural practices to increase production.

However a recent study by SLRC in 2012 in Northern Uganda noted that for many of these programs i.e. NAADS and NUSAF, the targeting emphasis is moving from vulnerable populations towards “viable” groups, for NAADS they are termed as the “Active Poor”- The “Active” poor are those individuals who have the production assets and can even take advantage of the opportunities to produce a surplus for the market. The challenge with this approach is that it leaves behind many people who, for one reason or another are unable to take advantage of these opportunities (SLRC, 2014). Another challenge is that these livelihoods programs are run and targeted with a lack of understanding of the effects of serious crimes, violations suffered and conflict induced trauma (SLRC, 2014). Another challenge which has not been given serious attention is the inability of the populations and especially young men to engage in agricultural livelihood recovery partly as a result of “relief dependency” leading to male idleness. The SLRC 2014 report concludes that, while there are many livelihoods interventions in Northern Uganda few have been the subject of rigorous impact assessment.

4.2 The NAADS program

4.2.1 NAADS within a broader policy context

NAADS is a 25 year program with a mission to increase farmer access to information ,knowledge and technology through effective, efficient, sustainable and decentralized extension with increasing the private sector involvement in line with Government policy in particular decentralization, privatization of service delivery, participation and gender mainstreaming in governance and development interventions (NAADS, 2000). The NAADS program started in 2001 with a few trailblazing sub-counties and by 2009 the program had reached national coverage.

In order to address the persistent poverty the Government of Uganda initiated a Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1995 as a component of the country’s comprehensive development framework (World Bank, 2002). In the PEAP of the year 2000 the PMA is formulated to provide guidelines for the transformation of agriculture.

The PMA proposes that modernizing agriculture will contribute to increasing the incomes of the poor by raising farm productivity increasing the share of agricultural production marketed, creating opportunities for employment (both farm and off-farm) while at the same time lowering food prices (Kidd, 2001 ; Bukenya 2010 ; Bahigwa et al., 2005). The NAADS is one of the strongest pillars of the PMA. According to MAAIF and MFPED (2000) the

PMA notes that transforming the country's subsistence agriculture requires addressing two types of constraints, namely production related and governance related constraints. The productivity related constraints range from lack of sufficient food, lack of land, soil infertility, insecure land tenure rights, lack of agricultural skills and knowledge, limited access to technical advice, low use of improved inputs, lack of capital and access to credit, poor roads, poor transport networks and poor marketing infrastructure. The governance constraints that NAADS is to address include insecurity of persons and property, corruption, lack of accountability, inefficient beneficiary targeting and transparency, poor delivery of basic public services, weak local leadership and lack of a voice among the majority of the rural poor farmers. It should be noted that the second pillar of the PEAP that is good governance and security are important pre-conditions for agricultural modernization (MAAIF, 2000).

The PMA interventions of which NAADS is a major component, are anchored in the Uganda Government's policies of decentralization, liberalization, privatization, empowerment of people in decision making for development process and increasing public sector coordination and accountability (MAAIF & MFPED, 2000; MAAIF, 2000). The NAADS program is one of the major pillars for the PMA to address the agricultural advisory services. All these are in line with the National Agriculture Policy and the over-arching National Development Plan. Agricultural extension services have been mentioned in the five year National Development Plan (NDP) 2010/11 – 2014/2015 as well as in the Development Strategy and Investment Plan (DSIP) 2010/11 -2014/15 financial years as among the interventions needed for agricultural development and transformation. NDP and DSIP specifically mention NAADS among the key institutions to undertake actions as necessary for enhancing agricultural production and productivity.

Additionally, the program of NAADS was specifically initiated because of the perceived failure by its predecessor, the Agricultural Extension Program (AEP) which critics say that it had a supply driven top-down character. The Mid-term evaluation report (MAAIF, 1998a) and the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) of AEP indicated that the AEP followed a highly mechanistic approach of the Training and Visit system (T&V) and seemed to ignore the importance of empowering farmers and to create a sense of ownership of the program among the beneficiaries.

The failure of previous interventions has been attributed to shortcomings and or constraints in the earlier extension approach, such as weak research-extension farmer linkages, externally

driven, uncoordinated and non-participatory service provision, high levels of bureaucracy in service provision, low responsiveness to farmers' needs and lack of financial and performance accountability. NAADS was set up as a new approach to address the identified institutional constraints undermining farmers access to knowledge and productivity enhancing technologies and to incorporate best practice features to make extension deliver more efficiently and effectively (MAAIF , 2000 ; NAADS, 2001). NAADS was designed in accordance with the overall government policies of agricultural modernization, poverty, eradication, decentralization, liberalization, privatization, empowerment of people in decision making for development process and increasing public sector coordination and accountability (MAAIF , 2000 ; Nahdy, 2004). The fundamental aim of the NAADS program is to develop a demand driven, client oriented and farmer led agricultural service delivery system particularly targeting the poor and women (MAAIF, 2000; NAADS, 2001)

Nahdy (2004) noted that client oriented extension and governance mechanisms are seen as a possible means to address the power relations that generate poverty and hence the decentralized service delivery approach adopted by NAADS. The main task of NAADS is providing advisory services that respond to farmer needs and accountable to the target farmers through the local contracting of private sector service providers (Garforth et al., 2003). Bahiigwa et al. (2005) noted that NAADS implies a two way exchange between the farmer and the service provider and hence the change of the name from agricultural extension program to Agricultural Advisory Services in reference to NAADS. NAADS is supposed to contribute to poverty eradication vision of the PMA by specifically addressing one of the underlying factors of poverty in Uganda, which is poor access to agricultural information, knowledge and technology (MAAIF, 2000).

4.2.2 NAADS structure and functioning

NAADS is a semi-autonomous public agency within MAAIF created by the Act of Parliament in 2001. The NAADS program is implemented under the decentralized local government system (see table 4.2 and Appendix 3). At the National level, MAAIF has the national oversight of NAADS. NAADS has a Board of Directors which is charged with coordination and guiding program policy and strategy. The NAADS secretariat is responsible for the day to day management of NAADS business providing policy guidance and operational support to the lower levels. At the operational level, the program administrative and coordination functions and structures are integrated into the local government system in accordance with the decentralization system of local government and

service delivery in Uganda (see appendix 3). The respective local government councils at the district and sub-county level i.e. LC5 and LC 3 respectively have the political oversight and responsibility for the NAADS program (MAAIF, 2000 ; Nahdy, 2004).

Public finance in NAADS is used to contract privately delivered advisory services while there is a share of public financing of farm advisory costs and farmers' cash and labor contributions. In order to benefit from NAADS services, farmer groups are required to make matching grant contributions of 2% of the total NAADS budget and local governments 5% towards the total NAADS budget. Here contributing to the cost of services is popularly referred to as co-funding and this aims at stimulating farmer and local ownership of the NAADS program. From the technical and administrative point of view the overall responsibility for program management and coordination in the district falls under the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and Sub-county Administrative Officer (SAO). The day to day NAADS program coordination and management is the responsibility of the District NAADS Coordinator (DNC) at the district level and at the sub-county level the sub-county NAADS Coordinator (SNC) (Nahdy, 2004). The farmer forum which represent farmer groups at the sub-county, district and national levels hold the most power as stipulated in the NAADS Act. The farmer's forum is supposed to elect a chairperson and two committees, namely the Executive Committee (EC) and the Procurement Committee (PC). The sub-county is the local government where most of the NAADS activities take place. The NAADS annual work plans and budgets are approved by the sub-county council.

In targeting, NAADS is to benefit the economically "Active Poor" i.e. poor farmers who have some limited assets, skills and knowledge to create a livelihood and this is the category of farmers generally described as subsistence farmers and these constitute the majority of country's largely rural based farmers.


<p>National Average Poverty Level-31%</p>	<p>Economically Active Farmers Nucleus Farmers Lead Farmers Model Farmers Demonstration Farmers</p>	<p>Economically Active Farmers</p>
<p>Northern Uganda Average Poverty Level-61% Commercial Farmers</p>	<p>↑ ← Graduation Process to Being</p>	<p>IDPs in Camps Widows Widowers Orphans PLWAs Ex-combatants Former abductees Female headed Households Unskilled and Unemployed Youth Elderly Labor surplus poor Child headed households Persons with disability Landmine victims</p> <p>Not Economically Active Farmers</p>

Table 4.1: Comparison of beneficiary targeting in NAADS and NUSAF programs
Source: Adopted from NUSAF operational guidelines.

Level	Personell/Institution	Roles/Responsibilities
National	Board of Directors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy setting and guidelines.
	NAADS Secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical guidance. • Programme coordination and supervision.
District	NAADS Coordinator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical guidance. • Program coordination and supervision in the district.
	District Farmer Forum (FF) (Composed of chairpersons of the Sub-county farmer forum, secretary for production LC V, District NAADS Coordinator)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision making on all NAADS matters in the district.
Subcounty (LC III)	NAADS Coordinator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compiles the subcounty NAADS budget. • Gives technical guidance to the procurement committee in the choice of service providers. • Supervises, monitors and evaluates service providers. • Collection of farmer contributions for NAADS activities. • Countersigns sub-county chief and sub-accountant on NAADS bank account.
	Subcounty Farmer forum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Takes decisions on behalf of the subcounty farmers. • Selects the subcounty NAADS enterprises.
	Contracts Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approves the short list for service providers.
Parish (LC II)	Parish Development Committees (PDCs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Help farmers to identify their enterprise priorities.
Village (LC I)	Farmer Groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participate in priority identification and group enterprises.

Table 4.2: Summary of the structure of NAADS and actor responsibilities

Source: Adapted from (DENIVA, 2005)



Source: NAADS implementation manual 2001.

Figure 4.3: NAADS organogram

4.2.3 Provisions in NAADS design to address the governance challenges

In its implementation manual of 2001, NAADS program has included innovative design features that aim at overcoming the anticipated implementation challenges. There have been constant efforts to adjust the implementation procedures to resolve the challenges, evidenced by the numerous changes in the NAADS implementation guidelines over the years.

Program design features to overcome the governance challenges include:

- NAADS is implemented in a decentralized manner which includes accountability and monitoring mechanisms, that is oversight and social accountability mechanism through committees and Barazas. The social accountability committees are responsible to assure value for money of the services, technologies and inputs. The Barazas are public fora where the residents discuss the issues concerning programme implementation. In NAADS a Baraza is a one day forum chaired by the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) who is a representative of the President in the area. NAADS also participates in Citizens Manifestos which is a community dialogue to discuss the programme implementation. The citizens manifesto is a community accountability tool.
- Monitoring of the programs through the District Internal Security Officers (DISOs) and Sub-county Security Officers (GISOs). These are intelligence security organizations that represent the President's office to ensure effective implementation of the NAADS program.
- NAADS implementation guidelines seek to set up an efficient monitoring and management information system (MIS) to ensure transparency and accountability.
- NAADS launched the NAADS Governance and Anti-corruption Strategy and is working with the Inspector General of Government (IGG), Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of parliament and the Directorate of Public Prosecution (DPP) to deal with corrupt officials. To fight corruption and abuse of the NAADS programme, new NAADS guidelines recommended setting up a 24 hour toll free telephone call center at the NAADS secretariat for the stakeholders to report any incidences of corrupt practices in the NAADS program.
- In order to promote good governance and social accountability NAADS guidelines recommend the formation of the Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation System (CBMES). The aim here is to contribute to government accountability by fostering active participation of the citizens and enhance access of poor communities

to NAADS services. The CBMES enhances the capacity of the citizens to hold government accountable for the NAADS services offered. NAADS Secretariat has introduced the rewards and sanctions strategy that is meant to reward good performing districts while taking sanctions on those performing badly. This rewards and sanctions will be instituted at the various levels of project implementation. Rewards will include for instance; issuing of certificates of recognition for good performance and recognizing good performance on public media e.g. On TV, FM radios, News Papers etc.

- In order to aggressively address the misuse of NAADS funds that has plagued the programme and hampered its success, the NAADS program has set up a complaints handling system, under the Agricultural Technology and Agri-business Advisory services project (ATAAS) to handle all the complaints regarding the implementation of NAADS.
- In order to fight the misuse of NAADS funds, the President of Uganda himself has set up a NAADS monitoring team based at the State House and has appointed a special Presidential NAADS assistant to monitor the activities and report back directly to the president.

4.2.4 NAADS implementation in reality-insights from literature

Judged by NAADS mandates and evidence from numerous project evaluations of the program and empirical studies, NAADS can be said to have gone some way in improving access by farmers to knowledge on improved agricultural production and technologies (Bukenya, 2010 ; Ekwamu & Brown (2005); Nkonya et al., 2007 ; Benin et al., 2011; ITAD, 2008). Nonetheless, by and large empirical evidence shows that the program still faces a number of governance challenges and various authors argue that the failure to address these types of implementation problems (governance challenges) has the potential to derail the projects' objectives by inducing frustration among communities who have joined the farmer groups and identified appropriate projects/ enterprises but are unable to access funds and project services (Bukenya, 2010 ; Parkinson, 2009; Rwamigisa, 2013). It should be noted that, despite its shortcomings, NAADS is still a major channel for huge amounts of funds from the central government to reach the impoverished subsistence farmers in the rural areas of Uganda.

During the past decade of NAADS implementation there have been public concerns about the NAADS impact on the livelihood of the beneficiaries, its effectiveness in increasing output

and incomes of the beneficiaries and efficiency in its implementation has been indicated to still be wanting. Further more under NAADS, while farmers participate in local decision making processes through their groups and associations and have accessed increased knowledge on farming and practice enterprise diversification, this has not necessarily translated into substantial increases in agricultural productivity (Muwonge, 2007 ; Sseguya, 2009). Opendo (2005), in his studies of NAADS implementation in Kabale district in Western Uganda indicated that the farmers' representatives on the farmers' forum also engaged in illegal activities during the NAADS implementation and many became illegitimate in view of the farmers. For example allocating the technology trials on their own fields, being pre-occupied with demanding high sitting allowances for the voluntary NAADS activities and asking for kickbacks from contractors by promising them supply contracts.

In the NAADS performance evaluation, various studies described the program as successful and the researchers found clear positive impacts on adoption of improved technologies, productivity and per capita incomes (Bukenya, 2010 ; Nkonya et al., 2007 ; Benin et al., 2011). The findings showed that, between 2004 and 2007, NAADS was associated with an average of 42-53% greater increase in the per capita agricultural income of the program's direct participants compared to their non-participant counterparts. The results also showed that significantly larger proportions of NAADS participants than non-participants perceived their standard of living had improved compared to what it was in 2000. In addition basing on differences across the NAADS and non-NAADS sub-counties , it was noted that the NAADS program is having substantial positive impacts on the availability and quality of advisory services provided to farmers, promoting adoption of new crop and livestock enterprises as well as improving adoption and use of modern agricultural production technologies and practices (Benin et al., 2007).

Issues of corruption and other financial irregularities in the implementation of the NAADS program are a common place in the media in Uganda and in numerous project audits and evaluations. For example the Auditor General's report of 2008 reveals that only 37.1 percent of the total money spent on NAADS is considered as useful expenditure. NAADS has been criticized by different stakeholders as an elite franchise, with its fancy sign posts and demonstration gardens, they say that the program is riddled with corruption and political capture with its elite patrons who collude with service providers to steal money from the program's so called huge budget (Bukenya, 2010 ; Parkinson, 2009 ; Birner et al. 2011; Musemakweri, 2007; Rwamigisa, 2012). In early 2009 , a report by Uganda's Auditor General indicated that 63% of the money allocated to NAADS program activities was wasted

because the farmers disliked the classroom style training administered to them by the contracted private agricultural advisory services providers.

After more than 10 years of NAADS implementation many governance challenges persisted as evidenced by various studies on NAADS for example, Agona, 2005; Mutimba, 2007 ; Byekwaso, 2004; CEED, 2004; GoU, 2007; Mutimba et al., 2007 and other studies following quantitative approaches such as Benin et al. (2007) and qualitative approaches such as OPM (2005) and Scanagri (2005) have attempted to provide insights into the impact of the NAADS program. The researchers observed that weaknesses in NAADS implementation include: late disbursement of funds, very low counterpart funding by the local government and the farmers and poor monitoring and evaluation of the program. In addition NAADS program faces implementation weaknesses such as nepotism that affects the selection (targeting) of beneficiaries. In particular the study by Benin et al. (2007) shows that the high imputed cost of inputs provided by NAADS to farmers makes the intervention less cost effective. The authors found out that while NAADS had promoted the use of the improved production technologies and high yielding crop varieties, only a few farmers were using them and as a result there was no difference in yield growth between NAADS sub-counties and those without its assistance.

NAADS program faces implementation weaknesses such as nepotism that affects the selection of beneficiaries and nepotism too has affected enterprise selection process to the extent that some farmers are apathetic about the success or failure of NAADS program (Mutimba et al., 2007). Evidence shows that NAADS has been implementing a bureaucratic and top down system for a larger degree, for instance sending implementation guidelines and budgets from the secretariat to the sub-county levels, some of which are even complicated for both the beneficiaries and the implementers (ITAD, 2008).

Other authors noted that there are challenges of targeting in NAADS. For example Bahiigwa et al. (2005) noted that the categorization of the poor in projects was not clearly defined and this was also reflected even in the NAADS workplans of most sub-counties where the beneficiaries are simply stated as communities or just farmers but not even stating their poverty status. Bahiigwa et al. (2005) noted that the NAADS Master Document do not disaggregate far on poverty grounds because it only states that the largest group of farmers that is 80% are subsistence farmers.

The program has been suspended twice on the President of Uganda's orders and restructured to address some of the governance challenges. Evidence from previous program evaluations

by technocrats and politicians suggests that these challenges were rooted in the conceptual design and the legal framework that defined the structural arrangements for implementation of the program i.e. the arrangements set the NAADS program outside the technical control of MAAIF and excluded key institutional actors whose input was critical for the reform program to succeed (Bahigwa et al.,2005; Rwamigisa, 2010; Rwamigisa, 2013).

The NAADS program took other roles for example beyond its mandate for which management was not adequately prepared to assume. Key among the roles was input distribution that is largely a private sector function. This resulted into misrepresentation of NAADS roles that in a way caused institutional distortions, inefficiencies and governance related problems/challenges (Rwamigisa, 2010). Other issues associated with NAADS include its lack of ownership by the different key stakeholders. Kjær & Joughin (2012) noted that, key stakeholders notably politicians and officials in the MAAIF were shut out from the original program and this threatened its viability. The authors argue that although there was a long process of program formulation in which all stakeholders were heard, ownership of the programme was not as encompassing as it first appeared. In essence, the agricultural reform program represented market oriented values that were not echoed in large parts of the Ugandan polity (Kjaer et al., 2012).

Joughin et al. (2010) argued that the reversal of the NAADS program should be seen as a result of a mix of electoral and patronage politics, coupled with impatience to see results as well as the re-emergence of pro-interventionist ideological stance. The NAADS program was restructured in 2007 resulting in the introduction of Prosperity For All (PFA) because the original institutional design of NAADS had left out the elected officials (Joughin et al., 2010). But with the introduction of PFA, elected officials in local governments such as chairpersons of ruling party and representatives of internal security organs became part of the NAADS institutional arrangements at district and sub-county levels. Funding for the first phase of NAADS came to an end in 2008 and the design of the second phase started in the same year. The PMA secretariat was responsible for coordinating the PFA program while NAADS was responsible for implementation.

The NAADS 2 new program design proposed new institutional arrangements that included among others, linkages with the National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO), expanding the national secretariat, an integrated Monitoring and Evaluation system (M&E) with NARO and MAAIF, governance and anticorruption committee and establishing regional offices in line with the NARO zonal research institutes. The NAADS Secretariat human

resource structure was expanded to over 90 personnel to be able to accommodate the new challenges the NAADS program was slated to confront.

Kjaer and Joughin (2012) , noted that the political elite were dissatisfied with the limited range of clientelist opportunities NAADS programme offered and after the 2006 elections a new structure for the Prosperity For All (PFA) was established under the President's Office running in parallel with the secretariats of NAADS and PMA under MAAIF. In this change a number of officers from MAAIF were directed to undertake PFA work although not much of this is visible on the ground. Joughin et al. (2010) noted that the fact that this parallel structure of PFA exists, it means that the rules, procedures and ethos of public spirit built up in the civil service over some years are confused and undermined.

In November 2010 MAAIF instituted a probe committee to investigate the mismanagement of NAADS program. The committee established that in spite of the program being well financed, there were glaring governance challenges that had resulted into inefficiency, poor accountability and corruption particularly in the procurement of goods and services. The committee recommended that NAADS should reduce their involvement in procurement of inputs /technologies, MAAIF should assume its role to supervise, guide, monitor and evaluate NAADS and NAADS secretariat should set up better accountability, reporting systems and efficient management of public /private partnerships. The Probe Committee noted that the existing institutional arrangements are parallel and in conflict and thus complicating the delivery of extension services at local government level and therefore in this case technical supervision of NAADS by MAAIF and local governments is challenged by the legal framework. The Committee recommended the review of the NAADS Act 2001 with the aim of removing bottlenecks in the existing institutional arrangements and to set up structures with clear mandates to deliver agricultural extension services to majority of Ugandan small holder farmers who constitute about 90% of the farming community.

The lessons and experiences learnt from phase one of the implementation of the NAADS program from 2001 to 2007 through evaluations of the program formed the basis for the design of the successor NAADS phase two program that is currently being implemented under the Agricultural Technology and Agri-business advisory Services (ATAAS) project. The experiences of NAADS implementation in the first phase revealed that there were some gaps in the monitoring and evaluation framework (M&E) of NAADS at implementation level and therefore the NAADS phase two provided for the establishment of a strong participatory mechanism to address these gaps. ATAAS also emphasizes the need for the NAADS phase

two in planning and resource disbursement to specifically addressing issues of active participation of various stakeholders at all levels of program implementation with special emphasis of farmer participation through their farmer institutions, for instance the farmer fora and farmer groups.


4.3 The NUSAF program

4.3.1 NUSAF within a broader policy context

Besides developing a decentralized approach to tackling poverty, Government of Uganda (GoU) adopted the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) as its strategy for economic development and poverty reduction. NUSAF is consistent with the PEAP and it works to fulfill the objectives of the PEAP namely: rapid and sustainable economic growth and structural transformation, good governance and security, increased ability of the poor to raise their incomes and enhanced quality of life of the poor. With peace returning in Northern Uganda, the government has developed the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) to provide a framework for post-conflict reconstruction of Northern Uganda (OPM, 2007). The PRDP was created as a framework for bringing together different stakeholders and agents of change to discuss and forge a way forward for the development of the post-conflict areas of Uganda (OPM, 2007).

The PRDP is a commitment by the government to stabilize and recover Northern Uganda in the next three years through a set of coherent programs in one organized framework i.e. the PRDP is a three year framework that would direct all development activities in the region. NUSAF two program is part of the PRDP which gained full implementation in 2009. The PRDP is in line with PEAP, which has been transformed into the National Development Plan (NDP) which seeks to strengthen coordination, supervision and monitoring of all development programs in Northern Uganda to achieve better results. The overall goal of the PRDP is stabilization and economic development of the Northern region in order to regain and consolidate peace and lay the foundations for recovery and development in Northern Uganda. The PRDP was designed with four strategic objectives: consolidation of state authority, rebuilding and empowering communities, revitalization of the economy, peace building and reconciliation. Part of the PRDP is implemented through on budget support to “special projects” which are managed by the government for example NUSAF phase two which is funded by a loan from the World Bank and a grant from DFID , and KALIP/ALREP which is funded by the European Union.

To build on the achievements and drawing from lessons learnt in the implementation of the first phase of NUSAF (NUSAF 1), the Government of Uganda has designed the second Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF 2) to be implemented under the PRDP framework focusing mainly on the PRDP strategic objective of rebuilding and empowering communities. The NUSAF 2 is a Community Development, Demand Driven multi-sectoral project aligned with the Uganda Joint Assistance strategy (UJAS) and the National Development Plan (NDP). The vision of the NDP is “a transformed Ugandan society from a peasant to a modern and prosperous country within 30 years”. The NDP interventions aim at creating employment, raising per capita income levels distribution in line with sectoral GDP shares, raising country human development and gender equality indicators and improving the country’s competitiveness to levels associated with middle income countries (GoU, 2010) and also address the structural bottlenecks in the economy in order to accelerate socio-economic transformation for prosperity (NDP- GoU, 2010).



Abbreviations

- CAO** -Chief Administrative Officer at the District Level
- NUMU- DTO** -NUSAF Management Unit, District Technical Officer
- NUMU -ED**-NUSAF Management Unit, Executive Director
- PS/ OPM** – Permanent Secretary Office of the Prime Minister

Fig. 4.4 Policy and Technical Interfaces in NUSAF

4.3.2 The rationale for the NUSAF program

NUSAF is a project initiated by the government of Uganda and its development partners to target the Northern region after realizing that despite significant gains in reducing poverty recorded throughout Uganda, the North has continued to lag behind other areas in development and has indeed fallen further into poverty (see sections 4.1.2.2 and 4.1.2.3 for details). Welfare indices for Northern Uganda have not improved at the same pace as the rest of the country. For instance, income, poverty remains significantly high, literacy rates are low and access to basic services is poor (UNDP, 2007 ; Nandy 2008). It has been observed by previous studies that the prolonged conflict in the North for over 20 years is the most important factor explaining the poor living conditions of the communities in Northern Uganda and at the same time the major bottleneck to increasing growth in the region (Nanyonjo, 2007 ; UNDP 2007).

Jointly funded by the GoU and the World Bank, NUSAF seeks to close the development gap between the Northern region and the rest of the country through handing control of development processes and resources directly to local community groups. NUSAF was initiated in mid- 2002. The first phase of NUSAF was a considerable budget of \$ 133.5 million project funded by an IDA loan contribution of 100 million, together with a government commitment of 13.5 million and local contributions of \$20 million.

The project development objective of NUSAF is to improve access of beneficiary households in Northern Uganda to income earning opportunities and better socio-economic services and to increase assets available to local people particularly those negatively affected by the war conflict (NUSAF project operational manual, 2010). The overall objective of NUSAF in post-conflict Northern Uganda is to empower communities to enhance their capacity to systematically identify, prioritize and plan for their needs and implement sustainable development initiatives that improve socio-economic services and opportunities there by contributing to improved livelihoods by placing money in the hands of the local communities. In so doing, NUSAF will contribute to improved livelihoods by placing money and its management in the hands of the communities (World Bank, 2002a).

Given the fact that people in the Northern region depend on agriculture for their livelihoods, NUSAF provides agricultural training and inputs to increase agricultural production and food security. Through its community approach (Community Driven Development approach) ,

NUSAF mobilizes communities to undertake agricultural projects of their choice to improve their livelihoods. Examples of projects undertaken in NUSAF affiliated farmer groups include crop production, pig rearing and poultry production. NUSAF is targeting the most vulnerable groups in the North particularly IDP returnees, returned abductees, female headed households/widows, orphans, people with disabilities and people living with HIV/AIDS and former combatants. It was expected that improved livelihoods and economic security derived through sub-projects funded by NUSAF will offset the opportunity cost of giving up arms.

In addition NUSAF will provide livelihood opportunities to former combatants in the Northern Uganda post-conflict region. Community reconciliation and re-integration of former combatants component of NUSAF is aimed at bringing additional benefits in terms of improved respect for the human rights of people in the region by reducing the prevalence of conflict. NUSAF also has a component of post arrival assistance of IDPs on arrival in their villages and an estimated 70% of IDPs have been provided with return kits (containing food and household items) worth to each family Uganda shillings 627,000 to enable them settle in their return areas. Livelihood support will be provided on a needs basis as outlined in the community recovery program. And in addition the program has supported return IDP population through community farming groups with farming inputs e.g. seeds and hoes to help them to rejuvenate their farming livelihoods.

The specific objectives of this approach are to stimulate community action, leadership development and resource mobilization, strengthen ongoing reconciliation processes and enable communities to articulate and prioritize their needs and to manage processes and outcomes and improve governance (NUSAF Operational Manual, 2010). NUSAF is a transitory tool, a funding mechanism that allows communities that are left behind in the ongoing development efforts in the country to “catch up” with the rest of the country.

NUSAF was a response to perceived failure of the top-down approach of its immediate predecessor, the Northern Uganda Reconstruction Program (NURP 1) and an effort to emulate the perceived success of the more bottom up Community Action Program which was being implemented in the West Nile Region of Uganda (Robinson, 2005). NURP 1 was a large, top-down supply driven program that built physical infrastructure e.g. roads, schools, clinics and bore wells across the Northern region with very little community involvement and this project had little success in the eyes of the beneficiaries. While NURP 1 achieved many of its physical objectives, a large proportion of the investments were not sustainable, many

were of low quality and its contribution to institutional development was negligible (Robinson, 2005).

4.3.3 NUSAF structure and functioning

NUSAF is a Community Driven Development project (CDD project) and in this project the vulnerable groups are mobilized to join mainstream development processes based on community accountability and improved governance. It is assumed that, the process of overcoming underdevelopment through community action, leadership development and resource mobilization will strengthen the ongoing peace processes in the region.

In NUSAF participation of the beneficiary community should take place in all the phases of the project cycle i.e. from problem identification and definition, prioritization, intervention design, planning, implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation. Here, meaningful community participation is a backbone for effective decentralization, planning and implementation of demand-driven projects. Community participation will be a continuous process, which is from the community needs assessment study throughout implementation and management, there will be need to put in place a system that ensures this within the decentralization strategy. Under NUSAF operational guidelines the community is “need defined” that is the community refers to a voluntary group of persons that have common socio-economic needs and have agreed to work together in pursuit of solutions to these needs.

The implementation of NUSAF involves institutions at the center and local government levels (district and sub-county). The most important agency in the implementation of NUSAF at the center is the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) which also hosts the NUSAF Secretariat. The NUSAF Secretariat is mandated through the NUSAF national office to prepare annual reports on the implementation of the program and submit these reports to Parliament. The Permanent secretary (OPM) is responsible for the overall monitoring and supervision of the project, sector ministries, NGOs/CSOs and relevant government institutions and agencies will support OPM in the national level supervision, monitoring and evaluation. Meanwhile at the district level, overall technical supervision, monitoring and evaluation is the responsibility of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). He /she will be supported by the district technical team including the sub-county staff. The sub-county chief on the other hand will be responsible for monitoring and supervision of project activities in his or her sub-county with the support of the sub-county technical team.

At the community level, gender equity is taken on board by ensuring at least 30% female membership in the Community Project Management Committees (CPMCs). CPMCs comprise of individuals elected democratically from the community by their fellow community members to plan, implement and monitor the activity for the duration of the sub-project cycle, the premise here is that communities are best placed to identify their perceived needs (NUSAF Operational Manual, 2010). The sub-project cycle is the primary tool for managing interactions between communities and outside agencies including OPM, NGOs, and CBOs, CSOs, interfaith agencies, local governments and private sector.

The core of NUSAF implementation includes an elaborate sub-project approval process which calls for the full participation of the communities. Under the CDI and VGS components of NUSAF which aim to improve households' livelihoods, communities are encouraged to come together in groups, identify their community needs, prioritize those needs with the help of privately hired facilitators (individuals and local organizations). According to the guidelines, the communities are free to appoint facilitators using resources available from the project funds to help them in the proposal preparation process. NUSAF implementation guidelines recommend up to 2 % of the project budget to be paid to the community facilitators. Provisions recommend that these facilitators can be local educated youths, community members or membership organizations (NGOs/ CBOs).

After completion of the proposals, they are submitted to the sub-county Community Development Officer (CDO) who is the NUSAF technical person where they are approved and forwarded to the district through the district NUSAF technical officer (see appendix 7 for details on the sub-project cycle). The community facilitators are also supposed to assist those beneficiary groups putting into consideration the capacities of the sub-project groups, for example where the members could neither read nor write, they are given additional attention and assistance to help them come up with feasible proposals for funding.

NUSAF implementation guidelines require that District Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) are also invited to check the proposals from the district before approval to guarantee financial and technical feasibility and also to determine how the sub-projects complement district planning priorities and budgetary allocations. A sub-project appraisal report should clearly indicate the contribution to be provided by the community. The community should be willing to provide such contribution in a timely manner. The size of community contribution will be 5% for the vulnerable support component which is aimed at improving livelihoods. The

financing agreement to be signed with the community will specify the community contribution proportion.

The sub-project groups through their leaders prepare the documentation to open a bank account in the nearest bank. After the proposals are approved at the district, grants are given directly to the groups on their already opened bank accounts and it's the groups through their leaders (CPMC) and procurement committee (PC) which then took on the responsibility for managing the funds within their community level institutions and groups.

Once the appraisal of the sub-project proposals is complete, the applications are submitted to elected councilors in the District Executive Committee (DEC) for ratification which forms a basis for a recommendation to NUMU for release of funds into the community sub-project bank account.




Figure 4.4: : Institutional structures and linkages for the implementation of NUSAF

Source: NUSAF implementation manual 2010

4.3.4 Provisions in NUSAF to address the anticipated governance challenges

The design process of NUSAF resulted in the preparation of a series of manuals to guide project implementation including a comprehensive operational manual in order to provide the staff of the implementing agencies of the program consistency to implementation procedures. The ability to control corruption in NUSAF at the technical level has been well documented in the implementation manuals and guidelines. Various risks and governance challenges are addressed in the NUSAF project design, for example the key financial management risks addressed include staff adequacy, usage and approval of project funds, reliability of financial information, adequacy of co-funding (counterpart funds) at the various levels, ignorance of rules and procedures by the technocrats and other stakeholders, identification of needs by the community and service delivery systems. In addition this has been guided by the existence of a monitoring mechanism which includes availability of adequate monitoring capacity and enforcement mechanisms. In order to ensure effective implementation of NUSAF, the implementation guidelines includes provisions for: transparency, accountability, social auditing, monitoring and grievance redressal. In addition incentive schemes for the technical staff are also provided for in the provision that increase the incentives for regular and reliable verifications/certifications plus monitoring and evaluation of the sub-projects.

The NUSAF implementation guidelines consist of the institutional development component which is intended to improve the technical, administrative and managerial capacity of the key implementers of the project and in addition NUSAF has set up the Transparency, Accountability and Anti-Corruption (TAAC) program component. This program seeks to strengthen transparency, accountability and anti-corruption at various levels of project implementation. Some of the measures include collaboration with anti-corruption agencies, instituting social accountability committees at the community level and strengthening Information, Education and Communication (IEC) component of NUSAF. NUSAF guidelines recommend for supervision, monitoring and evaluation of sub-projects at community, district and national levels. There are also provisions for setting up an appropriate Management Information System (MIS) to ensure timely availability of information for decision making and reporting at the various levels of project implementation. The TAAC component empowers the beneficiaries to demand for explanations on areas where they are not satisfied.

The TAAC will also promote gender mainstreaming in all project activities in order to ensure independence. The implementation of the sub-component will be spearheaded by the Inspectorate of Government (IG) headed by the Inspector General of Government (IGG). TAAC focuses on gendered social accountability that responds to the project's core pro-poor community driven approach and gender equity strategy. The gender focused social accountability in TAAC will ensure that ordinary women/men participate directly or indirectly in exerting demand for value for money and accountability to ensure that government development programs reach and benefit the intended target groups.

The TAAC monitoring matrix tool will form an integral part of the OPM financial control and monitoring systems. The tool brings together performance indicators on financial, procurement, regulatory and reporting compliance, social and gender accountabilities and the number of grievances handled. TAAC will include a grievance handling arrangement i.e. grievance handling will be at the grassroots level and will be anchored in Social Accountability Committees (SAC) and ultimately linked to the Inspectorate of government (IG) headed by the IGG at national level. Social accountability according to the NUSAF provisions will involve the principles of solidarity (pro-poor action for common good), subsidiary decisions and dispute resolution are taken as closely as possible to the citizen responsibility. NUSAF provisions indicate that the introduction of SAC will enable the communities to be exposed to the operations of NUSAF and therefore enhance the ability of the community members to act collectively for mutual gain.

Transparency at the community level according to the NUSAF implementation guidelines is through the Social Accountability Committee (SAC) of the community sub-project management committee. The SAC reports to the Community Development Officer (CDO) and will form part of the M&E system of the project. The SAC will respond to grievances and according to the provisions will be based on prevention, detection and consequence. The SAC shall meet at least once every month and shall submit its reports to the sub-county CDO and their respective beneficiary communities on monthly basis and the SAC will act as first point of call for resolving or reference of grievances e.g. nepotism, collusion, corruption, bribery and gender exclusion. In addition, participatory monitoring tools including the Community Score Cards (CSC) and the Citizens Record Cards (CRC) will be used as part of the approaches towards promoting social accountability, transparency and anti-corruption under NUSAF phase two project implementation. This will ensure active involvement of all

stakeholders in monitoring of project activities and outputs to secure commitment and build the capacity of communities to be able to analyze, reflect and take collective action. It was noted that such community level institutions promote democratic values and improve household internal welfare. The NUSAF project has a component of transparency and accountability (TAAC) that empowers the beneficiaries to demand for explanations on areas where they are not satisfied during the sub-project implementation process. The TAAC support program as an anti-corruption measure and good governance was set up in light of the linkage between fragility of state institutions, poor credibility and high incidences of corruption in post-conflict regions.

The IGG will be involved in monitoring the NUSAF project at all levels of the implementation process i.e. national, local government and community levels, investigate allegations of corruption and if there is a criminal offence prosecute the suspects. The IGG will liaise with the PS/OPM , CAOs , sub-county chiefs and sub-project committees to ensure effective implementation of the TAAC Program at national , district and sub-county levels respectively. Under this arrangement, the IGG will submit six monthly reports to OPM, MoFPED , Parliament and the World Bank. To maintain the independence of the IGG there will be under the TAAC support program an arrangement under which the IGG will receive financial support directly from MoFPED in order to avoid undue influence from the OPM. This project will follow guidelines as laid down under the Local Government Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy 2008/2013 and other measures aimed at fighting corruption.

To ensure accountability and transparency in program implementation, provisions in NUSAF recommend for rewards and sanctions. Here mechanisms for rewards and sanctions at various levels of project implementation will be instituted. To this end specific investigative arms of government will be supported to carry out investigations of reported cases of corruption, poor accountability, lack of value for money or abuse of office during the project implementation. Guidelines recommend that sanctions will be applied as per government standing orders for civil servants and in line with nationally accepted corrective practices of charges and committing suspects to prison in case of proven corrupt practices. Here rewards include: issuing certificates of recognition for good performance, recognizing good performance on public media e.g. Newspapers, FM radios, Televisions, and giving gifts , certificates and cash rewards on national occasions , for example independence day celebrations , farmers' shows, exhibitions and women's day celebrations.

Another provision to ensure accountability of NUSAF resources is that signing of the visitors books at the districts, sub county headquarters and the sub-project sites on each monitoring visit is mandatory for all monitoring teams. Provisions require that monitoring reports shall be prepared by all persons participating in each monitoring exercise to inform subsequent interventions and as part of accountability for the project resources in the exercises. Guidelines also include provisions for political monitoring i.e. Ministry of State for Northern Uganda and at district level by the District Executive committee (DEC) and LC 3 councillors and their executive members at the sub-county levels.

In a shift from NUSAF phase one, the NUSAF phase two funds will be channeled through groups instead of individuals. This is because it was discovered that some individuals who got NUSAF 1 funding did not use the money on the poverty alleviation projects they claimed they would invest in. For example previous research reported that it was common for individual beneficiaries in NUSAF 1 to use the money for their own personal benefit, for example engaging in luxurious life styles like alcoholism and marrying other women.

To ensure effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) provisions provide that the Undersecretary Planning and Development in the OPM supported by the project coordinator and the M&E specialist will be responsible for ensuring effective monitoring and evaluation under NUSAF 2. The district planner and the sub-county community development officer will coordinate M&E activities at the district and sub-county levels respectively. Provisions also call for the set up of an appropriate Management Information System (MIS) to ensure timely availability of information for decision making and reporting at the various levels of project implementation.

Implementation guidelines recommend that a computerized accounting system will be established at national and district levels to capture and track transactions. In addition a paper based system will be used to track the inflows and outflows at community and other implementing agency levels. Finally, there will be use of Rapid Results Initiatives (RRI) as results focused management tool to be used by the implementers of NUSAF to adapt and refine implementation strategies while creating the self determination to own the problems and find solutions to them. The aim of RRI is to strengthen accountability and commitment for results.

4.3.5 NUSAF implementation in reality-insights from the literature

It should be noted that NUSAF program offers an excellent case study that poor communities in a post-conflict environment can develop the capacity to identify, plan and monitor social investment projects with appropriate guidance and facilitation. Though the program has made significant gains in terms of physical infrastructure, gains in terms of improvement of livelihoods of the people of Northern Uganda are still modest. During the implementation of NUSAF numerous governance challenges have been realized which have made the realization of NUSAF objectives rather modest (World Bank, 2006). NUSAF 2 was launched and it followed the first phase which was riddled with cases of embezzlement, corruption and mismanagement (Robinson, 2005).

There is widespread evidence from project evaluations and empirical research for example, World Bank (2006), Golooba- Mutebi and Hickey (2010), Robinson (2005) and various media and News Paper reports that NUSAF funds and sub-project assets have been subject to large scale mismanagement by project officials, local leaders, private suppliers, private service providers as well as recipients. Of particular reference this has been widely reported in the News Papers and also highlighted by numerous anti-corruption NGOs for example the Anti-corruption Coalition of Uganda (ACCU) and the Uganda Debt Network (UDN). For example a number of NUSAF staff have been arrested and some of them imprisoned over concerns regarding the mismanagement of funds. Because of these reasons, his Excellence the President of Uganda gave serious consideration to shutting the project down in September of 2007.

Similarly reports of corruption by NUSAF program officials are also commonly reported in Newspapers in Uganda for instance the Redpepper online Newspaper in Uganda on 24th April 2012 reported the sacking of NUSAF district boss of corruption and incompetence. This is a result of failing to implement NUSAF 2 activities in Nwoya and Amuru districts. He is also accused of failing to account for 63 million shillings he received for the mobilization of the communities. Also a story from the Uganda Radio Network on 23rd April 2012 indicates that three members of NUSAF community procurement committee in Moyo district in Northern Uganda have been handed over to police and Inspectorate of Government (IG) after mismanaging over nine million shillings given to the community. According to the Newsletter of the Guardian.com of Monday 11th January 2010 NUSAF's public image was tainted by allegations of corruption whereby government officials and service providers have

been accused of embezzlement and of doing sub-standard/shoddy work or no work at all and some reports have put the number of NUSAF related court cases at more than 100 in number (the guardian.com 2010). Therefore mis-managing of projects in NUSAF is an issue which calls for serious concern.

A study by Blattman et al. (2011) indicates that the NUSAF projects were not well researched, funds were mismanaged and intra-group conflicts were common. The authors argued that it is unrealistic to expect poor people to be responsible for their own recovery and indicated that the NUSAF program actually had dis-empowering effects. Whereas the first phase of NUSAF was semi-autonomous the current phase has been somehow more integrated in the structures of local governments, for example more responsibilities have been given to the local governments in the implementation of NUSAF 2 compared to NUSAF 1.

The World Bank completion report of NUSAF phase one in 2009, ratings were as follows: outcomes were satisfactory, the risk of development outcome was moderate and government performance was moderately satisfactory and some lessons learned was that transparency and accountability can be a challenge in post-conflict areas. NUSAF project having a demand driven approach it was highly expected that it would help improve the capacity of the local people to participate fully and also be able to hold the implementers accountable, however various studies e.g. Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010) and various News Paper reports shows that NUSAF has tended to fall short of its ambitious aims of improving livelihoods in the North.

Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010) noted that although NUSAF is a community driven project many of the beneficiaries interviewed expressed a deepened sense of resignation that their views and demands were not being listened to or acted upon. Here the authors argue that because of the high rate of project failure in NUSAF, they add a voice of support to other elites that still question the capacity of the poor to manage development resources effectively (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010 ; Robinson, 2005). In their study the authors also noted that the NUSAF components that provided especially sub-projects for livestock and community infrastructure often the beneficiaries did not manage the funding well (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2010 ; Robinson, 2005). Other challenges faced by the NUSAF project included inadequate resources, inefficient use of resources, elite capture, corruption and capacity constraints at point of delivery of services (GoU, 2011 ; OPM, 2011 ; Isis-WICCE, 2011).

The previous study by Martin, Petty and Acidri (2008) on Northern Uganda indicates that there are a number of negative perceptions about government interventions in the region. The study observed that there are widespread perceptions of favoritism and exclusion by programs like NUSAF. Programs like NUSAF set very tough conditions for the communities to qualify for funding which the poor of the poor war victims could not afford. For example planting of trees and for animal enterprises contribution of materials apart from labor (Petty and Acidri, 2008). NUSAF ignored the stark inequalities which are existing in the Northern region (Martin , Petty and Acidri, 2008).

During the implementation of NUSAF there were also claims that some groups received funding faster than others after submitting their proposals and that they did so because they had agreed to pay off some of the people involved in decisions related for vetting proposals, approving them and deciding which ones got funded quickly and which ones were kept waiting (Golooba and Hickey, 2009). Also some applications which were judged to have the potential to receive approval for funding were allocated to other groups by corrupt politically motivated or nepotistic officials involved in the appraisal process (Beyond Juba Project, 2008).

A briefing note, by Beyond Juba Project (2008) on PRDP in Northern Uganda indicates that in some cases the information in the NUSAF sub-project files was deliberately being tampered with, for instance when a project has been approved some scrupulous individuals at the district local governments tear out the pages which have the names of the community members and then they insert the names of their own henchmen. This tampering of files and the collusion has created what they call “Ghost Communities” in NUSAF and this problem totally undermined NUSAF because people who did not intend to implement the project but just needed to steal money were the eventual beneficiaries (Golooba and Hickey, 2009).

Despite Uganda’s success at mainstreaming the poverty agenda in National Policy processes via the PEAP and its relatively extensive system of decentralized governance, NUSAF was not integrated into either with line ministries and the institutions of local government were rejected by the NUSAF project designers as the main channel for the project (Robinson, 2005). The decision to use parallel structures in the implementation of NUSAF and adopt a demand driven approach effectively excluded and alienated the state from the process and thus further embedding the popular idea in Northern Uganda that the state was absent from their lives (communities) for a long time and disinterested in their needs (Jones, 2009). This

is in line as observed by Lange (2008), that the danger of using non-state actors to deliver development is that it may have a very negative effect on people's interest in politics, increase cynicism about government, retard peace building and finally even weaken the democratic process.

Due to the parallel structures to the local decentralized system employed by NUSAF much of the work done on the projects is of poor quality because they did not involve the local government in their design, supervision and monitoring (Robinson, 2005 ; Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey,2008). This is also indicated by instances where the skilled specialized readily available local government technical manpower shunned the projects (Robinson, 2005; Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2008). Previous research by Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2008) indicates that the fuller involvement and participation of local government technical experts working in collaboration with beneficiaries would have likely improved the quality of the NUSAF project outputs, helped ensure greater sustainability and lower the costs of maintenance. Moreover Brett (2003) recommends that, for local development efforts in Uganda to be both efficient and empowering, it will require an appropriate blend of different institutional actors both public and private something which has been overlooked in NUSAF implementation.

In addition, research findings by Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2008) in Northern Uganda indicate that the discretionary and parallel project structures to the local governments associated with NUSAF, not only render such an intervention prone to elite capture and open to abuse and corruption but also tend to undermine the role and accountability of the state. Failure to engage with local structures of power (local councils and traditional leaders) has been a big challenge to the community based approach of NUSAF (Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2008).

Martin (2010), Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2010), Bailey et al. (2009) argue that although the social fund approach taken by the NUSAF program has the advantage of devolving responsibility to the community and limiting the influence of politicians on the project implementation, the availability of large sums of money for development purposes by NUSAF has been an attractive source of political patronage in a region that has been long deprived of such resources. This is because many politicians have used the program to advance their political ambitions by looking at the political feasibility of NUSAF rather than prioritizing the needs of the most vulnerable groups (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2010).

5 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

This research adopts a comparative case study of two large agricultural livelihoods programs, that is NAADS and NUSAF. The study investigates, uncovers and explains the governance challenges that are facing the two programs i.e. (NAADS and NUSAF) in a post-conflict situation of Northern Uganda. The study also explores various strategies that have been developed to address the governance problems of implementing the two agricultural livelihoods enhancement programs. Given the fact that most households depend on agriculture as a source of livelihood it was imperative to target the two large agricultural livelihoods programs in Northern Uganda that is: NAADS and NUSAF which are being implemented in the region to improve on the livelihoods of the farmers.

In this study I used both qualitative and quantitative research methods and the case was used as a method of data collection and as a unit of analysis and it offered a comparative analysis of the two programs (NAADS and NUSAF) with different implementation mechanisms and derives implications for policy and future research. Salminen & Lautamo (2006) noted that a case study approach to research is advantageous because the researcher is able to explore a phenomenon within its real life context. As observed by Mason (2002) and Kanbur (2001) qualitative research has an advantage that we can explore a wide range of dimensions in the communities and households, for example understanding the way social processes and institutions work and the significance of the meanings they generate and how this behavior in the communities affects program implementation.

The case study was conducted in four districts of Northern Uganda i.e. Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo and Pader (see Figure 4.2). The field study was the interview based qualitative and quantitative approach and was conducted over a period of 7 months on both NAADS 1 and 2 and also NUSAF 1 and 2 between June 2012 to November 2012 and the quantitative data collection took place from May 2014 to August 2014. The case study is based on 4 districts chosen within the post -conflict Northern region of Uganda that is Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo and Pader.

Selection of sub-counties was conducted to allow for a comparative approach i.e. differences between well performing and non-performing areas and selection of sub-counties on the border of two districts to study the influence of the local government district administration and services. In this case two sub-counties were purposely selected e.g. One being better developed than the other and the closeness of the sub-county to the district headquarters.

5.1 Data sources and methods

The study used a multi-method approach of data collection with key informant interviews, focus group interviews, observations of the environment and homesteads, attitudes and practices of the community. The study includes both primary and secondary data. The primary data was obtained using the Process Net-Map, participant observation, key informant interview methods and self-assessment. Other data collection methods included participant observations, unstructured interviewing and document analysis and review which also involved collection of grey data from reports. The Process Net-Map and literature review provided useful insights into the implementation process of NAADS and NUSAF and the context in which the implementation process took place.

5.1.1 Primary data sources

There were two components of data collection, that is the qualitative component and the quantitative component. The tools used to collect data included: key informant interview checklist, focus group discussion guide, literature review guide, questionnaire by personal interview for household survey and the Process Net-Map tool.

Qualitative data collection

The participants who were involved in the qualitative survey were purposively selected in order to ensure that they had credible knowledge about the implementation of NAADS and NUSAF programs.

- **Net-Map activities**

The Process Net-Map was used as one of the main methods of data collection to answer the research questions (for details of Process Net-Map process see Schiffer and Waale, 2008).

The process Influence Net-Map was carried out in three phases namely;

1. In phase one participants who included the technical staff, farmers who are affiliated to both NAADS and NUSAF, relevant stakeholders and members of the general farming community in the area were mobilized to take part in the Process Net-Map activity. The researcher asked the respondents to describe the target program (NAADS or NUSAF) procurement implementation process step by step and to identify the actors involved in each step. During the process interviewees were asked

in three stages about the steps that are taken to provide inputs or advisory services to the beneficiaries. The relevant actors were identified by the participants and then the actors were written on stickers with different colors and placed on a larger poster (flip chart). Then the implementation processes were drawn as arrows between the actor cards i.e. the arrows were used to describe the actions that are needed for providing advisory services or inputs. Here the arrows were marked with numbers and the respective implementation step corresponding to each number was noted down at the border of the paper.



Picture 5.1: Step 1 of the Process Net-Map
Source: Author

2. In phase two of the process Net-Map respondents were asked to rate the influence of different actors on the final outcome of the entire process (quantity, quality and timeliness of assets distributed to intended beneficiaries). The question which was asked is that how much influence this actor has on the final outcome. The rating was done on a scale from 0 to 6 and it was visualized by using checker or chess pieces or towers of carom game pieces.



Picture 5.2: Final step of Process Net- Map

Source: Author

In addition while performing the exercise, the respondents were asked to identify and give reasons why different actors have the influence level that is given (ascribed) to them. At this stage it was emphasized to the interviewees (participants in the Net-Map process) that the level of influence was not about “authority” but about the importance of actors for the implementation of NAADS/NUSAF as described in the process influence mapping exercise. In addition the participants in the Process Net-Map explained (defined) the different factors that contribute to the actors’ influence. Finally in phase three of the Process Net-Map, the respondents were asked to identify where in the implementation process possible problems / governance challenges for example leakages, elite capture, corruption, political influence may occur. Here the aim was to identify possible and potential entry points for problems that are linked to the different implementation mechanisms used in the target programs of the field study.

- **Observations**

Participant observation is a useful method for measuring concepts, testing hypothesis and also constructing causal explanations (Douglas 1976). In this survey, observation was important because it allowed the observing of the environment i.e. the quality of life for example shelter, food, health and nutrition, diet, access to services, food availability storages (presence of homestead granaries), the crops in the fields in order to assess the general food production. And in addition, informal talks were carried out with other people in the area to substantiate or validate the information gathered from key informants. During the field research, the researcher also attended some NAADS and NUSAF related activities. For example meetings like farmer forum, participatory planning exercises, farm inputs distribution meetings and some training meetings usually held at the district and sub-county level to obtain more insights into the implementation of NAADS and NUSAF. The researcher also engaged in informal discussions with key NUSAF and NAADS implementers at sub-county, district level and at the central level. Such informal discussions provided a good chance for the researcher to collect additional information and also a chance to clarifying the different field research impressions and cross-checking the information and possible preliminary conclusions from the study.

- **Key informant interviews**

For this study, key informant interviews formed a substantial part of this qualitative and quantitative comparative study. Unstructured interviews as recommended by Benard (1988)

have an advantage because these interviews put the respondents at ease to tell their stories to the researcher. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with NAADS and NUSAF affiliated beneficiary farmers and their institutions e.g. committees were carried out to get deeper insights into the implementation of the programs. The research method of FGDs takes the advantage of the interaction between small groups of people. Participants respond to and build on what others in the group have said. Ideally FGDs are a synergetic approach that helps in generating insightful information and encourages the participants to give sincere answers. Here the groups were formed comprising of men, women, elderly and the youths.



Picture 5.3: Focus group discussion session in progress

Source: Author

It should be noted that focus group discussions and semi structured interviews were based on an interview guideline designed on the basis of the research theme and the research questions.

- **Interviews on NAADS**

Interviewees included leaders and members of the sub-county farmer fora, leaders of NAADS affiliated farmer groups, community mobilizers, farmer group facilitators and other community members with responsibilities related to NAADS for example farmers hosting the technology development sites and demonstrations, NAADS coordinators, NAADS service providers, relevant sub-county technical staff, sub-county local council officials and community leaders (civic, traditional and political) and staff of NGOs participating in NAADS activities e.g. District NGO forums of the different districts and other participating NGOs in capacity development.

- **Interviews on NUSAF**

Interviews were held with the following types of respondents;

- Top administration and political leaders of the four sample districts as well as relevant (key) civil servants involved in the implementation of NUSAF e.g. NUSAF technical team in the office of the prime minister and at the district levels.
- Top administrative and political leaders in the selected sub-counties in each district.
- Sub-county civil servants responsible for NUSAF.
- Staff of NGOs involved in implementation of NUSAF.
- Private sector i.e. suppliers, contractors and facilitators in NUSAF.
- Beneficiary farmers and their affiliated groups (see farmer interview questionnaire in used in Appendix 1).
- Local traditional leaders.

Quantitative data

- Sampling and Sample size

The quantitative data for this study was collected through a household survey involving a random sample of respondents. The household survey targeted two categories of farmers namely those farmers who are affiliated to a NAADS farmer group and those farmers who are affiliated to the NUSAF farmer group.

The selection of the respondents for the household survey was a multiplestage process. First the list of the registered farmer groups for both NAADS and NUSAF in each sub-county targeted in the particular district were obtained at the district or sub-county levels. Then in each sub-county 2 parishes were randomly selected and in these 2 parishes 13 groups of NAADS affiliated farmers and 13 groups NUSAF affiliated farmers were selected randomly using a lottery method. After selection of the groups, the lists of members were obtained, the names written down and the respondent to interview was selected by lottery method of sampling.

Given that for the household survey four districts were targeted and in each district two sub - counties were selected this means that in each district 13 respondents were interviewed for NAADS affiliated respondents and 13 respondents for NUSAF affiliated farmer groups.

Therefore for each district 26 total number of respondents was interviewed. Given that the study targeted four districts in the Northern region, the total number of respondents interviewed was 26 times four (26x4) which gives the total number of respondents of 104 interviewed for the household survey.

- **Quantitative data collection**

This was collected using a pre-tested individual structured questionnaire for which it was applied for both NAADS and NUSAF farmer group affiliated individuals. The household survey questionnaire contained both, fixed choice, closed and open ended questions. The farmers selected were interviewed at their households and used the personal interview method because many of them are either illiterate or semi-illiterate so they could not fill the questionnaires personally. The main contents of the household survey questionnaire included: questions on the expectations from NAADS and NUSAF by the affiliated farmers, the levels of trust by the group affiliated farmers towards the technical personnel and local government politicians towards program implementation, satisfaction and perception of the respondents towards the programs, farmers' willingness to work together in groups, perceptions about their own farmer institutions and what the respondents think can be done differently to improve the programs performance (see appendix 1 for details).

- **Data analysis**

The household survey data was analyzed using the statistical package for social scientists (SPSS) and the data were also analyzed using descriptive statistics which also involved deriving frequencies, percentages and average values. The data was presented using tables and bar graphs.

5.1.2 Secondary data sources

Secondary data was collected through the review of relevant published academic literature such as journal articles, books, periodicals and unpublished literature (grey literature) for example policy papers and evaluation reports and internal communications related to the programs implementation process, implementation manuals, program evaluation documents, monitoring reports implementation reports both at the central level, in the NGOs and local government level .

The review of documents included;

- Government documents consulted included mainly those published by MFPED, MAAIF and Prime Minister's Office (OPM) which is the implementing ministry for NUSAF.
- Workshop reports-for NUSAF and NAADS related activities.
- Those documents related to PMA and the PEAP.
- Those documents related to NAADS and NUSAF as a project e.g. Project appraisal documents, implementation manuals, annual reports, monitoring reports and review/evaluation reports.
- Other sources included academic literature, Newspaper and journal articles, relevant government documents and information published through the internet.
- Work plans, progress reports, financial reports, payment vouchers, monitoring and evaluation reports.

5.2 Data quality assurance

In order to ensure the credibility of the results obtained, a number of methods were used to check for the accuracy of the results obtained. Triangulation was carried out through using multiple sources of data to get a more comprehensive views on the subjects studied. For example beneficiaries, program implementers and relevant stakeholders were interviewed to get comprehensive views on the particular topic.

Before the qualitative survey serious efforts were taken to identify and select appropriate participants purposely who were knowledgeable about the implementation of NAADS and NUSAF to provide credible responses asked about the programs.

To avoid biased answers during the household survey there were serious efforts to select the research assistants that are not directly involved in the implementation of NAADS program or NUSAF. This is because such research assistants were likely to influence the results of the negative criticisms about the programs' implementers. Also the respondents during the household survey were interviewed alone without the presence of the program implementers or the local leaders to enable them give sincere answers during the interviews. Also sensitive topics in the implementation of the program were mainly addressed during individual interviews rather than during focus group discussions.

Another way to ensure that credible data was obtained was that, during the study in the evening the author usually had informal discussions with the project coordinators and other stakeholders and such meetings provided important information in cross-checking and clarifying the research findings. Also information from the field was re-enforced by the personal observations by the researcher during farmer meetings and field observation. In addition, at the end of the working day of the research there were debriefing meetings between the author and the research assistants to resolving contentious findings from the team members during the data collection. For the quantitative data collection random sampling was carried out in the selection of participants to ensure that the results are not biased and also ensure the generalizability of the results.

	Gulu District	Kitgum District	Pader District	Lamwo District	Total
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)	3	3	3	3	12
Process Net-Map Interviews	4	4	4	4	16
Local Government (Political)	5	5	5	5	20
Local Government (Administrative)	4	4	5	4	21
Civil Society (NGO/CBO)	3	2	2	2	9
Private Sector Organizations	1	1	1	1	4
Opinion/Traditional Leaders	1	1	1	1	4
Private sector/suppliers	1	1	1	1	4
NAADS and NUSAF Group Member (Household survey) Quantitative Interviews	26	26	26	26	104

Table 5.1: Summary of data collection

5.3 Data management and analysis

First, pre-test of the research instruments was made to ensure clarity required for information collection and necessary adjustments were made thereafter. Data from interviews was organized categorically according to the different emerging themes identified during the study and also in line with the Conceptual Framework. Qualitative analysis then entailed sorting and organizing the material into common response categories i.e. focusing on certain

themes and or sub-themes. Basically this resulted into manageable and more relevant data sets. In describing the data, the researcher illustrated and substantiated the presentation through use of direct quotations from the respondents.

Quantitative data was reduced to frequencies and has been presented in the form of tables and bar graphs. Quantitative data was analyzed using SPSS data analysis program.

5.4 Ethical issues

Ethical issues were carefully taken care of during the study. All information received from the respondents was treated in confidence and steps were taken to ensure anonymity of the respondents, study district and source of such sensitive information. There was oral consent and all relevant agencies where the research took place were aware of the aim of the survey, for example the central government departments and the local governments were contacted with an introduction letter from Hohenheim University hence the study was conducted with the approval of the relevant authorities. All the informants that took part in this study were fully informed about the purpose of the study and freely agreed to participate.

All the interviewees were informed of the purpose of the study, as well as their rights to voluntarily participate (or not) in the study and ask questions at any time, refuse to answer any questions and to input information into the study they thought was necessary but which the interviewer had not solicited. The participants were assured of anonymity of the information.

6 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

6.1 Overview

This section deals with the implementation processes and practices of NAADS and NUSAF programs in the Northern region of Uganda. It includes the discussion on how the NAADS and NUSAF implementation took place in practice in the rural communities in the North. Here the emphasis has been put on the processual aspects of NAADS and NUSAF, such as implementation procedures and the institutional arrangements for delivery of extension services.

Section 6.1 and 6.2 presents the results of the Process Net-Map , individual interviews and focus group discussions with both NAADS and NUSAF service providers and the actors respectively that are involved in the implementation of the programs and at the same time discusses the implications of the results. I supplement the results from the Process Net-Map exercise with insights from observations, interviews, focus group discussions in which the process Net-Map exercise was not applied. For comparison with procurement for NAADS and procurement for advisory services see the Net-Map in appendix 4.

6.2 NAADS implementation process in practice

6.2.1 The implementation process of NAADS using the Process-Influence Mapping procedure

The description of the NAADS procedures in the implementation of the procurement process in this section is based on the process Net-Map procedure with different stakeholders i.e. district technical officers, NAADS coordinators, farmer forum representatives and beneficiaries. It should be noted here that the implementation process is explained as perceived by the interviewees from their practical experiences in the implementation of NAADS and therefore may deviate from the official NAADS Implementation Guidelines.

Figure 6.1 Shows the steps involved in the implementation process. Here the first step (step 1) involved the sensitization of all the stakeholders at the district level i.e. both on the political wing and the technical wing including leaders of the sub-counties i.e. sub-county NAADS Coordinators and farmer forum chairmen. In the second step (step 2) , the already sensitized local leaders and sub-county NAADS Coordinators are equipped with tools to go to the lower levels to sensitize the farmers in their parishes and also facilitate the election of

the procurement committee (Step 3). Here mobilization of the farmers is carried out basically by the Community Based Facilitators (CBFs). Other actors who are involved in the sensitization are members of the farmers' forum (F.F). The main actors in the sensitization of farmers about the activities to take place in the NAADS sensitization include the chairman Local Council 3, the sub-county chief and the sub-county NAADS Coordinator. After the sensitization the next step is the selection of farming enterprises to be undertaken by the sub-county and then in step 9 of the Process Net- Map, the information is sent to the sub-county NAADS Coordinator who delivers the information to the sub-county chief and then the sub-county chief forwards the information to the district NAADS Coordinator (step 10). At this step, the copies of the enterprises selected are also forwarded to CAO, Chief Finance Officer (CFO) and secretary for production.


After the enterprises are selected, the sub-county chief invites the procurement committee (PC) at the sub-county for a meeting (the PC is constituted from the farmers' forum). At this meeting (steps 14 and 15), after agreeing on the terms of reference by the sub-county technical committee and the PC, the PC notifies the sub-county chief through the sub-county NAADS Coordinator to advertise for the bids for the supply of specific farm inputs/technologies , for example seeds/ fertilizers and livestock. After advertisement at the district and sub-county notice boards and in national News Papers jointly with other sub-counties in the district. After advertisement, the interested suppliers pick the bid forms from the office of the sub-county NAADS coordinator and then submit all the required documents and information according to the terms of reference (TOR).

At steps 17 and 18 of the process Net-Map, the sub-county technical team sits and chooses the pre-qualified firms. The information is then displayed at district and sub-county notice boards and also sometimes announcements on radio are made. Then the sub-county chief calls a meeting which is attended by the subject matter specialists (SMS) (Agriculture and Veterinary) and the secretary for production and the secretary to the meeting who is the NAADS coordinator to participate in the evaluation and selection of the best bidder.

At steps 19 and 20 the selected firm or firms are invited for negotiations at the sub-county on prices and other issues concerning the supply contract and the actors at this step include the sub-county chief, NAADs Coordinator and Procurement Committee (PC). The aim of the negotiations is to have a win-win position between the farmers and the suppliers. During negotiation there is potential for reduction of prices to favor the negotiators on behalf of the

beneficiaries and in most cases the results of the negotiations are not revealed to the wider public because there is usually no written records. After this process of negotiations is concluded, the sub-county chief through the sub-accountant prepares a local purchase order (LPO) for the supplier to deliver the inputs.

At step 23, the procurement committee tells the suppliers to supply the inputs at a specific date so that the farmers are prepared to receive them. At step 24 the subject matter specialist (SMS) either at the sub-county or district, depending at which level the inputs first arrive checks the quality and quantity of inputs delivered in the presence of the procurement committee and some members of the farmer forum executive in accordance with the terms of reference and at this level the inputs are either approved or rejected. At step 24 if the inputs are approved they are handed over to the sub-county chief / NAADS Coordinator and the farmers' forum (FF) who are in charge of distribution of the inputs to the final beneficiaries (the farmers). At step 26 after the inputs are received and approved, the sub-county chief instructs the sub-accountant to prepare a cheque for the payment and then handed to the supplier usually by sub-county NAADS Coordinator but in some instances this process can be hijacked by the powerful sub-county chiefs and sub-accountant.



1. Sensitization at District Level and LC Council officials
 2. SC NAADS Coordinator with farmers forum sensitize farmers
 3. Election of SC Procurement Committee
 4. CBFs mobilize farmers for activities and implementation
 5. SC NAADS Coordinator informs farmers forum on activities to take place
 6. CBFs Informed by chairman farmers forum to mobilize the communities
 7. SC NAADS Coordinator, farmers forum and LC 3 chairman sensitize parishes
 8. Enterprises selected
 9. and 10 Information.....
 10. ation from coordinator to sub county chief about enterprises selected
 11. Information on enterprises selected forwarded to the district
 12. District NAADS Coordinator confirms the enterprises to the sub countv and
- Copies of enterprises given to CAO, CFO and Sec. For production
13. SC: Chief invites all procurement committees at sub county
 - 14 and 15 Advertise for bids through committee and SC
 16. Supplier picks bid forms from Sub-County
 - 17 and 18 suppliers submits and S/C chief announces prequalified firms on Radio
 - 19 and 20 here firms are invited for negotiation and award of contract
 - 21 and 22 Procurement committee informs supplier to supply thro 'NAADS coord.
 - 23 Procurement committee informs suppliers to supply
 - 24 and 25 with the farmers' forum procurement committee distributes the inputs

Figure 6.1: Process Net- Map 1 for NAADS procurement process

6.2.2 Level of influence of the different actors on the quality of inputs delivered to the beneficiaries

Figure 6.2 shows the perceived level of influence that the different actors have on the outcome of the procurement process i.e. on the quality of inputs received by the final beneficiaries (farmers). In this process, the respondents were asked to rank the influence of the different actors on the outcome (quality) on a scale from 0-6. The final good outcome is that the inputs delivered are of high quality, required quantity and delivered in time as required by the farmer beneficiaries.




Figure 6.2: Perceived levels of influence of the different actors

In figure 6.2 above, the farmers rated themselves as the highest i.e. 6 because they said that during community procurement they can be able to procure inputs for themselves and therefore can of course ensure high quality inputs for themselves. The sub-county chief also gets 5 and the LC 3 chairman because they come to the villages and ensure that quality inputs have been purchased. The supplier gets 4 because they just care about profit, so if they are not warned about quality issue by the implementers they can bring the cheapest product but even of very low quality delivered.




Figure 6.3: The mean influence level

When the mean values were taken for the different Net Maps (figure 6.3) , the supplier got the highest . This could be a perception in all areas that the supplier care for only profit but not good quality. Respondents said that they are usually at the mercy of suppliers and can wait for just what the supplier brings. The beneficiaries said that they just want to see things happening i.e. to receive the inputs because any delay for them they think may not get anything at all according to their previous experiences on NAADS input supply. However the technocrats were also given high scores, this could be because they are more involved in NAADS 2 procurement than in NAADS 1.




Figure 6.4: NAADS implementation challenges

Procurement Stage	Red Flags
Project and Design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political influence from LC 5 and LC 3 executives in enterprise selection. • Undue influence by politicians and elites in decision making.
Advertising , Prequalification, Submission of Bids	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No tender advertisements at the lower levels eg. Parish. • Very few companies are pre-qualified. • No official location (office) of the bidding company/ firms. • Manipulation of bid documents (favouritism). • Collusion. • Leakage of bidding information. • Submission of very few bid documents. • Lack of widespread advertizing of bids to reduce competition.
Bid Evaluation, Post-qualification and Award of Contract	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One company always winning the contracts in the area. • Company that wins contract does not have official location in the district. • Very short procurement process. • Delivery of inputs beyond official working hours or delivery on weekends. • Single sourcing undertaken as procurement option. • Best bidder fails to win the tender award. • The price of delivery of goods and services is increased from the original price according to the tender terms of reference. • The quality and or quantity of the goods is decreased from the original TOR. • The price of inputs to be delivered is inflated compared to the prevailing market prices.
Contract Performance , Administration and Supervision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All payments made before contract is completed. • Delayed payments to suppliers. • Very expensive project sign posts. • Weak accounting systems. • Ghost names of beneficiaries and project personell. • Poor monitoring systems. • Lack of random spot checks to give opportunity to the contractor to disguise illegal activities. • Poor transparency and no implementation/contract information given to the beneficiaries. • Oversight of the physical works in collaboration with beneficiary representatives is absent. • The clients of the service are dissatisfied with completed facilities. • Delays in the delivery of goods and services.

Table 6.1: Entry points for corruption in procurement of goods and services in NAADS-insights from the study

6.2.3 Governance challenges in NAADS implementation

This section is discussed according to the Conceptual Framework in Chapter 3 which considers both the Supply-side and Demand-side factors that affect program performance. The Supply-side factors refer to boxes I,J,K,L and M while the Demand-side factors refer to boxes F, G and H in the Conceptual Framework (Refer to figure 3.2 section 3).

Supply-side challenges

1. Human resource management

- **Local government human resource capacity**

The NAADS implementation guidelines emphasize the need for retooling (capacity strengthening) and technical backstopping by the Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) at the local government level to improve their knowledge and the skills. However evidence from the interaction of the various technical staff during the study shows that the available training support is not adequate to deal with the NAADS current challenging participatory planning and administrative tasks and the challenges posed by the ever evolving NAADS program. Outsourcing or hiring of technical tasks to private contractors for example hiring planning tasks under NAADS to NGOs under the institutional development component proved too costly and unsustainable. For instance, as observed there are problems of quality assurance of services as some of the NGOs hired lack capacity and in some instances employed or sub-contracted unqualified staff who are cheap to pay i.e. hired staff who don't ask for higher wages.

The rushed NAADS programme roll out to the districts led to a number of technical capacity challenges in NAADS. Evidence shows that many technocrats say that NAADS is “thin” on the ground because its impact is very small. During the design of the NAADS programme it was assumed that many of the service providers would be qualified and experienced agricultural extension officers delayered (moved out of local government/ retired from local government) in each district and sub-county, but this was not realized because most of them still remain employed under the local governments and therefore could not provide services to NAADS as private extension providers. Findings indicate that the present arrangement of only one staff member as a NAADS Coordinator in each district and one NAADS Coordinator at sub-county level working alongside other technical staff in the local government and private advisory service providers is insufficient in the management of

NAADS. The lack of adequate technical capacity at the local government levels is implied by the statements below;

“Decentralizing of agricultural extension services under NAADS is good but it has its own complications; in Northern Uganda in most instances districts lack the capacity to offer agricultural extension services and also the capacity to develop their staff and provision of facilitation to carry out their duties. In addition lack of incentives at work and the low salaries have resulted in loss of staff morale to visit the farmers and that’s why many of the extension workers are spending more time doing work on their private gardens and farms” (Retired District Agricultural Officer (DAO)).

An elderly farmer interviewed said that:

“I am appalled at the lack of proper extension services. Here it is surprising that farmers are still even getting bumper harvests because they practice agriculture like a person walking a dark tunnel, he laments. He continues to explain that after independence of Uganda in 1962 extension workers were heavily involved in the agriculture sector and he grew up seeing them”. He said that they used to come to visit his father’s farm often, but he does not see them these days. He blames the failure of transferring research findings to his farm on the absence of extension knowledge/services from the government extension workers”.

Another local technical capacity challenge relates to step 24 of the Process Net-Map which involves certification of inputs by technical officers (Agriculture and Veterinary SMS) before they are distributed to the beneficiaries. Findings indicate that this activity is hardly done. The NAADS procurement guidelines mandates the district Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) (i.e. Veterinary and Agriculture) to verify the quality and quantity of goods supplied as per the terms of reference (TOR) in the supply contract/bidding documents. One important reason for the certification challenges is the lack of adequate trained technical staff in the Production and Extension services departments, especially at the sub-county levels where program implementation takes place. Man power constraints predominantly concern the absence of Agricultural and Veterinary officers and hence the absence of such staff limits the access of the farmers to technical services such as inspection, monitoring, and quality assurance. Additionally this makes quality assurance and value for money a challenge and this offers a substantial scope for supply of substandard inputs, fraud and misappropriation of funds during NAADS implementation. Key informants said that the cause of the staff shortage is partly due to the government of Uganda Policy of not allowing district local governments to hire new district/ sub-county extension staff. In the surveyed districts many

vacancies at both districts and sub-counties are not permanently filled. Another challenge is that at the inception of NAADS many of the agricultural officers left government to serve as private service providers. For instance in many of the sub-counties, due to staff shortages the CDO can be assigned several posts, for example as a NAADS Coordinator, acting sub-county chief etc. Due to these additional responsibilities the officer cannot pay the required attention to the highly demanding NAADS programme in order to effectively monitor or administer the implementation of NAADS programme.

To illustrate the negative impact of staff shortage, as per the NAADS procurement provisions, the supplier is supposed to communicate a day before that he/she going to deliver the goods to the district to be verified/certified. Due to the capacity challenges, the subject matter specialist (SMS) cannot respond in time. This was particularly challenging for livestock which have to be fed and susceptible to disease outbreak. Evidence shows that this problem was worse for the poultry enterprise, for example at one of the sub-county surveyed over 30% of the local poultry died at the sub-county headquarters before delivery to the final beneficiaries.

One supplier complained that:

“So you are forced to keep for a longtime at the district headquarters and it is expensive and not part of the costs.” Death and body emaciation of animals can occur within this time leading to loss on my part and complaints from the farmers who are supposed to receive the animals/livestock that I am supplying them with poor quality livestock”.

In one incident in district C, local chicken in a sub-county stayed for two weeks before verification/certification by the district Subject Matter Specialist (SMS). Key informants at the district local government said that, for the Veterinary Doctor who is available at the district headquarters even lacks facilitation in form of fuel to go to the lower levels to assure the quality of animals and this led to problems of compromising the quality of animals and a good entry point for the supply of poor quality animals. This inadequacy in staffing levels is confirmed by evidence from this survey where the records show that staffing gap in the Production and Extension departments was just about 50%.

Private sector capacity

The NAADS programme being a private sector led delivery of agricultural advisory service the technical capacity of the hired private agricultural extension workers to deliver quality advisory services is crucial for the success of the program. Evidence from key informant interviews and the farmer beneficiaries confirm that the private sector organizations and the field staff hired by the programme do not have adequate numbers of professional to deliver quality services to their target group. Interviewed local government staff indicated that, this situation has been made worse because many of those who would be private service providers are still employed by the local governments.

According to GoU 2006/ 2007, when NAADS was being designed provisions indicated that the local government workers would be delayered out of government to fill the private sector technical gap within the second year of the NAADS inception phase. In addition evidence shows that the long planned programme for building capacity (retooling) of local government employees has not been carried out by NAADS. The technical staff interviewed reported that apart from the war conflict, another cause of the manpower problems is government of Uganda Policy of creation of new districts in Northern Uganda from time to time which has made the constraint of technical capacity in the region even worse. Recent NAADS implementation guidelines call for the legal registration of all potential individual private service providers with the aim of preventing contracting out the agricultural advisory work to unqualified individuals i.e. the individual who wins the contract is the one to provide the services. The challenge with this arrangement is that an individual may not be qualified in all fields, a multidisciplinary team is adequately equipped to respond to a range of agricultural advisory service needs than an individual service provider.

Findings indicated that many private agricultural advisory service provider companies used qualified staff just for bidding purposes and in the field employed/contracted unqualified staff whom they can be able to pay lower salaries in order to maximize profits for themselves. Some respondents even complained that some of these trainers were using class based training dominated by English words which many of the farmers could not understand. Trainers were also giving the farmers note books and pens in a dominantly class based training to take notes as if they were school going children, respondents complained.

Evidence indicates that, in the case of Northern Uganda where there are only a limited number of service providers, there is less competition in the bidding process which results in

the selection of less qualified personell who will provide substandard advisory service. One of the district extension staff interviewed indicated that in some cases there was a complete lack of private service providers for certain new enterprises/technologies which are not very common in the area (for example mushroom growing and Apiculture).

Another issue identified is that service providers were usually not available in remote sub-counties of the Northern Uganda districts because of lack of incentives and high transaction costs for service providers. As a result, there is complete lack of efficiency in the provision of advisory services in remote areas. It was evident from the process Net-Map that many of the service providers who get NAADS contracts are committed to other areas i.e. their companies are working in other areas with limited manpower. This has resulted in few service providers available in Northern Uganda. Similarly many companies have hired poorly qualified service providers leading to shoddy work. With the NAADS advisory services this is a serious issue in as far as efficiency and qualified technical capacity is concerned. There was evidence from the Process Net-Map interviews that even the same staff could form several firms leading to lack of concentration and efficiency. This finding resonates with even other findings from other parts of the country whereby the capacity of the private agricultural extension service providers is still wanting. For example, the Uganda Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA) also conducted an independent study entitled: the effectiveness of farmer groups as institutions for farmer empowerment and poverty eradication under the NAADS program in Kabale, Tororo and Arua districts (DENIVA, 2005). Their assessment at that time also indicated that among others, service provision was constrained by poor skills of the contracted service providers dominated by classroom based training.

Key informants reported that many of the service providers companies do not have enough working capital and there is shortage of credit facilities for the service providers to be able to buy equipment to carry out demonstrations and training. Findings indicate that the majority of private advisory service providers are not adequately equipped, for instance in terms of farmer training aides, transport, demonstration kits and drugs to offer the services. In addition there are other problems in regards to privately delivered extension services under NAADS more especially in the livestock sector, a case in point is the acute shortage of Veterinary Doctors e.g. In one of the districts surveyed there was only one Veterinary doctor in the entire district. These results support past studies by Benin et al. (2007) which shows that in Uganda , technologies and information are more available for crops than for livestock.

Another finding was that, due to the limited budgets to the private service providers, the money budgeted for is mainly for training and demonstration and there is no allocation in the private service provider budgets for funds for the monitoring and evaluation. This finding of the lack of the monitoring budget, shows that there is no opportunity for the service providers to carry out monitoring in the areas in which they have finished training and therefore they cannot provide feedback on the effects of their work with the farmers.

Other evidence points to the challenge of the private service providers being given very short term contracts, for instance many available contracts are between 3 to 6 months. Many client stakeholders interviewed indicated that depending on the nature of the enterprise to be supported by the agricultural extension advisor, the usual short 3-6 month contracts did not provide sufficient time for capacity to be built and the skills to be learnt in the farmer groups for the enterprises and technology being covered, for instance long-term enterprises like livestock breeding, improvement and management activities a very short 3-6 month period of contract does not suffice. Bahiigwa et al. (2005) and Bukenya (2010) noted that agricultural extension is not an event, but a process which takes a while before a farmer can adopt the technology.

NAADS guidelines provide for targeting through farmer groups, therefore farmer institutional development is key to the success of the program because strong farmer institutions depict the farmer ownership of the programme, high levels of farmer empowerment and group cohesion. In terms of the NGOs which carried out Institutional development in the study area, for the larger part of the NAADS program, findings from NAADS implementers at the local government level and beneficiaries alike indicate that many of these NGOs lacked the technical capacity to conduct the institutional development of farmer groups. Other challenges the NGOs faced was lack of knowledge of the area, short time period of contracts and poor budgetary allocations for institutional development leading to the delivery of shoddy work as reported by respondents in many sub-counties. Another challenge is that the NGOs were given very short contracts (3 to 6 months contracts) which time was not enough for preparing the farmer groups well and in some cases a single NGO was given contracts to operate in more than one sub-county thus putting a strain on its technical capacity in other areas.

On the issue of capacity building of service providers, given the wide scope of the role of the private service provider, compared to the individual traditional local government agricultural

extension worker, capacity building of service providers has been identified as a critical factor will enable NAADS to achieve its objectives. The NAADS programme component number 4 which provides for capacity building of private service providers has not been addressed/implemented. From this survey, there is no evidence that NAADS has conducted a training needs assessment for the private agricultural advisory providers and capacity building/training. Because of this evidence I conclude that the capacity building of private service providers was actually minimal and in some areas totally non-existent and or if present was just from other agencies e.g. NGOs in the area but not from NAADS program.

Staff welfare

According to the technical staff interviewed at both the districts and sub-county levels, they indicated that since the inception of the NAADS program in 2002 many of the local government workers' morale to work has declined. Many of the government extension workers interviewed are uncertain of their future in the local government system. The retooling program as envisaged in the NAADS operational guidelines of 2001 is not forthcoming. Evidence from key informants indicates that the parallel system of human resource management under NAADS undermine the incentives of the local government staff not employed under NAADS. There is also some resentment of the programme by the existing local government staff because of the disparity in remuneration of the District NAADS Coordinators and Subcounty NAADS Coordinators and the local government staff just because the NAADS staff are better paid and facilitated. As a result, evidence indicates that this has created potentially unhealthy relationships among professional staff at the local government level and the NAADS coordinators. In addition this has brought in an underlying resentment by the local government staff especially at the district level that the NAADS programme does not fully involve them or the programme does not sufficiently draw on their expertise and experiences in the area of agricultural advisory services.

Some local government staff are disappointed because they have not been offered specialized training from NAADS secretariat, yet they face challenges in the field because farmers' information needs are changing all the time. The local government technical staff also complained that they are poorly facilitated in terms of training materials. Findings indicate that delays in funding and payment of private service providers were common place and this meant that the service provision was often carried out at the wrong time of the year resulting in reduced effectiveness.

Findings indicate that the problem of staffing levels is more pronounced at the sub-county levels where a number of vacancies e.g extension workers are occupied by persons in acting capacity and not usually having the required qualifications for the job, for instance many jobs which are supposed to be occupied by Degree holders are now occupied by Diploma holders.

It should be noted that not much has changed now in terms of staffing levels because of the government ban on recruitment of agricultural extension workers. Key informants also cited the problem of the ever increasing number of districts created by the government as one of the factors that has led to staff shortage and in addition lack of facilities like office infrastructure is a disincentive in attracting new staff to these local governments.

The staff welfare challenge is implied by the following statement:

“when the security situation remains volatile and people still feel insecure, people from the North who are well educated have usually gone to places where it is peaceful to seek employment opportunities leading to ‘brain drain’ in the Northern Uganda districts”(CAO).

Other challenges also relate to the lack of interest of the local government agricultural extension work in their work and their poor performance, for example it arose from the focus group discussions that the beneficiary communities perceive the NAADS Coordinators and local Government agricultural extension staff at the local government and more especially those at sub-county levels not performing their duties as expected. This challenge was exemplified by the usual and regular absence of the sub-county NAADS Coordinators and agricultural extension staff from their duty stations as witnessed by the researcher and inadequate supervision of the private service providers. Findings indicate that the communities are not sensitized on the process of channeling of complaints for investigation and the actions on such absentee staff.

Another challenge identified is that the available officers lack the support of the infrastructure for example computers, printers, electricity and internet that would be needed for the efficient implementation of the program. In one of the districts surveyed during the study, there was only one Veterinary doctor in the whole district. Related to the above challenge is that officers who are involved in NAADS activities, for example sub-accountants are not paid any money for their services, whereas NAADS is a document intensive and transaction intensive program that requires their input and presence for most of the time. Lack of motivation of the NAADS support officers in the local governments leads to delays in

preparation of documents, financial reports, payment of service providers/suppliers and delays in preparation of accountabilities.

2. Conflicts of interest

There was alleged corruption and collusion in awarding contracts by the respondents in the focus group discussions. Respondents mentioned local government officials and farmer leaders as one of the culprits. The reason given by some of the private agricultural advisory providers is that they fear they may lose chances to obtain contracts in other sub-counties and districts because in the Northern region the local government staff know each other because most of these were one district but just split up into new ones and therefore can take collective action or blacklist such a private service provider who pins their colleague not to get a contract in their areas.

Respondents in the focus group discussions reported problems of poor supervision of the procurement committees by the district technical team and the involvement of elected officials directly in procurement processes and elected officials involved in supply of inputs themselves through their private firms leading to numerous cases of abuse of the procurement process as well as demonstrated impunity on the part of the district and sub county officials in instances where such cases of bad practices were reported to them. This leads to conflict of interest because the persons supposed to supervise the suppliers and assure value for money are themselves the suppliers. So in case of poor quality supplies can they criticize and penalize their own supply companies? respondents wondered .

Field research experiences indicated that there is a capacity gap at the sub-county levels because even the NGOs/CBOs working in the study districts still contract the services of the few local government staff to carry out their work. But the local government staff are the ones supposed to assure that the NGO offers quality services, so how can the local government staff criticize the NGO which has offered them employment? Respondents wondered. This has brought in problems of staff management at the local government levels because the local government staff are dedicating less and less time to local government work of which they are paid for by the government and offering most of their time to work with NGOs which offer better payments and allowances that's why you always find empty offices during working days more especially at the sub-county level.

Respondents reported some cases where the NAADS Coordinator is acting on behalf of the farmer beneficiaries i.e. parish procurement committee to issue and receive the interest forms for community suppliers which is not recommended in the official Community Procurement Guidelines. Here there is a big challenge on the powers of the community procurement committee who are the farmer beneficiary representatives being overtaken by the sub-county NAADS coordinator.

3. Financial management

NAADS budgeting , funding and internal accountability

According to the Operational Guidelines of NAADS, operational funds are supposed to be released from the NAADS Secretariat in March of the financial year and reach at the district in the same month and then released to the sub-county in April (for more information see the funds flow chart in appendix5). However it was evidenced from the discussions during the research that this was not the case on the ground. There is late release of funds and this has seriously negatively impacted on the implementation of the NAADS activities and programs. Respondents also reported that the late release of funds affects the absorption of funds by the sub-counties because it delays the seasonal implementation of field activities and the overall implementation process.

In addition the communities in the focus group discussions expressed the view that they have limited decision making powers particularly over the resource allocation and they indicated that their involvement in the NAADS planning and budgeting process is non-existent. The main perception here was that the intended beneficiaries are merely recipients of the planning and budgeting decisions which are made at the NAADS Secretariat and the districts. Respondents here recommended that NAADS planning and budgeting should follow a bottom up approach which is fully participatory and inclusive involving beneficiaries, implementers, civil society and other relevant stakeholders.

There is evidence that sub-counties usually receive the funds late, usually one to five weeks before the end of the quarter of the financial year. Because of this late disbursement of funds, issues of late implementation (poor absorption of funds) and timely accountability preparation arise. Here the level of absorption of funds is the percentage of the accomplished activities of the total planned activities in the quarterly or yearly reporting period. The key stakeholders mentioned that there is a serious challenge of retrieval of unallocated funds by

MFPEP as a Financial Management Policy which has to be done at every end of the financial year, therefore it is difficult for the sub-counties to use all the funds before the end of the financial year because of the late releases.

It was mentioned by the participant technical officers that some funds are even released towards the end of the quarter and the end of the financial year making it difficult to utilize the funds in time and this forces the sub-counties to send the much needed unspent funds at the district as per the Local Government and NAADS operational guidelines. In addition the underutilization of funds also reflects the non-compliance of the sub-counties especially with explicit NAADS funding guidelines that prevail at the NAADS Secretariat. For example to ensure timely accountability and effective implementation of the NAADS programme, the NAADS implementation guidelines includes provisions for maintaining of proper records i.e. reports and timely submission of proper accountability reports to the authorities before the next batch of finances is released.

Other evidence from the field indicates that the delayed release of funds, more especially at the implementation levels of the sub-county negatively affects the NAADS programme implementation, yet funds are supposed to be released at the beginning of the quarter. Delays in the release of funds have in turn delayed the procurement process and therefore farmers have not been able to get the required inputs in optimum time for the planting season. When funds are released late and off season this complicates the implementation of crop component of the NAADS programme which is dependent on climatic conditions to deliver. To obtain good yields the crops must be planted at the optimal time otherwise poor yields demonstrate a bad image and the inefficient use of resources by the NAADS advisory service providers and implementers alike. Key informant interviews indicate that delays in the release of funds are more pronounced at the beginning of the financial year because there are issues of approvals at the center i.e. Parliament budget approvals always delay.

Re-allocations of funds and variations by the amounts received was a key concern by the key informants and respondents in the focus group discussions alike. There were also incidences where funds were re-allocated to other enterprises and activities that were not planned for. NAADS Coordinators said that this happens usually from being pressurized by politicians to fund their district/council activities which are not even budgeted for in the NAADS budget. Another challenge reported by the NAADS implementers in the local governments visited during the survey is the top-down system of budgeting by the NAADS Secretariat, where by

indicative block figures for the different components of the program are just sent to the lower levels as a final guideline for budgeting purposes. Participants in the focus groups indicated the dissatisfaction with the formats of displayed budget releases at the sub-county level. The challenge with the displayed information is the presentation of block figures by the NAADS Secretariat, while the communities prefer a detailed breakdown of the block figures alongside with the planned activities. There was no evidence of this easy to understand (simplified) budgetary information at the lower levels, for example the parish levels. To illustrate this point, in all the sub-counties visited the budgets are displayed on the sub-county notice boards but nothing at the lower levels e.g. parish, market centers, churches etc. therefore farmers who cannot go to the sub-counties are not able to look at the NAADS budgets for their areas in order to know how much they are entitled to.

According to the NAADS Funding Guidelines (2000) sections 4.6 and 5.6, the Central Government and International Donors were expected to contribute 93 percent of the total NAADS budget whereas the local government (District and sub-county) as matching funds for NAADS activities and the farmers were expected to contribute 5 % (sub-county local government) and two percent (farmers). However evidence from the process Net-Map interviews and key informant interviews with the NAADS technical staff showed that the central government and the donors were able to fulfill their commitments yet the sub-county local governments and the farmers in all the sub-counties visited were not able to fulfill their co-funding obligations i.e. the sub-counties visited in the last financial years 2009/2010, 2010/2011, 2011/2012, were not able to contribute financial resources in proportions that the NAADS Guidelines recommended. This is clear evidence that the returnees (former IDPs) could not afford to abide by their co-funding obligations. Another challenge mentioned by farmers in the focus groups is that the sub-counties do not provide them with the accountability for their co-funding obligations i.e. they lack a grip on the co-funding funds control and accountability and this gave a wide scope for misuse of funds by the sub-county chief and NAADS Coordinator. Even the collected 2% funds for co-funding just appear on the bank statements but its use is only known to the NAADS local government officials at the sub-county.

The lack of adequate revenue at the sub-county and town councils and failure to pay co-funding (2 % matching funds) is implied by the statement below:

“Revenue collection is low. The low level of revenue collection is partly blamed on the insurgency that ravaged Northern Uganda rendering most people economically unproductive. We are still in the recovery process, not many people are earning enough to pay taxes”(Town Clerk).

Reasons given by other interviewees in the focus group discussions for this low co-funding contribution include; sub-county local governments are unable to raise adequate local revenue and the abolishment of graduated tax by the government which was an important source of local revenue, there is limited interest of the local council authorities to commit the little funds to support NAADS activities, poverty among the beneficiary farmers, and the lack of effort on the part of the technical staff responsible for NAADS to adhere to and enforce the guidelines of the NAADS program plus the wrong attitude of the farmers towards their co-funding obligations. The impact of low co-funding by the local governments is that it leads to the NAADS Secretariat penalizing the local governments by releasing less amounts of cash for their activities.

Procurement process and mechanism

Evidence from sub-county records on funds disbursement and procurement of goods and services indicate that beneficiary farmers for NAADS inputs receive inputs almost in a month's time after funds are disbursed to the sub-county. The very long and document intensive procurement process plus the delay in the release of funds to the sub-county and hence the inputs and technical advise to reach the beneficiaries. Here to illustrate this, when funds are disbursed to the sub-county for instance towards the end of the quarter in the financial year, there is less time to absorb (use) the money for the planned activities within the quarter because the procurement process is transaction intensive. Evidence shows that in many cases the procurement process has been rushed through and this need to absorb the large sums of money in a very short time remaining to the end of the quarter or financial year, in many instances leads to the officials to overlook the implementation procedures and it is an entry point for corruption and leakage of funds.

Ultimately because of this rushed procurement process, it brings in problems in the compromise of the quality and quantity of the goods and services received by the beneficiaries. Similarly in some cases where sometimes the procurement process is hurriedly

done, it may take a few days for the beneficiaries to receive the inputs when NAADS funds have been received at the sub-county, but the challenge is that the NAADS implementers use single sourcing procurement which compromises the quality and quantity of inputs provided to the farmers.

Evidence also indicates that because of this bureaucratic procurement process and delays, inputs especially seeds and fertilizers are given to farmers late when the rainy season has already begun, it is difficult for them to use the inputs in order to get good yields. To illustrate the bureaucratic procurement mechanism in NAADS, according to the Procurement Guidelines of 2009, the NAADS procurement cycle has 8 stages, it starts with the procurement plan, advertisement of the expression of interest and eventually the evaluation of bids and finally the award of contract. Respondents in the focus group and Process Net-Map also pointed out issues in delayed contracting because of the many steps involved. To illustrate this point, respondents indicated that in 2009/2010 farmers in some of the surveyed sub-counties in the Northern region were supplied with inputs i.e. Beans, maize seed and cassava cuttings when the dry season had already started leading to the high incidences of crop failure witnessed during the survey.

Steps 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of the process Net-Map indicate that there is too much technical responsibility of the procurement committee and the challenge is that the process is transaction intensive in terms of paperwork, technical capacity, cost and time. For instance, the procurement committee is responsible for procurement planning, adverts, negotiation and selection of the best bidders. However respondents expressed evidence that this is a challenge due to the fact that many of the members are illiterate or semi-illiterate and cannot cope with the responsibilities of the technical capacity required for their duties. Members of the Procurement Committee also mentioned that NAADS program activities take a lot of their productive time. Many of the respondents interviewed expressed the need to spend more time on their farms rather than spending it on the NAADS administrative issues which are voluntary without pay or facilitation.

Other governance challenges were identified at various steps of the procurement process for example; evaluation of bids (step 18 of the Process Net-Map) for instance guidelines recommend for more than one private supplier to bid for the supply of goods and services. But in reality on the ground it was found that in some of the suspicious cases, only 2 or one supply company would submit the application, be selected by the technical committee and

given a go ahead to supply the goods. It was also revealed that there were problems even in cases where more than one company submitted the bids at times these companies are owned by the same individual/ bidder.

Here one respondent reported that:

“These sub-county officials are given a lot of powers. In many instances these official basically determine who to supply the inputs according to their vested interest, overlooking the stipulated guidelines”.

Another senior politician stated that:

“NAADS funds have been misused through flouted procurement procedures, inflated costs of purchase of inputs and repairs of vehicles and motorcycles and unaccounted for funds for workshops, meetings and travels which didn't even take place”.

Another challenge mentioned by the respondents is at the step of supply of goods and payment of the contractors (Step 24, 25 and 26 of Process Net-Map figure6.1). After award of the supply contract, guidelines recommend that a verification (certification) committee composed of five officials i.e. the knowledge specialist, farmer forum chairperson, sub-county chief and sub-county NAADS Coordinator is supposed to check the farm inputs to see if they are of good quality according to the Terms of Reference (TOR) before the goods are given to the beneficiaries and payment authorized. However evidence from the influence Process Net-Map points to major irregularities at this step, as reported in many cases the contract conditions (TOR) are not fulfilled and yet payment was done already leading to lack of value for money on the part of the NAADS program.

In some cases it was only one individual who was assigned to receive the goods at the sub-county headquarters and in some cases these goods either arrived in the evening after official working hours, at night or on weekends. In some cases during the study we came across suspicious transactions where the procurement process took only four days in which it was impossible to follow all the procurement steps effectively and this short duration was coupled with the by-passing of the very important procedure for verification/certification of farm inputs to ascertain good quality standards. Evidence shows that this rushed procurement process was an entry point for compromising the quality of inputs and entry point for corruption, bribery and rent seeking. In some cases identified during the study, genuine

suppliers were not intentionally paid their money in time because of the search to coarsely pay suppliers for kickbacks by some corrupt local government officials. This delayed payment of suppliers led to slow service delivery to farmers in the district and frustrations to the genuine and reliable suppliers.

Another challenge identified in the study regards the highly recommended community procurement mechanism in the NAADS procurement provisions. The challenge of inadequate availability of certified high quality planting materials in the villages and lack of technical capacity of the community procurement committee makes the community procurement method not a viable option in the context of the post-conflict Northern region of Uganda where farmers lost virtually all the agricultural productive assets during the war.

Leakages and corruption

“When you ask the NAADS Officials why NAADS programme is not felt on the ground, NAADS officials at the Center (NAADS Secretariat) refer you to structural problems and corruption at the lower extension levels” (Author).

Experiences with procurement in step 16 of the Process Net-Map, suggests that some members of the procurement committee can impose an unofficial fee in order for the potential suppliers to access the supply contracts’ documents and inside secret information and also they can ask for “kickbacks” in order to provide information on the reserve prices prepared by the procurement committee, which information is supposed to be private and not supposed to be exposed according to the NAADS procurement provisions. In addition this corrupt practice of asking for kickbacks increases the opportunity costs of the local procurement application because it may deter potential suppliers from accessing the contracts to unqualified suppliers and hence compromising the quality of inputs supplied to the beneficiaries.

Step 9 of the Process Net-Map figure (6.1) shows that there was leakage of funds collected for co-funding, as some of the funds sent to the sub-county from the farmer groups to the sub-county show no evidence of accountability at the sub-county level. Respondents reported that at this step 16, 17 and 18 there is potential for leakage of bidding information to suppliers and potential for bribery and kickbacks. Some contractors/suppliers interviewed indicated that kickbacks nowadays are an accepted norm in bidding for government contracts, but stated that corruption in bidding for NGO contracts is much less of a problem in Northern Uganda.

The contractors/suppliers interviewed stated that corruption in NGOs is perceived as an unacceptable practice who dismiss staff involved in it. The view that was expressed here is that the tendering process under NAADS was not transparent and that it is influenced by people in senior positions, so that those service providers who were ‘agents’ of technical staff were awarded agricultural input supply contracts even when they were not best qualified for the job. In the sub-counties visited, some private service providers also claimed that there is a lack of transparency in awarding contracts and a high demand for ‘kickbacks’ with officials withholding payments until these were provided with ‘something’.

Corruption in procurement under NAADS is implied by the following statements:

“The procurement committee gives contract to the person who can talk well and give something. The contractor canvases because he knows who is on the committee and the most influential members of the committee. The contractor promises 10 percent even if not asked for the money” (NAADS beneficiary).

“Who can refuse money in such a situation of dire poverty and income insecurity, even those who already have are stealing so what should a poor person like us do”? (NAADS beneficiary).

In terms of payments from the sub-accountant to the suppliers in step 26 of the Process Net-Map (Figure 6.1), here respondents reported that the sub-county officials that is, the sub-county chief and sub-accountant have a lot of leeway for soliciting for kickbacks from suppliers i.e. The first contact is when the sub-county chief invites the suppliers to the sub-county headquarters with the chairman farmers’ forum and chairperson procurement committee to sign the input supply agreement. The second contact where interview responses point to the existence of soliciting for kickbacks is when the supplier picks the cheque payment for goods supplied from the sub-county chief’s office. The sub-county chief usually through the sub-accountant asks for a bribe for quick processing of payments. If the suppliers don’t comply they are usually delayed to be given their cheque and in order for the non-compliant suppliers to the giving of bribes to be punished, these non corrupt suppliers make a number of costly trips in terms of transport to the sub-counties leading to increasing the supplier’s opportunity costs to supply.

Evidence from the Process Net-Map suggests that at step 14 and 15 there is leakage and misuse of NAADS funds. A case is the non-refundable fee, usually (50,000 shillings) paid during the bidding process to the sub-county chief. NAADS Operational Guidelines

recommend that this money should be added on the operational fund for NAADS activities, however available evidence at the sub-counties visited during the survey shows that this money is not usually used for the approved purposes, it is either diverted by the sub-county chief and sub-accountant or misused to contribute to the co-funding of NAADS activities by the sub-county chief.

The procurement process being transaction intensive in terms of paper work, technical capacity, time and financial costs, there was evidence that the procurement committee does not have an office for proper storage of secret information and its paper work so the documents are safely kept with the NAADS Coordinator's office. It was reported by participants in the Process Net-Map that in some cases information about the procurement process is leaked by the sub-county NAADS coordinator, for example the reserve prices of inputs are leaked to potential suppliers for a fee as kick back (money) so that they can win a contract and also some sensitive documents are kept with the NAADS Coordinator, as observed in some of the sub-counties visited during the survey.

In addition it was noted that the prices of inputs provided by the private suppliers under NAADS are well above the market prices, in some cases 50% of inflated costs, some of this money is used to "reward the NAADS technocrats" who approve and process the payments for suppliers and such behavior was common with the supply of new technologies which are not relatively available in the area and where there is little information for example on prices and quality, for example exotic cattle, improved poultry breeds, Apiary (bee keeping), fertilizers and improved orange and mango seeds.

A lead farmer in one of the districts surveyed stated that:

"NAADS is like an "Eating Club" for a few people. For example while a Boer goat costs 250,000 Shillings on the open market, it is priced at over 600,000 Shillings under the NAADS programme. A walking tractor that costs about 8 million Shillings is sold at 18 million Shillings under NAADS program. The Lead farmer continues to say that under NAADS the price of everything is tripled because somebody has to have a "Cut". He stated that at the end of the day farmers cannot pay back their financial obligations to NAADS and farmers groups cannot co-fund the programme he adds. The lead farmer continues to add that the NAADS programme is good, but it lacks transparency".

In addition one Member of Parliament in the area noted that:

“You see a beautiful sign post indicating a wonderful farm or a demonstration site supported by NAADS, but when you go to learn from it, you are met by overgrown bushes. An indication that all the money for this demonstration was eaten”.

However when the NAADS officials in the area were asked about this allegation of empty demonstration gardens full of bushes, they claimed that the beneficiaries had harvested the crops and the sign posts remained.

It was mentioned by the respondents that in other cases of corruption, the private sector (supplier) negotiates with procurement committee usually with some kickbacks (bribe) as they by-pass the Subject Matter Specialists (SMS), for example the Veterinary Doctor and Agricultural Officer who is supposed to certify the quality and quantity of Livestock/ inputs before they are distributed to the beneficiaries. This is because the suppliers know that they are not supplying the right quality of animals and if they don't bypass the Veterinary Doctor who is supposed to verify/certify the animals he can reject their poor quality supply.

Other leakages and embezzlement of funds as indicated by the key informants concerned the hiring of private firms or individuals for advisory services. NAADS guidelines recommend the payment of 30% advance to the service providers at the inception phase of the work. Key informants at the sub-county levels reported that some firms/individuals after collecting the advanced payments, some service providers partially or completely abandoned the work. There are some incidences reported where service providers collected 30% advance in many sub-counties and run away with the money without completing the contracted job.

4. Project management

Information dissemination and mobilization strategy

The mobilization strategy of NAADS also has challenges. NAADS Implementation Guidelines recommend the full involvement of local politicians in active mobilization of the communities whereas evidence on the ground shows that the numbers of people attending NAADS trainings and activities is drastically dwindling. NAADS being a demand driven program, this suggests that there is still a wide gap between the actual demand for NAADS services and the delivery. Absence of good social mobilization strategy creates a challenge of the rural poor being unable to articulate their demand for advisory services effectively because their voices cannot be heard. NAADS program being largely demand driven, it

creates a fundamental challenge of mobilization of the communities and giving them the necessary information to articulate their demand.

Findings indicate that the initial mobilization strategy of NAADS had a number of challenges and giving conflicting messages to the war conflict affected farmers. Evidence shows that in Northern Uganda there are still clear differences in appreciation levels of understanding and perspectives on the NAADS programme between politicians and technical officers. During this survey there was overwhelming evidence that the interests of the politicians and their aims for mobilization for NAADS are shaped by their desire to deliver quick and tangible results to their constituents as they prepare for the next local government council elections. However, on the other hand the NAADS technical officers are committed to follow the NAADS implementation guidelines which involve processes like institutional development (group formation and development) which take a long time and produce less visible and less tangible results, which disappoints the politicians.

The issue of inadequate flow of information at all levels in the implementation process from implementers, beneficiaries and elected officials on NAADS implementation performance, NAADS multiplier effect, pay back management of technologies, list of technologies, list of beneficiary groups as well as well-prepared accountability by NAADS staff is evidence that there is no well-functioning Management Information System (MIS) in NAADS that contains timely and adequate data and information on performance and implementation at all stages of the program implementation cycle. Evidence shows that the existing so called information system is based on paperwork in terms of which cannot be readily accessed by the public to encourage social audits of the program. Here issues of transparency exist as mentioned by the respondents in the Process Net-Map. Due to challenges of transparency, it was evident that the implementation of the NAADS programme is usually done in an environment conducive to various malpractices, for example elite capture, corruption and mis-appropriation of funds.

Steps 1 and 2 of the Process Net-Map (Figure 6.1) of the NAADS sensitization and information flow uncovered other more serious challenges. The Process Net-Map uncovered the challenge of low participation rates in the NAADS activities, such as training and participatory planning activities. The low participation rates in the NAADS training and planning activities reflect the unawareness of the rural poor regarding the provisions in the NAADS programme, poor mobilization and how they can best benefit from the programme to improve their livelihoods. The high level of unawareness was also witnessed by the low

numbers attending the NAADS training activities, for instance evidence from attendance lists of various trainings by the private service providers shows that less than 50% of the NAADS affiliated farmers attended.

At Step 2 and step 24 of the Process Net-Map there are challenges of who gets the information i.e. the information that the inputs have arrived passes through the local council (LC1) at the lower levels. Respondents reported that in some cases the LCs who are the political wing of the government could delay to give information to the potential beneficiaries because of political differences. For instance, those usually on the opposing ends of the political divide are not given priority in accessing information during mobilization by the local council 1 chairmen. Another challenge on the issue of mobilization for NAADS activities by the local councils is lack of facilitation. The politicians ask for some allowances whereas NAADS mobilization is a voluntary activity and on the contrary activities for other NGOs and political mobilization these politicians receive allowances for such work. Therefore for this reason, the politicians at the lower levels in the community i.e. sub-county, parish and village level have been very reluctant to engage in mobilization activities of NAADS.

At step 23 in the Process Net-Map (figure6.1) of the procurement process, respondents indicated that there is a challenge of information flow from the community, sub-county, supplier and the Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) for example the District Agricultural Officer (DAO), Veterinary Doctor, Engineer to verify and ensure quality assurance of the inputs before they are distributed to the beneficiaries. This poor flow of information leads to higher transaction costs on the side of suppliers and the beneficiaries hence delaying the completion of the procurement process and the reduction in value for the inputs supplied to the farmers. Therefore ignoring this step in the implementation of the procurement process has resulted into the compromise in the quality and quantity of inputs delivered to the beneficiaries. Participants in the Process Net-Map confirmed that poor quality inputs have been delivered to them and also lower quantities of inputs than expected have been delivered and this quantity problem was mainly with divisible inputs e.g. maize seeds, beans and other cereals where the weighing scales have been adjusted to dupe the beneficiaries.

At steps 24 and 25 in the Process Net- Map which links to the final beneficiaries of the inputs had serious challenges, for instance many potential beneficiaries did not have access to the inputs and those who got some even got less. This is due to lack of information because some

participants reported that they did not even know when the inputs will arrive and how much they are entitled to. There were also problems in regard to the inputs for rotation (beneficiaries have to pay back a fraction of the yields) where initial recipients failed to pass on subsequent generation of seed or inputs to other members of the NAADS affiliated group as required in the implementation guidelines for rotation of NAADS benefits.

Monitoring and evaluation

NAADS guidelines mention Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) as a very important component to ensure effective implementation and provides critical management information for reviewing the performance of the program. Here the Management Information System (MIS) in the NAADS Implementation Manual of 2004 illustrates the whole process from planning to implementation of the M&E both at the districts and sub-county levels. Here the Implementation Guidelines provide sample forms for monitoring and a fund is budgeted for to cover this component each financial year. However evidence from interviews with key stakeholders revealed major weaknesses in the M&E system. Findings from this survey indicate that there is lack of up to date documentation on the overall M&E system and no evidence of an evaluation framework was found that can be used as a point of reference. Similarly technocrats and politicians at all levels of local government complained that there is a constant change in the NAADS implementation guidelines from time to time and this is causing serious confusion among the implementers and stakeholders alike. Key informant respondents at the local government level complained that many times the NAADS Secretariat has sent new implementation guidelines/circulars to the local governments without clear explanations.

The NAADS Implementation Guidelines (2007) emphasizes the need for participatory planning at the local government levels and also recommend for the formation of a good Management Information System (MIS) and a monitoring system with well laid out indicators. However available evidence indicates that the districts and more especially the sub-county levels suffers from shortages of technical support staff and thus lacks technical personell who can participate in the planning , monitoring , screening of technical proposals from service providers for their technical feasibility and cost efficiency. This limited staff capacity at the local governments also limits the processes of monitoring , that's why many critics of NAADS say that it is "thin" on the ground because its impacts and presence of extension officers on the ground is not seen.

It was also reported by the respondents that there were constraints of monitoring the NAADS programme at the farmer level (farmer forum monitoring). To illustrate the point, NAADS provisions call for the establishment of the monitoring and evaluation teams comprising of farmer representatives. However findings from this survey and the available sub-county documents indicated that the frequency of farmer representatives' monitoring is irregular because it is determined by the availability of resources from the sub-county chief. Some of the members of the NAADS farmers' forum indicated that they cannot monitor far away areas because of lack of transport. Members of the farmers' forum interviewed said that they are basically dependent on reports from the villages by the Parish Coordination Committees (PCC's) which in many cases are usually shallow and unreliable to adequately address the NAADS ongoing implementation issues and challenges.

According to the NAADS provisions, the main aim of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) within the NAADS programme is to inform decisions at all levels but most importantly at the sub-county which is the level where the NAADS operations and management of the extension services are concentrated. The M&E activities at the district level according to the implementation guidelines include; participatory M&E by beneficiaries, annual process assessment, quarterly progress assessment, quarterly technical audit, semi-annual and annual reviews, annual impact assessment and thematic assessments at National level. However in reality findings indicate that some of the components, for example impact assessments are not being routinely followed. This finding confirms ITAD (2008) performance evaluation of NAADS i.e. while they observed (ITAD) that the NAADS programme is carrying out a number of potentially relevant M&E tasks, they are not part of a well-defined M&E framework and program objectives , the relevant indicators at impact, outcome, output, result and activity level are not clearly set out.

Provisions recommend that at the sub-county level, there is supposed to be a monitoring and evaluation team of five people i.e. the Sub-county Chief, Community Development Officer (CDO), Sub-county NAADS Coordinator, one subject matter specialist (SMS) and one member of the farmers' forum. Findings from the sub-counties visited indicated that there was pre-occupation with monitoring activities any time when funds are available and if the reports are available they involved simple progress reporting with no information given on measuring the program achievements e.g. enterprise adoption and changes in production to provide a baseline for future comparisons. Farmers' representatives reported that the M&E

participatory monitoring forms given to the CBFs, FF, PC etc. are too complicated for them and evidence shows that they are not being applied during the monitoring process.

At the sub-county levels there was scanty information in as far as availability of detailed monitoring reports are concerned, indicating that the monitoring committee is not doing its designated work effectively. The available reports were mainly quantitative with little qualitative information on the progress of the NAADS program. Some members of the monitoring committee at the sub-county who were interviewed indicated that they are usually invited to monitor NAADS activities and technologies when they are expecting some technical officials and politicians from the top i.e. district, NAADS Secretariat and MAAIF, therefore this is clear evidence that NAADS monitoring is on an ad-hoc basis rather than systematic. Again from my field observations it appears that NAADS is implementing an "Implementation Monitoring Approach", whereas the M&E NAADS guidelines recommend for the setting up of a results monitoring system to measure the impacts of the implementation of the programme.

Another challenge is that the farmers in their committees, for example community based facilitators and farmer forum executives are supposed to do some monitoring, but their capacity has not been built to carry out effective monitoring and be able to present reports with good qualitative and quantitative information to support the program evaluation. Another challenge identified is that individual farmers rarely keep records that can facilitate the monitoring and evaluation process. Respondents across all the districts and sub-counties surveyed complained that the Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation form provided by the NAADS Secretariat is too complicated and too long, over 10 pages. So this form is very difficult to fill and in addition the NAADS implementers at the sub-counties perceive the tool as a NAADS Secretariat tool but not their tool clearly indicating lack of ownership because it was not designed in consultation with the clients at the lower levels.

Similarly, results from key informant interviews reveal that data for planning purposes is scanty and not well organized. All the districts surveyed lacked easily accessible, accurate, well collated information and up to date data. Data needed for strategic agricultural planning, which this study noted that it was not available at sub-county levels include data on; crops, livestock and yields. The problem is even more pronounced when it comes to the availability of time series data. Time series data on agriculture is sparsely available and that which is available in some of the districts surveyed it is not current and not organized to easy access

and use. This would not permit the planners to be able to forecast and also be able to carry out trend analysis, predicting or forecasting the future. It should be noted that lack of such data and information is where problems of agricultural planning anchor.

Another challenge identified during the study at the districts levels is the lack technical capacity to process even the little data so collected, this is confirmed by the finding that in the districts surveyed the available data is in raw form on data sheets on files and in disaggregated form and in most cases not accessible to the outside users, because during the study it was witnessed that government officials hide information by giving excuses that it is secret government information. This is more so with information to do with financial information i.e. funds and expenditures.

In addition it was observed that the linkages at the different levels in the bottom up planning process are not functioning well i.e. the linkages are weak. From the levels of local council 1 and local council 3, there is lack of capacity and an equipped unit to handle information flow, dissemination and documentation. During the study there were complaints from the sub-county NAADS Coordinator that the M&E exercise carried out by the sub-county councilors is more driven by their need to be facilitated with getting facilitation in terms of allowances and not actual checkup on the performance of the NAADS program.

One NAADS Coordinator Complained that:

“Councilors during the monitoring exercises at the grassroots just go to supervise but not monitor the NAADS program and they do not prepare any monitoring reports. If you are hard on them they threaten you that they will not pass the NAADS budget in the next year’s sub-county council”.

On the issue of program monitoring, key informant interviews from technical staff and other stakeholders show that physical performance monitoring of the NAADS program in conjunction with NAADS Secretariat and the local governments is not as intense as stipulated in the NAADS monitoring guidelines. Evidence shows that physical performance monitoring is not adequate and if it is carried out it is usually done on pre-selected well performing project sites to appease the program monitors from the central government (MAAIF) and the NAADS Secretariat that the implementation on the ground is going on well.

There were also challenges in frequency and intensity of programme monitoring to ensure effective implementation. A case in point is that in reality the office of the sub-county chief

only facilitates quarterly monitoring, however operational guidelines recommend that monitoring of the NAADS programme activities should be ongoing and also monitoring should depend on the need but not on the availability of allowances and facilitation as evidence shows. Findings also indicate problems concerning the implementation of the ISFG (Integrated Support to Farmer Groups) component which is a revolving farmer technology fund. NAADS guidelines, provisions and procedures seek to provide detailed monitoring procedures of the beneficiary farmers under the revolving fund component of NAADS. There is poor monitoring of the fund and on the ground the monitoring of the ISFG component is left primarily to the farmer groups themselves. It was noted that farmers have tried to track the first round of repayment for ISFG, but the systems to track how ISFG revolves in the subsequent years is poor and the ISFG performance has not done well beyond the first year in terms of repayments. Many of the farmers involved in ISFG do not have a good understanding of how the ISFG revolving credit works, but were just encouraged to sign for the fund without the real understanding of their responsibilities and obligations and the commitment they are entering into with the NAADS secretariat and the implementers of the programme. Summary evidence as to why serious monitoring was not carried out in all the sub-county local governments surveyed points to a number of reasons;

- Lack of facilitation allowances and fuel for field staff.
- Lack of proper and updated records for example no proper documentation on the revolving fund, for example number of farmers, recovery rates etc.

It was also reported that the funds for M&E of the program activities are not adequate for all the various stakeholders (technocrats and politicians). Another reason is that, because of political pressure to the sub-county chiefs by the political head of the sub-county (local council 3 Chairmen) and councilors, some of the funds for technical monitoring are awarded for councilors for their council meetings in order to appease them that they are getting something from NAADS. Another issue of monitoring is that politicians lack the technical capacity to lead the M&E process (i.e. many of them cannot interpret the indicators to measure the program achievements) and therefore have to be guided by the technical staff as a team. Evidence shows that the politicians basically carry out “supervision” of NAADS implementation instead of monitoring to help the program achieve its objectives.

Participants in the Process Net-Map mentioned only two review meetings at district and sub-county levels in a year i.e. semi-annual and annual reviews. Evidence indicates that the

procurement committee, parish coordination committee and leaders of farmer groups only carry out quarterly monitoring but even no reports are written for follow-up. In addition it was observed that during review meetings no reports are available for discussions from the parish and village levels, which is contrary to the NAADS monitoring guidelines which recommend preparation of written reports after a monitoring exercise. It should be noted that the NAADS provisions recommend for continuous monitoring of NAADS activities as need arises.

Regarding monitoring again, there is strong evidence that the NAADS Coordinator, Parish Coordination Committee (PCC), farmer fora (FF) and local council did not monitor as required in the NAADS implementation guidelines. The monitoring process is complicated by the inadequate funding for monitoring activities. Sometimes even if the committees for monitoring NAADS activities e.g. PCC, farmer forum exist, evidence shows that this is often only on paper but the committees are not active in as far as NAADS implementation is concerned. In some cases some committees e.g. PCC committee members, though they exist on paper as members, they are not really aware of their duties and many of the committees in NAADS, members are unaware of the objectives of the committees and their duties.

Another monitoring challenge is that monitoring of the implementation of NAADS activities by the sub-county stakeholders was made difficult because of lack up to date information on the relevant parameters of NAADS performance at the grassroots levels. For example farmer contributions, number of beneficiaries, income levels, number of functioning groups etc. In addition NAADS operational guidelines provides for monitoring checklists and guidelines, however there were no monitoring guidelines at the sub-counties surveyed and the monitoring committee members interviewed at the lower levels did not know that even these monitoring checklists exist.

Other evidence from the Process Net-Map tool suggests that there is evidence of monitoring problems even at higher levels that is, the national level and the NAADS Secretariat and district levels (step 1 and 2 of the Process Net-Map). For instance respondents reported that technical officers at district level e.g. Veterinary, agriculture and the Community Development Officers (CDO) are paid allowances for monitoring and technical backstopping to go to the lower levels but after pocketing the allowances they do not go for the monitoring activities. Evidence shows that in some cases in order for these officers to account for the monitoring funds and because recommendations in the NAADS guidelines for accountability

require that these officers sign the visitors books at the offices at the sub counties, so in order to go around this accountability problem it was reported that some technical officers at the district level ask the sub-county staff they trust to bring the visitors books from the sub-county to the district headquarters and then sign the visitors books from the district. Evidence shows that this was done in order to dupe the NAADS programme auditors that they really reached the sub-counties and carried out the NAADS monitoring activity at the grassroots.

Another challenge is that in the NAADS 2012/2013 financial year budget, the budget for stakeholders monitoring has been removed and hence there are no funds for the stakeholders monitoring of NAADS activities. There was little evidence of NAADS Secretariat field monitoring at the lower beneficiary levels. The NAADS Secretariat usually carries out financial audits but little or no field monitoring. Technical staff interviewed indicated that the few staff at the NAADS Secretariat are overwhelmed by the very many districts that have been created in the country that's why in the majority of the areas visited it was basically the internal audit teams that managed to visit the sub-counties. In many cases it was reported that the audit teams have invited the NAADS Coordinators and Sub-accountants to take the books of accounts at the districts for the NAADS audits instead of them going on the ground to carry out the value for money audits with the beneficiaries themselves to clearly understand what is exactly happening on the ground.

5. Design features of the program

Advisory methods

The key issue raised with the service providers is that delivery of training of farmers in their management and handling of technologies and modern farming operations was reported as either never having been done or conducted in just part of the parishes in the sub-counties surveyed even after the inputs had been delivered to the beneficiaries. Also most of the training was more of theoretical but not practically based. The recommendation here is that the ATAAS provisions on supporting and promoting the establishment of public private partnership for technology, agri-business and market development are expedited. Additionally there is need for the service providers to always conduct training on management and handling of new technologies in more practical terms.

Another challenge reported was the poor farmer mobilization by the service providers. The respondents in the focus group discussions also complained of basically a class based training

i.e. they said that the training from the private service providers was too theoretical with limited demonstrations, therefore many of their colleagues lost interest in the class based training sessions.

Step 4 of the Process Net-Map (Figure 6.1) shows that this link is still weak in terms of farmer participation in participatory planning activities (low number of farmers attending the training). In addition if the majority of farmers are not involved in the enterprise selection and participatory planning process, this has resulted into challenges of the NAADS plans being passed that do not include the priorities and needs of the communities. Similarly, respondents reported that the low participation rates are sometimes due to the local communities' (returnees) lack of interest in advisory services but prefer provision of farm inputs and advisory services to go hand in hand.

Evidence shows that too much class based farmer trainings have caused what is commonly known as 'farmer fatigue'. This is made even worse because of the many agricultural programs from NGOs targeting the Northern region that have similar programs and trainings leading to farmers getting tired of the monotonous trainings (farmer fatigue). In addition evidence from numerous respondents indicates that the returnees are interested in farm inputs than advisory services which NAADS mainly promotes (see Chapter 8 on the results of the household survey). Here NGOs have a comparative advantage because they are giving out inputs to the farmers for free, while NAADS requires farmers to pay co-funding before they receive inputs. Therefore farmers preferred to attend NGO activities where they can gain allowances and free inputs. Respondents reported that NAADS promises take a longtime to be realized whereas in their situation they prefer immediate benefits like those from NGOs.

Field evidence indicates that in the response to the rural credit and micro-finance challenge, NAADS Secretariat tried to fill this gap by initiating a new programme component, the Integrated support to farmers' groups (ISFG) which was a revolving fund given to the NAADS affiliated farmers and ISFG was also identified as a component under the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) in the Rural Development Scheme (RDS). But findings from this study indicate that the ISFG component of NAADS was seriously abused. This is because many beneficiary farmers did not pay back to the fund and key informants indicated that there was serious issues to do with effective supervision and monitoring of the project. These findings are in line with a full evaluation of the PMA conducted in 2006 funded by DANIDA and carried out by OPM consultants of the UK where

they indicated that the monitoring and supervision structures and capacity of NAADS from the NAADS Secretariat and lower levels is still inadequate.

During the study, there were complaints by the local government officials that the NGOs contracted were not able to carry out institutional development effectively especially at the beginning of the programme where it was necessary to build a strong foundation for farmer empowerment through institutional development. Another related challenge mentioned by some of the NAADS technical personnel is that the areas of coverage are wide for the small NGOs and the Community Development Officers (CDOs). These big areas to cover require a number of expertise which may not be readily available among the local NGOs and CDOs. Findings indicate that there was no standardized training manual for institutional development to act as a guide to ensure effectiveness. Similarly findings indicate that the component of NAADS for building farmer institutions just contracted NGOs for institutional development but did not offer any trainings to build their capacity. Similarly evidence shows that, because of lack of capacity building the private sector was not able to adequately handle new emerging training needs from the farmers i.e. the required training had to be specific to handle the new emerging farmers' post-conflict challenges.

There was also reported challenges in the content for training by the privatized or contract type service providers i.e. there were numerous incidences of repetition of training topics by the new service providers contracted as a result of the short term contracts of between three to six months awarded by NAADS program. The challenge here is that different service providers were contracted from time to time so there was lack of continuity. Evidence shows that because of competition for the advisory service provision job contracts within the sub-counties, some service providers were unwilling to share information with new service providers as an entry point to new areas. It should be noted here that information sharing is very important for continuity of the training programmes and to avoid repetitions of the already covered topics.

Targeting mechanism

One of the criticisms of the NAADS programme by the key respondents interviewed is the poor coherence of the NAADS programme targeting and implementation approaches with other programmes a case in point is that the NAADS approach that tends to focus on the “active poor” or “progressive farmers” as their target group. Findings from key informants indicated that this approach of targeting in NAADS contradicts other NGOs/CSOs and

government programmes that target the extremely vulnerable persons in the post-conflict North like widows, women headed families, the poor of the poor, orphans and elderly and there are complaints already from many stakeholders that this NAADS approach and more specifically in the conflict affected region denies services to the extremely poor the majority of whom are women and the conflict affected individuals since they cannot pass the criteria of being ‘‘active poor’’ farmers. This challenge of poor targeting in NAADS also resonates with the earlier study of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) conducted in 2012 in Northern Uganda through its Foreign Student Leadership Project (FSLP), whose findings similarly showed that there are many extremely vulnerable individuals in the communities in Northern Uganda and there has not been a strong focus by the government programs for example NAADS to specifically channel support to them. It is important to target the extremely vulnerable individuals e.g. elderly, the very poor widows , war wounded etc. because even in many cases they are far from the service points e.g. sub-county headquarters where many of the program activities are concentrated leave alone the the many inaccessible areas with impassable roads for motorcycles and vehicles. In case of programs like NAADS which use self targeting, such very vulnerable individuals cannot access services and assets due to problems resulting from mobility e.g. high transport costs which they cannot afford to go to the service points, for instance to move to district and sub-county headquarters.

Field evidence shows that inputs provide by NAADS have tended to benefit a few farmers and usually those who have benefitted are the well to do who can pay the co-fundig/ matching funds for the inputs and those who have political connections at the sub-county levels. During the focus group discussions there were numerous concerns and complaints by respondents in the selection of farmers. For instance; demonstration farmers, model farmers, nucleus farmers, lead farmers who are meant to train other farmers. Interviewees complained that the selection of such farmers was not transparent. Problems have been exacerbated by the failure of NAADS to provide appropriate and effective complaints mechanisms. Evidence shows that the system of vetting complaints is just on paper but it is not working.

According to the NAADS provisions, the design of NAADS main aim was to be effective in its targeting of the beneficiaries, that is the active poor farmers and the women and youth. According to MAAIF, (2000) NAADS Master Document of the Program Task Force and Joint Donor Group, NAADS indicates a relationship between poverty and the gender. However evidence obtained from interviews and focus group discussions indicated important challenges to participation especially the problem of well to do stakeholders and community

using participation to their own advantages by capturing the NAADS resources leaving out the vulnerable members of the communities. This finding confirms the observations from earlier studies for example, Byekwaso et al. (2004), Bukenya, (2010) and Tinsley (2004) that highlighted the challenge of targeting the poor with advisory services. They argued that the main reason why small holder farmers may not adopt technologies is not because of an absence of such technologies per se but because many farmers have limited resources to operate with and this has also affected their participation in the programme activities. Parkinson (2008) in a paper that focused on the lessons emerging from NAADS implementation observed that the NAADS implementers had to deal with a delicate situation of trying to balance the principles of farmer empowerment, ownership and inclusion with its other principles and with the overall policy strategy of commercializing farming in Uganda. In addition these results support the findings of past studies on NAADS by Benin et al. (2007) which indicated that shortage of capital and credit facilities was often cited by farmers as a critical constraint facing them in addition to scarcity of agricultural inputs and lack of adequate farmland. Benin et al. (2007) is in line with my findings where they argue that due to low levels of resources by the individual members of the groups, they are unable to raise the desired amount of capital from membership contributions to adequately support their activities.

With targeting there was evidence from the focus group discussions more especially in the first phase of NAADS that a group could include relatives, wife, children and also recruit non-existent people in groups commonly known as “Ghost members”. NAADS provisions recommend for one beneficiary per household but there was evidence that this has not worked because respondents reported that many of their colleagues belonged to at least more than one NAADS affiliated farmer group in order to take advantage of the different farming enterprises. However the 2007 revised NAADS implementation guidelines, in order to fight the challenge of double beneficiaries, recommended dealing with individual beneficiaries through their own groups i.e. beneficiaries of the technologies to be elected by individual group members. However evidence shows that this administrative change has not solved this targeting challenge.

Other evidence from the Process Net- Map interviews indicate that there was a challenge of targeting because people had divergent interests for joining the farmer groups but for the sake of getting farm inputs from the NAADS program could come together. There is evidence that after getting the inputs they could sell the inputs or eat some of them for example edibles like

g/nuts and maize because agriculture is not really their interest at that time. Also in the absence of livelihoods due to the war, people are not interested in long-term returns but they just care for the day to day survival. This is the challenge of NAADS dealing in private goods of which beneficiaries can sell the inputs even at much lower prices than in the market prices. Another challenge that complicates the group targeting in NAADS is the issue of the low level of mobilization of the communities for the NAADS program. This is evidenced by the low turn up of farmers for meetings and therefore many of the farmers cannot get the required information and are not active in their groups.

In addition NAADS guidelines provide for a revolving fund where one farmer who benefits from the inputs is supposed to return part of the outputs (yields) to other farmers so that they can also benefit from the NAADS program. From the Process Net-Map and interviews with extension staff there is incredible evidence that this fund has been seriously abused by the respondents. During the survey, there were reports that farmers have abused this component of the NAADS program. For example beneficiaries selling or taking the young animals away or selling the outputs for instance cereals for example maize and then they report to the NAADS officials that they got very poor harvests. Here the NAADS officials find it difficult to prove the facts because the officials are constrained with monitoring funds and have not monitored the projects to the end. It is not evident that farmers are willing to return the little they have. Here farmers say that they are just recovering from the hard times of conflict with which they have very limited production assets. The case study evidence also points to little or very low recovery in the NAADS revolving fund component (ISFG component). The ISFG in NAADS is a form of payback , for example if a demonstration garden of cassava is set up, once the crops mature the farmers are required to give back to other other group members so that they can also benefit. This kind of pay back under ISFG component of NAADS applies also to livestock enterprises like goats , cows, pigs etc.

Evidence shows that very few of the beneficiaries if any are returning some outputs in a revolving form to other farmers. Another challenge here is that the NAADS Secretariat assumes that there is recovery and other additional farmers benefitting and that is the reason the NAADS budget is dwindling every year. Interviewees perceive that the revolving fund component of NAADS is hardly working because the farmers are not willing to pay back so that other group members can benefit. Key informant respondents mentioned that the failure of the revolving fund component of NAADS is partly due to “returnees” (former IDP residents) perceptions about being given everything for free i.e. the dependency syndrome in

Northern Uganda because of the so many humanitarian agencies giving free goods and inputs. Because of this people think that anything from government should be free and should not be paid back. Some of the respondents mentioned that they expected NAADS to use the NUSAF approach which supported individuals/groups directly with cash resources to buy for themselves what they want.

This “dependence syndrome” is implied by the statement below from a respondent:

“Just a small NGO is giving us free inputs and for you the whole government you want us to pay back/ what type of government is this asked the respondent”’?.

Other farmers also complained about the NAADS targeting, for example a farmer noted that:

“The problem with the NAADS program is that it targets very few farmers, because it does not benefit the whole village but only farmer groups and not all members of the farmer group can benefit at once, but only a few members. Other members of the group can sometimes wait for almost one year without getting the NAADS support”.

Collaboration with NGOs/CBOs

Findings indicate that formal institutional agreements and mechanisms for cooperation are lacking with insufficient coordination of different agencies involved in agricultural advisory services e.g. NUSAF, ALREP etc. Evidence indicates that this challenge is particularly important where the policies and the approaches, for example regarding incentives given to the farmers e.g. cash, food fertilizers and seeds etc. are different from those provided by NAADS and this has resulted in some confusion, duplication, and inefficient use of the scarce resources. To illustrate the point, you find that in Northern Uganda, because of the post-conflict situation a range of agencies are providing agricultural advisory services and inputs in addition to the NAADS program. These agencies include NGOs, Government programs, and projects, district farmer associations, CBOs and private companies in addition other NGOs are involved in humanitarian relief work as well as development. However evidence from key informants and employees of these agencies interviewed shows that the extent of coordination between agencies providing farm inputs and agricultural advisory services is

generally lacking. For instance it was noted that the majority of the districts visited just have lists of NGOs operating in their districts but have so failed to coordinate NGO activities with Government agencies and many of them are left to work where they either chose to work or in response to political influence. Even some of the district and sub-county political leadership interviewed in this case study showed concern about the lack of proper coordination of the work of NGOs in their respective districts and sub-counties.

Another finding was that each implementing agency has its own policies and approaches and due to limited coordination between the different agencies there is little synchronization and harmonization in the field operations of programs.

This challenge is implied by a complaint from a technical staff that:

“Most of these small NGOs rarely report to the sub-counties with their work plans, so it is difficult to harmonize their activities with their counterparts or be able to measure their combined impact” and here the problem of poor coordination is not only limited to NGOs but even big government funded programs for instance NAADS, ALREP and NUSAF”.

Findings and field observations indicate that those NGOs that have particularly targeted the conflict and post-conflict region of Northern Uganda generally provide inputs without charge (no co-funding obligation required) and in addition many of them provide transport allowances or facilitation and lunch for participants that attend training sessions and meetings. The challenge here is that this has created a serious dependency attitude amongst farmers. With the result that many of them are now reluctant to attend the training sessions by NAADS and this has been witnessed by the very low numbers of farmers attending training sessions conducted by the NAADS service providers, whereas NGO activities are well attended. My personal observations confirmed that farmers are very enthusiastic about attending NGO activities. A key informant interviewee indicated to the researcher that many farmers in the post-conflict Northern Uganda are not interested in the long-term strategic approach of NAADS but more interested on how to survive today because they are not sure of what will happen tomorrow.

Institutional arrangements and governance structures

It should be noted that, the aims of the NAADS governance structures according to the implementation provisions is largely to ensure that the program is guided within the National Planning and Implementation Framework and that there is adequate harmonization with other

government livelihoods programs with the aim of reducing the duplication of services. Although NAADS has tried to streamline its activities with the existing central and local government structures, there are still a number of governance challenges.

In terms of governance and management of NAADS, field findings from this study resonates with the evaluation of NAADS undertaken by an independent UK management consultancy ITAD limited during October to December 2007 in which one of their key findings was the lack of resources to fully implement all the PMA pillars which has affected the implementation of NAADS effectively. For instance it was envisaged that the micro-credit pillar of the PMA, the value addition (agro-processing) and market linkages pillars would go hand in hand with the advisory services of NAADS. But evidence shows that this has not taken off to the frustration of NAADS affiliated groups and the NAADS implementers alike.

Another challenge identified from the key informant interviews is the lack of coordination and creation of parallel structures within the NAADS program and other government agencies providing agricultural advisory services. To illustrate the point here, there are a number of agricultural programs in Northern Uganda funded by the government e.g. NUSAF and ALREP, but using different implementation mechanisms and sometimes using contradictory approaches to the same target group. As a result of this there is poor coordination and lack of drawing and feeding lessons into each other. Such kinds of approaches have even led to “farmer fatigue”.

In addition the introduction of the Government’s Prosperity for All (PFA) “Bonna Baggagawale” scheme (initiative) under the Rural Development Strategy (RDS) of government to operate outside the design of PMA and NAADS brought in additional challenges to NAADS. Evidence shows that some policy makers did not fully support NAADS and PMA as a vehicle for the income prosperity of the rural poor farmers. Some of the NAADS technical staff interviewed complained that the PFA is disorganizing the implementation of the NAADS program by making conflicting statements and financial promises to the farmers.

The above challenges are implied by these statements from a respondent:

“there was also duplication of work, that is to say each district and sub-county has a NAADS officer and extension workers who have the same roles”. Why should we have new extension officers

recruited under NAADS program when local governments have similar extension workers she wondered!”. She said that, this is why President Museveni at one point vowed to stop the recruitment of NAADS officials in local governments so that NAADS uses the local government workers who are not paid handsomely like the NAADS workers so that the money saved goes directly to the farmers”.

According to the NAADS implementation provisions, the key governance bodies include the NAADS parent Ministry (MAAIF) which has overall responsibility and oversight of the program but the challenge from key informant interviewees is that MAAIF is not actively engaged in the implementation and monitoring of the NAADS program. Here there is overwhelming evidence of lack of effective communication channels between the Ministry and NAADS. Evidence from key informants at the central and local government levels shows that there is already tension between the MAAIF and NAADS Secretariat. Incredible evidence was witnessed from statements made more especially from MAAIF officials interviewed for this study. This finding confirms earlier work by Rwamigisa (2011), Bukenya (2010), and ITAD (2008) who noted that there is a serious missing link and uncoordinated agricultural extension information and projects between NAADS and MAAIF.

Key informant interviewees indicated that, there are weaknesses regarding ownership of the NAADS program because of its centralized and top-down approach. For instance all program regulations for example those on budgeting, accountability of funds are made at the NAADS Secretariat without inputs from the farmers who own the program. In addition, NAADS Secretariat as the entity providing funding has set its own administrative structures and program regulations on how funds are accounted for and progress reports should be made which is different from the local governments where the program is being implemented.

Another staff member at the district NGO forum (which is an association of all NGOs working in the district) argued that:

“such top-down regulations are made to give control of the program by the implementers while giving less power to the beneficiaries who are just waiting for whatever the NAADS Secretariat offers and this is a fundamental weakness to the farmer ownership of the NAADS program”.

In terms of the governance structures of NAADS, another governance challenge identified during the study is that NAADS is one of the seven pillars of the PMA but the PMA

Secretariat does not sit on the NAADS Board of Directors (PMA Secretariat is not represented on the NAADS Board) indicating a clear gap in the management and oversight of the NAADS activities in order to ensure effectiveness, transparency and accountability i.e. the NAADS Board is the governing body of NAADS and is answerable to the MAAIF, with the NAADS Executive Director being the Secretary to the Board. But evidence from key informants shows that there is inadequate flow of information from NAADS Secretariat to MAAIF.

Demand-side challenges

1. Household level

Education level

Education is undoubtedly a key factor in ensuring higher participation in the NAADS affiliated groups. In this study the main shortcoming of respondents with no or low education was that they cannot take up roles beyond ordinary membership probably due to the feelings of inadequacy. Findings from the survey indicate that the factors that affect general participation in groups leadership were mainly education level and age.

The NAADS implementers interviewed at the sub-county level indicated that there is inadequate technical capacity and experience with the new farmer groups to prepare an acceptable group constitution as recommended in the NAADS provisions. A 2007 report by the UN found that out of the four regions of the country (East, West and South) , Northern Uganda had the lowest adult literacy rate at only 56% which is 12 percentage points lower than the national average. Findings indicate that it was difficult in filling positions of responsibility within the NAADS farmer groups. This challenge according to the interviewees became apparent during the formation of the sub-county farmer fora (SFF) and more specifically the committees for example, procurement committee where NAADS provisions required the committee members to have atleast ordinary level education.

Respondents indicated that it was really difficult to get the required group member who had all necessary education level to fill all the positions on the NAADS committees more especially the women's slots where NAADS implementation guidelines require at least 1/3 of the procurement committee members to be women (for details see section 5.1.3.1 on NAADS Structure and Functioning in the NAADS implementation guidelines, 2001).

Research findings indicate that the bureaucratic requirements for joining farmer groups posed a serious challenge to the farmers. Participants in the Process Net-Map indicated that, the requirements of a standard group constitution and matching fund contribution (co-funding) were among the most important constraints to farmers joining the NAADS affiliated groups especially for the vulnerable groups, for example the women and the youths who were mainly poor, illiterate or semi illiterate.

Another challenge was that apart from the transaction costs involved in preparing the documentation for the farmer groups to fully register at the sub-county, all this required a particular level of education to prepare and meeting financial obligations including a group registration fee. Focus group discussions indicate that the NAADS group constitutions were not easy to write for the illiterate and semi illiterate members of the communities who are the majority in the Northern region of Uganda.

Respondents indicated that their group constitutions were rejected a number of times in some cases more than two times. Interviewees indicated that the bureaucratic formal document intensive requirements and the co-funding plus registration fees to be paid by NAADS affiliated farmers groups were a general constraint and a cause for concern among farmers and the local politicians alike. Findings also indicate that the groups were required to comply with payment of a two percent matching grant of the total NAADS budget in the sub-county (co-funding) which is always cynically referred to by the NAADS affiliated farmers as “two percent”. This “two percent” was very difficult to raise by the farmers in the NAADS farmer affiliated groups.

Human capital

Findings indicate that Northern Uganda war led to many deaths, injuries and even migration of people to other peaceful areas. The quantitative survey carried out in this study indicates that 11.54% of NUSAF respondents and 7.69% of the NAADS respondents are widows and the overall percentage of widows according to the quantitative survey results is almost 10% (i.e. 9.62), for more details see subsection 8.1 in section 8 of this thesis. This effect of the war has resulted into lack of adequate labor for farming which is common in households especially those with widows, injured persons/disabled, very small households as a result of deaths or migration. Evidence shows that the absence of adequate labor in many of the households in the North has greatly decreased the self sufficiency of households and individuals and has greatly affected the agricultural production and impacted negatively on

the household food security situation. Another challenge to the availability of labor is the returnees' attitude towards farming. Originally when they were in the IDP camps most of them were idle and depending on handouts, for example food from humanitarian agencies and developed a "dependency syndrome". Evidence from the villages indicates that , returnees now see farming as very labor intensive and they do not want to work and this is even worse for the youths who basically grew up in IDP camps. A recent study by the World Bank indicates that the percentage of unemployed youth stands at more than 62% and in addition more than 400,000 Ugandan youths join the search for jobs every year. Evidence shows that youth unemployment in Northern Uganda is the highest because many of the present youths did not get education because they grew up in the IDP camps where it was difficult to access the educational facilities.

Another related challenge indicated by the key informant interviews in the districts surveyed is the problem of human resource deficiencies in the whole Northern region because of the presence of very many unskilled and unemployed youth as a result of the two decades of the LRA war. Evidence indicates that many of the youth in Northern Uganda have grown up in IDP camps without formal education , literacy, work experiences or other proficiencies to be able to obtain meaningful employment.

This is why in the implementation of NAADS and NUSAF youth require special attention and must be helped. To illustrate this point, field evidence shows that very few youths have joined the NAADS groups and according to the provisions cannot benefit from such a livelihood program and moreover the main income generating opportunity in the region is agriculture. Evidence shows that programs like NAADS which could make the youth more employable are not well structured to specifically target the youth and also make them appreciate the program. This is why the majority of the unemployed youth in Northern Uganda are pre-occupied in the informal sector e.g. Motorcycle transport business (Boda Boda) and many suffer low levels of formal skills and poor attitude to government and agriculture. An elderly respondent interviewed decried the rise in the number of youth involved in gambling.

The problems of the youths' active participation in the NAADS program activities are implied by the following statement from the Mayor in one of the town councils:

“Most of the youth in this area spend all their time loitering around, playing cards and drafts games for money instead of doing productive work. The land here is very fertile, yet they lament of poverty and yet they are sitting on gold. He said that there are also fears that the youths might become criminals if they don’t change or something is done”.

Household income

Key informant interviewees indicated that many of the poor farmers had issues with understanding their obligations towards the NAADS programme due to their attitude towards the NAADS program. For example evidence shows problems in accepting of their co-funding obligations towards the NAADS budget. NAADS implementation guidelines require that community members contribute a proportion of funds (co-funding) before they can access NAADS benefits. People thought that membership in NAADS was free. Findings indicate that the farmers’ mobilizers (the CBFs-community based facilitators) were usually faced with challenges for example convincing the farmers to pay for co-funding from the communities and changing their attitudes so that they can accept the co-funding obligation as part and parcel of the NAADS program. Findings from this survey indicate co-funding was a serious dis/incentive to join groups in a post-conflict Northern region, which is a region with chronic poverty mainly as a result of more than two decades of war conflict. This challenge of the failure of the farmers to meet their co-funding obligations in post-conflict Northern Uganda is not surprising given the fact that even in areas where people have not been impacted by the war co-funding is still a problem. For example Muwonge (2007) discovered that in Kabale district, Western Uganda which has enjoyed constant peace throughout the recent history of Uganda, many members of the NAADS affiliated farmer groups were not comfortable with the NAADS co-funding contribution.

Process Net-Map interviewees and participants in the focus group discussions indicated that it was predominantly poor women farmer groups who went through more difficulties in raising their co-funding obligations in their groups and also difficulties in meeting other requirements for registration of the groups at the sub-county level due to the transaction costs involved. The financial obligation was a constraint to the participation of the women and the youth as a vulnerable category of farmers. This finding about problems of who is included or excluded in NAADS confirms earlier work for example, failure of targeting a group among the poorest by NAADS program, which was also documented in recent studies by Bukonya

(2010) on the study of NAADS in Mukono District in Central Uganda and NAADS project evaluations (GoU, 2007).

2. Community level

Social cohesion /social capital

Respondents indicated that the impact of war led to breakdown of social relations in the communities. Respondents gave examples where neighbors and (or) relatives became enemies because of accusations of killings or belonging to different political camps i.e. either supporting the LRA or the government. Former combatants, former wives of LRA soldiers were not liked in the communities because they were regarded as killers. All these factors led to the break down of social relations which were very strong before the war conflict. Respondents indicated that the traditional ways of working collectively for example collective land preparing, weeding and planting were common before the war but now after the war these collective forms are now virtually non-existent because everybody now cares for his/her household survival and uncertain of even the security situation now or in the future. Respondents indicated that before the war, the farmers after working together even organized harvest festivals where they could cook together, eat ,drink and dance together to celebrate the end of a good harvest season.This collective labor enabled the residents to plant more acreage of land and have bigger harvests while the sharing of harvests through these community networks helped to reduce the risks and adverse conditions that lead to crop failure in the individual households. Respondents indicated that this collective action also allowed villagers to increase their food security because they could be able to prepare more land for planting crops before the onset of the rainy season. These findings are consistent with McCormac and Benjamin (2008) where they noted that because of the war conflict in Northern Uganda, engagement with the community decreased, a survivalist mentality increased and these are often replaced with a tendency for people to adopt an “each person for themselves’’ attitude.

Another challenge identified was the personal and social differences among farmers in the North at the lower levels i.e. parish and village and these also contribute to the low acceptance of extension services for example in one of the villages visited during the survey, the lead farmer under NAADS had political differences with some other villagers i.e. in this case some farmers refused to visit his farm to learn from it. One farmer said that the project (NAADS) is for the National Resistance Movement (NRM) members popularly refferedto as

Government supporters. Such is the dilemma NAADS has to deal with, a politically polarized society in Northern Uganda in order to improve its performance.

Findings indicate that there were also serious problems of mistrust in formation of groups and problems associated with free-riding i.e. evidence shows that in many NAADS affiliated groups, the commitment of the members to group activities and their unity is still wanting. Respondents attributed previous activities to group land preparation, planting and harvesting. However a number of respondents interviewed mention the challenge of increasing individualism in the communities because they say that in the IDP camps the question was “How do I survive today?”. Other respondents again mentioned differences often associated with politics in Northern Uganda, which is one of the regions which is seriously politically “Polarized” like Kibaale district in Western Uganda leading to decline in social networks and social capital. The majority of the farmers said that they preferred to work alone but not in groups because in groups they cannot get the choice of the enterprises they want but have to go with the majority decisions of the members. There is a sense of reduced trust among the farmer communities and households as reported by the interviewees and also witnessed by the various conflicts in the communities reported to the police stations in the area.

An elderly respondent complained that:

“Here in Northern Uganda, before being herded into IDP camps our farmers were very active in communal or group activities for example communal digging and harvest festivals, but this tradition has been lost for over the past 20 years. I would say this has been as a result of mistrust between friends, neighbors, and relatives as a result of past war experiences, because in some cases even neighbors became enemies and after the war many are hesitant to engage in group related activities with this mistrust on their minds”.

Another challenge identified is that there were feelings of jealousy among those farmers’ groups and individuals who did host the technology development sites while other member groups were hosts of the technologies. Here feelings of jealousy arose because those who would be beneficiaries did not get anything because of the usual budget cuts in NAADS (reductions in cash disbursements to the local governments) and they felt alienated from the NAADS program which originally during the sensitization they were told that everybody will benefit from the programme.

Farmers' needs and priorities

Findings indicate that in post-conflict, there was lack of focusing on the community's priority enterprises and also failure in choosing enterprises that suit the post-conflict conditions with a major focus on the vulnerable groups impacted by the war. Key informant interviews revealed that the major challenge NAADS programme has found in Northern Uganda is meeting the farmers' enormous expectations from the programme. Key informants revealed that although the funds from NAADS is mainly for agricultural advisory services, many farmers thought that the program will give them cash to invest and when the farmers realized that money was not forthcoming they lost interest.

Discussions with farmers affiliated to the NAADS program in the focus groups revealed their frustrations that little material support in form of inputs has been made available by NAADS far less than they had originally hoped and even the little is going on dwindling from year to year. Key informant interviewees reported that the idea of demanding for farm inputs by the farmers was especially re-enforced in the North, by the presence of many humanitarian organizations and NGOs whose activities involved giving out farm inputs and technologies to farmers. Key informant interviews revealed that the widespread expectation of material inputs and cash is related to the nature of the initial mobilization of farmers at the inception of the program where a number of promises were made more especially by the political elite coupled with widespread poverty in the Northern region and to the history of previous interventions from humanitarian agencies, NGOs and government characterized by the dependency of the communities (e.g. IDPs and returnees) on external support in the form of handouts. This demand for inputs as a motivation to join groups is not a new phenomenon, for example Datta (2005) on his study of the sustainability of community based organizations of the rural poor in Bangladesh, found out that accessing material benefits by farmers from the development program was vital for the sustainability of the farmer groups and those groups where farmers thought that they were not receiving sufficient benefits compared to the amount of time invested to ensure that the groups ran smoothly membership declined and other groups disbanded all together. Findings from this study also agree with Behera & Engel (2006) and Uphoff & Wijayaratra (2000) who also noted that the motivation of farmers to join and also stay in groups is the achievement of benefits from participation mainly in terms of material benefits as a reward for the participant's efforts and farmers weigh in on the opportunity costs in group activities given their voluntary nature.

This motivation for material inputs is implied by a statement from a NAADS affiliated group leader who said that:

“When people don’t see the material support they lose hope and the majority of the farmers don’t see mere advice as real support”.

The key informant interviews revealed that, there was still lack of integration of the program with other crucial of PMA components like credit and micro-finance services. Evidence shows that because of lack of input technologies and credit services the poor farmers encounter constraints to acquire technologies in order to apply the knowledge they have obtained from the advisory component of NAADS.

In a key informant Interview with the Chairman LC 3 in one of the sub-counties and a prominent farmer, he explained that:

“There is ever increasing decline in attendance at NAADS trainings. Overtime the farmers have become less enthusiastic about NAADS training activities. There is a growing apprehension about the classroom based advisory services without inputs. There is training fatigue with the farmers. In some cases attendance for trainings on advisory services has even dropped to 1/10 of the number of farmers expected for the training”.

Several key informants cited the same reasons that the response to the trainings depended on peoples’ expectations for material assistance more specifically in the post-conflict situations and if these expectations are not met, for example like other NGOs which give material assistance hence response and attendance will be low. During the Interviews many politicians complained that without substantial tangible inputs, they believed that the farmers were not getting much support from the NAADS finances sent to their sub-counties which are reported by the local leaders to be quite substantial in the beginning but dwindling at the moment.

Decline in interest of NAADS activities is implied in the statement below:

“during the first years of NAADS 2001/2002 there was rapid formation of farmer groups while the other groups were formed opportunistically just to capture the NAADS resources but without even standard requirements as per the NAADS provisions. He gave an example of some cases where even a dormant group, which was not active at all, re-awakens in order to capture the NAADS farmer inputs and resources. He also explained that another challenge of

sustainability of groups is that there were also cases of dubious farmer groups formed to just benefit from the NAADS assets”. (retired (DAO) / former NAADS Coordinator).

The DAO’s comments echoes earlier findings by Bukenya (2011) in Mukono district, Uganda and similar patterns that can be found in previous studies e.g. Mutimba and Luzobe (2004) on farmer organizations in Uganda and Zimbabwe where there was formation of “opportunistic farmer groups” and on how groups form in response to artificial interests which is usually stimulated by the NGOs in the area which usually provide material incentives to be able to obtain quick results and therefore creating a culture of dependency in rural areas as a result of external NGOs. This finding of the need for material inputs from the impoverished war affected communities of Northern Uganda is not seriously disputed given the fact that it is also the order of the day in other regions of Uganda which have not been affected by war conflict. For example Bukenya (2010) on his study of NAADS in Mukono district, central Uganda region noted that farmers exhibited a dependency syndrome derived from previous government programs like the Agricultural Extension Programs (AEP) which had a top-down approach and external humanitarian agencies which could give out handouts and whereby farmers were willing to accept anything of benefit to them even if it is of poor quality if they know they can use it for something.

Other findings indicate that in the very beginning of the NAADS in 2001 in Northern Uganda , the local leaders and communities during the on-going war interpreted NAADS as a program for government direct assistance to farmers and communities affected by war conflict and therefore participation and enthusiasm for NAADS program was high. In this study participation was reflected in regard to attendance of farmers in NAADS training activities and also participation in their farmer groups. Evidence shows that women showed more enthusiasm in terms of belonging to the NAADS groups because the men are more interested in material inputs and cash rewards.

In addition information from key informants indicated that men were enthusiastic about NAADS because of the inputs and technologies provided, but were less inclined in joining farmer groups and participating in group activities regularly. Similarly the general view from the focus group discussions and personal observations in the community NAADS meetings in all the sub-counties visited during the study was that the youths were less involved in NAADS related activities especially in terms of membership in the NAADS farmer groups compared to the women and men.

NAADS implementation provisions provide for a comprehensive, participatory process to provide a means for farmers to articulate their enterprise preferences (i.e. NAADS strategy of farmer empowerment) starting at the lower levels of farmer groups and resulting in each subcounty identifying three priority enterprises. In the focus group discussions it was indicated that this provision was not adhered to. To illustrate this point, concerns were raised by the farmers that their decisions were sometimes influenced and in some cases overridden by the politicians in the process of enterprise selection. Farmers complained that there were instances where the technical staff influenced the process of identifying the enterprises indicating that the process was more of “top-down” and not a demand led process that was intended in the NAADS enterprise selection provisions.

In addition the issue of mixed cropping specifically for food security for the poor farmers was not given due consideration, for instance with a limit of only three enterprises many farmers found their preferred enterprises were not included and seriously affected the resource poor farmers in particular. Because of this challenge, findings indicate that there were incidences where some farmers opted out of the NAADS program. These observations particularly the influence of politicians and technocrats on farmers’ needs and priorities have undermined the NAADS provisions and demoralized the farmers whose priorities were rejected.

One local politician commented that:

“The new “Enterprise Mix” approach being promoted by NAADS in the post-conflict regions is just in theory but cannot work because the people of the North have unique challenges like household food security which need to be addressed first and foremost”.

Note: The enterprise mix is an approach in which different combinations of commercial and food security activities are available, taking into account of the agro-ecological zone and the size of the land holdings.

According to the NAADS implementation guidelines (2009), the selection of farmer enterprises under NAADS affiliated groups is supposed to be demand driven and provisions recommend that the selection process for enterprises should be bottom up approach to ensure active participation of all the beneficiaries. During the study, many farmers expressed reservations about a limited number of enterprises (only three enterprises) to be prioritized by

farmers as per the NAADS enterprise selection guidelines. It was a common feeling during the focus group discussions that the enterprise selection method recommended by the NAADS implementation guidelines tended to favor commercial enterprises that require high capital inputs and large pieces of land and capital, therefore putting the vulnerable groups i.e. the poor of the poor, IDP returnees, women and youths at a disadvantage.

Following the focus group discussions, it was noted that during enterprise selection the guidelines are not critically followed. A key informant at the sub-county indicated that, in reality the usual practice is that the process is a rather centralized top-bottom process because the final decisions are made at the sub-county and district levels respectively usually with the advice of the NAADS Secretariat, because NAADS is also interested in its overall strategy of zoning. Zoning is whereby a specific crop (s) is grown in one zone in order to promote bulk marketing. Similarly, there were also complaints that enterprise selection decisions made by farmer groups in the sub-counties were reversed at the district level allegedly by some district NAADS coordinators and district political heads for their own selfish interests.

The challenges that arise from this top-bottom approach of enterprise selection is the low sense of ownership of the enterprises and this is witnessed by the neglect of enterprises supported by NAADS as seen in some of the areas during this survey. Evidence from the field study shows that in some cases the beneficiaries are not taking good care of the technologies and in many instances the beneficiaries sold off the inputs because such technologies were not their first priority after all . Evidence shows a number of goats and pigs sold in a few days or a few weeks after NAADS has provided them to the beneficiaries is common in the area.

Evidence also shows that there is limited involvement of the youths in NAADS activities because their needs and priorities have not been addressed by the NAADS program. Findings from the study indicate that the main disincentives and constraints for the youth full involvement in NAADS activities include; bad attitude towards farming, limited capital to apply knowledge received from the trainings and technologies resulting in failure by the youths to get material support from NAADS and as a result the youths preferred to prioritize other fast rewarding activities for example Boda Boda (motor cycle) transport business, retail trading i.e. buying and selling produce, brick making and some artisan activities.

Another challenge for the active involvement of the youths is the negative attitude to farming, many of the youths were said to prefer handouts since the majority grew up in IDP camps

where handouts of food and other basic materials were the order of the day and comparison with farming which they say involves hard labor and does not offer quick returns. Many of the youths the researcher interacted with said that they would rather prefer other enterprises like brick making, charcoal burning and retail trade which are favourable for the day to day survival.

The above concerns and challenges to participation of the youth in agricultural development programs for example NAADS resonates with earlier work by Nuwagaba (2006) and Parkinson (2008) where they observed that the negative attitudes towards agricultural work among the general population of the youths in Uganda was one of the constraints to poverty alleviation in the country and it is a worse scenario in post conflict northern Uganda where basically the majority of the youths grew up in camps for two decades depending basically on handouts from humanitarian agencies and government.

The above challenges are implied by a complaint below from a local leader:

“During sensitization and information on radios about NAADS, it was always emphasized that the largest percentage of the NAADS funds is to benefit us directly the farmers, but most of the NAADS funds was being paid to the trainers (advisory service providers). Here farmers perceive that the NAADS program was more concerned to benefit the advisory service providers who are being paid handsomely for their ‘lip services’ than to address our needs of material technology inputs i.e. improved seeds and livestock”.

There was also disappointment by farmers in the focus group discussions who showed concern that the privately hired agricultural advisory service providers were at many times paid to provide monotonous training which have been conducted a number of times by the NAADS advisory service providers and also trainings by agricultural based NGOs and CBOs in the area. The interviewees singled out trainings on banana production, organic manure making and cereal production as trainings that have become monotonous and class based where it was even common for the farmers to be provided with pen and exercise books to take notes with limited practical training if any.

Local organization capacity and culture

According to the NAADS Act enacted in 2001, the implementation of NAADS is through farmer empowerment. The PEAP 2004/2005 – 2007/2008 defines empowerment in Uganda’s context as “all those processes where women and men take control and ownership of their lives”. In NAADS empowerment implies that the NAADS affiliated groups should be proactive, be able to demand what is due to them and not just accepting what is provided, being able to challenge whoever is accountable and their ability to network amongst themselves to build bigger capacity for effective participation and presenting their demands. Here a major principal of empowerment and ownership in such situations is that the voices of the majority of the farmers should be heard in decision making and accountability at local and central levels government levels. Findings from this survey show that this is still missing to a large extent in the NAADS implementation.

In order to achieve the objectives of the NAADS program, a number of farmer level institutions have been formed for the effective implementation of the program, for example the Farmers’ Forum (FF), Procurement Committees (PC), Parish Coordination Committees (PCCs), Farmer Forum Executive Committee (EC), Implementation Committee and Technical Committee. Various studies, for example Bukenya (2010), Benin et al. (2007) and Hussein (2001) have shown that strong farmer groups and other institutions with collective action are very important for effective agricultural extension delivery because they can help the farmers achieve the economies of scale. This is because these collective institutions can be able to lower the transaction costs by pooling the resources of the poor farmers together. However, evidence from this survey shows that on the ground there are various disincentives/constraints that have continued to be major reasons for a relatively low response by the farmers and their institutions to NAADS activities more especially at the sub-county level.

The growing dissatisfaction about the NAADS implementation among a good number of farmers and farmer groups during the study was indicated in the numerous complaints about NAADS in the communities, including numerous complaints of corruption by the NAADS technical personnel at sub-county levels and influential politicians, especially at district levels. Another challenge identified from key informants is that the promoters of NAADS emphasized that the program was part of a wider package where the need for production capital and market for agricultural produce would be assured and this as a result was

misunderstood especially with the politicians who were supposed to mobilize the communities and hence through their sensitization about NAADS, this heightened farmers expectations because they told the farmers that through NAADS they were assured of inputs and credit to improve their agricultural production.

Findings from the focus group discussions and interviews indicate that the number of active farmer groups affiliated to the NAADS program is going on dwindling from year to year. This has even been witnessed by the low attendance of trainings and NAADS group activities by farmers. Findings indicate that in many cases as low as less than 10% of the expected participants attending the trainings. Findings indicate that at the beginning of the NAADS programme, there were high level of enthusiasm generated among the farmers and the local communities at large. This high attendance resulted in the formation of very many of NAADS affiliated groups.

Findings indicate that this was due to the expectations of the farmers in the beginning that NAADS would give them material and financial support. Therefore as time passed, farmers realized that what they expected was not forthcoming and found out that the main objective of NAADS is to offer agricultural advisory services and hence many group members especially the youths lost their initial high interest in NAADS. Similarly, findings indicate that in the beginning of the NAADS programme in Northern Uganda there was enthusiasm in the program and eventually with time many NAADS affiliated groups collapsed or declined in activity. This disappointment is shown in the views of the farmers in the focus groups discussions where they argued that, the issue they face is not a lack of agricultural knowledge per se but it is the lack of financial assistance to acquire the technologies by the farmers to apply the knowledge which they say they already have. A key informant indicated that, considering the range of constraints farmers faced in the conflict and post-conflict conditions, farmers saw technology development activities (seeds and livestock) offering more immediate benefits for their food security and survival than advisory (extension) services predominantly offered by NAADS.

According to the NAADS implementation guidelines, it was evident that NAADS affiliated farmers' groups have rules, regulations and constitutions in place governing them, but it was noted that these are usually on paper because the members' adherence to these regulations governing their groups is ineffective. To illustrate this point, is that many of the farmer groups did not have evidence of minutes for regular meetings showing a weakness of the

farmer institutions. It was noted that some farmer groups have adopted constitutions just as a condition to satisfy the requirements for group registration under the NAADS program in order to be able to get support from the program. There was evidence that some of these groups disband after opportunistically getting the support in terms of farm inputs and technologies. In addition it was noted that there were problems of some farmers joining several groups to maximize the support and denying other members from benefitting from the program. In addition this leads to divided royalties in terms of time and support given to particular groups and this inevitably causes weaknesses in groups because a member cannot effectively handle all these responsibilities required from the groups. The survey also found out that leadership in farmers' institutions is mainly dominated by the rural elite i.e. those who are mostly secondary school drop outs.

It was noted that there was still low capacity among farmer structures such as village farmers forum executives and procurement committees especially in record keeping, NAADS monitoring and its impact. Evidence indicates that no capacity building was organized for the sub-county farmer forum to monitor the programs i.e. in the sub-counties surveyed there was no evidence of any capacity building for the farmer forum in M&E of NAADS activities. Evidence also indicates that there is lack of information by farmers on their entitlements, for example how much farm inputs they are entitled to or the number of trainings by the private service providers. It should be noted that for the farmers to take the program as their own and demand accountability from the providers they need easy to understand information, however findings indicate that farmers as clients of the NAADS service are not given information on what they are entitled to.

The success of the NAADS program is hinged on the capacity of the various structures to effectively perform their roles and duties. Therefore there is need for continuous capacity building and sensitization of their roles and responsibilities especially on the concepts and importance of monitoring and evaluation. Findings indicate that many of the procurement committee members lack the required technical capacity to handle the procurement process for example how to evaluate farm input supply bids effectively. This challenge undermines the efficiency of the procurement committee as a very important farmer committee which ensures that good quality inputs are provided to the beneficiaries.

Land availability and tenure security

Field evidence indicates that if land issues in Northern Uganda are not dealt with they are bound to negatively affect the implementation of NAADS since all the activities implemented need the access of land by the communities in order to take place. The over 19 year gruesome war led by the LRA displaced many individuals breaking up families and friends. The eventual government resettlement program as the war receded saw the return of people to their villages. This process of return however, translated into a big challenge to the land tenure system for the local communities, households, youths born in the camps and the elders alike.

Evidence during this survey shows that these land based conflicts have emerged in the Northern region of Uganda. Boundary demarcation challenges, border disputes between clans, individuals and villages, land grabbing by the investors, trespass, human–animal conflict on the land has been the norm according to the respondents interviewed.

Conflicts over land in Northern Uganda affects food security because a field of land which is contested may not be used for productive purposes because of the high risk of investment. Findings indicate that land belonging to the indigenous people in some areas has been illegally obtained by some government officials, local and foreign investors and many attempts to safeguard such land , according to the key informants has met stiff resistance resulting into deaths and injuries. For instance many animals under re-stocking program of NAADS have been killed on the disputed lands. Evidence shows that the weak dispute resolution traditional structures caused by the war, coupled with the general lack of information on the existing land laws and policies and other enabling instruments are a very big threat to the lives and the volatile peace and a major obstacle to the implementation of agricultural recovery programs like NAADS and NUSAF in the post-conflict region of Northern Uganda.

In Northern Uganda it is the men who control the land but women also have some rights to use the land. The majority of women don't own the land and all decisions on investment on land are made by the men. This lack of control of the productive resources by the women has also affected their effective participation and decision making in the NAADS affiliated farmer groups. This finding corroborates with findings by Weinberger & Jütting (2001) who noted that one of the favourable conditions for women's participation in local organizations is

the availability of productive resources to them, for example land, level of income and the education level of the NAADS programme beneficiaries.

Gender issues

The NAADS operational guidelines mandate the gender inclusiveness in the NAADS program with special emphasis on women. However many of the interviewees perceive that this is usually on paper but rarely done. Field evidence on implementation of NAADS in Northern Uganda has shown that women have not been empowered according to the program's implementation provisions. It has been noted that in many cases even women have been marginalized in as far as decision making in groups is concerned, for example in decisions concerning procurement, leadership positions etc. Given the challenge of sustaining farmer groups in NAADS, it is easier for women groups to use group solidarity approach than men and women in the same village can easily organize together. This has been shown by the regular attendance of NAADS activities by women more than men according to information on attendance by women in NAADS activities obtained from the sub-counties.

Other evidence from this study has shown that women have also proved better keepers of money and other assets in NAADS affiliated groups than their male counterparts and women also play an important part in as far as good nutrition and household food security is concerned. This finding is also confirmed by other studies, for example in Bangladesh, where it was noted that women can take good care of household savings and farmer group savings and also play an important role in household food security (Birner et al., 2010).

It should be noted that women in Northern Uganda are key in the households because they ensure food security and moreover in the post-conflict Northern Uganda women face unique challenges because many of their husbands were killed during the war and as widows they are the head of their families (for more details refer to section 8 on the household survey). It has been noted during this field study in Northern Uganda that it is the women who work longer hours in the farm fields in order to feed their families while many men are in towns looking for casual work. This finding is corroborated by the study of Najjingo & Sseguya (2004) on their study of gender dimensions of rural producers' organizations in Central Uganda. They found that though the women farmers dominated the groups in terms of numbers, their participation in group decision making was limited.

Available statistics at the national level, for example UBOS (2010) shows that 90% of the rural women in Uganda work in the agricultural sector compared to 53% of rural men, however women own only 17% of productive land. This means men own 83% of the agricultural land. Unfortunately another challenge that has impacted negatively on the implementation of NAADS is that in Northern Uganda rural women are often denied access to land and property from which they could derive livelihoods to ensure food security for the household. It should be noted that Article 26 of the Constitution of Uganda provides that women have the same right as men to have property that they can keep alone or share with other people and no one should deprive them of their property. This has been witnessed by a number of conflicts concerning livestock inputs and access to land in NAADS affiliated groups.

Other findings from the NAADS affiliated farmer groups indicated that the leadership of the lower level farmer institutions e.g. Farmer Forum (FF), Procurement Committee (PC), Parish Coordination Committee (PCC) is predominantly composed of men, while evidence shows that women are the higher number of members in the majority of the farmer groups surveyed. This finding indicates the problems of exclusion because in terms of decision making processes the women are not equal participants. One of the reasons given for this is the education requirement for participation on the procurement committee (at least secondary level), of which many of the women do not have this qualification. These findings agree with earlier work by Mwaka (2009) on the needs assessment study of PRDP in Northern Uganda on the participation of the women in planning, design and implementation of programs where the study revealed that majority of women (54.2%) said that they rarely participate and only a very small percentage of 7.2% said they participate fully in PRDP and the major observation here is that involvement of women is done for accountability purposes to donors and aiming at achieving gender targets in terms of numbers. I agree with the author that such involvement of women can only show results at output but not at outcome levels.

In addition, findings indicate that at monitoring level of NAADS activities, this activity is carried out by purely technical people and political leaders of which very few of them are women. This finding indicates that women in the rural areas of Northern Uganda are mainly only engaged as respondents and not active participants and this limits the ownership of the program. Similarly lack of active involvement of women in NAADS implementation prevents the demand for accountability from the private agricultural service providers by the majority of the service beneficiaries who are the women. I argue that the majority of the

NAADS beneficiaries are women because evidence from the survey of NAADS affiliated farmer groups in Northern Uganda indicated that the majority of members in the groups are women.

3. Local government level and central level

Political interference

Evidence shows that there was a challenge of different expectations of the beneficiaries, politicians and NAADS implementers alike from the NAADS program. Findings indicate that there is still a growing uneasiness with politicians especially the LC 3s (sub-county political leaders) and the Sub-county NAADS Coordinators in as far as NAADS implementation is concerned. The LC 3 politicians up to now still expressed concern why NAADS is more concerned about the advisory services while dedicating just a very small budget on the provision of agricultural assets and inputs. During the study there was incredible evidence in the differences in perceptions between the political leadership more especially LC 3s who clearly favored offering more material supplies, for example inputs like improved seeds, fertilizers and agricultural assets while the NAADS implementers and administrators supported giving priority to agricultural advisory services to farmers. Findings indicate that the political leadership at the sub-county (LC 3) where the NAADS implementation activities take place have interfered in the NAADS implementation whereby they want almost all the NAADS budget at the sub-county to provide inputs and technologies to farmers.

The Sub-county NAADS Coordinators interviewed indicated that these two opposing opinions about NAADS between the technical and political divide have created tension between these two stakeholder groups i.e. the political and technical wing and has made the implementation of the NAADS program very difficult for the NAADS Coordinators without the much needed political support in the mobilization of the farmers. One of the sub-county NAADS Coordinator interviewed cited a case where a local politician mobilized the farmers against attending the trainings offered by the private agricultural service providers and advised them to first make demands for material agricultural inputs and technologies.

Evidence from the sub-county NAADS Coordinators interviewed indicated that another cause of this strained relationship between the technical wing and the politicians was also as a result of the NAADS implementation guidelines of 2001 banning politicians to be involved in

NAADS implementation activities, so the politicians felt alienated from decision making in as far as NAADS implementation was concerned. It should be noted that this ban was aimed at avoiding conflict of interest problems more especially with the political elite during the implementation of the NAADS program (NAADS Act, 2001). Respondents indicated that in some cases politicians expected to receive a direct share of the benefits (farm inputs e.g. seeds and fertilizers) without necessarily having to follow the set official NAADS implementation guidelines.

This perception by politicians that they have to directly benefit from government development programs is also echoed by (Moncrieffe, 2004) who noted that:

“political competition has been a major driver of corruption in Uganda, this is because elections are very expensive,time intensive to contest and many candidates have become severely indebted and therefore when they join office they resort to corruption to recover the lost funds lost during the campaigns” (pp.17).

Findings indicate that there were also cases of interference by politicians more especially at the lower sub-county levels, i.e. campaigning against the co-funding policy of the NAADS programme. Findings indicate that this behavior by some of the politicians was generally caused by the nationwide perception that NAADS has substantial financial resources from the government directed to all farmers. This perception resulted in the politicians suggesting to farmers that NAADS implementers should not put pressure or demands on them to pay a co-funding contribution as already the government gives NAADS large sums of money meant for farmers.

One of the sub-county NAADS Coordinators interviewed also complained of the challenge he is facing while implementing the NAADS program. He said that he has faced the challenge of handling the politicians. He indicated that the NAADS program is facing unrealistic expectations and demands from local politicians, for example the politicians always want to show their power and many feel that they and all their constituents should benefit from the NAADS program in form of farm input provision. He gave an example that his LC 3 Chairman is his political boss and can report him directly to the District political boss (LC 5 chairman), so it is very difficult for a mere civil servant like him to resist the wishes of the political boss and hence he faces a serious challenge of striking the balance

between technical implementation of NAADS according to the official guidelines and politics.

The process influence Process Net-Map (figure 6.1) uncovers the challenge of political capture and elite capture. The NAADS guidelines recommend that the chairperson of the Parish Procurement Committee is the chairperson local council 1, however by law the chairperson local council 1 is a member of the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party and this has led to the challenge of ownership of the parish procurement committee because there is evidence that many members of other political parties do not own this committee.

As one respondent mentioned:

“This is an NRM committee (Parish Procurement Committee composed of only members of NRM), if you do not support them you will not get any benefit from NAADS so there is no need to join their groups”.

Political patronage was also evident as a result of involvement of local council 1s in the villages and local council 2 in the parishes where the politicians call a meeting per village on the formation of procurement committees at the village and parish level. In NAADS phase 2 the Parish Coordination Committees chairmen are also chairmen of the local council 2. According to the new NAADS operational guidelines 2007, it was thought that involvement of local council 2 as chairmen of Parish Coordination Committees could result into transparency but instead it caused bias especially in farm input procurement. The chairman LC 2 is also a member of the parish coordination committee, so he has a lot of influence on who is mobilized to benefit from the program. This political influence is implied by the statements below:

“The local councils are in their own thing in as far as NAADS implementation is concerned because they are the voices of the NRM ruling party”(Respondent).

Another respondent said:

“Who can challenge the chairmen of the sub-counties? .These chairmen call themselves the Presidents of the sub-county and they always brag that if it is not due to their political influence we would not have benefitted from the NAADS program”.

Respondents indicated that because of this so called political power and popularity, these political powers at the higher level always over-ride the decisions of the lower NAADS farmers' committees (for example PC, FF, and EC). Respondents indicated that the politicians, for example LC 3 can influence the Community Procurement Committee to offer input supply contracts to their political henchmen or family members.

Evidence from the Process Net-Map (figure 6.1) indicated that the political influence and capture was also evident when a local council 1 chairperson or local council member comes to the beneficiaries and claim credit for having provided the inputs to the farmers. This is because the local council 1 chairman is a powerful member of the Procurement Committee. Respondents indicated that they cannot even reject poor quality inputs because they are afraid of the influential politicians and they are scared that if they reject the inputs they will not have another opportunity to receive them again. If they reject the poor quality inputs they are branded by the NRM Government supporting politicians as being anti-government development programs. This observation is confirmed by the farmers in the focus group discussions who reported that they have little influence on the quality of inputs i.e. the farmers just receive the inputs and believe other stakeholders involved in the procurement process have played their part.

Conflict of interest

Findings from the focus group discussions indicated that many of the local politicians more especially the LC 3s chairmen and district councilors who are supposed to monitor the quality of work of NAADS are at the same time suppliers of NAADS inputs and technologies. Respondents indicated that these politicians have private companies but they hide in other people to disguise ownership. So when beneficiaries try to complain about the quality of services and assets offered by NAADS, the politicians shut them down because these are their own people. Findings indicate that even local government extension workers formed their own private companies and this was more so with advisory services where they took advantage of lack of competition in Northern Uganda due to lack of adequate private advisory service providers in order "to share on the NAADS cake" as commonly said in NAADS private service provision community.

Other conflict of interest issues is when the representatives of the farmers, for example the members of the Farmer Forum are involved in the private supply of agricultural inputs to the NAADS program and distribution of technologies and demonstration gardens to their own

farms, relatives or croonies. These findings agree with Opendo (2005) on his study of the implementation of the NAADS program in Kabale district Western Uganda where he noted that the beneficiaries in the district complained of their farmer representatives i.e. farmer forum members of poor leadership because they were engaged in illegitimate activities for example locating the agricultural technology trials on their own fields, being pre-occupied with demanding high sitting allowances for services which are voluntary and demanding for kickbacks from contractors with a promise of awarding them contracts.

6.3 NUSAF implementation process in practice

6.3.1 Implementation process of NUSAF using the process Influence-Mapping procedure

Here the description of the NUSAF implementation of the procurement process is based on Process Net-Map interviews with the stakeholders who take part in the procurement process of agricultural assets and inputs.




Figure 6.5: NUSAF procurement process Net-Map

The first step (Step 1) in figure 6.5 is that the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) provides guidelines to the relevant districts for the sensitization, dissemination and implementation

guidelines of NUSAF. The NUSAF District Technical Officer (NDTO) carries out sensitization at the district level with NUSAF officials from OPM. In order to ensure effective implementation at least one member from the NDTO goes with the district team to the sub-county for technical backstopping during sensitization (steps 1 , 2 and 3). During the sensitization at the sub-county the implementation guidelines are distributed to the lower local leaders who sensitize the lower levels and also hand over basic information about NUSAF implementation. It is the duty of the sub-county Community Development Officer (CDO), sub-county technical team and facilitators to sensitize the farmers at parish and village levels about NUSAF implementation. The local leaders at the lowest level of parish and village level help in the mobilization of the communities.

In NUSAF 1 it was the NUSAF Monitoring Unit (NUMU), the NDTO through the district leadership who were responsible for recruiting the NUSAF facilitators whose role was to help the communities to come up with fundable proposals for NUSAF sub-projects. After the facilitators were recruited and trained they go to the communities in the sub-county to facilitate the sub-project groups to generate project proposals. After the preparation of the sub-project proposals, the facilitator submits the generated sub-project files to the sub-county Community Development officer (CDO), who is the sub-county NUSAF technical officer to verify the files to see whether the projects comply with the provisions of NUSAF for funding. At this point the CDO is assisted by the sub-county technical team for both technical and field appraisal of the sub-project proposals (see Steps 7 and 8 of the Process Net-Map figure 6.5). After the appraisal process at the technical level, the Sub-county Chief invites the LC 3 executives to look at the sub-project proposals to ascertain whether they meet the specifications and they endorse (put a stamp) on the proposals to be sent at higher level (district). At this point findings indicate that in reality the LC 3 executives do not go through the projects files but just stamp and approve the projects.

After the proposals are approved by the political wing of the sub-county (step 9 of fig. 6.5), they are sent by the sub-county CDO to the NUSAF technical officer at the district who sends the sub-project files to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) for the technical approval of the projects and at this point the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), NDTO and District Technical Planning Committee (DTPC) sit and approve the qualified projects, which are later endorsed by the District Executive Committee and the LC 5 Chairman stamps on the approved projects (step 12). After this step, the project files are sent to the OPM for approval.

Findings however indicate that here at step 13 and 14 in reality the project files are not sent physically to OPM in Kampala but what happens is that a technical person from OPM comes to the districts to look at the proposals and approve them. Here the list of approved proposals is approved by NUMU through their representative. After the projects are approved, the information is displayed at the district and sub-county notice boards of the approved projects. Announcements of the approved projects are also made on the local radio stations.

Through the district NUSAF technical officer, the information is sent to the facilitators to guide the sub-project groups leaders to open bank accounts in order to be able to access the sub-project funds. Immediately the accounts are opened, the OPM then clarifies with the CAO and then funds are released to the sub-project accounts. After the funds are released, the beneficiaries decide on the procurement modality through their committees i.e. the Project Management Committee (PMC) and the Procurement Committee (PC) (step 19 of fig.6.5).

The procurement method can either be the community procurement method involving a supplier to purchase agricultural inputs or another option is that the beneficiaries themselves through their relevant committees could purchase the inputs or assets themselves. For the purchase of Oxen for plowing their fields the farmers preferred to purchase the animals themselves. For this purchase to happen, three leaders of the farmers group i.e. the chairman, the treasurer plus the secretary (who are signatories) to the bank account are the ones who are supposed to withdraw funds from the sub-project's bank account. But they also need a letter of recommendation from the parish to confirm that they are the signatories. This letter is presented to the bank (in this case DFCU Bank) in order to withdraw funds. In NUSAF 1 the funds were usually withdrawn from Stambic bank, whereas in NUSAF 2 this was changed to DFCU bank after a lot of corruption and collusion to siphon off NUSAF funds was reported in Stambic Bank.

After the money is withdrawn, the selected members of the CPMC and in some occasions accompanied by the facilitator go to the nearby market to purchase the animals of their choice. After the completion of the transactions a stamped receipt is supposed to be provided by the supplier of animals at the market for accountability purposes. But in many cases the suppliers of these animals can only access cash sale receipts from nearby retail shops which are not accepted by NUSAF for accountability of large amounts of money. So what happens in reality is that members of the Procurement Committee (PC) looks for the receipts and put on the amount of money they see it duly fit and then keep the "difference" for themselves. The

transport of the livestock was paid from the money that was withdrawn from the sub-project group but some of the beneficiaries interviewed said that this was usually inflated by the PC.

When it came to the distribution of animals, the sub-project group members used the lottery method as the method to fairly distribute the animals to the group members but findings indicate that in a number of cases this method was not used and as a result this led to some influential members of the group to be able to get animals of their choice. Finally, all the expenses in the form of receipts for accountability are handed over to the CDO (NUSAF technical officer) at the sub-county. Each family within the group received a pair of Oxen and Ox-plough. The group as per the implementation guidelines was also supposed to receive additional follow-up support for buying assets like barbed wire and for the veterinary care but field evidence shows that at the end of the day challenges arose on the side of the livestock beneficiaries because these steps in the procurement implementation process were not effectively implemented.

6.3.2 Levels of influence by the different actors in NUSAF implementation

Figure 6.6 below shows the influence levels of the different actors involved in NUSAF implementation, for the procurement of community assets as perceived by the interviewed sub-project beneficiaries that received livestock, in this case Oxen under the NUSAF programme. Here the respondents rated the level of influence of the different actors on the quality of inputs procured on a scale of 0-6 and in this case a good procurement outcome was described as the delivery of the community inputs, assets, technologies and in this case the assets were Oxen which were expected to be of good quality, right quantity and delivered in time to the intended beneficiaries.

In NUSAF 2 the contractor (supplier) gets the maximum score of 6 indicating that they have the highest influence on the quality of agricultural assets provided to the beneficiaries. The reasons given to this ascribed level of influence is that the supplier since he is the one who buys the animals he can choose whatever quality of animal and the farmers just receive.

The NUSAF facilitator gets a high score of 5 on the scale of 0-6. The reason given by the participants in the Process Net-Map is that usually the facilitator knows the suppliers and can also negotiate on the prices on behalf of the sub-project groups because the farmers believe that he knows more than they do. Respondents mentioned cases in which the facilitators collude with suppliers to bring them poor quality animals and inputs. The procurement

committee gets a score of 4. Respondents said that some of the members have a say on the prices of animals and in some cases they can go to the market and procure by themselves.

The NUSAF district technical officer and contractor and technical staff at the district and sub-county get a score of 3. The reason given is that, during contracting the district technical officer can influence the procurement process by recommending certain supply companies where she/he has influence to the CPMC or procurement committees. The technical officers in some cases verify the quality of supplies. Respondents mentioned that the politicians, some of them have their supply companies can influence the selection of certain individuals who in many cases do not have the ability to supply quality inputs.

The District Veterinary Officer (Veterinary Doctor) gets a score of 3 on a scale of from 0-6. The Veterinary officer has an influence on the quality especially for the livestock re-stocking project (cattle, Oxen, Goat). This is because before the livestock is distributed to the beneficiaries he has to verify that they are of good quality in terms of health and size. Since all the sub-counties visited during the do not have veterinary Doctors, it is the District Veterinary officer responsible for the certification of the livestock. The Veterinary Doctor can reject the poor quality animals. He/she also compares the size of the animals with the price to ensure value for money because the auditor responsible for this activity is not usually readily available. The respondents gave themselves a score of 2. They said they do not have much say, it is the technical officers who decide for them. They just wait and receive the animals and even if they complain things just end there. Local councils were given a score of 1. Respondents said that local politicians just make noise about the poor quality of inputs but usually take no serious action.

The OPM, local Bank, Radio and NGOs are ascribed an influence of zero (0) and therefore they do not have any influence on the quality. The reasons given by the participants in the Process Net-Map is that these actors are not involved in the procurement process directly. They just facilitate the release of funds (OPM and Bank) and the radio just facilitates the dissemination of information.




Figure 6.6: Levels of influence of actors

Mean influence levels for NUSAF 2 procurement process

Here the mean influence levels were calculated for the 6 Influence Net-Maps conducted during the survey. The diagram below (Figure 6.7) shows the results. Here the farmers groups get a maximum of 6, followed by the technical team and the facilitators. The politicians get the lowest influence level on the quality of inputs. The reason why the farmer groups get the highest mean score could be that through collective action they can be able to demand quality goods from the suppliers. The supplier also in this case gets a score above average, meaning that the supplier still has a far big influence than the politicians on the quality of service. This observation has implications for input supply, this is because it shows that politicians who are supposed to monitor and ensure that good quality inputs are supplied, the supplier has more influence over them.





Figure 6.7: NUSAF mean influence level of actors



Source: Author

Figure 6.8: NUSAF implementation challenges

Table 6.2: Entry points for corruption in procurement of goods and services in NUSAF

Procurement Stage	Red Flags
Project and Design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concentration of projects around towns or urban centres. • Only one enterprise ie. Livestock taking a big chunk of the funds. • Undue influence by politicians and elites in decision making. • Very short sub-project approval process. • Re-allocation of funds for other activities without official approval.
Advertising , Prequalification, Submission of Bids	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • • Manipulation of bid documents (favouritism). • Collusion. • Leakage of bidding information. • Submission of very few bid documents (few firms submitting bid documents). • Lack of widespread advertizing of bids to reduce competition.
Bid Evaluation, Post-qualification and Award of Contract	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Best bidder fails to win the tender award. • The price of delivery of goods and services is increased from the original price according to the tender terms of reference. • Very short procurement process. • The quality and or quantity of the goods is decreased from the original TOR.
Contract Performance ,Administration and Supervision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak accounting systems. • No certification reports of inputs from Subject Matter Specialist (SMS). • No monitoring books at project sites. • Ghost names of beneficiaries and project personell. • Poor monitoring systems. • Lack of random spot checks to give opportunity to the contractor to disguise illegal activities. • Poor transparency and no implementation/contract information given to the beneficiaries. • Oversight of the physical works in collaboration with beneficiary representatives is absent. • The clients of the service are dissatisfied with completed facilities. • Delays in the delivery of goods and services. • Delayed payments to the suppliers. • Lack of project completion reports and certification eg. from engineer etc.

Source: Author's compilation based on procurement process Net-Map

6.3.3 Governance challenges in NUSAF implementation

The discussion of results here is based on the Conceptual Framework which discusses both the Demand and Supply-side factors which affect program performance (see section 3 and figure 3.2 for more details).

Supply–side factors

1. Human resource management

Local government human resource capacity

Findings indicate that in Northern Uganda there is the lack of capacity by the local governments to lead the recovery process after the war as evidence indicates low levels of capacity to plan, monitor and mobilize resources for the recovery process. For instance all the districts visited during this study operate below the required staffing levels and have problems of retaining the recruited staff because of the poor post conflict working conditions which lead to poor staff motivation. Evidence shows that the situation is even worse in the newly created districts where there is limited capacity of the technical staff both in numbers and in areas of specific skills in agriculture and other livelihood projects implementation skills.

Key informant interviews at the central level indicated that the first phase (NUSAF 1) there were delays in the recruitment of NUSAF staff at the center (OPM) and this impacted negatively on the most important initial phase of sensitizing the local government staff and the communities. This is because a small NUSAF team available at the OPM could not manage to sensitize all the 18 districts and this caused significant delays in implementation and as a result no significant fund releases were made to sub-projects for almost after two years, that is until 2004 when the NUSAF1 project started in 2002. Evidence indicates that this challenge of delays in funds release therefore had negative impacts on the funds absorption by the local governments.

The private facilitators interviewed said that they were given the work but cannot get any assistance from their respective local governments. However, findings from key informant interviews indicate that even if the local governments wanted to assist the facilitators, the few local government staff in the production department at the district and sub-county levels are too overstretched in terms of available skilled manpower to perform an effective facilitating and monitoring role for all the many individual sub-projects in their areas of

jurisdiction. Key informants indicated that NUSAF programme did not strengthen the district and sub-county veterinary extension services which are in a dire lack of technical personell to respond to the beneficiaries' enormous demands and given the fact that over 60% of the livelihoods budget under NUSAF was allocated to the purchase of animals (livestock).

Another challenge identified during this study is that the districts do not have enough Engineers, Veterinary Doctors and Agricultural Officers to supervise all the NUSAF projects. Some of the projects are as far as 40 kilometers from the district headquarters, so even where the technocrats visit the projects their supervision is limited to a few trips throughout the entire project period due to logistical constraints. This finding is in line with a mid-term review report of the PRDP-NUSAF 2 by the Isis Women's International Cross Cultural Exchange (Isis-WICCE) in 2011 which revealed that most of the staffing levels in the departments in the districts covered under PRDP/NUSAF 2 are below those recommended by the Ministry of Public Service and Ministry of Local Government restructuring exercise and as a result local governments in Northern region have persistently and consistently underperformed in terms of effective delivery of public services.

Private sector capacity

The NUSAF operational guidelines emphasize the need for the recruitment of technically qualified, privately hired and resident in the area facilitators to guide the communities through the sub-project proposal preparation up to the final approval. Here it is important to note that skilled community facilitators are critical for the success of NUSAF because they are able to effectively assist the poor farmers and other vulnerable groups who are usually illiterate and semi-illiterate and often lack planning and organizational skills. Provisions also indicate that the choice of the facilitator and private contractors is left to the community discretion. Guidelines recommend for hiring of facilitators who are from the area and who have adequate capacity to provide guidance and oversight in sub-project proposal preparation and procurement process such that the scope of corruption and sub-standard work is minimized.

Interviewees reported that many of the facilitators were chosen mainly at district headquarters and a few at sub-county levels and sent directly to the groups. This shows that district and sub-county authorities did not comply with this implementation guideline. Field evidence shows that many of the facilitators as evidenced from problems in trainings were unfamiliar with local conditions and community requirements, challenges and needs.

The challenges encountered in recruitment of facilitators under the NUSAF project is implied by the statement below:

“Facilitators originating from outside the district have little knowledge of the local conditions and these outsiders have enormous scope for corruption and because they are not born from the area they have little reason to offer value for money for the work done on the ground” (Community Development Officer, district C).

In recruitment of the NUSAF facilitators who are private sector technical people to help the NUSAF sub-project groups to come up with fundable project proposals, the Process Net-Map uncovered major challenges. First of all, most of the facilitators were recruited at the district level mostly with political influence by the elites and then deployed anywhere in the district. Evidence shows that facilitators who did not originate in the project areas had little knowledge of the locality and little knowledge of the unique challenges affecting their target communities and therefore they could not perform the NUSAF duties as reported by some the local government officials and the beneficiaries. In addition, regarding the qualifications of the facilitators there is strong evidence that most of the facilitators hired lacked the prerequisite qualifications to carry out their duties effectively. Similarly, a survey about the facilitators in the study area showed that the facilitators lacked the social sciences and agricultural extension knowledge and skills. To illustrate this point, in one of the districts surveyed (District A) a facilitator with a diploma in mechanical engineering was recruited to guide the farmers through an agricultural sub-project cycle.

The challenges faced by the facilitators to cover large areas and so many sub-projects is implied by the statement below:

“only one facilitator in the whole sub-county cannot effectively assist the communities because there are many sub-projects to handle which involve numerous paper work and document interpretation”.(Community Development Officer).

Additionally, there is overwhelming evidence that the majority of the facilitators from the areas surveyed were not seconded by the communities as recommended in the NUSAF provisions and all the community facilitators have not received the required training on the Demand Driven Development (CDD) approach of NUSAF. Evidence from the focus group discussions shows that many community facilitators instead of helping communities to translate their priorities into feasible projects have acted more as “brokers” between the

suppliers of inputs and Community Project Management Committees (CPMCs) and Procurement Committees than facilitators, because in this way they can get more money from kickbacks than the little official payment for their work as community based NUSAF facilitators .

Findings from key informant interviews show that there were problems of favoritism in the recruitment process of facilitators, a case in point is where the relatives of politicians, political allies of farm families, technocrats were favored in the interview process. This favoritism in the recruitment of facilitators reflects the non-compliance with the provisions of the NUSAF recruitment Implementation Guidelines and in many incidences resulted into recruitment of unqualified (unskilled facilitators). Another related challenge to these problems is the recruitment of NUSAF technical officers at the districts. Findings from interviews with key informant respondents point to the recruitment of key district NUSAF personnel with political influence from the district top brass. Complaints about favors from the political elite and the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) in the recruitment of NUSAF district technical officer. A case in point was that in district C surveyed the NUSAF technical officer was the district Chief Personnel Officer and in district A it was the District Information Officer who was the one in charge of NUSAF. The challenge here is that these NUSAF district technical officers lack the technical skills in as far as agricultural enterprises and extension are concerned which dominate the NUSAF livelihoods component geared to help the predominantly poor farmers in the Northern region to move out of poverty. The above challenges reflected the administrative failure of NUSAF because of its general failure to recruit key qualified personnel who are key for the successful implementation of the programme.

2. Staff welfare

Interviewees also indicated the poor motivation and staff commitment of the local government workers who are supposed to assist the private NUSAF facilitators in their work. Key informant interviews indicated that involving NUSAF facilitators who are not well paid and are involved in activities where they have substantial control over which sub-group benefits from NUSAF assets has caused serious problems and governance challenges in the programme. Evidence indicates that if the NUSAF facilitators are not usually paid in time and not well paid, this practice also at many times resulted in these NUSAF facilitators seeking compensation for their services in the form of asking for money or kick backs from

contractors (suppliers) and farmers. Evidence also shows that other facilitators abandoned the work completely because their expectations from the NUSAF project were not adequately addressed.

3. Conflicts of interest

A key informant complained that in his home town there is already bad feelings between the local businessmen and civil servants due to local businessmen allegations of corruption within the local government system for instance local government officials giving input supply contracts (tenders) to their firms by setting up their own companies and thus denying the local business men the input supply business. This has been a major constraint to local business men in urban and semi-urban areas cited by the businessmen because they cannot be able to tap into the business opportunities provided by the local government under the NUSAF project. Evidence also shows that it was difficult for both politicians and local government staff who are involved in supply contracts under NUSAF to assure value for money. This is because they always defended their private firms even if they offered shoddy work to the communities.

4. Financial management

NUSAF budgeting, funding and internal accountability

Funds release

Sadly for NUSAF program, annual reports indicate that very few social infrastructures and individual projects were successfully implemented as compared to the community population were approved for funding due to little resources and therefore resulting into negligible impact on poverty reduction. A number of sub-projects coming from the impoverished communities of Northern Uganda were not funded mainly due to the limited resource envelope, compared to the high expectations from the project during the sensitization and inception phase.

In order to ensure effective utilization of funds, provisions in the NUSAF guidelines provide for a timeline on the release of funds from the OPM, district and sub-county and finally to the beneficiaries' sub-project accounts (see step 16 Appendix 6 of the Process Net-Map). However the Process Net-Map suggests challenges in the release of funds more at all levels of the implementation process. There is overwhelming evidence that there is delay in the

release of funds to the sub-project beneficiaries' bank accounts. This has in turn led to delays in the implementation of the sub-project activities and this caused more problems with crop related enterprises which had to be carried out according to the rainy seasons.

According to the NUSAF financial disbursement provisions, funds transfers are meant to take 24 hours to reach the group sub-project accounts , but there are long delays from sub-project approval and funds disbursements which in many cases takes several weeks. Some of the sub-counties surveyed reported that many sub-projects approved for instance in for example June of the financial year did not receive their first disbursements until one month later. Findings from the focus group discussions also indicated complaints and frustrations in the communities and as a result inevitably contributed to financial management problems as a result of bribery, asking for kickbacks from the desperate beneficiaries and in delayed implementation. In some instances the delay in the release of funds reflects the non-compliance with the explicit NUSAF funding guidelines on the side of the beneficiaries which call for timely submission of well-prepared accountabilities to the different levels of project implementation. Findings show that part of the problem was that the community leaders i.e. the Procurement Committee (PC) and the Project Management Committee (PMC) lacked the necessary technical capacity to handle accountability issues.

Internal accountability

Financial management

Implementation procedures, financial management procedures and guidelines concerning accountability state that satisfactory accountabilities and reports from sub-project should be submitted at the various levels i.e. sub-county, district and Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) before new funds are released (step 16 in the figure 6.5 of the Process Net-Map). Provisions recommend that money is given in bits (partial releases) after presenting the accountability of the previous financial funds releases to the districts through the sub-county's NUSAF technical officials.

The Process Net-Map interview evidence shows that the sub-counties surveyed in the study area have failed to adhere to the accountability provisions in the guidelines. In all the areas visited, a lot of money was not accounted for and this was more pronounced in the first phase of NUSAF as indicated by the respondents. Participants in the Process Net-Map gave the reasons of the accountability problems as;

- Lack of technical capacity at the community level in handling accountability and paperwork involved leading to the delay in release of funds from the center as a result of delayed submission of accountability to the authorities i.e. from the community sub-project leaders. Here research findings indicate that many of the group leaders were either illiterate or semi-illiterate so had problems to handle accountability issues.
- Another related challenge is of the poor technical capacity of the procurement committee in preparation of accountabilities was a cause for concern. This challenge results from the fact that NUSAF involves a document intensive procurement process. In some instances interviewees reported that the procurement committee could hire a technical person, the so called ‘‘accountability expert’’ to ‘‘FORGE’’ acceptable accountability to the authorities. Participants in the Process Net-Map activity mentioned that another problem with accountabilities is the delay by the suppliers to bring in their accountability after being paid the money and this delays the compilation of the final accountabilities by the NUSAF technical officer at district level and hence delays the disbursement of funds from the OPM (Step 16).
- Findings also indicate that members of groups struggled to hold their usually better educated group leaders accountable to the funds. Better educated leaders usually dominated the whole implementation process especially in procurement. Since the group leaders were usually considered as superior members of society, (secondary school leavers) it was rather difficult for other members to hold them accountable and demand from them to submit the accountabilities in a timely manner. Even the illiterate group members could not manage to understand the accountabilities even if it was shown to them.
- According to the financial management guidelines, issues to do with accountability of sub-project funds is done through the finance sub-committee, but findings show that many of the members of this committee lack the basic mathematical and literacy skills and this has proved to be a challenge in the accountability of funds. Findings show that some communities have engaged the services of local government staff privately at a fee to assist them in financial management and preparation of accountabilities but there was a case in a district surveyed where the communities were conned of their sub-project funds.

- To ensure transparency and to control corruption, NUSAF guidelines call for the organization of Social Audits (SA) commonly known as Barazas within the beneficiary communities to ensure transparency and accountability in program implementation. The aim of the Barazas is to create a collective strategy aimed at enhancing public accountability. Evidence from respondents indicates that Barazas faced a number of governance challenges which prevented their effective implementation. Although on paper Barazas had good intentions and clear objectives, on the ground the experience points to a different picture.

Findings do not support that these social audits (Barazas) took place in all the areas under this study because of lack of written reports and I did not also find support for the existence of active vigilance and monitoring committees as provided for in the NUSAF implementation guidelines. Another finding from this survey was that the majority of the respondents interviewed did not have a clear understanding of the Baraza initiative and its benefits and moreover they did not understand the concept. This evidence points to the challenge of poor sensitization on the side of NUSAF implementers. Reasons why this provision was not implemented effectively is that there was insufficient mobilization of rural households by the political wing to participate in the social accountability meetings. Evidence shows that the technocrats could not encourage the organization of the Barazas because they know the communities can somehow pin them down on the implementation issues and also technocrats look at these Barazas as ways of the politicians to witch hunt them. Another reason given by the respondents is lack of knowledge of their role as beneficiaries in the social audit (Baraza) process and evidence also indicates that the communities are not aware of their entitlements because of limited information about NUSAF implementation availed to the communities. Those members of the committees (farmer institutions) that existed, when interviewed could not mention their responsibility in the implementation social audits strategy under NUSAF. This finding could be indicative why the communities did not demand for the social audits and therefore the project beneficiaries missed out on having a platform to demand for accountability from the implementers of the program.

In one district surveyed where the Baraza took place, respondents complained that the time given for the activity is very limited to exhaust all the implementation issues of a big program like NUSAF with so many livelihoods components. To illustrate this point, on the day of the Baraza, the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) who is the representative of the President in the area convenes the Baraza at the sub-county or district level, then the local government

technical staff in charge of NAADS, NUSAF, Health, Works , Education etc. make presentations at the Baraza which are then followed by reactions from members of the community, who raise questions and other concerns at the Baraza, basically focusing on the community (dis)satisfaction with service delivery in the period under review. All this activity takes place in only one day which is a clear time constraint for the community members to give comments and come up with a way forward and moreover the communities are not equipped with progress reports before the day of the Baraza for verification of the information contained in the NUSAF reports.

5. Leakage of funds and corruption

The evidence from the Process Net-Map Mapping exercise suggests that misuse of funds and corruption exist at the program administration level too. For example officials concerned with payments to the private sector for example the suppliers and facilitators have been found to be corrupt. Evidence from the Process Net-Map has identified channels through which funds are misused, for example outright embezzlement of funds, diversion of funds to unplanned activities, distribution of assets to illegitimate beneficiaries etc. Evidence shows that these kinds of problems occur because of the absence of adequate supervision and monitoring mechanisms. For example in some cases the District NUSAF technical officer (in district B surveyed) has turned a blind eye on the lower officials e.g. accountants and sub-county chiefs who collude with the suppliers and in the end are siphoning off NUSAF funds.

Other evidence on the access of funds by the sub-project beneficiaries indicates that the politicians i.e. local council 1s are supposed to recommend the groups to open up a bank account and in this it has been reported that some local council 1 leaders can impose an unofficial cash fee before the recommendation letter is written. Focus group discussions also uncovered other charges which related to corrupt facilitators asking for more payments than the money they are supposed to be paid or sometimes the facilitators asking for advance payment for their services before completion of the sub-project preparation and approval process.

In the focus group discussions there were claims of corruption relating to some NUSAF officials dealing with suppliers to increase the prices of livestock and other farm inputs and technologies. For instance in District A, there was an incident where by goats were bought at 200,000 Shs. each by a beneficiary group 3 times the cost of livestock compared to the local market price.

A key informant reported that to avoid delays in delivery of inputs which is an additional cost to the suppliers, the private sector (suppliers) negotiates with the Procurement Committee with some kickback (money exchanges hands) and they bypass the Veterinary Doctor who is supposed to certify the quality of animals and then the suppliers quickly take the livestock directly to the beneficiaries. Evidence from the Process Net-Map indicates that corruption exists at the level of project approvals of infrastructural projects. A case in point are the sub-project enterprises where infrastructure like buildings for livestock and poultry are required before the project can kick off. Here the engineers can include some “difference” which is a cost above the normal market value with the intention that this money will be shared with their henchmen (collaborators). The focus group respondents in district A said that the NUSAF District Technical Officer is one of the most corrupt agents in the costing process of NUSAF building infrastructure and in the contracting process.

Evidence shows that some elites in the community who wanted to benefit from NUSAF made lists of members or convinced them to sign their names after promising them something “money” and then these lists were used to access NUSAF funds. This is clear evidence of the existence of “ghost projects” and “ghost beneficiaries”. Here big expensive sign posts for projects are seen but no or little activity at the sites and no value for money to show for the projects. Here the researcher confirmed this finding because he saw for himself some big NUSAF sign posts that were alleged to have cost to the tune of 200,000 Shs. in some cases which is almost 5% of the total project costs but with no evidence of value for money at the sites.

Evidence from interviewees showed that, in some instances there was duplication of sub-project files and creation of non-existent projects, the so called “ghost projects” and “ghost beneficiaries” names of non-existent persons in the sub-counties. When the ghost project is funded the money is shared by the technical people and farmer leaders, that is all those people involved in the preparation of the “fake paper work” share the money. Finally, the tampering with files and the collusion to form “ghost sub-projects” totally prevented NUSAF from achieving its objectives.

6. Procurement process and mechanism

In order to ensure effective and timely implementation of the procurement process in NUSAF, implementation guidelines includes provisions for transparency, monitoring, grievance redressal, auditing, and social public auditing (Barazas). However, there were

challenges identified at the various steps during the procurement process as a result of bypassing the procurement provisions. At the sub-county levels in all the districts visited, there was no evidence in form of reports for any social audit or Baraza to have taken place.

In procurement by the community (community procurement) which was recommended in the provisions of NUSAF 2 for purposes of ensuring transparency and value for money, there were numerous problems uncovered. First, the problem with local purchase is that it delays in the supply of new technologies e.g. animals (goats, cows, sheep etc.) because many of the local suppliers did not have the capacity to supply the inputs. Sometimes the lack of local input supplies was caused by competition in the area from many different suppliers in the same market looking for the same technologies for instance big projects like NAADS, ALREP in their program activities are mostly re-stocking programs like NUSAF competing for the same suppliers.

At steps 17 and 23 of figure 16 , here at this point problems arise when the communities through the procurement committee can withdraw money from the bank and procure in puts on behalf of other members. Findings show that this very important responsibility was seriously misused. Evidence from the Process Net-Map interview suggests that poor quality inputs bought at cheaper prices in order for the procurement committee leaders to get a” difference” i.e. the difference between the actual quoted price and the negotiated cheaper price was usually shared by the members of the committee and in some recorded worst cases all the money was embezzled by some members and they relocated or ran away from their communities to other areas where they could not be traced. This challenge was exacerbated by the fact that the NUSAF project is dealing with a relatively “mobile” return IDP population i.e. the people are not yet settled down very well in their villages and many of them are still on the move within and outside the post conflict zone, therefore it is very challenging in some cases to trace the culprits of the corrupt practices.

However getting a supplier with the guidance of the district NUSAF technical officer was not a preferred option. Here the procurement process was not followed according to the procurement provisions. Findings show problems of favoritism, for instance facilitators could recommend to the procurement committee suppliers of their own choice and interests where they could possibly get a kickback. Interview evidence points to the leakage of the secret bidding information to the potential suppliers. To illustrate this point, there was evidence that the community facilitators mediated with suppliers and beneficiaries on behalf of suppliers

for a “kick back” as a reward for the service. This usually happened because the NUSAF community facilitators have inside information about the project. Secret information for example the reserve prices was revealed and in addition since the facilitators have worked with the procurement committee, they already know the person who is more influential on the committee and thus can be contacted by the supplier for “un-official negotiations”.

Similarly there were reports of the private sector exploiting the project members, for example buying low quality inputs that are not money worth. Another related challenge reported in the focus group discussions that has hampered community procurement is that there are usually no certified planting materials in the villages especially for the new technologies and for this reason usually the sub-county procurement committee takes over from the village and parish procurement committee and this disempowers the lower committees. This challenge is confirmed by findings from some members of the procurement committee who reported that they have not carried out any responsibilities or activities for the last six months.

Interviewees on procurement committees complained that they are given powers but they cannot exercise them. Another procurement challenge reported by the key informant interviewees is that in the first phase of NUSAF (NUSAF 1) there was a directive that the private sector takes the lead in the procurement process. As a consequence this limited the powers of the project management committee and the procurement committee to handle the contracting process because OPM thought that the communities steal the money and run away to other areas. The poor working relationship between members of the CPMC and CPC is illustrated by this statement below from a member of the PC:

“Sometimes the contractor just delivers the animals to the CPMC and CPC without even the knowledge of facilitators and SMS because they don’t live in our villages. The communities are eager to receive their inputs and they are not interested in delays. The communities just want to see things happening”(PC member).

Participants in the Process Net-Map interviews considered the district technical team to be the most corrupt agents in the implementation because this is where final sub-project approvals take place (Step 11). NUSAF provisions recommend for the direct provision of cash and inputs directly to local groups in order to ensure community empowerment and sustainability of sub-projects, however key informant interviews with the technical staff in the districts indicate that the project gave the local poor people to manage big amounts of cash. The funds were so big and excitement was so high for the people in post-conflict to

handle. Some projects with 10 members could be given about 15 million shillings with a member earning less than 200,000 shillings in a year being responsible for handling inputs and cash worth over 1 million in a few months. Evidence shows that some sub-project groups members conspired and sold the inputs and get cash to begin a business or motorcycle (locally called-Boda Boda) or retail business where they thought they can easily get daily income.

The problem identified here in addition is that NUSAF did not mentor the communities adequately in terms of expected responsibilities, obligations on financial management, expected sanctions of misuse of funds and accountability. There was poor monitoring and many of the groups were left on their own because of the inadequate capacity of the NUSAF facilitators and CDOs to monitor and technical backstopping of the many sub-projects emanating from their areas of jurisdiction. All these findings from the Process Net-Map tool, focus group discussions and interviews indicate that NUSAF implementation of the procurement process was generally engulfed in corruption of different manifestations resulting from questionable procurement procedures, weak control mechanisms in the procurement process, poor on site supervision of NUSAF assets (technologies) and inadequate monitoring arrangements of the sub-projects. There were no monitoring program and reports that were found at the sub-counties visited during the study indicating that most of the monitoring was just carried out on an adhoc basis when visitors from the center (OPM) are expected to visit the areas. According to the NUSAF procurement guidelines, all supplied inputs must be certified for quality by the district relevant personnel before they are given to the beneficiaries. Findings show that certification of inputs before they are distributed to the beneficiaries does not usually take place and this is confirmed by lack of documents for example certification letters and reports at the sub-counties visited during the survey.

This procedure of certification is again complicated by staff shortages at both the district and more so at the sub-counties. Related to this constraint is that the Veterinary doctor or the District Agricultural Officer (DAO) if available they lack adequate facilitation in terms of fuel from the NUSAF budget to carry out this activity and also to move at the lower levels of the district to ensure quality assurance. In case of supply of animals a movement permit from the Veterinary doctor at the source of the animals is required but field evidence shows that this stage is usually bypassed hence sick or stolen animals can be brought to the area.

7. Sub-project selection and approval

According to the NUSAF provisions, the sub-project approval process requires 2 months to be complete (see appendix 7 and 8 for table of sub-project cycle/process). But evidence indicates that in some of the cases surveyed the sub-project process was too fast for the communities to cope with. Focus group discussions showed that the communities were not given enough time to participate effectively in the project selection, project preparation and since NUSAF is a Community Demand Driven project (CDD) this was contrary to the implementation guidelines.

Findings indicate that the rushed sub-project identification and approval process led to the approval of unviable projects and respondents reported that this was one of the key reasons underlying the failure of many of the sub-projects. To illustrate this point, this rushed process made the projects not to be well researched for example some groups went into rearing goats, cows, improved poultry, piggery etc. without having the interest, financial ability and technical capacity to look after these enterprises for maximum benefit. Evidence in 2 of the sub-counties visited shows that some of the NUSAF sub-project group members showed considerable disregard for the livestock re-stocking NUSAF investments because this was not their first priority. Many saw little fast tangible benefit because livestock take long to bring benefits and as a result the cattle were mishandled. Evidence showed many cows emaciated as a result poor feeding and dire health conditions and with wounds as a result of canes.

Interviewees in the Process Net- Map indicated that one of the reasons why this sub-project process was rushed through is that the districts wanted to use the money as fast as possible to avoid serious circumstances where money can be taken back to the center (Ministry of Finance) if it is not spent at the end of the reporting financial year. As a result the communities were forced to take up projects they did not really want and projects which were not their priority at the time.

Evidence shows that in the Northern region people are predominantly crop farmers but were convinced to take up re-stocking program (cattle keeping) as the main project activity in NUSAF. Respondents indicated that in post-conflict conditions people are mainly interested in food security in the short term rather than keeping cattle which many considered a labor intensive and long-term venture and expensive in terms of food supplements, veterinary drugs and care. This evidence shows that implementation of NUSAF fell short of the ability to mentor groups and guide them properly in project selection. The beneficiaries even after

delivering the NUSAF assets and technologies were generally left on their own ignoring the fact that such projects need a lot of additional financial input in terms of health care (veterinary services) and feeds and plus follow up support in terms veterinary services to control disease vectors.

Participants in the focus groups indicated that the names of some projects were altered when they reached the district local government level for approval and vetting. Evidence shows that there were incidences in which the information in the sub-project files was tampered with, for example if the project has been approved some crafty NUSAF technical officers tear out the paper with the names and signatures of the of the beneficiaries and then they insert the names of their own people i.e. family, friends or political allies whom they can easily collude with to share the NUSAF funds and assets. Other evidence indicates that there was no feedback why some farmers who applied did not benefit from NUSAF i.e. there was poor feedback from districts about the project approval process.

Evidence from the Process Net-Map shows that contrary to the implementation guidelines whereby the project files are supposed to pass through the sub-county (step 7 in figure 6.5) but in reality many files for subprojects left the community and went directly to the district chairman (district boss LC 5 office) who hands the files to the district NUSAF technical officer to accelerate the sub-project approval process for his “people” or “henchmen”. Other evidence points to problems of lack of minutes for the technical evaluation of the bid documents contrary to the procurement guidelines. In addition, even these documents cannot be accessed easily in some of the areas visited showing that there is something being hidden. Some sub-county technical officers interviewed complained that district administrators dominate and sometimes hijack the sub-project appraisal process. Findings indicate that the failure to involve local governments at this sub-county level by NUSAF had serious negative impacts because the most important man power for monitoring of NUSAF projects to ensure sustainability had to come from the sub-county level because this is the level at which implementation of activities takes place.

In steps 11 and 12 of the Process Net-Map there was a challenge of inadequate flow of information. Some of the interviewees complained that there was no feedback to the communities to give reasons why their projects were rejected. Project files were not taken back to the communities to show gaps in their sub-projects therefore the beneficiary communities were not supported and they were left demoralized. Participants in the focus

group discussions also indicated that there was no written feedback given to them to explain why their projects were rejected.

Sub-project approval issues are implied by the statement below:

“The sub-project approval process had a “syndicate approach” and problems of lack of transparency. District leaders could avoid dialogue and just announce on radio and notice board at district the successful projects and they don’t even give reasons for rejection of other projects” (Community leader).

Closely related to the above challenge, Process Net-Map interviews point to the challenges of malice and trickery in the sub-project approval process. Here some groups looked for their files at district for unsuccessful projects but on reaching the district, surprisingly they found out that the files were non-existent at the district. Evidence shows that some sub-project files were removed during the approval process to reduce competition for the limited funds or to deny some people NUSAF benefits because of political intrigue and outright malice. Interviewees also complained that even tracing of the project files was very difficult, time consuming and costly for the rural poor farmers in terms of transport costs to and from the district back to their villages. For instance some places could be more than 40 kms from the district and with no reliable transport services it was difficult to access the district headquarters. Similarly respondents indicated that some of sub-project file names were changed to other projects names by unscrupulous individuals, usually the technical personnel at the district who had access to the NUSAF offices. To illustrate this point, a local poultry file can be changed to an animal re-stocking file with some changes, so tracing the file under a changed sub-project name proved to be impossible.

These problems highlighted above are also reflected in the problems of sustainability of NUSAF sub-projects witnessed by the researcher where there was minimal activity on a number of sub-project sites visited. This indicates that the NUSAF implementation guidelines which require an in-depth participatory approach which entails the involvement of all stakeholders were not adhered to. This governance challenge in NUSAF is also reflected in the low rates of sustainability of many of the NUSAF sub-projects and low rates of utilization and maintenance of the community infrastructure e.g. bore wells, dug wells and communal cattle crushes to control ticks in livestock (goats, sheep and cows).

8. Project management

Information dissemination and NUSAF mobilization strategy

Process Net-Map, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and written records indicate that politicians were to a large extent the first mobilizers for NUSAF sub-project in the communities. To illustrate this point, all the LC 5 and LC 3 chairmen and politicians interviewed for this study showed considerable knowledge and active interest in NUSAF and its potential benefits to their constituencies. Because of these reasons I explored further this issue and found evidence of politicians, more especially local council 5 and 3 chairmen and councilors deriving political capital out of the NUSAF project and district level politicians and councilors commandeering the NUSAF resources to their constituencies. Respondents indicated that community participation was high at the selection phase of sub-projects but community participation fell considerably at the implementation and monitoring phase.

In all the four districts surveyed for the study findings indicate that political mobilization has led to elite capture and local capture of the financial and agricultural assets of the program by the politicians. There was evidence of political involvement in the NUSAF program's mobilization of communities, for example use of LC 1 for publicity and mobilization of communities. In addition information on NUSAF projects usually flows through political lines i.e. from the very lower levels, that is village level (LC1) and parish level (LC 2) and eventually to the higher levels that is sub-county, district and central levels. Interviewees argued that the involvement of LC1 has caused problems. To illustrate this point, information that the agricultural inputs and assets have arrived at the lower council (village level) is through the chairmen of LC 1, politicians who are by law NRM supporters (Government Ruling Party supporters). Therefore a name of somebody who is not a political ally can be removed at the last moment and give the inputs to their political henchmen. A respondent said that in some cases information may not even be passed to the one who would be a beneficiary that the inputs have been delivered to the area.

As one respondent said:

“I don't trust this process of beneficiary selection and distribution of inputs. If you are not a NRM (government supporter) with your own people in the implementation process your name can easily be removed from the list of the beneficiaries or be given lower quality livestock” (NUSAF beneficiary).

The mobilization strategy for NUSAF of involving politicians has serious problems. Being a Community Demand Driven (CDD) project, absence of a good mobilization strategy creates the challenge of those not close to the political elite being unable to have a platform to articulate their demand for NUSAF services. Evidence from respondents confirms that the NUSAF project still remains dominated by the local elites and this still remains a fundamental challenge of the implementation of the program in Northern Uganda. Respondents reported that politics at lower levels plays a role in selecting which project will be funded. So findings indicate that in a number of cases how politically feasible the sub-project is in terms of votes replaced the recommended technical feasibility in the sub-project approval.

Interviews point to the challenge of poor communications between the central level and the local governments i.e. NUSAF Management Unit (NUMU) and more especially with the rural sub-counties where the activities for project implementation take place. Findings indicate that the rural sub-counties surveyed lacked internet access and computers for data management and for general NUSAF operations and this deficiency constrains the process of timely approval of sub-projects which in many cases frustrates the needy communities who are eager to receive the NUSAF long awaited benefits. Another challenge is that the NUSAF Operation Manual does not provide for sufficient facilitation for the sub-county Community Development Officers and the parish facilitators which as a result, greatly affected mobilization and sensitization of the community about the NUSAF operations.

Project monitoring and evaluation

NUSAF operational guidelines required that certain designated officers carry out regular field visits so as to provide technical support and guidance to the beneficiaries, review and report on progress to ensure that the sub-projects' objectives are achieved. Key informant interviewees indicated that local governments at the district and sub-county level are supposed to engage actively in the monitoring and supervision of NUSAF sub-projects but due to shortage and lack of logistical, technical and human resources most projects are not supervised in time, regularly and completely.

Evidence from the focus group discussions showed the problems of inadequate flow of information at all the stages of the implementation of the NUSAF sub-project process. This evidence shows that there is no well-functioning Management Information System (MIS) that contains adequate flow of information and feedback at all stages of the implementation

which was highly recommended in the NUSAF implementation guidelines. A case in point is the NUSAF re-stocking project in one of the sub-counties visited. For example there were no advert lists available and monitoring reports plus a file of exhaustive progress reports of projects. Interviewees said that local leaders, CDOs and the politicians were left out in the procurement process so it was difficult to monitor the projects because they did not know the terms of reference in the procurement process. The CDOs were not fully utilized considering their strategic positioning at the sub-county level especially in the management of the community development work. This finding confirms that NUSAF project was implemented mainly in isolation from other ongoing government programs such as NAADS which already has community institutions in place like extension workers and community based facilitators (CBFs) plus the farmers' fora.

The Process Net-Map suggests that there was a total breakdown in monitoring of NUSAF activities for instance respondents mentioned that the parish development committee and the sub-county officials were not involved in monitoring. Whereas provisions in the guidelines allocate 8% of the budget for administrative and monitoring activities, evidence in all the districts surveyed shows that the monitoring funds at the sub-county levels were misused because there were no comprehensive monitoring reports or in some cases two or one report could be found at the sub-county levels surveyed, which could not help in addressing issues affecting the NUSAF implementation. Evidence shows that the NUSAF desk officers were spread thin on the ground and their technical field visits were hampered by limited facilitation ie. reports show that the 10% budget allocated to monitoring was already exhausted at the initial stages of the financial year.

Respondents also reported that the already existing parish farmer institutions for monitoring, for example the Parish Development Committee which is under the sub-county local government structures were left out of the NUSAF implementation process. The statement below describes the situation:

One member of the Parish Development Committee (PDC) said:

“What does the Parish Development Committee do if you can leave them out of the NUSAF implementation process. Here the information gap between us the PDC and NUSAF officials at the sub-county is big. They do not even inform us about their

activities and we also do not know what exactly they are doing in our communities”.

Another challenge faced by the communities is the ability to digest the quantitative information reported by the districts and sub-counties. Findings indicate that there is no detailed qualitative information reported on the sub-projects. The majority of reports usually just come up with numbers and the amount of money spent and status of implementation whether the project is ongoing or finished.

As one local leader commented:

“The projects completed are reported as numbers i.e. so and so many projects completed but what about their quality? Here the implementers are interested in just telling us the number of projects completed”.

9. Design features of the program

Advisory methods

Participants in the focus group discussions said that NUSAF did not take advisory services to farmers seriously but concentrated on the distribution of assets to beneficiaries. For example this statement from one of the NUSAF livestock beneficiaries illustrates the point:

“ NUSAF phase 2 in the first place did not even train us on basic animal management practices,for example feeding , treatment of diseases and even gave us no support for input provision for example building shelters for the animals” (NUSAF beneficiary).

NUSAF has not provided additional inputs to assist farmers, for example the pumps and other additional equipments for spraying. There is no adequate support to the farmers after delivery of animals. Even monitoring of animals by the technical persons is a challenge.

The inadequacy of advisory methods in NUSAF is illustrated by these statements below:

“Technical assistance to us beneficiaries by NUSAF technical personell was not there.That is why diseases have killed many of our animals. We could not also manage the high costs involved in animal treatment. Some funds for

treatment of animals were included on the budget but these were not adequate”. (NUSAF livestock beneficiary).

“NUSAF did not develop complementary projects that can benefit from each other. They developed "Stand alone projects” (District technical officer).

Project coverage and targeting mechanism

Findings indicate that the rushed program rollout of NUSAF to the communities more especially at the beginning of the program brought in serious governance challenges. Here the rushed rollout of NUSAF in the communities prevented group processes from emerging more organically (failure to create groups with strong bonds). Findings indicate that in the majority of cases the groups had not received effective institutional development training and quickly rushed to sub-project proposal preparation. Another finding is that the quality of services of the NUSAF group facilitators also negatively affected group cohesion, which resulted from poor mobilization and rushed trainings plus lack of technical capacity.

According to the implementation guidelines, NUSAF took a Community Driven Approach and it was believed that the requirement by NUSAF for groups to work cooperatively in groups (group targeting) will improve rates of farmers’ participation and thus promote higher levels of social cohesion, but evidence shows that in many sub-project groups this was not the case. Evidence shows that many groups have collapsed as a result of conflicts between the group leaders and other group members themselves. Respondents also complained that unfair distribution of assets in NUSAF led to community conflicts and intra-group conflicts in some cases. Findings show that these conflicts regularly happened where livestock distribution took place and where those members with more influence (power and authority) manipulated the distribution process and information when the animals would be distributed in order to manipulate those members absent on the day of distribution. Cases of conflict led to sub-project failure in most cases because project members could not work and support each other as a group for the sustainability of the projects. Findings indicate that problems of enmity are partly due to corruption within their ranks (farmers) for example it could be members of the community who have not benefitted from NUSAF when they had applied for support or some members of the groups who are not happy with the quality of animals they have received. Findings indicate that in some cases some beneficiaries were walking off or fled their homes with animals without the prior knowledge of fellow members of the group and in other cases group leaders defrauded their members of the sub-project funds and assets.

One local key informant commented about NUSAF targeting approach:

“With NUSAF project, too much money was involved with the very needy people and some group members were not trustworthy and others moved from one village to another in order to maximize the benefits. People have fought each other and some families have broken up because of wrangles over NUSAF money”.

In terms of social cohesion, focus group findings confirm findings from interviews that the distribution of inputs within the NUSAF affiliated sub-project groups was not well organized and considered unfair and resulted in the outbreak of conflicts which turned violent in some cases even leading to family breakdown with even fatal injuries on some farmers as a result of the conflicts. Interviewees reported problems of malice for example, farmers who did not get the animals became jealousy and could kill the neighbor’s animals and this was reported to be common especially when the animals stray away and go into somebody else’s garden. Here respondents reported that this problem is caused by unfair distribution of animals leading to poor group spirit and some people applied to get the NUSAF group assets but feel that they were unfairly denied a chance to benefit from the project.

In reality the Process Net-Map identified deficiencies in the selection and targeting of beneficiaries to benefit from the NUSAF programs. One of the major deficiencies of concern is the selection of who is to benefit from the NUSAF program. In order to ensure effective implementation of NUSAF and to make sure the services reach the vulnerable communities, implementation guidelines in NUSAF includes provisions for targeting. The idea for NUSAF was to empower vulnerable people, however evidence from the case study indicates that these provisions are rarely adhered to. Many people applied for NUSAF 1 and 2 but for some reasons did not get anything, but sometimes projects are given to those who can offer something (ie.money) respondents reported.

The study noted that the poor and marginalized people are not always in groups and probably some vulnerable individuals might have been left out by NUSAF because of the stringent conditions of joining groups in order to receive NUSAF assets. The war wounded , widows, as well as those who experienced multiple serious crimes remain among the most impacted and impoverished with worse food security and these people are not even able to access basic services like health but were not given due consideration in NUSAF targeting. These research findings which indicate the failure of NUSAF to target the very poor members of the society

is also corroborated by earlier research in Northern Uganda by Martin, Petty and Acidri (2009) on Northern Uganda which noted that NUSAF set very tough conditions for the beneficiaries to qualify for funding which the poor of the poor could not afford e.g. co-funding, ability to afford medical care for livestock, home sanitation and planting trees as conditions for accessing NUSAF funds.

Even in some cases the beneficiaries for a sub-project could be from the same family, for instance members of one family could apply for a project because the restrictions in the guidelines about who should benefit from NUSAF were not implemented i.e. that each household should have one beneficiary for a sub-project. As a result many members of the communities were left out due to poor targeting. In addition there was evidence that beneficiaries from the same family and household could easily misallocate the money for other purposes or distribute the money among themselves for other personal gain.

Respondents indicated that it was common to select well to do people because of their influence power (authority) and the patronage opportunities offered by the loopholes in the NUSAF targeting provisions. To illustrate this in NUSAF, evidence shows that many politicians, businessmen and some civil servants benefitted from the sub-projects at the expense of the targeted rural poor who according to the NUSAF implementation guidelines are the intended beneficiaries. Interviewees indicated that some elite groups with influential members pay kickbacks to the technical people to make the approval process of projects move faster and this is usually done by the rich and influential people. Respondents reported that those groups that had well connected people received the technical and administrative approvals faster. There were incidences of groups who got funding faster and findings indicate that those who got approvals faster did so because they were ready to pay kickbacks to the officials who had powers to take final decisions concerning the vetting process of proposals, approvals and deciding which ones got funded at that time and also those projects that were kept on the waiting list for the next phase of funding and those that were thrown into the ‘dust bin’.

Another challenge was political capture and local capture of the subprojects. Interviewees complained about the involvement of political elite in the area in the distribution of sub-projects in the communities. There were cases where some politicians especially at the district level wanted to ensure a balanced spread of the projects in all their constituencies (sub-county and parishes) which undermines NUSAF’s targeting guidelines of prioritizing

the most vulnerable groups but not areas. A case in point is in district A and B where it was observed during the survey that there was excessive concentration of projects around town centers.

Another challenge is that NUSAF technocrats faced a serious governance challenge of gaining political commitment from politicians in the implementation of NUSAF when their views on sub-project distribution in their constituents have not been considered by the NUSAF technical wing, for instance during the study some of the politicians interviewed at all the local government levels complained about the failure of NUSAF technocrats to listen to their suggestions and advice in as far as targeting is concerned.

10. Collaboration with NGOs and CBOs in NUSAF implementation

According to the NUSAF implementation guidelines, it is recommended to involve the local NGOs in the area in the various aspects concerning NUSAF implementation in order to provide the required bridge between the communities and local governments and also to assist the local governments in strengthening the capacities of the community institutions e.g. PC and PMCs to manage the project funds responsibly. It was envisaged in the implementation provisions that there will be active involvement of NGOs in NUSAF activities this is because it was believed that NGOs have the capacity for performing a complimentary monitoring role in the programme implementation. However, the framework for integration of NUSAF into other government programs and NGOs is missing in its operational manual.

Findings indicate that limited coordination of government programs with other humanitarian organization has constrained the effectiveness on the current humanitarian and livelihoods improvement response in the North. The main problem here is the duplication of resources. Key informants indicated that aid projects by NGOs have not been mainstreamed with similar government programs and no clear exit strategies in good time especially for targeted vulnerable groups. This is important so that the farmers are not left in a vacuum once the assistance from development partners is phased out.

The Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) were also supposed to have a bigger role to play in the implementation of NUSAF. In the beginning the CSOs were brought on board but when the activities of NUSAF started on the ground the CSOs were ignored. For example in Pader District, the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) invited the CSOs and even stated their

roles, that is to train members of the funded project. Pader district is an example of the success story in this respect because in NUSAF 2 the CSOs are on the ground and directly attached to the community and therefore play a very important role in monitoring therefore implementers of NUSAF should endeavor to bring the NGOs and CSOs on board . NUSAF 1 completely ignored the role of CSOs and NGOs. In NAADS 1 however some members of CSOs in Pader were involved in training farmers as a business. When there is a gap NAADS continues inviting CSOs.

Findings indicate that NGOs and Civil Society Organizations are making a big contribution to the recovery program in the Northern region, but it is hard to ascertain their contribution in the absence of shared work plans with the district local governments. For instance, many of the NGOs in the North do not coordinate with the district authorities in the implementation of their PRDP (NUSAF project is part of the PRDP framework) related work. As a result it is also difficult for districts to supervise such projects or know how many projects they are in the district. One of the technical staff interviewed at the district level noted that, most NGOs think that they only have a financial obligation to their donors who give them money. This lack of accountability to the local governments by NGOs and CSOs makes it difficult to measure and appreciate the contribution of the donors through the various NGOs and CSOs in the district.

An Assistant Chief Administrative Officer (ACAO) commented:

“There is insufficient funding in the districts and in addition failure of the NGOs to declare what they have done. We want NGOs to coordinate with the districts local government to avoid duplication of work or concentration of same projects in one area, however when you try to ask some of the NGOs , they just ignore because they say that they are only accountable to their funders , so it is actually hard to know the actual contribution of some NGOs on the ground”.

However the ACAO admitted that the districts always ensure that a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is signed with NGOs before any operations start in the districts but also noted that there are also cases of uncooperative NGOs after signing the MOU. Findings also indicate that some NGOs do not want to disclose their sources of funding nor their budgets so it is impossible for the districts to know which kind of specific activities are funded by NGOs and how much money is being spent on activities in the district.

To illustrate the point, the ACAO said:

“A district political official may be called to officiate on the ceremony of distribution of animals in the communities by a particular NGO and the district authorities were not informed at the inception of the project”.

However interviewees from the NGOs and local governments indicated that collaboration has been very limited and some little collaboration which exists has been with very few International NGOs. The major local NGOs in the surveyed local governments indicated that NUSAF implementers have not engaged them for collaboration and also mentioned that their respective roles in NUSAF are not clear and thus poorly specified in the NUSAF implementation guidelines. For effective and cost effective implementation of NUSAF it would have been advantageous to involve the local NGOs in mobilization and capacity building. This is because the NGOs are already on the ground and they can also promote participatory planning and can work together with the local governments more especially at the sub-county levels which are constrained in terms of skilled manpower.

Other evidence indicates the unwillingness of some NGOs to tarnish their credibility with working with NUSAF because of the previous enormous corruption scandals witnessed in the project. A case in point is one big local NGO which rejected funds to the tune of 1 billion Uganda shillings to implement livelihoods NUSAF projects in Northern Uganda and Karamoja regions. This is because the NGO feared that being associated with the NUSAF project will damage its credibility in the face of its International Donors whom they fear that they can lose the longterm support whereas they know that NUSAF is a short term project of which many commentators from NGOs and Civil society mention that NUSAF will “collapse” any time the NAADS way. A number of NGO officials consulted during the study expressed skepticism about the capacity of local government staff to implement NUSAF 2 effectively alone given the bad experiences with other huge government programs e.g. NURP 1, NUSAF 1, NAADS and LGDP, fearing that resources in NUSAF 2 could have the same fate of being swindled or used sub-optimally.

A NUSAF district technical official also indicated the risks of working with some NGOs:

“In Northern Uganda some of the NGOs and CBOs are not credible, many were formed for optimistic causes, because of the availability of NAADS and NUSAF resources targeting NGOs and the need to tap these resources for personal gain”.

The issue of incredible NGOs working in Northern Uganda is implied by the following statements from a former Member of Parliament:

“Some of the programs by the NGOs are imposed on the people. For example in 2010 I stopped 2 lorries of cassava cuttings not to be distributed in my constituency of Omoro County, Gulu district because it was November coming to the dry season and the farmers had not even prepared the fields and the cuttings were dry and poor quality. Here the NGO just wanted to ‘‘Clean its Books’’. The would be beneficiaries were not consulted to tell them (NGO) their priorities and prepare their gardens and also advise the supplier on the best time for the delivery of the planting materials. This is why many programs in Northern Uganda both Government and private have not had a high impact in the region”. (Former Member of Parliament-MP).

11. Institutional arrangements and governance structures

NUSAF implementation guidelines indicate that it will be implemented through institutions at both the center (state level) and through a decentralized implementation at district and sub-county level. Provisions recommend that NUSAF will be implemented through community based approach. Evidence indicates that some of the NUSAF components have a high degree of overlap with some other government programs for example, Community Agricultural Infrastructural Programme (CAIIP), NAADS and ALREP indicating the need to streamline the implementation of these programs.

The most important agency at the center in the implementation of NUSAF is the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) (Refer to NUSAF Institutional Structure figure 4.5). This location of NUSAF in OPM is problematic because NUSAF would have been located elsewhere, for example MAAIF which is central for improving agricultural livelihoods. Another challenge is that NUSAF guidelines recommend the use of private facilitators and this left the local government technical staff alienated. Many of the local government staff felt that they are left out of the NUSAF livelihoods development process and this was more pronounced in NUSAF 1 project and therefore it was rather difficult to bring them on board in NUSAF phase two.

One local government senior technical staff said:

“The implementation of NUSAF with its parallel structures and the sidelining of the existing local

government technical staff in the implementation of NUSAF is a serious mistake. This is because most of the work done now on many of the sub-projects is of very low quality because the technical staff at the local governments were not involved in their design, supervision and monitoring.’’

Other key informants voiced concern over the parallel system of NUSAF project to the local government structures. Here a case in point is lack of the full involvement of the district local government staff in the implementation. Other authors for example Jones (2009), Robinson (2005) and Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey (2008) also noted the institutional challenges in the NUSAF design, that is the decision to use parallel structures in the implementation of the program. The authors noted that the Community Driven Development approach of NUSAF effectively excluded and alienated the state from the NUSAF implementation process and further showing to the people of Northern Uganda that the state previously was not interested in their needs. According to Brock et al. (2002) at the time of inception of NUSAF donors were advocating for NUSAF to be linked to the ongoing Local Government Development Program (LGDP). This research findings also are in line with Robinson (2005) who said that:

“Politicians usually complained about NUSAF program as a substitute for political action required to tackle the underlying causes of poverty in Northern Uganda”.

According to my field experiences in the North during the survey , I also completely agree with Lange (2008) who noted that:

“The danger of using non-state actors to deliver development is that it may have a negative effect on people’s interest in politics, increase cynicism about the government, retard peacebuilding and even finally weaken the democratic process”.

Key informants mentioned that it would have been better for NUSAF to offer incentives for the government existing civil servants to offer services, for example to work as facilitators and Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) in programme implementation. From the survey findings from all the local government officials interviewed complained that NUSAF is not providing them facilitation to complement the project’s work. The absence of facilitation allowances from NUSAF acts as a dis-incentive since the local government staff are not interested to carry out NUSAF tasks without facilitation. This is because when the local

government staff are involved in NUSAF activities they incur additional expenses and additional responsibilities in addition to their official duties.

Another issue is that NUSAF is under Community Development Directorate, but the services under NUSAF are mainly all technical and the challenge is that NUSAF is only handled mainly by social workers. There is need to include the technical people in agriculture and veterinary fields. Findings indicate that there is some lost linkage of NUSAF 2 to the Production and Marketing Department at district level which trickles even down to the lower local government levels. There is a weak institutional arrangement because the NUSAF project should have been linked to the right departments. In addition there is no Institutional Framework between NAADS and NUSAF.

Interaction with district officials also revealed that there is a problem of conflicting guidelines from the OPM, MoFPED and other line ministries in regard to supervision and monitoring of PRDP of which the NUSAF project is part. Yet the districts must supervise the projects to know whether they have been implemented and done properly. As a result of inadequate or poor supervision, beneficiaries at several projects complained of sub-standard work. For example there was incredible evidence that some buildings like poultry houses had developed cracks during construction or immediately after completion. Therefore these shortcomings remain serious challenges that retard or hamper the full realization of the NUSAF strategic objectives especially of rebuilding and empowering the community and revitalization of the local economy.

Key informant interviewees indicated that only indicative figures to show the total resource availability from NUSAF are provided to districts. In addition, evidence shows that in all the districts surveyed the NUSAF resources and specific budget lines are not integrated budgets with the district local governments' yearly budgets. Interviewees at the district level indicated that this challenge is as a result of NUSAF failing to provide information in time in as far as community sub-projects are concerned and also be able to integrate them into the annual budget in line with the local government planning cycle in order to harmonize the planning and monitoring at the local government level.

Evidence shows that NUSAF faces serious challenges of reporting and coordination. For instance the challenge identified by the key informants is to be able to coordinate the big component of agricultural livelihood activities in NUSAF from the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and also to be able to work with staff from the districts and sub-county in the

Production Directorate who are under the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF). Key informants interviewed in MAAIF mentioned that there is a missing link in terms of information flow and coordination between the OPM in the NUSAF implementation and some technical officers at MAAIF said that they do not know what is going on with NUSAF implementation and referred this researcher to the district levels for information regarding NUSAF implementation.

Demand-side factors

1. Household level

Education level

The challenge of NUSAF is that the sub-project cycle is being transaction and document intensive. There are a lot of documents required to be prepared before the farmers can access the benefits. This document intensive process is a problem to the implementers and beneficiaries alike. In the first instance evidence from Process Net-Map shows that these implementation manuals and procedures are too complicated for the beneficiaries members to understand and use. This finding is illustrated by the statement below

One beneficiary complained that:

“the document intensive process renders the whole NUSAF implementation system futile”.

The lack of adequate education in the rural communities of Northern Uganda complicated processes that required preparation of paper work, handling documents and trainings. The process of generation of feasible sub-projects up to approval is transaction intensive for instance it requires a lot of time, technical skills and paper work and cost. Evidence shows and this was not well anticipated by NUSAF designers in the post-conflict conditions.

Human capital

Here human capital refers to the stock of knowledge, habits, social and personality attributes including creativity embodied in the ability to perform labour so as to produce economic value. Displacement through the conflict led to a big loss in human capital. This loss has been through death and migration to other peaceful areas. Many people don't want to work or live in the post conflict North. This is due for fear of the resurgence of the war. People are not sure whether really the war ended. The post conflict North has a limited physical and social

infrastructure which does not attract the technical staff. Poor education services for family, poor road infrastructure, poor health services, poor banking services and high incidences of crime present challenges for the local governments in the North to attract technical staff from other regions.

Household income

NUSAF implementation guidelines stated that 20% of NUSAF's overall project costs should be raised locally as counterpart to the funding supplied by the World Bank and the Uganda Government. NUSAF operational guidelines request for the farmers' contribution before accessing the NUSAF funds as a matching fund. The guidelines recommend that there will be minimum of 5% for VGS and CRCM and 20% for CDI sub-project components and in addition there were also requirements at household level which had to be fulfilled in order to qualify to benefit from the NUSAF project e.g. planting of trees, sanitation (presence of toilets in the household applying for funding) etc. Findings indicate that this level of community contribution was very high for the poorest of the regions of Uganda. This problem was echoed by all the local government, district and sub-county leaders interviewed and they said that this provision was outrightly rejected during the design and consultative meetings on NUSAF 1 by the district leaders. But the district leaders complained that these stringent conditions were forced into the design of NUSAF once again by the technocrats.

Insights from the focus group discussions indicate that many of the poor farmers could not comply with the tough requirements to access NUSAF 2 by the communities because of the high poverty levels in the post conflict region.

One respondent stated:

“How is a community so poor like ours which has been devastated by war be given conditions in order to access the livelihood resources when at the same time the aim of the project is to move us out of poverty?. This issue of conditional access to funds should be revisited and given according to the level of poverty in the regions and households”.

Evidence from the field and from respondents across all social sectors strongly indicates that many of the communities were not very positive in regard to complying with the conditions for access to funds and also other evidence points to the fact that the cause of this rejection apart from the prevailing poverty in the area was instigated by the local leaders the majority of whom belonged to the opposition parties to the ruling NRM party.

Evidence shows that there was a challenge that many of the would be beneficiaries could not comply with the co-funding provisions. Participants in the focus groups complained that there were very tough requirements before a household could access the NUSAF funds since they are just IDP returnees and are just settling in and have immediate needs for example building houses and ensuring food security. Interviewees indicated that those elite members and well to do members of the community who could contribute as per the NUSAF provisions, in some cases negotiated a share of the sub-project assets with those who could not contribute. This finding was especially very common with technologies which are private goods like improved seeds and fertilizers which could be sold again even at far lower prices than the prevailing market prices.

2. Community level

Social cohesion and social capital

Findings from this survey indicate that in Northern Uganda family structures and dynamics have changed. Due to the war there are weakened family and community systems. During the war and after relative peace had returned to the North collective action declined among the returnees. Before the war respondents indicated that there was strong collective action, for example collective forms of land preparing, planting, weeding and harvesting. Evidence shows that IDP camp inhabitants just cared for their own family survival and this norm continued even as people returned to their villages when peace returned to their areas.

Pre-conflict agricultural expertise

Findings show that the groups lacked capacity to manage resources of which they had no prior expertise before the war conflict. Evidence from the Process Net-Map suggests that there was mismanagement of the NUSAF projects by the beneficiaries especially the livestock enterprise sub-projects. Findings from the field visits showed that there was lack of technical capacity by the communities to look after the animals. Similarly, evidence shows that the beneficiaries were not prepared enough in time to receive and manage the NUSAF sub-project assets. There was evidence in the field where the animals were not cared for properly like feeding, spraying etc. This caused death of many of the animals and considering evidence from the interviews, many of the beneficiaries lacked interest in animal rearing compared to crop production eg. maize, cassava, sorghum, simsim, ground nuts, which is the main enterprise in Northern Uganda. Respondents indicated that with the VGS component,

in NUSAF 1 almost all of them collapsed and those that succeeded were not sustained. Members complained that group leaders mismanaged the groups and in case of re-stocking programs many animals have since died. There are expensive sign posts where these projects were but if you go to the site itself you find no activity.

One political leader said:

“Northern Uganda people are predominantly crop farmers and not so much of them are animal keepers that’s why in some cases they even hire people from western Uganda (predominantly cattle keeping area) to help them look after their animals for a fee”.

Another finding was a failed Zero grazing Heifer Project just because many members of the community were not used to such intensive livestock management before the war. Interviewees stated that if you give a heifer cow maintaining it is a challenge for the recipient.

Like one respondent said:

“Those improved zero grazing cows are very difficult to manage because they are fed and cared for better than the people who keep them. They need houses which are better than ours. Imagine my self the beneficiary I am living in a small grass thatched hut and then you tell me that part of the money for this project should buy materials like iron sheets and cement. Yet I live in just a small hut and in the end the cow will end up living in a structure better than mine”.

Farmers’ needs and priorities

Some of the political leaders interviewed mentioned that though NUSAF is a good project for them, it is making their life very difficult with complaints from their electorate about the way the program is being run. During sensitization the program offered high expectation to every member of the community and assured them that everybody will benefit directly from the NUSAF resources and assets.

A politician mentioned:

“We promised all the members from the community to benefit directly from NUSAF, but what we are facing now as a result are the overwhelming demands in form of sub-project proposals emanating from the communities and when we ask NUSAF technical officials to get projects for our

people signs indicate that they have limited capacity in terms of funding in order to respond to the community expectations” (District political leader).

NUSAF being a Community Driven Project (CDP), implementation guidelines call for complete community involvement in the selection and implementation of their sub-projects. However a number of challenges were reported in the focus group discussions. A case in point is the poor selection of projects in the livelihood component of NUSAF for instance Oxen and Ox-ploughs supplied, but there were no inputs supplied to ensure short term livelihoods of food security for the returning IDPs. Evidence indicates that the involvement of the community in some of the NUSAF sub-projects implemented has been minimal to the extent that some beneficiaries complained about the relevance of the sub-project enterprises selected to their needs and expectations. This challenge had a negative bearing on the legitimacy, ownership and sustainability of the various projects under the various interventions.

A local CBO official commented that:

“When people are not consulted on a range of issues and lack the necessary knowledge about the investment priorities and their feasibility in their own situations, their contribution in the development and recovery process is minimal. Ultimately this affects the number of the beneficiaries both at planning and reporting stages”.

Another respondent said that:

“NUSAF provided a negative menu. Why didn't they provide money (cash) for business for returnees because this can be a much needed fast provision of livelihoods for returnees in post-conflict?”.

Also some respondents in the focus group discussions reported issues of poor project planning. To illustrate this, for example in case of Oxen project some of the beneficiaries were supplied with oxen but for some unknown reason did not get an ox-plough. This was a big challenge to the poor IDP returnees to hire ox-ploughs which the majority of farmers could not afford.

In many of the NUSAF affiliated groups, it was noted in the focus group discussions that they have members with different enterprise interests and this is the reason why after getting the sub-project funding from NUSAF the groups dis-integrated and in many cases conflict results on how to share the resources in their midst. Similarly, there were challenges of the misuse of

animals by the beneficiaries, some animals (cattle) for re-stocking purposes were slaughtered and sold illegally to other elite or well to do members of the community at far lower market values. In addition other animals e.g. Goats were sometimes used for traditional ceremonies like paying dowry (bride price) and other traditional ceremonies. All the above problems indicate the failure of NUSAF to encourage and mentor the formation of strong and sustainable groups on the demand driven basis, entrepreneurship and cooperation among the group members.

The lack of full beneficiary participation in project identification was shown by the rather poor maintenance and supervision with many of the NUSAF assets and technologies remaining incomplete and in other cases un used or abandoned for example there was a bore hole abandoned and then ransacked and others under utilized. The borehole was located in an area with low population compared to other areas but attracted to the area by one popular political individual. Evidence from the survey districts showed an abandoned poultry house and borehole and dug well showing no physical activity at the site for a long time.

Local organization capacity and culture

Key informant interviewees indicated that the negative attitude of many of the rural people in Northern Uganda, especially the youth has hampered the smooth implementation of livelihoods projects like NUSAF. Many interviewees indicated that there is negative attitude in the region . To illustrate the point, because of the 20 years of fighting and being forced into IDP camps, the communities developed negative attitudes towards the NRM government. Similarly even the youths who were born in the camps do not believe that they were born in the camps because government wanted to make their parents and relatives safe. They were told by some of their relatives that the government kept them in camps in order to make them suffer. This makes them believe that nothing is good from the government and don't want to participate fully in local government led programmes. Findings indicate that this negative attitude has been aggravated by the high levels of suspicion from many respondents in the focus group discussions that the local leaders are corrupt because of being beneficiaries of numerous inputs and assets from various sub-projects because they support the existing NRM government.

The Community Development Officer (CDO) commented that:

“Communities in Northern Uganda are desperate and still depend mainly on ‘hand-outs’. The lack of income generating opportunities makes the community unable to participate in the recovery programmes and sustainability of such interventions becomes difficult”.

Findings indicate that in Northern Uganda there are millions of people living in rural communities and lack the means and access to higher education. Many of the former IDPs have been unable to pursue primary education and therefore cannot fully participate in the recovery programs. This challenge of lack of technical capacity is illustrated by the statement below:

“Due to the length of the LRA conflict, rural community members need to be empowered to ‘restart’ their lives. They have become accustomed to emergency relief efforts and expect the local government and NGOs to continue giving them ‘hand outs’”(Officer from Invisible Children-NGO).

Another type of governance challenge identified in NUSAF is the weak institutional and technical capacity of the local communities. Findings indicate that the local community who are also supposed to play an active role in the implementation of the sub-projects are either technically incompetent or are not empowered to challenge work of a contractor. Interviews with beneficiaries of some of the infrastructural projects e.g. water project and community road under NUSAF, beneficiaries could not tell even which contractor did the work. During the focus group discussions, respondents complained that they as end users are never informed by the relevant authorities about the projects before or upon commencement of works and under what terms. So the local leaders are unable to monitor the projects because they lack information on the Terms of Reference (TOR). The respondents in the focus groups said that they just see a contractor coming and starting the work. They said that they do not have a clue on whether they are supposed to play a part in the monitoring of the contract.

Implementations guidelines in NUSAF require the creation of committees (CPMCs and PCs) whose members are elected by the community and are given responsibility on behalf of other group members for project design and implementation. Evidence from interviews, focus group discussions show that in practice this institutional arrangement has not worked efficiently because the committees have not managed to cope with the transaction intensive

and speedy procedural and organizational requirements of NUSAF due to issues to do with education. Findings indicate inadequate institutional capacity of the committees. To illustrate this point, in the majority of the groups visited there is little evidence of minutes of group and committee meetings on a regular meeting as required in the implementation provisions.

Findings indicate that committees in the rural areas with mostly illiterate or semi illiterate leaders faced enormous challenges and this affected the number of sub-project applications i.e. less sub-project applications were generated from rural areas compared to the urban areas at a particular time.

Another recipient of a re-stocking improved goat program and a group leader complained that:

“some group members think the animals belong to the district or sub-county. He stated that there is one instance where the recipient of the improved goat breed called the Veterinary officer at the local government and told him to come and take away his goat because he could not manage the feeding and veterinary medical bills. He said that this challenge is as a result of not involving people who are going to benefit and asking them what they actually want and assessing what they can manage”.

Another related challenge identified in the focus groups is that NUSAF being a Community Demand Driven project, there was a challenge in terms of the NUSAF affiliated groups which is the lack of capacity to monitor the work of the service providers, for instance on projects like poultry farming and zero grazing which required construction work. Similarly it was difficult for the communities to find the contractors who could offer quality services to their projects. Because of these problems, the long term viability of such sub-projects is highly doubted and beneficiaries will incur more costs of maintenance and ultimately issues of sustainability will emerge.

Land availability and tenure security

It is acknowledged in several research for example, Bukenya (2010) and Parkinson (2008) and documents on agricultural development strategy in Uganda that access to land continues to constrain so many small holders. Issues of land access even become a greater constraint to production when farmers are advised by program implementers and extension workers to engage in enterprises oriented towards commercial farming and require big chunks of land, for instance livestock farming. Field observations indicate that the post-conflict region of

Northern Uganda has unique challenges in as far as land issues are concerned. Evidence indicates that the acquisition of land for the construction of public utilities and sub-project facilities is an issue that has the potential to derail the good development intentions of NUSAF because evidence shows that there are a number of cases where some of the programs under NUSAF that require larger pieces of land have exacerbated conflicts in the communities. For example many of the NUSAF sub-projects failed due to problems brought about by land access and ownership. Here in some instances the livestock were distributed to some people who had no land of their own for grazing. In other cases the problem was that someone who is the owner of the land on which the project is to be located for instance, houses for poultry later tried to take the project assets especially when the projects went idle.

To illustrate this finding, there was a case in district B where one beneficiary who hosted the poultry enterprise sub-project appropriated the poultry house from the sub-project group to whom he had lent the site of the project and removed the iron sheets and other materials and used them for his personal house elsewhere. Because the group members lacked the ownership rights, it was very difficult to make a legal challenge and this has given the sub-project group members who own land comparative advantage to gain from the failure of these group projects. Findings indicate that NUSAF failed to take into account the contextual factors in the Northern region. There is incredible evidence that NUSAF failed to engage with the local structures of power, for example involvement of traditional leaders to solve the land issues, disputes and also explore the previous issues associated with working together in groups in Northern Uganda.

Another challenge identified is that while women played an active role in the success of many sub-projects, the majority of them do not own land and the majority do not participate in decisions concerning land and do not have control over agricultural proceeds and these are still big challenges in the implementation of NUSAF. Evidence indicates that the main cause of this land governance challenge is because of the traditional constructions in the Northern region. Evidence shows that the main reason for this occurrence is due to the strong patriarchal and cultural attitudes in the region which has led to the impediment of access to the land by women. During the study, it was noted from interviews and personal observations that women in Northern Uganda play a critical role in contributing to the economic wellbeing of their families because they are key players in food production that ensures food security and household incomes.

Findings from the study indicated that women lacked full control over the land in their households and according to the traditions in the North, the final decision concerning land is left to the husband as the head of the family. ie. in Northern Uganda land is customary owned and this becomes difficult for women to independently own land. As a result, evidence shows that this prevented some women from successfully engaging in certain types of enterprises which required substantial amounts of land. To illustrate this point, there was a case in one of the sub-counties where a women group wanted to have a sub-project of poultry but found difficulty to identify a host farmer because most of them were reluctant to convince their husbands to provide a sub-project site at their homes. This led to the delay in the implementation of the sub-project. This challenge of lack of access to land confirms earlier work by FOWODE and OXFAM in 2004 and Bukenya (2010) , where it was noted that even though women are estimated to provide 90% of agricultural labour in Uganda, only 7% of the agricultural land is under their control. Similarly according to OPM evaluation of PMA in 2005 and Bukenya (2010) it was noted that the most important gender concern for the PMA was women`s lack of ownership, control over land and productive assets and it was recommended that land reform is a major issue to be addressed if women are to benefit from development initiatives.

Another challenge identified from this survey resulting from problems of land access is the limited access to finances by women. Women face challenges of accessing finances from formal credit institutions like banks since the majority cannot afford the collateral security which in most cases is land. This confirms earlier work by Mwaka (2009) in a needs assessment study in which she found out that a big number of women have low access to finance with 57.9% from Acholi (Northern Uganda) and this limits women`s active participation in productive activities which require a substantial financial input.

Gender issues

During the conflict that seriously affected Northern Uganda for 2 decades, women became the most vulnerable victims of war. Evidence shows that very many people experienced violence through killings, rape, kidnappings as well as forced marriages and unwanted pregnancies. Findings indicate that today in Northern Uganda many women are heads of families and alone have to ensure the food security and survival of their children alone. Survey findings indicate that the low level of education of women is one of the challenges in women`s participation and inclusion in the NUSAF implementation. Whereas the majority of

the sub-project group members are women and 30% of the council members are supposed to be women, their capacity to participate is low because many of them are not educated. It was noted that very few women have leadership positions in the farmers' institutions under NUSAF, for instance Procurement Committees (PCs) and Project Management committees (PMCs). This finding echoes earlier work by Isis-WICCE (2011) report on PRDP review and UWONET (2011) evaluation of the Gender Capital for Peace Recovery and Development Plan, which revealed that on deciding service delivery modalities in the Acholi sub-region women are not involved and usually women in decision making positions do not usually have a chance to present their views fully. I agree with the Isis-WICCE which calls for local governments to ensure that the views and voices of women are taken into account in the PRDP/ NUSAF and that government programmes benefit equally women and men, girls and boys and these programmes take care of their special needs and interests.

Transaction costs

Key informant interviews in the case study indicated that financial management is a particular challenge where the communities characterized by capacity constraints are required to open accounts for their sub-projects in the nearest bank into which the funds are disbursed from the NUMU –OPM account on authorization from by district executive committee. These funds are made through separate disbursements (three tranches) according to the implementation provisions (see step 16 in the Process Net-Map in figure 6.5). Findings indicate that at the community level some of the sub-project groups especially those far away from big urban centres face problems in the form of limited number of banking services in their communities. Visits to banks involves travel for long distances and may even require to travel outside the district in order to access banking services. Bank services in the Northern region of Uganda are so scattered and they are found only in major towns for example Gulu, Kitgum and Pader this is because many of the banks withdrew their services from smaller towns during the war conflict in the region. This challenge reduces accounts accessibility by the farmers and increases the opportunity costs of farmers to visit banks let alone the high transaction costs and the time involved. Additinary it is also risky to move with cash for long distances because of the high incidences of thuggery in Northern Uganda. Other bank administrative burdens of opening bank accounts are a challenge to the sub-project beneficiaries e.g. printing of individual photographs, travel costs etc., which are additional costs to the rural poor farmers. For instance the challenge to travel from Lamwo district to Kitgum town where the banks are located in about 20 kms distance and there is no readily

available transport any time of the day. Travelling such distances is expensive and dangerous to the beneficiaries to move with cash in regions which are not very secure, with many reported cases of thuggery in the area.

Field evidence shows that members of the procurement committee faced other transaction costs in addition to the scattered nature of banks in the area. For example access to information on their sub-project approval process from the sub-counties and districts. In addition many of the group leaders who were signatories to the sub-project accounts had to move long distances to access bank services. Evidence shows that it was also risky for the group leaders to move with cash because of the high incidences of thuggery in the area.

According to the NUSAF implementation provisions, representatives of farmers and 3 signatories have to go to the bank with a letter of approval of LC1 who is a member of the ruling party by law which is a governance challenge of political capture. Bank delays e.g. opening accounts and getting the necessary documents for instance a bank can take about a month to produce the cheque book for the sub-project group. Similarly findings show that the communities face challenges of high transaction costs for example travelling to districts to access information and also additional costs of photographs, accessing the bank and even negotiation during the community procurement process by the sub-project procurement committee because they lack information on the different enterprises they have selected.

The poor communities incurred transaction costs in terms of access to information and transport costs plus opportunity costs to follow up their project files up to the final stage at the district level. Respondents said that access to NUSAF officers at district level is not easy as some secretaries of the officers ask whether you have an appointment. Many of the villages are far away from the district headquarters so the poor farmers apart from lack adequate funds for transport, they also do not know which correct people and which offices are to consult. So some of respondents mentioned that they had to make numerous trips to the district headquarters in order to get some credible information about NUSAF implementation. As one key respondent said:

“Lack of transparency on which project was rejected and the reasons why made the victims of war conflict to be victimized

again''. Just putting the lists of successful projects at the sub-county notice board does not tell us the truth''.

3. Local government level/central level

Political interference

Provisions in the NUSAF implementation guidelines mandate the use of local political leaders for the mobilization of communities, for example at the grassroots the local council 1 is the one concerned with grassroots community mobilization. Findings show that the majority of the local council leaders were usually associated with other political elite at the upper levels e.g. LC 3 and LC 5. This offers a substantial scope for political capture and political interference in the implementation of the program more especially at step 2 and 3 of the Process Net-Map in figure 6.5. To illustrate this point, information in NUSAF projects usually flows through political channels for example in the parish information flows through local council 2 and in the village it is through local council 1. Therefore those who are not political allies are usually left out of the process. In the focus group discussions some participants complained that the local council leaders LC 1 and LC 2 usually gave information quite more easily for those who are known supporters of his or her political party.

When mobilization favors a few people, this in turn may reduce the interest and commitment of the communities who are intentionally ``sidelined'' in the programme implementation and as a result political capture makes the programme fail to promote activities targeted towards the weaker and vulnerable sections of the society e.g. IDPs, returnees, demobilized soldiers, widows, women etc. Closely related to this, interviewees said that politicians preferred to issue favors to members of his family and political party or those henchmen close to him while other members were less likely to receive it.

Secondly, respondents in the Process Net-Map mentioned that there is a challenge of the involvement of LC 3 who is the political head of the sub-county (for details see step 9 of Figure 6.5) in the procurement process i.e the chairman LC 3 participates in a meeting for opening and selecting of the best bidder. Respondents said that at step 9 of figure 6.5 it was common for those people who are not political allies of the LC 3 to be left out and be punished by their lack of loyalty by not getting the supply contract. The LC 3 influences the selection of the best bidder. In one of the sub-counties surveyed, the LC 3 chairman felt so

powerful in his area that he called himself the “President” of the sub county and usually he was feared to be challenged by the technical officials at the sub-county when he said anything.

Other findings indicate that the choice of sub-projects to be funded was linked to politicians i.e. either to politicians more so at the district level (councilors) influencing the vetting decisions in favor of the sub-project applications coming from their home sub-counties and sometimes encouraging them to send as many applications as possible at a faster rate to be able to benefit at the expense of those constituencies that are slow to bring in applications. This was done such that these politicians can gain political capital out of the political patronage opportunity from NUSAF as they prepare for the next elections. In the focus group discussions district and sub-county politicians that is the chairmen and councillors (these are area representatives) were mentioned as the most politically influential people in this process.

Conflict of interest

Respondents reported conflict of interest problems. There was evidence that some LC 3 chairmen and councilors (politicians) have their own supply companies, so how can they then certify the quality of their own supplies. In the Process Net-Map participants reported that due to their political influence and power, the LC3 chairmen can go to the extent of influencing and challenging the group members. That is, they tell their constituents that it is because of their political might that they have NUSAF 2 in their area. Here the procurement committee members are humbled and cannot oppose the suggestions of LC 3 in the selection process of the best bidder. Similarly the LC 3 gives the possible suggestions of those he prefers (his henchmen) to benefit from the NUSAF assets.

Respondents reported conflict of interest problems because there was evidence that some LC 3 chairmen and councilors have their own supply companies. So they cannot certify the quality of their own supplies and also criticize that their own companies have brought in poor quality inputs. In the influence Net-Map process, participants reported that due to their political influence and power, the LC3 chairmen can go to the extent of influencing and challenging the group members that it is because of their political might that they have NUSAF 2 in their area. Here the procurement committee members are humbled and cant oppose the suggestions of LC 3 in the selection process of the best bidder and here the LC 3 gives the possible suggestions of those he prefers or his henchmen to take up the supply contracts.

7 QUANTITATIVE SURVEY RESULTS

Overview

The aim of this quantitative survey was to follow-up on the governance issues identified in the qualitative survey and to quantify the beneficiaries' experiences and perceptions of governance in the implementation of NUSAF and NAADS programmes. This section focuses on the respondents' perceptions on different issues concerning the target programs' implementation. The study was also aimed at assessing the citizen- government relations in as far as program implementation in post-conflict areas is concerned. This section was also able to quantify the extent of problems in the implementation process i.e. participation of different age groups in the programmes, motivation to join the groups, adequacy and level of satisfaction of the NAADS and NUSAF programs in the eyes of the beneficiaries, group cohesion, access to information and perceptions about the different levels of government by the beneficiaries in as far as programme implementation is concerned. This information was collected at farmer group levels in both NAADS and NUSAF farmer affiliated groups through interviewing a randomly selected individual member of the farmer group.

7.1 Household characteristics, income levels and enterprises

In terms of household characteristics of the respondents who are affiliated to NUSAF and NAADS farmer groups (Table 7.1), results show that the mean average age of all the participants is 43 years of age. This finding clearly shows that very few youths are being involved in the NUSAF and NAADS program activities. This finding confirms earlier findings in the qualitative survey in section 6 of this thesis where the youths were not interested in participating in programs that promote farming as an enterprise. This finding clearly confirms that the interests of the youths and the priority enterprises are different from those of the other members of the community.

In terms of education level of the respondents the situation is not so bad at this mean average level of 43 years ie. at-least 50% of the respondents have primary education. But this situation could be different for the youths who spent all their childhood time in the IDP camps with limited access to education. In terms of income the survey results indicate that over 70% of the respondents are poor. Such a situation of poverty in the region has implications for the ability of the farmers to be able to meet their co-funding obligations in order to benefit from the NUSAF and NAADS programs.

The people in Northern Uganda have relatively big family sizes i.e. about 20% have about four members and about 50% have more than four members in the household. The question is how old are the members in the family? i.e. this has implications for dependency given that the highest numbers of individuals in the household are still young and the availability of human capital in the household depends on the age of the members in the homestead.

7.2 Household characteristics, income levels and enterprises

Survey results in table 7.1 indicate a high percentage of widowed individuals i.e. about 10% of the households are headed by female household members who according to the survey results have limited livelihoods' opportunities and this has serious implications for vulnerability and availability of household labour for agricultural production. Results in table 7.2 indicate that there is some perceived changes in income of the beneficiaries because of participation in the programs i.e. generally results show a 15% increase in income as a result of benefits attained in participation in NAADS/NUSAF activities. In terms of diversification, NAADS affiliated farmers are engaged in both livestock and crop enterprises i.e. 30% crop and 54% livestock while few farmers in NUSAF are engaged in crop enterprises. Just a meagre 8% and the majority almost 90% are supported to undertake livestock enterprises. Such a situation with lack diversification in NUSAF has negative implications for food security of the farmers who mainly depend on subsistence crop production for their household survival.

Table 7.1: Household characteristics

		NUSAF (52)	NAADS (52)	Overall
Age	(Mean)	41.6	39.9	43.4
Sex	Male	48.1	44.2	46.2
	Female	51.9	55.8	53.8
Education Level				
	None	5.8	7.69	6.7
	Primary	57.7	42.3	50.0
	Secondary	32.7	36.5	34.6
	A level	3.9	5.8	4.8
	College-diploma	0.0	7.7	3.9
Marital status				
	Married	80.8	84.6	82.7
	Separated	1.9	0.0	1.0
	Divorced	0.0	3.9	1.9
	Widowed	11.5	7.7	9.6
	Single	5.8	3.9	4.8

Main Occupation				
Farming	92.3	80.8	86.5	
Teaching	0.0	9.6	4.8	
Civil Servant	1.9	1.9	1.9	
Trading	3.9	5.8	4.8	
Student	1.9	1.9	1.9	
Family size				
0-4 people	23.1	21.2	22.1	
4-8 people	55.8	42.3	49.0	
8-14 people	15.4	28.9	22.1	
>15	5.8	7.7	6.7	
What means of transport do u use?				
Own Bicycle	71.1	55.8	63.5	
Own motor cycle	3.9	3.9	3.9	
Hire	25.0	40.4	32.7	
Type of House				
Grass thatched	84.6	69.2	76.9	
Semi permanent	15.4	15.4	15.4	
Permanent	0.0	15.4	7.7	
School for children				
UPE	69.2	66.7	67.9	
Private	26.9	27.5	27.2	
USE	3.9	5.9	4.9	

Table 7.2: Income levels and enterprises

	NUSAF (52)	NAADS (52)	Overall
Monthly Income before NAADS			
100.000 Shs	78.9	71.1	75.0
100.000-500000	21.2	23.1	22.1
>500.000	0.0	5.8	2.9
Monthly income after NAADS			
<100.000	55.8	63.5	59.6
100.000-500.000	44.2	32.7	38.5
>500.000	0.0	3.8	1.9
What enterprise are you engaged in?			
Livestock	88.5	53.9	71.2
Crop	7.7	30.8	19.2
Retail Business	1.9	1.9	1.9
Crop and livestock	0.0	13.5	6.7
Any other	1.9	0.0	1.0

7.3 Access to information about NUSAF/NAADS

In terms of information dissemination (Table 7.3) about the NAADS and NUSAF programs, both local politicians and local government officials played an equally important role in sensitization i.e. 42 % and 52.92 % respectively. However findings indicate that, payment as a requirement to benefit from NUSAF program constituted a large percentage of about 54% and other household requirements which are 38% compared to NAADS program which had minimal requirements, for example the percentage of beneficiaries who had to pay something to participate was just 15%. This indicates that NUSAF instituted stringent measures to participate which many of the poor people in Northern Uganda could not afford.

Table 7.3: Access to information about NUSAF/NAADS

	NUSAF (52)	NAADS (52)	Overall
How to become group member			
Required to join	7.7	7.7	7.7
Invited	25.0	25.0	25.0
Voluntary Choice	40.4	46.2	43.3
Invited by political leader	26.9	21.2	24.4
How did u know about NAADS			
Local politicians	38.46	46.15	42.3
Local government technical staff	59.62	44.23	51.9
Colleagues	1.9	7.7	4.8
Religious leaders	0.00	1.9	1.0
Any requirements to join group?			
Payments	53.9	15.4	34.6
Sign documents	5.8	7.7	6.7
Household requirements eg. Sanitation	38.5	15.4	26.9
All the above	0.0	5.8	2.9
None of the above	1.9	55.8	28.9

7.4 Benefits obtained from joining the groups

When asked about which benefits the respondents obtained, the highest number of farmers indicated that they obtained training i.e. 71% under NUSAF and 55.8% under NAADS. In addition about 60% of the NAADS and NUSAF farmers said that they were not able to access technologies as a result of participation in the programme activities. The highest percentage of farmers, overall 88.5% mentioned that they were not able to access credit or savings services from the NAADS and NUSAF programmes. Those who mentioned that they

had access to credit were mostly members of those groups that were formed before both the NUSAF and NAADS programmes began.

Table 7.4: Benefits obtained from joining the groups

Access to education and training		NUSAF	NAADS	Overall
	Yes	71.2	55.8	63.5
	No	28.9	44.2	36.5
Access to credit or savings				
	Yes	7.7	11.5	9.6
	No	92.3	88.5	90.4
Group help in access to agricultural input/technology				
	Yes	42.3	44.3	43.3
	No	57.7	57.8	57.7

7.5 Working together in the community (Social capital)

As a measure of social capital i.e. ability to work together in the communities, the majority of the farmers i.e. 69% overall mentioned that they did not work together in the gardens and 93% overall said that they did not work together at all to carry out other activities. This finding confirms earlier findings from the qualitative survey that there is a breakdown in social networks after the war whereby the majority of the community members now prefer to work alone because of the new individualistic tendencies. This finding of increased individuality in the North resonates with earlier findings in the qualitative survey where farmers now prefer to work alone in the gardens which was not the case before the war where collective weeding, planting and harvesting was the norm.

Table 7.5: Working together in the community (Social capital)

		NUSAF (52)	NAADS (52)	Overall
Have you worked with others to weed?				
	Yes	38.5	23.5	31.0
	No	61.5	76.5	69.0
Have you worked with others to market your agricultural produce?				
	Yes	0.0	7.7	3.9
	No	100.0	92.3	96.2
Have you worked with others to build?				
	Yes	3.9	3.9	3.9
	No	96.1	96.1	96.1
Have you worked with others to do other things?				
	Yes	5.8	8.2	7.0
	No	94.2	91.8	93.0

7.6 Level of satisfaction and constraints in the programs

When asked about the level of satisfaction with both NUSAF and NAADS services (refer to table 7.6), an equal number of farmers (34.6%) said that they are not satisfied with the services offered by the programmes, while those who were satisfied was 30.8% for NUSAF while for NAADS it was lower at 25%. In terms of constraints of farmers for active involvement in group activities, a highest percentage (52%) overall said that activities on their gardens took much of their time while co-funding obligations took second place of 36.3% overall.

Table 7.6: Level of satisfaction and constraints in the programs

	NUSAF (52)	NAADS (52)	Overall
level of satisfaction from the benefits from group			
1 Satisfied	30.8	25.0	27.9
2 Fairly satisfied	34.6	40.4	37.5
3 Not satisfied	34.6	34.6	34.6
1	53.9	52.0	52.9
2	34.6	42.0	38.3
3	11.5	6.0	8.8
1	36.5	36.0	36.3
2	50.0	38.0	44.0
3	13.5	26.0	19.7
1	36.5	36.0	36.3
2	50.0	38.0	44.0
3	13.5	26.0	19.7
1	9.6	10.0	9.8
2	15.4	22.0	18.7
3	75.0	68.0	71.5

7.7 How can the problems be solved and adequacy of Services and adequacy of services of services offered by the programs?

In terms of solutions to the problems the farmers are facing, the majority i.e. 56.3% overall recommended that co-funding obligations should be eliminated while 36.9 % of the farmers recommended that facilitation in terms of for example, transport allowance could solve the constraints they are facing.

Table 7.7: How can the problems be solved and adequacy of services to farmers

	NUSAF (52)	NAADS (52)	Overall
Solve problem by eliminate co-founding to access program services and assets			
1	61.5	51.0	56.3
2	30.8	23.5	27.2
3	7.7	25.5	16.6
Solve problem by providing facilitation			
1	34.6	39.2	36.9
2	61.5	45.1	53.3
3	3.85	15.7	9.77

General level of adequacy of services			
Adequate	23.1	13.7	18.4
Fairly adequate	21.2	58.8	40.0
Not adequate	55.8	27.5	41.6

In terms of adequacy of services provided by the programs, a higher percentage of farmers under NUSAF (55.8 %) mentioned that the services are not adequate, while 27.5% under NAADS said that the services are not adequate. However a lower percentage of farmers under NAADS i.e. 13.7% consider the services adequate, while a higher (23.1%) under NUSAF consider the services provided to the beneficiaries adequate.

7.8 Support to join group

In terms of support to the farmers to join the groups, grassroots local politicians i.e. LC 1 played an important role for both NAADS and NUSAF programmes (see table 7.8 for details). This finding of involving politicians already involved in partisan politics has implications for the political capture of the programme resources/assets.

Also more than 75% overall farmers in both NAADS and NUSAF benefited from inputs and just 20% said that they also benefited from the extension knowledge provided by NAADS/NUSAF. In terms of benefits, results from table 7.8 indicate that just only 10% of the farmers did not get what they requested for in NUSAF while double this ie. 20% in NAADS did not get what they wanted or they requested for. This finding confirms earlier findings from the qualitative survey whereby many farmers affiliated to NAADS complained that NAADS promises them technologies (inputs) but they wait for a longtime for the promised technologies to arrive and in the end they get nothing.

Table 7.8: Support to join group


	NUSAF (52)	NAADS (52)	Overall
Did any body support you to join group			
LC 1 Chairman	84.6	76.0	80.3
Relative	5.8	8.0	6.9
LC 3 Chairman	1.9	2.0	2.0
Councillors	0.0	8.0	4.0
Husband/wife	7.7	6.0	6.9
Benefits from group in last year			
Inputs	75.0	78.9	76.9
Technical Support	21.2	19.2	20.2
Direct Cash	3.9	0.0	1.9
All the above	0.0	1.9	1.0
Did each member get the input wanted?			
Yes	90.4	80.4	85.4
No	9.6	19.6	14.6

7.9 Main source of motivation to join NAADS/NUSAF affiliated groups

In figure 7.1 the respondents were asked what was their motivation to join NUSAF/ NAADS supported farmer groups. The overall motivation for getting farm inputs (technologies) from the program was the highest i.e. 47%, followed by knowledge 35% and lastly 27%. This result confirms earlier findings in the qualitative survey which showed that the participation of farmers in the farmer groups is a function of the perceived benefits they expect to obtain from the programme such as access to material incentives for example farm inputs/technologies.

Motivation to enter groups to get direct cash was surprisingly low for both NAADS and NUSAF i.e. about 45%. This finding could be that through sensitization at the inception of the programs the farmers are now aware that they cannot get direct cash from either NAADS or NUSAF. This finding also corroborates other insights from the field whereby the female farmers preferred to get benefits in kind but not cash for the fear that their husbands can demand the cash from them and misuse it. Other implication from this finding is that overall, almost 50% of the farmers have high motivation to join the groups in order to get agricultural advisory knowledge. The challenge for project implementers is to be able to balance between knowledge and the technologies (inputs) given to farmers participating in the programmes.

Figure 7.1: Main source of motivation to join NAADS/NUSAF affiliated groups



7.10 Procurement issues, accountability and access to inputs

In table 7.9 below, respondents were asked about the problems they face in the implementation of the procurement process in order for them to be able to obtain the required inputs. All the respondents interviewed said that they faced challenges in the procurement process and the majority for NAADS beneficiaries i.e. 57% said that they faced challenges of poor quality, less quantity supplied to them plus problems with late delivery of inputs to the farmer beneficiaries. Qualitative results also indicate that procurement problems faced in both NAADS and NUSAF hinge on issues of quality, quantity and the timeliness of the delivery of inputs. However for NUSAF this problem was less pronounced with just about 20% of respondents mentioning this problem. For NUSAF the problems of poor quality delivery, according to the qualitative survey findings were reduced by operationalizing the community procurement process which enabled the farmers to procure their own inputs. This finding confirms earlier findings that the NUSAF procurement cycle is very long and a document intensive process which is a serious constraint to the majority of farmers who are semi-illiterate.

For NUSAF respondents, paper work preparation appeared to be a more dominant problem with 50% of the respondents mentioning this problem. Also a reasonable number of respondents of about 30% for both NUSAF and NAADS mentioned the problem of lack of

information (information asymmetries). In terms of ensuring accountability on the Supply-side the farmers said that the project implementers made it a point that they had to sign some documents to confirm that they received the inputs. In table 7.9 a considerable number of 33% mentioned that they had difficulty in getting inputs from the programmes. This finding confirms earlier findings that there are problems of exclusion in both NAADS and NUSAF programmes.

Table 7.9: Procurement issues, accountability and access to inputs

	NUSAF (52)	NAADS (52)	Overall
Procurement problems (quality, quantity and timeliness)	21.4	57.1	39.3
Procurement process paper work preparation	50.0	14.3	32.1
Lack of information in procurement	28.6	28.6	28.6
Did you sign something to get inputs?			
Yes	98.1	98.1	98.1
No	1.9	1.9	1.9
Any difficulty in getting inputs			
Yes	32.7	35.3	34.0
No	67.3	64.7	66.0

7.11 Entitlements and group leadership

In terms of entitlements a reasonable percentage of respondents (27% for NAADS and 31% for NUSAF) indicated that they did not know how much money they are entitled to in their groups. This has implications in that the beneficiaries are unable to hold the implementers accountable because they do not have the information. So as earlier mentioned, many of the beneficiaries just wait and take what they are given knowing that they can use it for something. In terms of participation in groups, 62% of the respondents mentioned that their group leadership is active compared to the 31% who mentioned that the group leadership is somewhat active. Of the group leaders interviewed, 72% said that they know about entitlements from their group while the remaining 28% said that they don't know how much they are entitled to.


Table 7.10: Entitlements and group leadership

	NUSAF (52)	NAADS (52)	Overall	
How much money did the group receive?				
	dont know	26.9	30.8	28.9
	Know the amount	73.1	69.2	71.2
How much money did the group receive? (mean)	1.71	1.7	1.7	
Are you leader in the group?				
Yes	67.3	40.4	53.9	
No	32.7	59.6	46.2	
How active in decision making?				
Leader	11.5	1.9	6.7	
Very active	65.4	57.7	61.5	
Somewhat active	23.1	38.5	30.8	
Does not participate in decision making	0.0	1.9	1.0	

7.12 Main benefit from joining the group

When asked about the perceived benefits from joining the NAADS/ NUSAF affiliated groups, overall the farmers (61%) mentioned improved income as the main benefit and inputs was the second overall at 24%. Self esteem also scored a reasonable 24% indicating that the farmers still enjoy working and associating in groups and this could be used as an opportunity for farmer institutional development. Other findings indicate that a very small percentage of less than 10% (6%) regard joining the groups as beneficial to the community. This finding confirms earlier findings in the qualitative survey which found out that there is a growing sense of individualism in Northern Uganda which was not the case before the LRA war. Before the war people regarded the household and community as important and could carry out collective activities of digging, weeding, harvesting etc. which is a rare phenomenon in Northern Uganda nowadays.

Figure 7.2: Main benefit from joining the group



In table 7.11 when the group members were asked whether the group membership has changed, about 30% mentioned that the group membership has declined and this was even worse for NAADS affiliated farmer groups where 38% mentioned that the group membership has declined. Seventy nine percent (79%) of the NUSAF respondents mentioned that the group membership has remained the same, whereas for NAADS only 40% mentioned that membership has remained constant. This finding indicates that there is high fluctuation of membership in NAADS affiliated groups and which is an indicator of poor group cohesion in NAADS compared to NUSAF affiliated farmer groups. The decline in the group membership is related to the motivation of farmers entering the groups in order to obtain inputs. When farmers do not realize the inputs/ programme assets, they lose interest and group membership declines.


Table 7.11: Group participation and leadership

	NUSAF (52)	NAADS (52)	Overall
Has group membership changed?			
Declined	19.2	38.5	28.9
Remained the same	78.9	40.4	59.6
Increased	1.9	21.2	11.5
How is decision making in group?			
Leader decides and informs members	5.8	5.8	5.8
Group members decide together	94.2	94.2	94.2
How effective is the group leadership			
Very Effective	55.8	59.6	57.7
Somewhat effective	30.8	38.5	34.6
Not effective	13.5	1.9	7.7
How many group meetings attended in last 6 months? (mean)	7.0	7.9	6.1
How much money did your household contribute (Shs)? (mean)	11475.97	15740.40	7211.54
Some members rich or poor?			
Mostly same income level	78.9	48.1	63.5
Mixed rich/poor	21.2	51.9	36.5

7.14 Challenges that group leaders face to get inputs to their members

When asked about the challenges the group leaders faced in order to obtain the inputs to their members, the respondents mentioned that procurement issues (quality, quantity and timeliness) was the most dominant problem with 66% of respondents mentioning that the challenge of procurement is high. Transport problems came a distant second with 22% overall while information problems came last with about 10% of the respondents. Another key issue which came up in figure 7.3 is that for NUSAF there was a need for political connections to get the inputs i.e. 33% mentioned this issue, while for NAADS none of the respondents mentioned the lack of political connections as a problem. This finding clearly confirms earlier insights from the qualitative survey which indicated that in NUSAF political capital was important for someone to be able to get the inputs.


Figure 7.3: Challenges that group leaders face to get inputs to their members



7.15 Trust by beneficiaries in programme implementation

When the different respondents were asked about the perceptions about the trust of the different actors in the implementation of NAADS/NUSAF activities, the trust for their group leaders was the highest at 81%, followed by extension staff at 70% and central government officials at 60%, while the trust was lowest for the suppliers/contractors and local government politicians at 18% and 38 % respectively. However findings indicate that NUSAF affiliated farmers trusted the central government officials more than the NAADS affiliated farmers. This finding has implications for service delivery because earlier findings indicated that the respondents complained of the capture of their entitlements by the local politicians.

Figure 7.4: Trust by beneficiaries in programme implementation



7.16 Perception of honesty of the beneficiaries towards the program implementers

The mistrust of the suppliers was also mentioned in the qualitative results whereby there were numerous complaints of supply of sub-standard inputs, inflated prices, lesser quantities supplied and late delivery of inputs. Findings indicate that NUSAF affiliated farmers trusted

the central government officials to a great extent (i.e. 48%) than the local government (37%). This confirms earlier findings from the qualitative research that the beneficiaries feel that the local government politicians are capturing the resources for their own selfish interests. Other findings indicate that, the farmers have more trust in their group leaders for both NAADS and NUSAF i.e. trust to a very great extent in NUSAF was 69% and 75% under NAADS. This finding indicates that also group trust is stronger in the NAADS programme compared to NUSAF. Another finding which has implications for service delivery in both the NAADS and NUSAF programmes is that the farmers in both NUSAF(40%) and NAADS (42 %) trust the extension workers to a great extent more than the political wing at the central, district and sub-county levels.

To investigate the perception of honesty by the beneficiaries towards different key actors in NAADS/NUSAF implementation, the respondents were asked how they trust these actors in as far as program implementation is concerned. Respondents perceived the technical wing to be more honest i.e.the NUSAF/NAADS coordinator at 50%, sub-county technicians at 41% and district technicians at 40%. In terms of honesty the district politicians were ranked last at 21% overall while the subcounty politicians ranked 29%. Of all the key actors in the implementation of NAADS and NUSAF, the district politicians were regarded as the most dishonest followed by the subcounty politicians. The reason here, according to insights from the qualitative interviews is that the district politicians promise a lot to the farmers through NAADS/NUSAF programs but in the end their promises are not realized by the farmers. Also this confirms earlier incidences of the district politicians capturing the resources for their cronies and being involved in supply of sub-standard inputs through their pseudo private firms. The highest number of farmers regarded the project coordinators and technical staff as very honest. However it should be noted that the level of honesty was higher towards NAADS coordinators (42%) than NUSAF at a mere 13.73%.

Figure 7.5: Perception of honesty of the beneficiaries towards the program implementers





Figure 7.6: Perceptions of group leaders and non-group leaders under NAADS and NUSAF about the honesty of various stakeholders in program implementation



7.17 Comparisons of responses between group leaders and non-group leaders

In order to investigate whether the beneficiaries know what and how much they are entitled to, table 7.12 compares responses from both group leaders and non-group leaders in both NUSAF and NAADS. Evidence shows that a high number of non-group leaders i.e. about 41.7% said that they were not aware of what they are entitled to whereas a lower number of 17.9% of group leaders showed that they did not know. In addition a higher number of 82% of the group leaders said that they know what they are supposed to receive compared to 58% non leaders. This finding clearly shows that there is an information gap between the group leaders and the non-group leaders i.e. the group leaders intentionally do not pass on the information on the entitlements to their members because they fear to be held accountable.

Table 7.12: How much money did the group receive?

Are you leader in the group?		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	Dont know the amount	10	17,9	17,9	17,9
	Know the amount	46	82,1	82,1	100,0
	Total	56	100,0	100,0	
No	Dont know the amount	20	41,7	41,7	41,7
	Know the amount	28	58,3	58,3	100,0
	Total	48	100,0	100,0	

7.18 Support to join the group

When asked about the support to join both NAADS and NUSAF affiliated groups i.e table 7.13, both the group leaders and non-group leaders affiliated to NAADS and NUSAF were asked who supported them to join the particular program. Findings in table 7.13 show that the LC 1 (political wing of government at village level) played an important part in mobilization i.e. 45% for group leaders and 37% for non-group leaders. Other stakeholders shown in in table 7.13 played a minimal role for both group leaders and non-group leaders. This finding showed that the involvement of political leaders at the grassroots (LC1) who are by the law in the NRM ruling party, evidence of earlier complaints by the beneficiaries that both NAADS and NUSAF resources, information/assets, have been captured by the supporters of the present government (NRM) and those in the opposition parties have been denied

information/not been mobilized to participate in the programs i.e. evidence from both qualitative and quantitative findings indicates that the LC 1s tended to mobilize their political cronies first, leaving out the non-political members of the beneficiary group which many of them in the post-conflict North are critical of government.

Table 7.13: Did any body support you to join group?

Are you leader in the group?		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	LC 1 Chairman	45	80,4	80,4	80,4
	Relative	3	5,4	5,4	85,7
	LC 3 chairman	1	1,8	1,8	87,5
	Councillors	2	3,6	3,6	91,1
	Husband/wife	5	8,9	8,9	100,0
	Total	56	100,0	100,0	
No	LC 1 chairman	37	77,1	80,4	80,4
	Relative	4	8,3	8,7	89,1
	LC 3 chairman	1	2,1	2,2	91,3
	Councillors	2	4,2	4,3	95,7
	Husband/wife	2	4,2	4,3	100,0
	Total	46	95,8	100,0	

7.19 Decision making within the farmer groups

The findings in table 7.14 clearly show that the group leaders are more active in decision making at 69.6% compared to the non-group members at 52%. And the highest percentage of non-group leaders say that they are just somewhat active. This shows a reluctancy of the non-group leaders in decision making concerning their issues. Ealier perceptions in the qualitative survey indicates that group members (non-leaders) just want to see ‘things happening’ but not so much interested to suggest something because they feel they have no powers and they know this because this has been like this since the programs started.

Figure 7.6 above shows that both the group leaders and non-group leaders consider the district politicians as very dishonest, however the non-group leaders show the highest perception of dishonest against the district politicians and this is the same trend for the sub-county politicians whereas the non group leaders consider the district technical staff as mostly dishonest at 43.8%. This finding indicates that may-be the group leaders are close to the district technical staff that’s why they don’t consider them mostly dishonest. Overall the

sub-county coordinators of both NAADS and NUSAF were considered the most very honest by both the group leaders and non-group leaders at 27.3% and 29% respectively.

Table 7.14 :How active in decision making?

Are you leader in the group?		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	Leader	7	12,5	12,5	12,5
	Very active	39	69,6	69,6	82,1
	Somewhat active	10	17,9	17,9	100,0
	Total	56	100,0	100,0	
No	Very active	25	52,1	52,1	52,1
	Somewhat active	22	45,8	45,8	97,9
	Does not participate in decision making	1	2,1	2,1	100,0
	Total	48	100,0	100,0	

7.20 Procurement problems (comparison of group leaders and non-group leaders)

Both the group leaders and non-leaders were asked to rate the extent of procurement problems on the scale of 1-3. Whereby one indicated the most important procurement problem and 3 the least important problem. The group leaders rated (poor and late supply) first at 66% and the non-group leaders at 54.2%. The challenge of transport was rated at 27% for group leaders and 22.2% as most important problem. The challenge of influence of political leaders came as the third most important problem with 25% from group leaders and 12% from non-group leaders. The challenge of lack of information in the procurement process came last , a mere 5.6% of group leaders and 13.5% of non-group leaders mentioned it as the most important problem. The results here show that even the group leaders have problems in ensuring that quality inputs are delivered to the final beneficiaries in a timely manner.

8 GENERAL DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

8.1 Key Supply-side constraints affecting NAADS and NUSAF implementation

Human resource management

NAADS programme implementation hinges on provision of demand driven agricultural advisory services through contracting out advisory services to private individuals, private companies and NGOs/CBOs. At the inception of NAADS it was assumed tha these private

service providers will offer better services than the existing local government extension staff who were considered inefficient and unreliable. Findings from this study indicate that there were challenges of lack of limited technical capacity in the private provision of advisory services.

In Northern Uganda there were few qualified and adequately advisory services companies to undertake the advisory work and many companies also applied for contracts in other sub-counties thus putting strain on the already inadequate capacity. Because of lack of adequate staff many companies resorted to hiring inexperienced extension workers who were more concerned with classroom based training and who were even poorly facilitated to be able to carry out the required tasks. This study agrees with earlier work on NAADS by Bukenya (2010), Parkinson (2005) who noted that the private sector involvement in advisory services under NAADS was not adequate because sub-counties contracted inexperienced staff who could not take the farmers through the practical components of advisory services. Another issue that led to the inadequate numbers of private technical staff was that in the NAADS Implementation Manual (2000), it was assumed that the existing local government staff would form the bulk of the private extension workers after being delayered from the civil service. However this delayering process has not taken place as yet. During the survey, it was noted that the amount of money paid to the private service providers is too low to accomplish the task at hand. That is the reason why there is a high turnover of service providers in Northern Uganda because the transaction costs are very high i.e. due to remoteness and limited infrastructure. This is why the companies tend to contract out services to less experienced staff in order to lower the operational costs.

NAADS implementation guidelines call for the joint implementation of NAADS with the existing Subject Matter Specialists (SMS) at local governments. Findings indicate low morale of the existing local government staff towards NAADS and a feeling of being “sidelined”, the reason being that whereas NAADS staff are given fat salaries and well facilitated whereas the local government workers are not facilitated for the additional responsibilities of NAADS work.

NUSAF Implementation guidelines (2010) call for the sub-county CDO to work with the communities to identify the facilitators who had closer links in the communities (facilitator should be from the area) to provide support to the communities to be able to develop feasible and fundable sub-project proposals. According to the guidelines, communities have a

mandate to recruit facilitators with the help of the sub-county CDO and pay for their services from sub-project funds to help them in the proposed sub-project preparation process. Facilitators according to the provisions are supposed to be paid up to 2% of the total sub-project budget. Findings indicate that many of the community facilitators recruited lacked the requisite qualifications in order to be able to organize the communities to come up with fundable proposals and also to be able to guide and support the communities to make the right choice of enterprises according to their capacities and sub-project feasibility. Many are not even trained on the implementation of CDD projects. Many of the facilitators were selected at district levels and sent to the communities. And moreover the remuneration of the private facilitators was not attractive because it was based on a commission basis depending on how many sub-project proposals were funded. Evidence from this survey indicates that many of these facilitators abandoned the work because their expectations in terms cash rewards were not met and they left the communities stranded. Even many of the facilitators payments were at the hands of the sub-project management committees who saw this amount of money paid to facilitators as too much and some resisted to pay the facilitators. Similarly, provisions indicate that there should be capacity building of the facilitators and supervision of facilitators, but in reality this has not taken place and it partly resulted in the low quality of services offered by facilitators to the communities. Similarly guidelines indicate that the CFs will be under the supervision of the CDO but with inadequate facilitation it was difficult for the CDO to supervise the facilitators and also offer them technical backstopping.

Evidence also showed that the facilitators misbehaved either by asking for more money from the group members or acting as brokers in the procurement process thereby asking for kickbacks from the suppliers of inputs. In summary, skilled community facilitators would be critical for the success of NUSAF but there was failure of NUSAF implementers to engage the already existing manpower on the ground at the district and sub-county local governments and also to take advantage of the strong NAADS institutional structures like farmer forum, community based facilitators which are already very strong at the grassroots. Other evidence from key informants indicates that the tasks and responsibilities of NUSAF implementation and monitoring was too much for the few NUSAF skeleton staff at the OPM.

Financial management

The centralized design of NAADS especially with planning and budgeting totally undermined the grassroots participation, choice of budgeting priorities and lacked a sense of

ownership. The budgets were just compiled at the NAADS Secretariat and then they were just sent to the lower local government.

Other issues in NAADS implementation concerned the bureaucratic procurement procedures which led to delays in farmers receiving the inputs whereas they depended on rainfall seasons to be able to plant the crops. Findings indicate that the bureaucratic procedures which involved many actors in the implementation process were also entry points for corruption and misuse of funds. NUSAF implementation guidelines indicate that procurement under NUSAF will be implemented at 3 levels, that is; at the central government level, local government level and at the community where the project implementation takes place. Provisions indicate that the procurement committee composed of farmers will be responsible for all community based procurements. Evidence shows that the majority of the people in the study area are either semi-illiterate or illiterate. Therefore there was a challenge to the procurement committee to undertake the extensive sub-project approval mechanism which was rather bureaucratic and document intensive process.

Evidence also shows that the direct contracting and single sourcing option of procurement was abused in NUSAF. This is because the power to select the supplier was left in the hands of the community procurement committee which lacked technical capacity. Findings on NUSAF implementation indicate that many of the committees were duped of the money and also were supplied with sub-standard inputs. Similarly there were challenges of placing too much money in the hands of the communities which caused enormous problems of accountability. The communities who were just returnees to their villages did not have the capability to handle big amounts of financial resources provided by NUSAF in a responsible way. This challenge was anticipated earlier by the local government officials and politicians in the region who had earlier at the design phase of NUSAF had doubts of entrusting the financial responsibility directly with the communities, but this issue was ignored by the project design team (Robinson, 2005).

Another challenge is that the CDD approach of NUSAF generated considerable interest from the communities affected by the war conflict and almost everybody in Northern Uganda was eager to benefit from the NUSAF assets. Because of the very big number of sub-projects emanating from the communities, the NUSAF budget could not fund all the projects and hence left many of the communities that did not benefit demoralized. This finding is

corroborated by various studies for example; Robinson (2005) on earlier studies on the governance challenges facing NUSAF programme implementation in Northern Uganda.

Targeting

NUSAF targeting is through groups. However due to the conflict many people who were seriously affected by the war, for example the war wounded, widows etc. were not active participants in NUSAF. Findings indicate that many of very vulnerable people have not joined the NUSAF sub-project groups because of the stringent conditions set out by the NUSAF guidelines for example, co-funding, household sanitation etc. Because of this challenge, many vulnerable people especially women have been denied a chance to benefit from the NUSAF livelihoods sub-component. This finding is corroborated by Martin, Petty and Acidri (2008) on Northern Uganda who noted that NUSAF implementers failed to take into consideration the household and individual stark inequalities of the people in the North. This finding also is consistent with the CARE Uganda 2006 study where they found out that the vulnerable people do not always join groups. Findings also indicate that although women constitute a large number of both NAADS and NUSAF affiliated groups, they have not been given a chance to participate in decision making partly due to the lower levels of education in the communities. Also the enterprises selected under NUSAF and NAADS ought to be gender sensitive given the fact that about 10% of the population are widows. For example during this study, there was evidence that women groups were struggling to get land for their sub-project assets and also struggling to get credit for the capital intensive projects. This study agrees with earlier work by Buvinic et al. (2007), Schindler (2010), Hilhorst et al. (2011) and Wisner, Ben et al. (2004) who argued that widows (female headed households) may constitute a group of households that are affected differently by conflict and that require specific attention. Collier (2007) argues that targeting widows and their families with post-conflict assistance and resources may break this transmission channel of poverty and halt the reproduction of conflict related poverty. Bahiigwa et al. (2005) noted that, to improve performance of NAADS, performance targets need to be clear that getting support to poor and vulnerable farmers including women is the key result expected from extension agents so that they do not target model farmers in order to get results. The author recommends the need for the formation of farmer groups which improve representation of disadvantaged groups such as women, youth, ethnic minorities and displaced people (Bahiigwa et al., 2005). In this study I agree by other scholars, for example Parkinson (2008), Bukenya (2010) and Muwonge (2007) who argued that the ultimate advise to NAADS is that; there is need to

reconceptualize extension innovations as a situated action and in addition taking into full account of the environmental, social-economic and historical context of those farmers to be targeted by any kind of proposed interventions. Evidence from the respondents indicates that the NAADS program has not yet managed to achieve its mission i.e. ensuring food security and moving the target farmers from subsistence to commercial farming through its popular ‘farming as a business’ drive.

Similarly, other evidence from the study indicates that the NAADS beneficiaries were particularly disappointed by the general failure of the NAADS program to meet the enormous demands for farm inputs and assets from the farmers. Many respondents complained that NAADS is spending almost its entire budget on advisory services/trainings. Respondents said that the advisory service component has ‘wiped’ out all the NAADS funds through paying of the private agricultural advisory service providers, whom they complained that they (suppliers and private service providers) are even offering substandard service to the beneficiaries. This study also agrees with Bukenya (2010) who argued categorically that the challenge for NAADS is to get the right and appropriate balance (‘MIX’) between the NAADS activities that deliver knowledge and skills and those that offer technology putting into consideration of the context i.e. post-conflict conditions and not using one size fits all. In terms of constraints of farmers for active involvement in group activities, a highest percentage (52%) overall said that activities on their gardens took much of their time while co-funding obligations took second place at 36.3% overall. Therefore NAADS and NUSAF should also take into account the time spent on trainings to allow the farmers devote enough time on their gardens.

According to the findings, both the NAADS and NUSAF targeting is problematic. NAADS is targeting the ‘Active Poor’ i.e. the economically active farmers, for instance the nucleus farmers, lead farmers, model farmers and demonstration farmers. Whereas NUSAF according to its guidelines it is targeting not the economically active farmers. Evidence shows that in the post-conflict region of Northern Uganda there are very few active poor so the NAADS targeting strategy should also consider the context where the programme is being implemented.

NUSAF assumed that it will target the very poor farmers to help them become ‘Active Poor’ to be targeted by NAADS. The challenge here is that there is no joint targeting framework between NAADS and NUSAF. In reality on the ground it appears that both

NAADS and NUSAF are targeting the same farmers. Other findings indicate that payment as a requirement to benefit from NUSAF programme constituted a large percentage of about 54% while other household requirements constituted 38% compared to NAADS program which had minimal requirements to be able to access its services and assets. For example the percentage of beneficiaries who had to pay something to participate in NAADS was just a mere 15%. This indicates that NUSAF instituted stringent measures to participate which many of the poor people in Northern Uganda could not afford.

Other respondents had reservations of joining NUSAF affiliated groups because they said that being in groups does not qualify them to receive the items of their choice or preference but because you are a member of the group you have to abide with the pre-condition in order to atleast get something from NUSAF. This is why the survey found that in some villages farmers sold off the NUSAF assets in a few days after receiving them. There is a need therefore to revise the operational guidelines on enterprise selection in both NAADS and NUSAF in order to include a provision to support individual enterprises of choice which might not be a priority to the majority of group members but can help in a household's food security. For example cassava and finger millet may not have a high commercial value but they are important for household food security of the IDP returnees.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E)

It should be noted that the success of the NAADS and NUSAF programme is dependent on the ability and capacity of the various institutional structures to effectively perform their duties. Therefore there is need for continued capacity building and sensitization on their roles and responsibilities especially on the concepts and importance of monitoring and evaluation and the need for adequate facilitation for monitoring and evaluation of the programs.

The NUSAF operational guidelines indicate that certain designated officers should carry out regular visits to NUSAF sub-project beneficiaries and sites so as to provide technical support and guidance to the beneficiaries, review and report on progress to ensure that the sub-project's objectives are achieved. Evidence from key informants indicates that local government staff and NDTOs are too busy to carry out effective monitoring for the very large number of individual sub-projects because of the limited number of skeleton staff at the OPM Secretariat. All of the CDOs interviewed and given the fact that they are key implementers of NUSAF at the sub-county level admitted that they have not been involved regularly in monitoring of NUSAF beneficiaries' sub- projects. Similarly, the majority of the

beneficiaries interviewed said that they last saw the sub-county officials when they were verifying the sub-projects a few days after delivery of the NUSAF assets. Other evidence from respondents indicated that the politicians were mainly just involved in commissioning of NUSAF projects or handing over assets to the beneficiaries.

The district technical staff (Subject Matter Specialists) for example, Veterinary and Agricultural officers were also not seriously involved in the monitoring and technical backstopping in NUSAF implementation. Findings indicate that NUSAF technical officers at the district level were rarely seen on the ground for technical backstopping given the fact that the dominant enterprise in NUSAF was livestock keeping. This was also caused by the limited facilitation because according to the NUSAF implementation guidelines only 10% of the local government operational costs is for monitoring. This technical gap due to lack of adequate monitoring funds is mainly to blame why many of the beneficiaries enterprises collapsed at the infant stages.

This study confirms earlier findings by Robinson (2005) and Golooba –Mutebi and Hickey (2008) that indicated that NUSAF was implemented with parallel structures to the government and in isolation from the ongoing government programs for example NAADS, ALREP that already have strong community institutional structures e.g. farmers forum, Community Based Facilitators, NAADS contract extension workers, NAADS registered farmer groups etc. which NUSAF would have taken advantage of in its implementation.

8.2 Key Demand –side constraints affecting NAADS and NUSAF implementation

Social Capital

Findings show that during the war conflict there was a breakdown of the social networks and this was made even worse during the displacement of virtually the whole population in the North into IDP camps. Upon return to their villages life style of collectivity reduced . As a measure of social capital i.e. ability to work together in the communities, the majority of the farmers (69%) overall mentioned that they did not work together in the gardens and 93% overall said that they did not work together at all to carry out any other activities. This finding confirms earlier findings from the qualitative survey that there is a breakdown in social networks after the war whereby the majority of the community members now prefer to work alone because of the new individualistic tendencies. This study also agrees with Buvinic et al. (2012) who mentioned that the situation in Northern Uganda is made worse by the

destruction of social networks and the consequent depletion of important elements of peoples' socio, economic and political capital including the previously mentioned constraints that accompany widowhood and female headship (Buvinic et al., 2012).

Land issues

The communities in Northern Uganda mainly depend on agriculture for both food security and income. However as discussed before, issues of land have become more rampant as the former IDPs return back to their original villages. Land conflicts have hampered investment on land and also in some cases have led to death due to community conflicts. Findings indicate that among the factors that have caused these conflicts is the internal displacement of the communities into the IDP camps. After over 2 decades of war the natural barriers which were separating the land disappeared and therefore the returnees could not know where their land begins or stops. Another reason is the weakening of the traditional structures of land dispute resolution due to the displacement and death of the traditional chiefs. Findings indicate that many of the cases registered in the courts in Northern Uganda, the majority are land related cases.

Farmers' needs, capacity and priorities

During the implementation of NAADS there was disappointment by farmers in the focus group discussions, who showed concern that the privately hired agricultural advisory service providers were at many times paid to provide courses that were already taught to the farmers. Respondents indicated that many of the courses facilitated by the privately hired service providers in NAADS became monotonous and in the end causing them fatigue after being taught the same thing over and over again. The interviewees singled out trainings on banana production, organic manure making and cereal production as trainings that have become monotonous.

According to the NUSAF 2 Operational Guidelines (2010 pp.25), the Household Income Support Program (HISP) sub-component of the Livelihood Investment Support (LIS) component is aimed at increasing productive assets to the people of Northern Uganda and in the process improve incomes of the targeted poor households. During the survey it was noted that in all the districts visited more than 70% of the HISP budget was allocated to the purchase of animals (ie. re-stocking program). However, the challenge identified was that the implementers of NUSAF did not strengthen the Veterinary extension systems in the local

governments which were already lacking manpower or put in place a system of private animal health services providers who could be able to respond to the enormous beneficiaries' demands for veterinary services. This was very important given the fact that the people of Northern Uganda are mainly crop farmers , so for many of them it was their first time to own cows, had little experience in the enterprise and most of them being poor they could not afford the cost of the limited veterinary services available in the area. To illustrate the point, because of the high costs for veterinary services and drugs. It was noted from the survey that quiet a number of farmers usually call in the veterinary services when the health of the livestock is out of hand i.e. when the animal is almost going to die.

Similarly, NUSAF sub-project beneficiaries were not prepared enough to receive and manage the assets. NUSAF in the first place did not train the beneficiary groups on even the basic animal management practices (feeding and treatment). Beneficiaries were left on their own after delivery of the animals. Many beneficiaries faced challenges to manage the cattle. During the survey I encountered instances where some beneficiaries hired other people to care for the animals or sold them off prematurely to avoid the high costs involved in catering for them. Poor management practices were the order of the day and the author encountered scenarios where the cows were last sprayed over six months ago and after that no single treatment could be afforded by the beneficiaries. Because of these reasons a high percentage of animals provided by NUSAF have since died. NUSAF implmenters should have in the first place trained the beneficiary groups on atleast simple basic animal management practices ,support inputs provision such as shelter, fodder production training etc. and in addition standards should be emphasized on the quality of animals (good health, age and weight standards) delivered to the beneficiaries because poor health quality of the animals was one of the main causes of the death of many animals under the HISP sub-component of NUSAF. The OPM should make it a priority to equip and strengthen the veterinary extension system at district and sub-county level so that the majority of the beneficiaries under HISP can access affordable veterinary services such as vaccines, spraying pumps for ticks which are very crucial for the survival of the animals.

Other findings from the survey indicated that animals were not their (beneficiaries) first priority but because in groups they had to go with the majority decisions some members were coersed into taking up farming enterprises they did not want. NUSAF implementers were just looking at the market value of some enterprises without looking at their feasibility in the post-conflict context of the Northern region. Enterprises like cassava, sorghum and finger

millet that seem to have a lower market value than cattle but very important for food security for the returnees were left out. During the survey it was also noted that generally communities were provided with cattle and goats that takes longer to yield returns and so many of the ‘‘returnees’’ from the IDP camps to their former villages were looking for enterprises that could bring them quick returns to solve some of their cash needs. For this reason that is why many of the animals were sold off by the beneficiaries and the culprits alleged that the animals either died of disease or they were stolen. Here NUSAF implementers faced the challenge of providing private goods to the poor farmers more especially in post-conflict conditions i.e. many of the beneficiaries turned the NUSAF assets into cash since they could be sold at nearby markets even at far cheaper prices than the market prices.

In summary, the NUSAF program lacked the important elements of preparing the returnees mindsets which have been affected by the ‘‘dependency syndrome’’ in the IDP camps which has prevented them to adjust to the longterm development of their households and region. This finding is consistent with the quantitative survey results which indicated that the majority of the farmers i.e 69% overall mentioned that they did not work together in the gardens and 93% overall said that they did not work together at all to carry out other activities which is a confirmation of the individualism that has developed in the communities during the conflict and post-conflict period. Research findings indicate that the NUSAF program is driven by short term needs to show that something is being done in the North which hampers longterm planning and this seriously undermines the sustainability of development interventions. Needless to say that the NUSAF project was largely implemented in isolation and not very well connected to the development needs, priorities and the unique challenges affecting the households in Northern Uganda. For instance, that’s why the bigger portion of NUSAF funds were budgeted for infrastructural projects to maximize the patronage opportunities provided by NUSAF.

Accountability

NUSAF Implementation Manual (2010) provisions recommend for participatory (community level) monitoring and evaluation with the aim of promoting a good working partnership between the government and community institutions in undertaking monitoring and evaluation. Provisions indicate that NUSAF program will employ mainly 2 participatory monitoring tools namely Citizen Report Card (CRC) and Community Score Card (CSC).

However findings indicate that Social Accountability Committees (SAC) which are established under the community sub-project management committee to promote social accountability at community level are not doing their work effectively, for example the SAC is supposed to meet at-least once a month and submit its reports to the sub-county CDO and respective communities on a monthly basis however there were no reports of the SAC available in the CDO's office. Therefore the cases SAC was supposed to handle for the NUSAF sub-project groups like gender exclusion, nepotism, collusion and corruption have not been handled effectively. Findings indicate that the SAC is on paper but nothing is happening on the ground making public service delivery inefficient. I therefore totally agree with Francis and James (2003) who argued that service delivery under decentralization has not been effective as expected partly because of limited civic engagement by the beneficiaries with local governments in ways that ensure downward accountability and equity. Thus efforts to improve livelihood conditions need to go beyond investments in human, financial, natural and physical assets and ensure that these interventions take care of the involvement of the beneficiaries of the service (Buckland, 1998).

Another challenge is that the issue of accountability of the NUSAF committees for example the Procurement Committees (PCs) is not satisfactory because according to the findings many of these committees have exhibited low levels of transparency with regard to procurement and availing information to the members on sub-project matters.

Institutional arrangements

Evidence on the ground shows that NUSAF program is working in isolation. There is no framework to intergrate the NUSAF project into other livelihoods programs and this has not also been addressed in the implementation guidelines. The NUSAF Implementation Manual (2010 pp.73) only mentions that existing government programs e.g. NAADS, PMA and Prosperity For All (PFA) among others will complement the programs under NUSAF, but the provisions do not mention how this is to happen. The sector specialists interviewed complained that NUSAF wants them to do additional assignments like supervising their work without facilitation which is the result of the poor design of NUSAF which created parallel implementation structures to the district and sub-county local governments.

Table 8.1: Summary of Comparison of Key Findings on both NAADS and NUSAF Implementation

Key issues	NAADS	NUSAF	Opportunities in NAADS	Opportunities in NUSAF
<p>Demand-side Issues</p>	<p>Household Level</p> <p>Community Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The interest of the farmers in the program is reducing at a fast rate (high rate of group disintegration) <p>Local Government Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Little political support at both local government and the center 	<p>Household Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Set very stringent requirements for the communities to participate, for example the extremely vulnerable individuals i.e the injured by war were excluded <p>Community Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More enthusiasm about the project in the communities <p>Local Government Level</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Too much political involvement in the mobilization of communities to participate • Too much involvement of the private sector and less involvement of the technical sector specialists has compromised the quality of services and works under NUSAF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Existence of grassroots institutions eg. farmer forum, farmers associations • Can take advantage of the large number of NGOs, CBOs to work with • trust to a very great extent in NUSAF was 69% and 75% under NAADS. This finding indicates that also group trust is stronger in the NAADS program compared to NUSAF. • Relatively high level of trust between the farmers to the implementers i.e 70% NAADS farmers trust extension workers in as far as program implementation is concerned • The highest number of farmers regarded the project coordinators and technical staff as very honest. However it should be noted that the level of honesty was higher towards NAADS coordinators (42%) than NUSAF at a mere 13.73%. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very strong political support from the central government towards the NUSAF program • Substantial amounts of funds budgeted for the program • The program concentrates in a smaller area, therefore the impact on the ground can be felt by the beneficiaries • Relatively high level of trust between the farmers to the implementers i.e. 60%. NUSAF affiliated farmers still trust extension workers in as far as program implementation is concerned

<p>Supply-side Issues</p>	<p>Human Resource Management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More involvement of the local government structures • The parallel systems of human resource management in NAADS undermines the incentives of the local government technical staff • NAADS disrupted the mainstream agricultural extension system <p>Financial Management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High incidences of procurement problems <p>Project Management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is constant change in the implementation guidelines in NAADS (no consistency) • NAADS spreads slowly so it is seen as very thin on the ground. 	<p>Human Resource Management</p> <p>Less involvement of local government structures Poor staff motivation of the community facilitators</p> <p>Financial Management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Less procurement problems because of adoption of community procurement <p>Project Management</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Design Features of program • There is minimal follow-up support given to the farmers after delivery of inputs • Transaction intensive project appraisal cycle • Concentrated on very few enterprises i.e. livestock production is where most of the funds have concentrated. 		
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9 RECCOMENDATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This Study has uncovered the governance challenges both on the Demand-side and Supply-side confronting the implementation of both NAADS and NUSAF and at the same time it has generated key strategies that are needed both on the Supply-side and Demand-side in order to improve the program performance of the target programs of NAADS and NUSAF (see figure 9.1 for more information). The findings from this study indicate that contracting out the provision of agricultural advisory services to the private sector is not a guarantee for improved project (program) performance. The findings also agree with De Graaf's (2007) theory (see section 2.2.1 for more details) on the causes of corruption which is a very important governance indicator. De Graaf (2007) noted that corruption is determined by a number of factors which include individual, institutional and environmental factors. The author argues that in order to design strategies to control corruption it should not be one size fits all but should take into consideration the context to determine which strategies work best and under what conditions. Similarly these findings also agree with Trevino (1986) (see section 2.2.2 for details) who postulated that the ethical decision making power of an individual is influenced by organizational factors , organizational culture and environmental factors.

Findings from this study established that the individual factor is a leading factor affecting ethical decision making because the levels of incidence of corrupt practices varied from one local government to another and also varied in the different programs surveyed. Other factors that were found to affect ethical decision making included the context and organizational culture. For example one of the key findings uncovered during the study as a result of interaction with the different people in the communities is that the people in the North feel that they have been neglected for a longtime by the central government. The communities therefore thought that the coming of such programs with "huge investments" would be a chance for them also to enjoy on the national cake and hence if given the chance they will "Chop the Money" as the common saying in Northern Uganda goes.

An example of the organizational culture fuelling corruption in both NAADS and NUSAF, is the culture of previous rampant corrupt practices and a culture of impunity for those who have been caught in the corrupt practices. Therefore when implementers get a chance they become corrupt as a result of the common assumption that others have stolen and nothing has not been done to them, so why don't I do it". Another finding is that the rich people who

have embezzled the money are regarded as heroes in their areas because of the philanthropy activities in community projects e.g. churches, schools etc. which other non-corrupt individuals in government cannot carry out.


Empirical results from this study indicate that both NAADS and NUSAF in the post-conflict context have concentrated and done a lot on the Supply-side by supporting numerous initiatives that seek to strengthen management systems like financial audits, value for money audits, local government public expenditure management systems etc., but very little has been done on the Demand-side of public service delivery. Given the numerous governance challenges also uncovered on the Demand-side during this study it is time now to shift gears and also at the same time address the Demand-side issues to strengthen the ability of the beneficiaries to be able to demand for accountability for the quality of public services provided to them. The schematic diagram (see figure 9.1) provides a detailed road map to address the governance challenges identified. In addition to the challenges mentioned above, many of the farmers feel frustrated that many of their expectations have not been fulfilled by these programs.

The key challenges which have been uncovered during this study and warrant serious attention include those both on the Supply and Demand-side of service delivery. On the Supply-side it includes human resource management issues, for example poor staff motivation and capacity development, financial management problems, bureaucratic management structures for example complex procurement procedures, targeting problems, poor planning and budgeting, lack of partnerships with the private sector e.g. NGOs, CBOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Other governance challenges include; ineffective advisory methods, poor local government political wing and farmer relations plus problems with information dissemination. The key challenge on the Demand-side identified during this study is the high level of expectations and demands from the improvised communities which is far beyond the available resources that the programs can offer. In addition the participation of the youths in the livelihoods recovery programs is still very low as evidenced from the quantitative survey results. There is also a challenge of mobilization of the communities because of the poor citizen-state relations as evidenced from the quantitative survey.

There is need to re-orient both the Demand-side and Supply-side to work together effectively and in unison although this not an easy task to undertake. This is because the quality of the

agricultural advisory services extended to the communities and the effectiveness of the Demand and Supply-side strategy will depend on the ability of both sides working together. Program implementers (Supply-side) should avoid the earlier thinking that they are the only ones with knowledge and information. Learning from the exact situation of farmers through information sharing and information exchange can give the opportunity to the Supply-side to improve their services. For example the beneficiaries can help the programme implementers to identify strategies that can work or do not work in their own situations or context. This is important in order to avoid statements from farmers like “ we tried all that , but it does not work” and now you are bringing the same idea to us ”. The detailed road map to address the governance challenges identified is outlined in figure 9.1. The issue of the limited financial and technical resources plus the overwhelming demands from the communities can be handled by creating an efficient and innovative information dissemination system and creating partnerships with NGOs and CBOs involved in the livelihoods recovery programmes. It is highly recommended that NUSAF and NAADS should take advantage of the already existing large number of NGOs and CBOs in the Northern region of Uganda in order to create partnerships. This strategy will enable NAADS and NUSAF to fill their funding gaps and avoid duplication of the limited financial and technical resources.

Figure 9.1: Proposed interaction between the Supply and Demand-side strategies for improved program performance



Source: Author

9.1 Policy implications

The research which has been reported in this thesis has explored the governance challenges that confront livelihoods recovery programs in post-conflict areas. In addition to the qualitative and quantitative research methods, it has used an innovative participatory research tool known as the Net-Map. On the basis of the research results obtained from this study, this section discusses the policy implications which are relevant to policy makers, practitioners, researchers and the beneficiaries of the agricultural livelihood programs in post-conflict conditions.

Program design

When designing programmes that are to be implemented in the different regions of the country which certainly have different environmental factors and facing different challenges, there is need for the indepth analysis of the context, but not to use the one size fits all approach in the design and implementation of the programs. This was a big issue most especially with the design of the NAADS program which is not tailored for post-conflict regions like Northern Uganda.

Collaboration between Government agencies and NGOs/CBOs and CSOs

Government should create a framework for collaboration with partners e.g. NGOs, CBOs and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) involved in the post-conflict livelihoods recovery to improve the efficiency and the sustainability of the NAADS and NUSAF programmes. Field evidence indicates a lot of duplication of resources and conflicting messages disseminated to the farmers which has resulted in confusion in the communities.

Involvement of traditional leaders

There is need to consider the involvement of existing traditional structures which are key to reconciliation, prevention of recurrence of conflict and land dispute resolution. The involvement of the traditional chiefs like the Rwot directly in the implementation of programmes is crucial to assist in solving the land disputes.

Multistakeholder involvement in agricultural livelihoods program implementation

There is need to use innovative approaches to balance between activities to be undertaken by private sector and local government. Programme designers and planners should give the local government autonomy to implement NUSAF and NAADS, but in addition should ensure continuous and effective oversight of the programs from the Central Government to avoid recurrence of the governance problems.

Programs to specifically target the youth

Findings from this study indicate that participation of the youths in the livelihoods recovery programs was low. The government's programs in post-conflict regions need to promote programs that target the youth. There is need to promote youth groups to ensure that their distinct needs are catered for. This calls for designing tailor made programmes targeting the youths in the post-conflict conditions to be able to encourage them stay in the rural areas which would encourage them to engage in productive activities like farming to improve their livelihoods.

Focus on land issues, accountability, access to credit facilities and information;

- Government should set up a clear road map to solve the overwhelming land disputes in Northern Uganda which have hampered investment on the land.
- The farmers indicated that access to credit facilities is still a problem in Northern Uganda. Programme designers should ensure that farmers can have access to low interest credit facilities in order to improve their livelihoods.
- Should use effective and innovative approaches to dissemination of information to be able to manage farmers' expectations.
- Should balance between how much of the technologies (inputs) should be given to the farmers and how much of the advisory services is needed.
- There is need to strengthen the accountability mechanisms in the program implementing agencies both on the Demand and Supply-side of public service delivery.

- Should strengthen the Demand-side through innovative approaches outlined in figure 9.1.

Areas for future research

This study did not track the amounts of funds received from the Central Government up to when it trickles down to the final beneficiaries. Therefore the study, although identified that there is significant leakage of funds in NAADS and NUSAF from the time the funds are released from the Central Government to the Local Governments and finally to the beneficiaries. This study was not able to ascertain the actual amounts of leakages of funds. This could be an important area of research because no study in Uganda has investigated this area of actual amounts of leakage of funds comprehensively in the agricultural extension delivery sector. Some of the studies carried out so far concentrated on other sectors i.e. health and education. For example the available study in the education sector in Uganda was by Reinikka & Svensson (2004) who tracked the education capitation grant from the central government up to the final beneficiaries to assess the amount of funds that reach the beneficiaries and those funds that are lost due to leakages, elite capture and corruption.

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1: Questionnaire For NAADS/ NUSAF Affiliated Farmer Groups

Demographic Information

Name of group member	Sex M=1 F=2	Age (Years)	Education Level	Marital Status	Main Occupation	Family Size
			1. None 2. Primary 3. Middle (secondary drop out) 4. A level 5. College training (Diploma) 6. Degree	1. Married 2. Separated 3. Divorced 4. Widowed 5. Single	1. Farming 2. Teaching 3. Civil servant 4. Trading 5. Student	1. 0-4 2. 4-8 3. 8-14 4. >15
Spouse 1						
Spouse 2						
Spouse 3						

Are you affiliated to : 1. NAADS 2 NUSAF

Household Income Levels

What means of transport do you use to go to the nearest town	1. Own bicycle 2. Own motor cycle 3. Hire 4. Taxi
Type of house	1. Grass thatched 2. Semi-permanent 3. Permanent
Where do your children go to school ?	1. UPE 2. Private 3. USE

Monthly Income levels before NAADS/ NUSAF

1 <100,000 shs

2 100,000 -500,000 shs

3 > 500,000 shs

Income levels after NAADS/ NUSAF

1 <100,000 shs

2 100,000 -500,000 shs

3 > 500,000 shs

1. NAADS and NUSAF GROUP ACTIVITIES

1.1 I'd like to start by asking you about the groups (NAADS/NUSAF) groups to which you belong, your participation and activities

When was the group founded?		Comments
What kind of project (s) are you Engaged in?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Livestock 2. Crop 3. Retail business 4. Crop and livestock 5. Any other 	
How are the participants selected or how does one become a member of this group?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Required to join 2. Invited 3. Voluntary choice 4. Invited by political leader 5. All the above 6. None of the above 	
A part from NAADS/NUSAF which other farmer groups do you belong to ?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NAADS 2. NUSAF 3. None 	
How did you get to know about the programme?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. local politicians 2. Local government technical Staff colleagues 3. Elders/traditional leaders 4. Religious leaders 	
Where there any requirements to join the group	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Payments 2. Sign. Documents 3. Household requirements e.g. Sanitation, tree planting etc. 4. All the above 5. None of the above 	
Did anyone support you to join the group/ did you have support from any of the following	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. LC 1 Chairman 2. Relative 3. LC Chairman 4. Councillors 5. Elder/Traditional leader 6. Husband/wife 	
In the past 6 months how many group meetings did you attend?		
During the last year what benefits did you get from the group?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Inputs 2. Technical Support 3. Direct cash 4. All the above 5. Other 	
Did each member get each benefit he wanted?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes 2. No 	
If No what was the reason	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Lack of information 2. was taken by the rich 3. political influence 4. Did not know how much we were entitled to 	
What do you consider to have been the main source of motivation to join the NAADS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> A Financial benefits B Extension Knowledge 	

group? e.g. Rank 1 is most important	C Farm inputs D Direct cash	
What was the distribution criterion?	1 Lottery method 2 Political Influence 3 co-funding 4 Other.....	
Do you know any challenges that the group leaders have to get the inputs? Rank 1 most important	A Procurement problems B Paper work preparation C Lack of information D Lack of political connection E Transport Problems F Influence by political leaders	
Did you sign something that you received inputs and did anyone come to verify that you received the inputs?	1 Yes 2 No	
Did you have any difficulty in getting the inputs?	1 Yes 2 No	
What is your relationship with the other group leaders?	1 Village mate 2 Relative 3 Clan 4 Other.....	
Do the group leader have any connections with	1- Sub- county chief 2- NAADS coordinator 3- Local council leader LC3 4- LC5 5- Councilor 6 Councillor	
How much money did you receive for the group? How much was spent and how was the balance funds used?	1 Don't know 2 Know the amount	
Are you a leader in the group?	1. Yes 2. No	
If yes what position?	1-Chairman 2-Secretary 3- Treasurer 4- Procurement Committee 5- No position	
How actively do you participate in the group's decision making?	1 Leader 2 Very Active 3 Somewhat Active 4 Does not participate in decision making	
How much money or goods did your household contribute to the group in the past 12 months?		
What is the main benefit from joining this group? Rank ie 1 is most important	A Improves my household livelihood B Provides farm inputs/ improved C seed and livestock D Important in times of emergency E Benefits the community F Self esteem	

Does the group help your household to get access to any of the following services? 1. Yes 2. No	1.Education or training 2.Credit or savings 3.Agricultural input or technology 4.Other (specify)	
Thinking about the members of this group, most of them are of the same Rank ie. 1 most important	A. Neighborhood/ village B. Family or kin group C. Religion D. Gender E. Age F. Tribe G. Political Party	
In the past 3 years, has the membership of the group declined or remained the same or increased?	1. Declined 2. Remained the same 3. Increased	
How is decision making in the group?	1. Leader decides and informs members 2. Group members decide together 3. Other (specify)	
In your opinion how effective is the group leadership?	1. Very effective 2. Somewhat effective 3. Not effective	
Are some members richer or poorer than others, or do they all have mostly the same income level?	1. Mostly same income level 2. Mixed rich/poor	
How do you trust in as far as NAADS implementation is concerned Local government officials	1.To a very small extent 2.To a small extent 3.Neither small nor great extent 4.to a great extent 5.To a very great extent	
Central Govt. Officials	1.To a very small extent 2.To a small extent 3.Neither small nor great extent 4.to a great extent 5.To a very great extent	
Contractors/suppliers	1.To a very small extent 2.To a small extent 3.Neither small nor great extent 4.to a great extent 5.To a very great extent	
Extension Staff	1.To a very small extent 2.To a small extent 3.Neither small nor great extent 4.to a great extent 5.To a very great extent	
Local politicians	1.To a very small extent	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2.To a small extent 3.Neither small nor great extent 4.to a great extent 5.To a very great extent 	
Group leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.To a very small extent 2.To a small extent 3.Neither small nor great extent 4.to a great extent 5.To a very great extent 	
In the past 12 months, have you worked with others in your village/neighborhood to do something for the benefit of the community? 1. Yes 2. No	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Weeding/land preparation 2. Marketing 3. Building construction 4. Others..... 	
What are the three most important sources of information about what the government is doing (such as agricultural extension? On NAADS. Rank: 1 most important 2 second important etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A Relatives, friends and neighbors B Community bulletin board C Local market D Radio E Political associates F Community leaders G An agent of the government H NGOs 	
Overall, what is your level of satisfaction with the benefits you have realized from the group so far ?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.satisfied 2. Fairly satisfied 3. Not satisfied 	
What do you consider to be the three main constraints and or challenges to the full involvement of your household in the activities/ services of NAADS? Rank them ie. 1 most important etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Other household activities/farming 2 Financial contributions/ co-funding 3 No benefits expected as a result of involvement 4. Other..... 	
How can the situation above be changed to enable you and your household be fully involved. ie. Challenges above and suggested solutions.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Eliminate co-funding 2 Provision of facilitation 3 Reduce the number of trainings/meetings 4 Other/ specify..... 	
What do you consider to be the 3 major benefits of your household from NAADS / NUSAF services so far? Rank them ie. 1 Most important	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provision of extension services 2. Improved seeds 3. Livestock 4. Farm inputs e.g fertilizers 5. Provision of direct cash 	
What are some of the main services you expect from government extension service that have not yet been provided by NAADS/ NUSAF? Rank i.e. 1 is most important	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A Direct Cash B Markets for products C Field Tours 	
What is the level of adequacy of the services provided by NAADS/ NUSAF?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Adequate 2. Fairly Adequate 3. Not Adequate 	
Overall , what would you like to be done in a	1.....	

different way within NAADS/NUSA	2..... 3..... 4.....	
In your opinion, how honest are the officials and staff of the following agencies? Please rate them on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is very dishonest and 5 is very honest. A. District Politicians B. District technical Staff C. Sub county politicians D. Sub county Technical Staff E. NUSAF technical Officers F. NAADS coordinators	1. Very dishonest 2 Mostly dishonest 3 Neither honest nor dishonest 4 Mostly honest 5 Very honest	

Appendix 2: Characteristics of Group Members


		NUSAF (52)	NAADS (52)	Overall
Same neighborhood	1	72.22	62.00	67.11
	2	11.11	38.00	24.56
	3	16.67	0.00	8.33
same family or kin group	1	20.00	4.35	12.17
	2	60.00	17.39	38.70
	3	20.00	78.26	49.13
same religion	2	60.00	75.00	67.50
	3	40.00	25.00	32.50
same gender	1	21.43	3.85	12.64
	2	35.71	26.92	31.32
	3	42.86	69.23	56.04
same age	1	28.57	37.21	32.89
	2	50.00	41.86	45.93
	3	21.43	18.60	20.02
	4	0.00	2.33	1.16
same tribe	1	15.38	33.33	24.36
	2	23.08	0.00	11.54
	3	61.54	66.67	64.10
same political party	2	50.00	50.00	50.00
	3	50.00	50.00	50.00

Appendix 3: Subcounty NAADS Farmer Institutions

Institution	Composition	Level of Operation	Roles/Responsibilities
Farmer groups	All members of the group	Village (LC I)	Participatory planning and selection of enterprises for inclusion in the parish priority list
Parish Coordination Committees (PCCs)	Chairpersons of farmer groups from that parish	Parish	Participatory planning and selection of parish enterprises of group enterprises for inclusion in the subcounty priority list. Approves subcounty workplans and budgets Supports and facilitates farmer group operations Monitors program implementation Ensures inclusiveness of women and the youth in the program
Subcounty Farmer Forum (SCFF)	2 farmers made up of the chairperson of each group and one other farmer	Subcounty	Advise on the strategic implementation of the program
Procurement Committee	Three members of the SC FF each with at least Ordinary level of Education, one of whom should be a female Chairperson of the SC FF and the NAADS coordinator as ex-officials	Subcounty	Approves the specifications of goods to be procured Approves the TOR for service service providers Approves the shortlist for service providers Approves and awards contracts based on the technical committee's report
Farmer Forum Executive Committee	The chairperson of the subcounty farmer forum and two other farmers one of which should be a female Subcounty NAADS coordinator Secretary for production	Subcounty	Assists the NAADS coordinator to compile the subcounty NAADS budget based on indicative budgetary estimates given by the NAADS secretariat. Decides and approves the terms of reference for service providers
Implementation Committee	SC FF Chairperson Two other members of the farmer forum NAADS Coordinator	Subcounty	To oversee the implementation of NAADS activities in the subcounty.
Technical Committee(it has no farmer representation)	S/chief, sub-accountant NAADS coordinator Community development officer and any other extension staff	Subcounty	Prepares Terms of reference for service providers Evaluates expressions of interest from service providers Evaluates service providers' proposals

Source: Adopted from DENIVA 2005


Appendix 4: NAADS Phase 1 – Procurement for Advisory Services



1. Releases guidelines for implementation
2. Sensitization of District stakeholders and SC coord.s
3. S- NAADS coord. sensitizes at s/c level
4. S/c hires NGO for institutional development
5. Enterprise selection with NGO
6. List of priority enterprises
7. Copy of priority enterprises sent to the District
8. S/NAADS Coordinator develops a work plan
9. Work plan copies sent to farmer forum
10. Copies to LC 3

11. Invitation for bids
12. Negotiates with input suppliers
13. Negotiates with input suppliers
14. Negotiates with input suppliers
15. TPC forward invitation to the sub county
16. Negotiation
17. Sign contract, service, payment of 30% SC
18. Negotiation
19. Negotiation
20. Negotiation


Appendix 5: Flow of Funds for NAADS Activities



Notes


1. All donors providing Budget Support will release funds to the Special/Budget Support forex a/c in the Bank of Uganda (BOU). Releases will be based on a set of triggers.
2. Funds will be released to the GOU Consolidated Fund a/c at BOU in UG. Shs. Trigger for release of funds to Consolidated a/c will be Statement of Release of counterpart funds from the GOU Consolidated Fund. Transfer of funds from the Consolidated a/c to NAADS Executive and District Grants Collection a/c **should be within a period not exceeding two days** after receipt from the forex a/c.
3. NAADS Secretariat will operate a separate USS Account to facilitate transactions in USS directly. The Accounting Officer will be the NAADS Executive Director.
4. Funds will be disbursed to the GOU Grants Collection a/c at the District under the Poverty Alleviation Fund (PAF) Conditional Grant Guidelines.
5. NAADS Secretariat will be established with a separate Budget Vote. The Budget Vote Holder/Accounting Officer will be the NAADS Executive Director.
6. Funds will be disbursed from the Collection a/c to the District NAADS a/c within a period **not exceeding five days** from date of receipt from the GOU Consolidated a/c. The trigger for disbursement of funds to the District NAADS a/c is the availability of the District Matching Grant on the a/c.
7. Funds will be disbursed to the Sub-County NAADS a/c. The trigger for disbursement of funds to Sub-County NAADS a/c is availability of the Sub-County Matching Grant on the a/c.
8. Farmers' contributions (2% of total annual budget) will be deposited on the Sub-County NAADS a/c. This will be a trigger for disbursement of funds to the Sub-County NAADS a/c.

Appendix 6: Flow of Funds for NUSAF Activities



Appendix 7: NUSAF Subproject Cycle

NUSAF 2 Subproject Cycle (Note: All the sub project cycle stages summarized below take into consideration environmental and social Management Concerns)



Appendix 8: Benchmarks for 12 Month Sub-project cycle

Stage	Responsibility Centre	Maximum duration (days)
1. Central Government Guidance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sector Ministries - Government Institutions and Agencies 	Ongoing
2. Sensitisation & Mobilisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - District Chairperson - CAO - Sub-county Chairperson - Sub-county Chief - RDC - CSOs/NGOs 	Ongoing
3. Sub-project Identification & Preparation (EPRA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sub-county Chief - Community Dev't Officer - Sector Specialists - CSOs/CBOs 	14 days
4. Desk Appraisal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sub-county Technical staff 	7 days
5. Field Appraisal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sub-county Technical staff 	7 days
6. Sub-project Approval	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - District Technical staff - District Executive Committee 	14 days
7. Fund Disbursement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OPM - District Local Governments 	14 days
8. Implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community Project Management Committee - Local Government - Local service providers 	270 days
9. Monitoring & Supervision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Communities - Local Government Staff - Sector Ministries/Government Institutions & Agencies - CSOs/NGOs 	Ongoing
10. Commissioning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community Project Management Committee - Local Governments 	7 days
11. Post-subproject cycle (a) Operation & maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community - Local Governments - Sector Ministries 	Ongoing
(b) Subproject evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community - Local Governments - Sector Line Ministries - Uganda Bureau of Statistics - NGOs/CSOs 	Ongoing